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Ender
Guest
What makes it evil?
What is the primary objective of punishment, and should the primary objective be the primary consideration in determining what punishment should be applied?
Ender
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Ender
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o_mlly
Guest
Then, what is the just punishment for the crime of deliberate attempted murder?
Assume that the only difference in circumstance between the successful murderer and the unsuccessful murderer is the ineptness of the latter.
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Ender
Guest
Why is this an issue? My point in arguing about capital punishment is not to figure out where to draw the line between those crimes where its use is appropriate and where it is not, but to make the case that its use is justified at least for the crime of murder. Focusing solely on that instance I think makes the discussion as clear as possible.
Ender
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o_mlly
Guest
The word “ought” which indicates a moral duty or obligation and in the negative, a proscription.
… the nature and extent of the punishment must be carefully evaluated and decided upon, and ought not go to the extreme of executing the offender except in cases of absolute necessity … (EV p. 56)
To redress the disorder caused by the offense.
Yes.
Again, the question is: Ought the state which has an insecure penal system execute one guilty of attempted murder? Is capital punishment required because it is the just desert of the murderer which retribution demands? If so, then then what are the limits to the state’s use of capital punishment? Is capital punishment only just as a sentence for the crime of murder?
Friend, you most certainly do argue where not to draw the line on capital punishment. The entire point of this thread and p. 56 of EV is “to figure out where to draw the line." We have your maximum crime which demands capital punishment – murder. What is your minimum crime that requires the magistrate have the right to sentence execution of the criminal?
You argue from the philosophical nature of punishment that retribution is primary and, incorrectly, synonymous with redress. To argue with your claim, one needs to know both limits – min and max crimes – for which the notion of retribution requires capital punishment.
No one, certainly not EV, argues that capital punishment is never justified for the crime of murder. The teaching on the moral use of capital punishment has progressively over the millennia limited its use. EV furthers the limitation.
Again, does Church teaching ever allow capital punishment for the crime of attempted murder to satisfy justice?
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Ender
Guest
I think you read into the word more than was put there.*2273 The inalienable rights of the person must be recognized and respected by civil society and the political authority. *
When the church means “must”, she doesn’t say “ought.”
This is not helpful. Which of the four objectives of punishment (protection, rehabilitation, retribution, deterrence) does this phrase refer to?
If death is not a just punishment for murder then it is not just for any crime. Until we have settled that question it hardly makes sense to argue whether it is just for lesser crimes. That will simply muddy the issue.
I don’t really care where the line is drawn limiting the use of capital punishment, and I see any discussion on that matter as simply going off into the weeds. I have argued for capital punishment specifically in response to murder. If we agree it is just there we can continue to discuss where else it might be just, but arguing that point now is like arguing about which show to see before we’ve decided to go to the movies.
I have made any number of arguments as to why redress and retribution are synonymous. Why not provide a counter argument of your own rather than simply assert that I am wrong?
We don’t need to know that here any more than we need to settle the issue of when life begins to say that late term abortions take a human life. One question is not dependent on the other.
Your assertion about “progress” over the millennia is inaccurate. The teaching was unchanged until 1995.It would be fitting to set aside the death penalty exacted by society on those found guilty of crimes of extreme gravity. Although the punishment is legitimate, the Church hopes for a habitual recourse to clemency . . . [Revised Project (1989), 3541]
The “Revised Project” was the precursor to the catechism. That the “punishment is legitimate” has always been the church’s teaching on the matter.
Ender
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o_mlly
Guest
When she says “ought” she often means “must” just as she does in EV:
… ought not go to the extreme of executing the offender
… public authority** must **limit itself to such means, …
Yes, I can see that is is not helpful but it is critical that “redress the disorder” and “retribution” are synonyms to support your position. EV (and the catechism) states “redress the disorder” as the primary end of punishment. And, that is my magisterial source for my claim. If you claim that church teaching also says that “retribution” is the primary end of punishment then it falls to you to document in a magisterial source support for your claim.
Please do not take us back to argue what has always been agreed. It is settled: death can be a legitimate punishment for murder. The question you seem to be evading is: Can capital punishment be just for crimes other than murder?
Really? JPII drawing the line in EV limiting capital punishment to states with insecure penal systems seems to have engaged your significant attention.
I repeat. It is settled: death can be a legitimate punishment for murder. The question you seem to be evading is: Can capital punishment be just for crimes other than murder?
