Capital Punishment

[Ender]

I think we’ve exhausted this issue for this year. (See you next year?)

Whenever the subject arises…

Ender

 

[Blue_Horizon]

Originally Posted by Blue Horizon View Post
“In Evangelium Vitae, John Paul teaches that both defense of society and retribution are necessary for the legitimate exercise of capital punishment, and neither alone suffices. This teaching does not reverse any previous Church teaching, since no previous Church teaching had addressed the question of the relationship among the various purposes of punishment in the case of the death penalty.”

You mean:

1. CP is not intrinsically evil and subject to it being pursued as just punishment and in the belief it does not do more harm than good, it (instances of it) is/are a moral act(s);

1. Neither he, nor AFAIK any other poster, has uncovered evidence that the Church has traditionally taught in accord with the full claim made in ccc2267 (in particular the rider … “if this is the only possible way of effectively defending human lives against the unjust aggressor”).

Why would JPII’s EV “if this is the only possible way of effectively defending human lives against the unjust aggressor” not be the basis for your CCC2267 rider?

 

[Rau]

…Why would JPII’s EV “if this is the only possible way of effectively defending human lives against the unjust aggressor” not be the basis for your CCC2267 rider?

EV was published in 1995 I think, a very similar timeframe to the CCC. The CCC in 2267 is referring to the “traditional teaching…” - which evidently is not a reference to 1995. Did that rider (“if this is the only possible way…”) actually arise in the “traditional teaching” - we should presume so, since the CCC says so!

**But **- over some years of posting on CP, Ender has asked the forum at large if anyone can point to where that rider was a feature of “traditional teaching”. AFAIK, no poster is aware of teachings expressing that rider in anything but very recent time frames.

It is odd.

 

[Blue_Horizon]

If it really is the traditional teaching of the church that capital punishment is valid only when it is necessary for protection you should be able to provide at least one citation that actually says that, or something like it, or something that suggests it.

I recognize that there are documents that acknowledge the protective aspects of capital punishment, but recognizing that benefit is not the same as requiring it for justification.

Ender

What is the difficulty with:

(A) The requirement of a direct medicinal end:
*" In the infliction of punishment it is not the punishment itself that is the
end in view, but its medicinal properties in checking sin; wherefore punishment partakes of the nature of justice, in so far as it checks sin. *. (ST II-II 43, 7 a1)"

demonstrating the existence of a principle (medicinal end) other than mere retribution that must necessarily also be satisfied to finally justify a State Execution?
It will be a prudential judgement that determines if the demands of both retribution and medicinality are met in particular cases…but the existence of a principle of medicinality would not appear to be a matter of prudence but a clear theological teaching for Aquinas. Without greater proportional medicinality consequences retribution’s negative consequences (eg scandal, schism) would be both a greater evil and directly intended… which Aquinas disallows above if justice is to be truly served…

(B) The requirement of Common Good end:
*“It is lawful to kill sinners… if a man be dangerous and infectious to the community…it is praiseworthy and advantageous that he be killed in order to safeguard the common
good, since “a little leaven corrupteth the whole lump”…When, however, the good incur no danger, but rather are protected and saved by the slaying of the wicked, then the latter may be lawfully put to death. (Aquinas II,II, 64 a2).
… *”

*“The nature and extent of the punishment must be carefully evaluated and decided upon, and ought not go to the extreme of executing the offender except in cases of absolute necessity: in other words, when it would not be possible otherwise to defend society…Public authority must redress the violation of personal and social rights by imposing on the offender an adequate punishment for the crime, as a condition for the offender to regain the exercise of his or her freedom. In this way authority also fulfils the purpose of defending public order and ensuring people’s safety… (EV 56).” *JPII

The very reason a private individual may not administer CP is because they have no authority re deciding matters of the common good.
Hence it is a principle re just CP that common good conditions must be satisfied for it to be lawful.

It is of course a prudential judgement as to whether the common good end is not compromised in particular cases. The Magisterium in its last three Popes prudentially judge that the common good / medicinal ends are indeed compromised in modern times as reasonable bloodless means are available which provide greater goods and lesser evils re the community.