I don’t believe you offered any arguments for the identity in meaning of “redress the disorder” and “retribution” but only cited academia that, like you, claimed retribution as a primary end. We have in EV a magisterial declaration that the primary end of punishment is to “redress the disorder.” Please cite your magisterial source stating that the primary end of punishment is retribution. Absent that, we ought (must?) yield to the teaching’s literal meaning.
I do not see how direct abortion relates at all to discussions on the death penalty. The former is different in kind, not degree, to the latter. Abortion is intrinsically evil.
Why do you evade the question? Does attempted murder as a crime warrant the death penalty in a state that lacks a secure penal system?
My assertion that the church has and continues to circumscribe the state’s right to use the death penalty has already been supported. It does not help to further the discussion by taking us back, once again, to that which no one has argued against: the legitimacy of the death penalty.
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Ender
Guest
I have taken a position based on the meaning of the term as explained by nearly a half dozen sources.
By demanding a “magisterial” source you are insisting that unless I can find a papal document of some kind making that exact statement you have cover for insisting the phrase means “something” else, but just what you are not prepared to say. You have no “magisterial” claim for anything; the phrase is meaningless without explanation, but since there is no “magisterial” explanation the phrase remains (happily for you) undefined.
The question has never been is there any circumstance where capital punishment is legitimate? The question has always been whether it is legitimate in (e.g.) the US today. If you’re prepared to admit that it is, then we can move on, otherwise nothing has been settled.
Actually I cited several sources explaining that retribution meant redress, and, yes, it ought to be meaningful that other sources asserted that retribution was primary, which would surely be true if the terms were synonymous.
It has no literal meaning. A decade after a murder, what literal disorder remains? Given that there is no disorder to redress, punishment of any kind would be illegitimate. You have disassociated punishment from justice; the entire concept that a person deserves to be punished for his crime is lost. There is no place for justice under your definition.
I evade the question because it is irrelevant to the discussion about the moral use of the death penalty.
It has been claimed; it has not been supported.
Ender
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Blue_Horizon
Guest
I am not going through all your posts to repeatedly observe the flawed logic and the poor understanding of the quotes allegedly used to support your strange conflation of the virtue of justice simply to vengeange.
The salient difficulties in your position are well summarised above.
(1)
Its good we agree on these two at least.
Do note they are not “aspects” they are necessary ends.
Therefore when it comes to SE (State Executions) we cannot speak of such possibly “being just” (ie acting morally) or speaking of "justice"unless we defer to both ends - as ends define objects.
Why so?
One cannot make a moral decision without applying moral principles to concrete acts and their circumstances/details by an act of practical reason.
Do I kill my aggressor with a punch in the stomach or with a bullet to the head.
The correct moral choice depends on judging many details including consequences.
So why is a practical judgement never integrally a very important and essential step in making a moral choice exactly?
This is your abiding theological error.
It seems you have never studied the moral theology of a moral act (certainly not Aquinas) if you really believe the wild assertion you keep making here.
(2)
I am surprised I need to call you out on your poor logic here.
If vengeance cannot alone fully describe “justice” or a “just act” then we cannot call any example of pure vengeance ordered in its object. We only have two choices:
(a) We admit there is not enough information to confirm if this act of vengeance is licit (like “killing” or “coitus”). OR
(b) We assume vengeance is the only end present and therefore the SE is in principle unjust because considerations of the other necessary end that must be considered (CG Commonm Good) has been intentionally ignored.
CG considerations (which must be proportionate) must be part of the described act of SE if it is to be justice. If we leave them out then we have an incompletely described act and no judgementrs of morality yay or nay can yet be made. Just like “killing”.
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Blue_Horizon
Guest
(3) So my question was:
And you responded:
which I suggest would leave most people wondering what you are on as its a non sequitor. Have you ever taken a Logic 101 paper may I ask?
(a) Since when is “the common good” to be considered identical with “the cardinal virtues”?
(b) Since when is all vengeance (retributive justice) just or moral. If something can be immoral how can it be automatically considered a virtue (“justice”).
(c) Just because vengeance is called “retrib justice” that does not make it “just” or by definition a virtue (“justice”). Surely you are not so simple as to believe the “black box” on an aeroplane has to be colored black just because of its name?