If that practical judgement be true then incarceration and CP are no longer merely alternative just options. CP in modern times is no longer just and incarceration is the moral option…as a matter of the principles being applied to current modern day circumstances.

Such a practical judgement re the reasonableness of bloodless means in modern times admits of details that are no longer of the “circumstances” font but of the “object” font. It means the State execution in such cases may well become examples of State Murder not State CP.

We see how details affect our identification of the true “object” in moral matters all the time:

• theft changes from grave object to light object if the theft is a small article.
• coitus may be either adultery or a good object depending on the small “detail” of whether my partner is married to me or not.
• why must State Executions be any different depending on the “details/circumstances” involved.

 

[Blue_Horizon]

Criminals deserve to be punished. If the punishment was not deserved then it would be unjust to apply any…

Being “deserved” and being “just” are not identical as you assume.
The common good must also be respected.
As Aquinas clearly states, and common Catholic sense declares, God often demands that man not mete out what an individual really deserves and leaves it to his providence and to do otherwise is immoral.

Unlike your “eye for eye” justification which is certainly affirmed in the OT but is gain-sayed in the NT, the contrary saying “Vengeance is mine says the Lord” is affirmed in both OT and NT.

Often the only moral and just option is for man NOT to give sinners what they deserve.

 

[Blue_Horizon]

With regard to Aquinas it is unlikely that he held contradictory views.

Agreed.

What you have on the one hand is an unambiguous statement of his position, and on the other hand a personal interpretation of other statements he made relevant to the subject. Given that the interpretation of one set of statements conflicts with the clear meaning of the other, it seems the more reasonable explanation is that the proposed interpretation is flawed.

Ender

May I suggest the decision as to which side is clear and which side is an “interpretation” is itself your own personal “interpretation” which you project as “objective”.
Such a confidence in your own judgements of objectivity do not make it so.

I would think other indicators of your mistaken confidence here would be:

• no backers for your view on this thread which does have a few people at least as intelligent as yourself.
• no backers for your view on this thread which does have a few people at least as theologically educated as yourself.
• objections from an ordained professor.
• your stated disagreement with the CCC

I suggest even the thick skinned amongst us would be quite tentative in their views over what is objectively clear or not given the above contra-indicators.
If this doesn’t indicate the likelihood of invincible ignorance in oneself I wouldn’t know what would.

 

[Blue_Horizon]

Capital punishment is a particular form of the general term punishment, so whatever is true of the latter is also true of the former.

Have you heard of the logic flaw of equivocation?

The issue is not Capital “punishment” but the licitness of State executions.

 

[Blue_Horizon]

Having already recognized that capital punishment is not subsumed under self-defense…The treatment of the death penalty is itself within Evangelium Vitae and the Catechism explicitly put in the context of punishment, not within the treatment of killing in self-defense.
…it is too late to claim this is what Aquinas believed.

Well that seems a non-sequitor.
Clearly they are indifferent sections because it is not the role of a private individual to make decisions re the common good.

That in itself does not mean that “self defence” cannot be a similar principle in both sections. Nor is there any reason why “self defence” is inimical to “common good”…especially when Aquinas actually says so on a first pass reading.

 

[Blue_Horizon]

At the same time, the accepted Fathers of the Church never adopted these extreme positions, either outlawing all war as unjust or forbidding all capital punishment as inherently evil.

(Fr. John Hardon)

You suggest that this logically implies CP must therefore be, in itself, at worst only morally neutral.

That simply doesn’t follow. Hardon more likely is read as saying that some CP is immoral…meaning it is the very nature of CP that it it is justified only by linming a few more ducks in a row than simply identifying if a given case meets the eye for eye criterion.

Being opposed to its use is very different than raising a moral objection, which Ambrose did not do. He did not want to see it used, but he recognized its legitimacy

This is more about the counsel versus the command aspect of killing. However sometimes circumstances can be such that what is often a counsel against , yet mostly allowed, is in some instances not allowed and therefore becomes a commandment against in those circumstances.

But again, while Augustine did not want to see capital punishment used (for obvious reasons) he recognized that its use was valid. He raised no moral objection to it, but only prudential reservations.
Ender

This cannot be easily read to conclusively mean any more than that such State killings are not intrinsically evil. That doesn’t mean circumstances can never be such as to make CP sometimes unjust.