(d) This is circular reasoning. The very issue we are trying to decide is when vengeance may be just or not.
(e) The question I asked is that you demonstrate from authoritative texts that “the common good” as used by Aquinas is primarily seen in the exercise of vengeance.
You have extolled “justice” as a great habit of individuals which I concur with…
But I would rather you answer my question re a definition of the common good that considers vengeance on criminals to be the best example thereof…
I suggest you are gravely mistaken.
Have another try.
(4)
I have no idea what you are saying. Magisterial opposition is very much morally based.
If it wasn’t why the strong opposition - a matter of bad form?
Prudential does not always mean the matter is arbitrary like eating fish as you assume here.
Some prudential judgements are over the objective nature of things which have moral implications. E G is this sexually active man married to his coital accomplice?
What is your point?
One could say the same of homosexual acts or masturbation or adultery of the eyes.
One may not be morally culpable, but one may still be objectively wrong and in error as to the objective situation given the circumstances accepted by all (eg reasonable bloodless means).
(5) My observation was:
You still assert the State has a range of licit options do you not and can choose whatever it likes and still be just do you not?
(6)
Noone denies this. However you have lost sight of the justification of that particular authority - the common good.
As Aquinas states the surgeon has the right to amputate not simply because he has been given political authority but because this rationale best executes common good considerations. An approved and trained surgeon is the best man to know when a leg should be amputated or not. If he fails in that judgement he maims regardless of his authority. Likewise a king may fail in his authority if he believes not he needs to consider the common good and all choices are licit to him in conducting vengeance.
There is an objective order that the surgeon must answer to regardless of his authority. It will be right to amputate NOT because he has the authority but because he has made the right call from examining the patient accurately and correctly determined that is it for the good of the patient that the corrupt leg be removed.
You clearly would have it that the surgeon’s right comes from his authority alone and not from his correct assessment of irreversible corruption in the leg AND the correct identification that the survival of the good flesh (ie the patient as a whole) can only be achieved by amputation of the corrupt. One does not go around removing members of the body simply because they are lame for example.
Not at all.
If you say you have 9 toes with 5 on your right food then you have essentially advised us that you only have four toes on your left even though you “didn’t say that”.
You say things whose inexorable logic leads you to further conclusions you then deny.
Either I am inventing…or you simply do not have the theological octane to see the contradictions in your position.
You may not be culpable due to your invincible ignorance, but you are still in objective error.
Just as Fr Ruggero, myself and the CCC (which you publically disagree with on this point) agree.
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Blue_Horizon
Guest
So what. That doesn’t make it wrong just because the Magisterium does not feel the need to advise Ender how it made this determination from tradition or that you personally don’t like or understand it.
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Blue_Horizon
Guest
You have missed the point. Your original statement was:
This is a ridiculous conclusion, that it is unjust not to execute simply if lex talionis principles are met.
If their are legitimate means that better accord with the common good then it is clearly immoral according to Aquinas to ignore application of these principled CG considerations.
It is a mistake to believe that retributive justice - lex talionis…eye-for-an-eye - has been
What makes you think Christ repudiated them?
He simply said there was a better way than what God tolerates in the OT and by the State for those persons are not mature enough to know any better.
However individual Christians and communities constituted of Christians are called to a higher standard and it is ilicit for those of the New Covenant to do so to each other and likewise for their own leaders.
This in turn points to the importance of the common good considerations even in State Executions which the phrase “secondary end” points to. The phrase should not lead us to believe, as you do, that it is a light matter only worthy of secondary considerations by the State as if the morality of SE may not itself be called into question if new ways of fulfilling the CG better have indeed arisen.
A universal right of “authority” is not the same as a “intrinsically just” under all conditions as you have confusedly assumed.
A physician has authority to amputate, but he cannot therefore amputate a leg just because it is permanently lame or diseased.
You really need to better define your use of words and concepts given that common sense moral understanding here is letting you down so badly.
Of course he does when the CG is not at all considered and the best choice made.
The wheat and darnell story makes this clear.
Sometimes the judgement is not the minister’s to make and while it needs to be executed at some time…sometimes it is best left in Gods hands as the Most Competent Executioner before the Common Good. Which is also of God.
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Rau
Guest
You assert these criticisms (of Ender) Blue, but make no argument.
And persons, acting sincerely, may form different judgements about consequences of various alternatives, and yet each acts morally.