 

[Ender]

Why would JPII’s EV “if this is the only possible way of effectively defending human lives against the unjust aggressor” not be the basis for your CCC2267 rider?

It is - the footnote in 2267 points to EV 56 as its source. The thing is, the footnote in EV 56 points to CCC 2267. They each point to the other as the source of that restriction, which seems accurate to me since I’ve been unable to find anything like it anywhere else.

Ender

 

[Ender]

What is the difficulty with:

(A) The requirement of a direct medicinal end:
*" In the infliction of punishment it is not the punishment itself that is the
end in view, but its medicinal properties in checking sin; wherefore punishment partakes of the nature of justice, in so far as it checks sin. *. (ST II-II 43, 7 a1)"

demonstrating the existence of a principle (medicinal end) other than mere retribution that must necessarily also be satisfied to finally justify a State Execution?
First, I have not argued for “mere retribution” so that objection is not relevant. Second, you have a narrow view of what constitutes “checking sin” if you assume it means providing physical protection only. All of the objectives of punishment contribute to that end, so no, this passage does not mean that capital punishment is valid only when it is necessary for physical protection. Even by your interpretation, deterrence would equally justify its use.* Even the punishment that is inflicted according to human laws, is not always intended as a medicine for the one who is punished, but sometimes only for others: thus when a thief is hanged, this is not for his own amendment, but for the sake of others, that at least they may be deterred from crime through fear of the punishment… (ST I-II 87, 3 ad 2)*

It will be a prudential judgement that determines if the demands of both retribution and medicinality are met in particular cases…but the existence of a principle of medicinality would not appear to be a matter of prudence but a clear theological teaching for Aquinas.

The separation between retribution and “medicinality” is entirely yours. Aquinas explicitly recognized that the evil of punishment (its retributive aspect) can be medicinal.*Nevertheless we must observe that sometimes a thing seems penal, and yet is not so simply. Because punishment is a species of evil, as stated in the FP, Q[48], A[5]. Now evil is privation of good. And since man’s good is manifold, viz. good of the soul, good of the body, and external goods, it happens sometimes that man suffers the loss of a lesser good, that he may profit in a greater good, as when he suffers loss of money for the sake of bodily health, or loss of both of these, for the sake of his soul’s health and the glory of God. In such cases the loss is an evil to man, not simply but relatively; wherefore it does not answer to the name of punishment simply, but of medicinal punishment… *(ST I-II 87, 7)

Without greater proportional medicinality consequences retribution’s negative consequences (eg scandal, schism) would be both a greater evil and directly intended… which Aquinas disallows above if justice is to be truly served…

The determination of the consequences of an action involve prudential judgment. It is not a question of justice if you and I disagree about the likely consequences of executing someone.

(B) The requirement of Common Good end:
"It is lawful to kill sinners… if a man be dangerous and infectious to the community…it is praiseworthy and advantageous that he be killed in order to safeguard the common
good, since “a little leaven corrupteth the whole lump”…When, however, the good incur no danger, but rather are protected and saved by the slaying of the wicked, then the latter may be lawfully put to death. (Aquinas II,II, 64 a2).

Again, your definition of the common good is much too narrow. You ascribe to Aquinas a separation he never made and to the church a understanding she never had. The primary objective of punishment is justice. Can you really suppose that justice is not part of the common good?*For the fundamental demand of justice, whose role in morality is to maintain the existing equilibrium, when it is just, and to restore the balance when upset. It demands that by punishment the person responsible be forcibly brought to order; and ****the fulfillment of this demand proclaims the absolute supremacy of good over evil; right triumphs sovereignly over wrong. *****(Pius XII)

The very reason a private individual may not administer CP is because they have no authority re deciding matters of the common good.

This is true of all punishment; it is not unique to capital punishment.

It is of course a prudential judgement as to whether the common good end is not compromised in particular cases. The Magisterium in its last three Popes prudentially judge that the common good / medicinal ends are indeed compromised in modern times as reasonable bloodless means are available which provide greater goods and lesser evils re the community.

Yes, this is what I have been saying all along. It is a prudential judgment about the expected consequences of a particular action.

Such a practical judgement re the reasonableness of bloodless means in modern times admits of details that are no longer of the “circumstances” font but of the “object” font. It means the State execution in such cases may well become examples of State Murder not State CP.

Not at all. You have recognized that opposition to capital punishment is prudential. It cannot now be made into something else. The nature of the act is not changed.

Ender

 

[Ender]

Being “deserved” and being “just” are not identical as you assume. The common good must also be respected.

I have recognized this several times. This was why I cited Aquinas on that very point (post #381).

Unlike your “eye for eye” justification which is certainly affirmed in the OT but is gain-sayed in the NT, the contrary saying “Vengeance is mine says the Lord” is affirmed in both OT and NT.

It is a mistake to believe that retributive justice - lex talionis…eye-for-an-eye - has been repudiated. Nothing in the NT supports that position. As for the passage “Vengeance is mine”, its meaning is not quite what you think.*And thus that which is lawful to God is lawful for His ministers when they act by His mandate. It is evident that God who is the Author of laws, has every right to inflict death on account of sin. For “the wages of sin is death.” Neither does His minister sin in inflicting that punishment. The sense, therefore, of “Thou shalt not kill” is that one shall not kill by one’s own authority. *(Catechism of St. Thomas)
Ender

 

[Ender]

I would think other indicators of your mistaken confidence here would be:

• no backers for your view on this thread which does have a few people at least as intelligent as yourself.
• no backers for your view on this thread which does have a few people at least as theologically educated as yourself.
• objections from an ordained professor.
• your stated disagreement with the CCC

Your points are valid, which doesn’t change this fact: my arguments are undisturbed. If I am wrong there is certainly very little to indicate that other than the opinions of others. As I said before: I can support virtually every assertion I make with a relevant citation from a serious source. That seems more significant than the absence of supporters.

Ender

 

[Rau]

…Such a practical judgement re the reasonableness of bloodless means in modern times admits of details that are no longer of the “circumstances” font but of the “object” font. It means the State execution in such cases may well become examples of State Murder not State CP.

I think you draw a long bow here. You are asserting that it is somehow “so clear” that CP is inappropriate that the one who chooses it must be doing so out of wrong Intention. You are denying the “honesty” of the prudential judgement of the one choosing CP.

We see how details affect our identification of the true “object” in moral matters all the time:

• theft changes from grave object to light object if the theft is a small article.
• coitus may be either adultery or a good object depending on the small “detail” of whether my partner is married to me or not.
• why must State Executions be any different depending on the “details/circumstances” involved.

Because CP is not intrinsically evil whereas theft and adultery are. And I think you know that the status of a sexual partner as spouse or not is not a proper application of the Circumstances font.

 

[Ender]

That in itself does not mean that “self defence” cannot be a similar principle in both sections.

On some occasions it is necessary to repel an ongoing assault proportionately to avoid damage caused by the aggressor, and the need to neutralize him could lead to his elimination; this is a case of legitimate defense. (cf. Evangelium vitae, 55). Nevertheless,* the presuppositions of legitimate personal defense do not apply at the social level, without the risk of misinterpretation**. When the death penalty is applied, it is not for a current act of aggression, but rather for an act committed in the past. *(Francis, 2015)

Nor is there any reason why “self defence” is inimical to “common good”…especially when Aquinas actually says so on a first pass reading.

No one has suggested otherwise.

Ender

 

[Ender]

You suggest that this logically implies CP must therefore be, in itself, at worst only morally neutral.

That simply doesn’t follow. Hardon more likely is read as saying that some CP is immoral…meaning it is the very nature of CP that it it is justified only by linming a few more ducks in a row than simply identifying if a given case meets the eye for eye criterion.

This is more about the counsel versus the command aspect of killing. However sometimes circumstances can be such that what is often a counsel against , yet mostly allowed, is in some instances not allowed and therefore becomes a commandment against in those circumstances.

This cannot be easily read to conclusively mean any more than that such State killings are not intrinsically evil. That doesn’t mean circumstances can never be such as to make CP sometimes unjust.