He did not claim it is not. He just notes that persons acting morally may conclude differently, without moral fault.
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Rau
Guest
It rarely means “arbitrary” - that is your claim about Ender’s statement, not at all what he said.
In the context of moral assessment, how is that a prudential judgement? It’s a fact.
His point is that an assessment of the morality of CP hinge on the consequences - a matter of prudential judgement. The morality of homosexual acts and masturbation lies in the moral object of those acts. So while one CAN say the same of those two acts, that observation (about consequences) is not the relevant factor in assessing their morality.
The object situation may be that bloodless means exist to render the offender harmless. But that such means that they are the “morally superior” form of punishment would appear to be a prudential judgment (and one made by recent Popes, and FYI, with which I agree), making claims about what is objectively wrong difficult if not impossible to verify.
Morality on the part of the surgeon does not at all hinge on “getting it right”. He must act (with patient concurrence) with the right intention (patient welfare, not, say, fee maximisation), and in the sincere belief that the operation presents a positive likelihood of success.
I believe you have manufactured this argument, claimed that it is Ender who made it, and are now proceeding to shoot it down.
I think it is your claim as to what is “inexorable logic” that is at fault. And I’m not talking about toes…
IMHO, it’s the former.
Did you think Don Ruggero made any argument that countered Ender’s argument at all? I believe what he did say in “rejecting” Ender’s post was rebutted (post #169).
He did say other things with which I agreed.
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Rau
Guest
Nonsense. He has no authority unless it is given to him by the patient (as a minimum). And as I explained earlier, the morality of his act hangs on considerations well beyond authority.
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Blue_Horizon
Guest
Yes, if it is not the best means of also safeguarding the common good it is immoral.
This moral judgement can validly be made:
(a) of particular instances; and
(b) also universally of all instances of a certain well described type of State Execution:.
e.g. those where reasonable bloodless options are available.
Just as the last three generations of the magisterium have observed.
We can universalise immoral individual instances of behaviour if we well describe the behaviour with a universal qualifier. Thus “killing” is permissible despite the 5thC.
Though we can further specify conditions and so make a universal prohibition: e.g. killing the innocent (murder) is always and everywhere wrong.
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Blue_Horizon
Guest
Perhaps you have forgotten your original point which I was observing to be ridiculous?
So its good you now agree with me
.I suggest you avoid using the passive “deserved” as if its active version (“must be imposed”) is univocal in meaning. It obviously isn’t.
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graciew
Guest
It is posible to verify objectively the places,prisons and report whether they are safe enough.
Or work so that they are,and thus avoid putting a person to death…
Wouldn t that be more reasonable?
Once one knows there isn t any practical reason why a person is to be killed,why kill him/ her?
What do we go to God with? Retribution?
Would God accept it?
Let me know your thoughts when and if you can,Rau
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Blue_Horizon
Guest
Was Oedipus behaving morally?
Were the Congo nuns behaving morally?
If secure imprisonment is available then such State Executions are immoral.
What is your problem with this?
Ahem, I was just paraphrasing JPII and the CCC.
So no, I think I am in good company - but you not so much.
*"Punishment ought not go to the extreme of executing the offender except in cases of absolute necessity: in other words, when it would not be possible otherwise to defend society.” * (VS)
Correct, vengeance hardly exhausts the meaning of “the common good” just as Fiat hardly exhausts the meaning of “car.”
Your logic always seems to go a bit funny when you deal with parts and wholes.
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Blue_Horizon
Guest
You are a flat earther Ender. You will always find reasons to object its not traditional.
You would also have rejected changes in the teaching on usury, slavery and soldiering for the same reasons had you lived at those times.
It is clear the Pope rests his new practical teachings on traditional principles of common good applied to new concrete conditions. As was the case with usury, slavery and solidering … (and 2nd marriages and communion coming).
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Blue_Horizon
Guest
They are repeating a consistent set of assumptions I have attempted to rebut below.
That is vague.
Is a contraceptor tolerated by his confessor (as per the advice in the Vademecum) acting morally?
There is a difference between not being culpable and engaging in objective sin.
We are here discussing what types of decisions involve objective sin are we not?
The presence of prudential judgements on either side does not necessitate the absence of an objectively correct understanding of one of the parties.
It is about recognising natural law not whether meat can be eaten on Fridays.
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