It would seem that capital punishment can be unjust for two reasons: it is too harsh a punishment for the crime, or imposing it would cause more harm than good. For murder the punishment fits the crime so the only valid opposition to its use would be the belief that, in a particular case, its use would be unwise.

Ender

 

[Blue_Horizon]

Nor is it accurate to claim that anyone, let alone the Maisterium or Aquinas, has asserted that it cannot be justly imposed solely on the basis of a deserved vengeance.

By all means give me those clear silver bullet quotes from each.
I think you will find you have, as before,

1. confounded deserved with just/moral.
2. assumed that what is just for God (in His own time) is intrinsically licit for the State at any time. This is not correct as even Jesus denies this principle in his teaching of the wheat and the darnall.

the common good is a much broader concept than “defend(ing) human lives.” Given that justice is assuredly one of the greatest “common goods”, whatever is done must clearly satisfy that requirement.

What does this actually mean?
Given that Aquinas opposes CG to mere vengeance justice, which is what you seem to mean by “justice” above, it would seem he speaks of the objects of the other secondary ends of justice not vengeance. CG then is fairly readily to be understood as a justice that does not interfere with the rights and goods of other citizens. Vengeance, deserved or not, easily contaminates others as even the Lex Talionis law of the OT was intended to limit…Indeed most observe that was why it was set in place to begin with.
And here you try to argue vengeance is one of the most desirable objects of the CGood:shrug:.
God save us from autodidacts and their distorted self serving interpretations!

But by all means provide clear Thomistic and Magisterial quotes that vengeance is the pearl of the Common Good and that the CG has nothing ever to fear from pure retributive justice if you really believe this nonsense?

First, this “clear” teaching doesn’t mean what you think it does, nor (unsurprisingly) does it conflict with what he says elsewhere

.
Perhaps it would be helpful to clearly state exactly what you think it means instead of beating round the bush…your past attempts do not seem to have worked?

… it hardly seems fair to chastise me for cherry picking too narrowly on the one hand, and excoriate me for “searching everywhere” on the other. Can’t you just deal with my arguments?

The two statements are opposed?. That’s what CPS do…because their views are distortions of an author’s views they have to search extensively in an author’s corpus to find a form of words that seems to make their own differing view.
I am interested in more than dealing with your arguments…I also indicate other deeper signs that indicate to the wise when their arguments proceed from a common foundation of sand.

Aquinas always recognized that the impact of the punishment on the entire community was to be considered if the punishment was to be considered just in its fullest sense.

This is seminal.
The problem is that you believe the State has a range of objectively licit options.
This is denied by recent Popes. The full moral principles associated with analysing State Executions make it clear that in modern times that bloodless means are the only licit options.
Your view that all options in this matter are just, though some better for the CG than others, is deeply flawed.

You repeatedly confuse the virtue of justice" with “being just” (ie moral).
Yet justice is but one of the four Cardinal Virtues, and for it to be truly moral the other virtues must also be present. If they are not then what you believe to be justice will only be a shell and therefore immoral.

Just as Aquinas states:

• “But if it is evident that the infliction of punishment will result in more numerous and more grievous sins being committed, the infliction of punishment will no longer be a part of justice.”

The meaning the passage you (exclusively) cite is not that capital punishment must satisfy both justice and protection, but is actually about who is authorize to impose it - the physician in the case of amputating a limb, and the magistrate in the case of executing vengeance

You are mistaken, the reason the State alone may sometimes judge that a killing is just is because individuals have no authority or ability for best determining what the common good may be in particular cases.

You seem to be distorting this view. Namely, because the State decides to execute therefore it must be for the CG and therefore it is moral. That is ridiculous.
Even a physician first weighs up what is best for his patient overall before amputating.
You would have the reverse…if he amputated it must be good for the patient!
What a foolishly authoritarian approach to objective assessment of licitness. The doctor would be objectively incapable of mistaken and illicit amputations by your account.

The argument you make is that a person cannot be executed *even if he deserves it *if it is harmful to the common good.

It is Aquinas and the Church that makes this argument.

But determining what is or is not best for the common good is a prudential judgment, about which people may reasonably disagree.

Prudential does not always mean the matter is arbitrary like eating fish as you assume here.
Some prudential judgements are over the objective nature of things which have moral implications. E G is this sexually active man married to his coital accomplice?

That you accept that a person may deserve to die for his crime, however, is a moral judgment with which I concur.

This is simply an incomplete moral analysis that is only half judged. As is the case re contusions above.

 

[Blue_Horizon]

…continued…

So while we might properly disagree on whether or not it is wise to execute (e.g.) a murderer, we are at least in agreement that he deserves death for his crime.

Deserving death as I have observed is not univocal with it being moral for either an individual or State doing so. There are further considerations needed to finally judge the licitness

 

[Blue_Horizon]

I think this is the quote you’re looking for.*Punishment cannot be reduced to mere retribution, much less take the form of social retaliation or a sort of institutional vengeance. Punishment and imprisonment have meaning if, while maintaining the demands of justice and discouraging crime, they serve the rehabilitation of the individual by offering those who have made a mistake an opportunity to reflect and to change their lives in order to be fully reintegrated into society. *(JPII, Homily - Jubilee in Prisons, 2000)
Ender

Perhaps you may like to helpfully explain your point…the relevance of which to my view is far from obvious.

 

[Blue_Horizon]

Vengeance, deserved or not, easily contaminates others as even the Lex Talionis law of the OT was intended to limit…Indeed most observe thats why it was set in place to begin with.

Jesus in Mt 5:38 begs to differ I suggest.
While equal retaliation may seem to curb rage it is surely better to curb the rage itself…whether it be of State or individual.

Like the prudential teaching of heliocentrism the Church certainly assumed this truth both in science and in the Scriptures (ie the New Law) for a very long while. Regardless I am not trying to prove anything to you. I am simply offering you a model of understanding that ties together these many disparate threads better than your less able one. By all means clutch your plank while I climb on board the life-boat if you believe it gets you further.

And Aquinas certainly held this - along with many others. That is Church enough for me to accept without feeling the need to justify further.

Comments on Mt 5:38

"For without this command, the commands of the Law could not stand. For if according to the Law we begin all of us to render evil for evil, we shall all become evil.

Or has your return blow at all restrained him from striking you again? It has rather roused him to another blow. For anger is not checked by meeting anger, but is only more irritated."
Pseudo Chrystostem.

"I might state it yet thus; It was said to them of old time, Thou shalt not take unequal retaliation; But I say unto you, Ye shall not retaliate; this is a completion of the Law, if in these words something is added to the Law which was wanting to it; yea, rather that which the Law sought to do, namely, to put an end to unequal revenge, is more safely secured when there is no revenge at all. " August.

Why do you reject the view that the purpose of LT is to limit vengeance’s contagious side effects (ie never ending rage and feuds).
While LT works to some extent it is hardly the last word on the underlying principle that the New Law in Mt 5:38 more perfectly fulfils by its command of those who would belong to the Kingdom.
It is a standard observation

The argument is all the more ironic in that while you believe man is denied the use of “pure vengeance” as a control on his baser instincts, you reserve such (base?) action to God.

Please state where I said that?
I believe you will find that vengeance and proportionality motives are not enough to limit what God opposes in unjust CP. Requirements of the common good, objectively judged, must also be satisfied for such punishment to be legitimated for man - as indeed it is in God.

What is just for God is just for his ministers.

What a ridiculously unsupportable universal this is .
Are not clerics ministers of God?
Yet under the New Law no cleric may kill whatever his authority. Not even the Pope.
Jesus’s Kingdom is not an institution where CP is ever justified.
Secular society and its ministers not so much.

We are agreed that if mercy speaks for a lesser sentence then the harsher one (in this case death) is the just one.

Not at all.
It is a matter of justice not mercy that CP is unjust under some circumstances: eg where proportionality of common good requirements are not satisfied.

In God of course both justice and mercy are the same.

That said, it is necessary to recognize that there are times when mercy is inappropriate (e.g. there is no contrition).

Irrelevant even if it were true (you will note Jesus was clearly merciful to the woman caught in adultery when expressions of contrition were NOT equally clearly presented to the reader).