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- Status
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Rau
Guest
Cardinal Avery Dulles writes in
firstthings.com/article/2001/04/catholicism-amp-capital-punishment
"The Catholic magisterium in recent years has become increasingly vocal in opposing the practice of capital punishment. Pope John Paul II in Evangelium Vitae declared that “as a result of steady improvements in the organization of the penal system,” cases in which the execution of the offender would be absolutely necessary “are very rare, if not practically nonexistent.” Again at St. Louis in January 1999 the Pope appealed for a consensus to end the death penalty on the ground that it was “both cruel and unnecessary.” The bishops of many countries have spoken to the same effect. The United States bishops, for their part, had already declared in their majority statement of 1980 that ‘in the conditions of contemporary American society, the legitimate purposes of punishment do not justify the imposition of the death penalty.’ "
“In coming to this **prudential **conclusion, the magisterium is not changing the doctrine of the Church. The doctrine remains what it has been: that the State, in principle, has the right to impose the death penalty on persons convicted of very serious crimes. But the classical tradition held that the State should not exercise this right when the evil effects outweigh the good effects. Thus the principle still leaves open the question whether and when the death penalty ought to be applied. The Pope and the bishops, using their prudential judgment, have concluded that in contemporary society, at least in countries like our own, the death penalty ought not to be invoked, because, on balance, it does more harm than good. I personally support this position.”
It is the broadness of the net consequences that matters of course, not just the specific question of whether the death penalty was needed to protect society from this criminal or not. But in any case, comparing a good(s) of one kind with an evil(s) of another is inherently challenging.
I believe some may argue that the imposition of CP in circumstances when imprisonment is sufficient to neutralise the threat from this criminal is not in fact CP, but must be an act (within the class of State Executions) with an evil moral object. I believe that is wrong (noting CP/punishment is not equivalent to self-defence). Further, the “good effects versus bad effects” assessment - while including the elements of “protection from this criminal” and “death of this criminal” - is broader than that, and their weighing is a matter of prudential judgement.
From the CDF “Donum Veritatis…”:
"When it comes to the question of interventions in the prudential order, it could happen that some Magisterial documents might not be free from all deficiencies. Bishops and their advisors have not always taken into immediate consideration every aspect or the entire complexity of a question. But it would be contrary to the truth, if, proceeding from some particular cases, one were to conclude that the Church’s Magisterium can be habitually mistaken in its prudential judgments, or that it does not enjoy divine assistance in the integral exercise of its mission."
vatican.va/roman_curia/congregations/cfaith/documents/rc_con_cfaith_doc_19900524_theologian-vocation_en.html
firstthings.com/article/2001/04/catholicism-amp-capital-punishment
"The Catholic magisterium in recent years has become increasingly vocal in opposing the practice of capital punishment. Pope John Paul II in Evangelium Vitae declared that “as a result of steady improvements in the organization of the penal system,” cases in which the execution of the offender would be absolutely necessary “are very rare, if not practically nonexistent.” Again at St. Louis in January 1999 the Pope appealed for a consensus to end the death penalty on the ground that it was “both cruel and unnecessary.” The bishops of many countries have spoken to the same effect. The United States bishops, for their part, had already declared in their majority statement of 1980 that ‘in the conditions of contemporary American society, the legitimate purposes of punishment do not justify the imposition of the death penalty.’ "
“In coming to this **prudential **conclusion, the magisterium is not changing the doctrine of the Church. The doctrine remains what it has been: that the State, in principle, has the right to impose the death penalty on persons convicted of very serious crimes. But the classical tradition held that the State should not exercise this right when the evil effects outweigh the good effects. Thus the principle still leaves open the question whether and when the death penalty ought to be applied. The Pope and the bishops, using their prudential judgment, have concluded that in contemporary society, at least in countries like our own, the death penalty ought not to be invoked, because, on balance, it does more harm than good. I personally support this position.”
It is the broadness of the net consequences that matters of course, not just the specific question of whether the death penalty was needed to protect society from this criminal or not. But in any case, comparing a good(s) of one kind with an evil(s) of another is inherently challenging.
I believe some may argue that the imposition of CP in circumstances when imprisonment is sufficient to neutralise the threat from this criminal is not in fact CP, but must be an act (within the class of State Executions) with an evil moral object. I believe that is wrong (noting CP/punishment is not equivalent to self-defence). Further, the “good effects versus bad effects” assessment - while including the elements of “protection from this criminal” and “death of this criminal” - is broader than that, and their weighing is a matter of prudential judgement.
From the CDF “Donum Veritatis…”:
"When it comes to the question of interventions in the prudential order, it could happen that some Magisterial documents might not be free from all deficiencies. Bishops and their advisors have not always taken into immediate consideration every aspect or the entire complexity of a question. But it would be contrary to the truth, if, proceeding from some particular cases, one were to conclude that the Church’s Magisterium can be habitually mistaken in its prudential judgments, or that it does not enjoy divine assistance in the integral exercise of its mission."
vatican.va/roman_curia/congregations/cfaith/documents/rc_con_cfaith_doc_19900524_theologian-vocation_en.html
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Blue_Horizon
Guest
Minor correction:
The latter are called prudential moral judgements - and proceed from the faculty of practical reason.
The former are called speculative moral judgements - and proceed from the faculty of speculative reason.
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Ender
Guest
I’m not sure I understand your question. It is the church’s mission to interpret God’s law, but as a matter of discernment, not of creation or invention.
Thus distinguishing between the will of man and the will of God, and illustrating the observation that “…revealed truths can seem obscure to human reason and experience” (CCC 157).
I’m not sure this is true. Moral norms are not formulated based on man’s (the church’s) judgment of what he thinks is true, but on what he believes God has said about the matter.*The knowledge which the Church offers to man has its origin not in any speculation of her own, however sublime, but in the word of God which she has received in faith. *(Fides et ratio, #7)
Isn’t this inconsistent? If you reject Bellarmine because he is outdated then surely Aquinas, who is even older, must be rejected as well. Either they’re both in or they’re both out.
Ender
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Ender
Guest
I have saved a number of Dulles’ comment from this article, but clearly I need to add this one as well as there are two points here that are significant.
The first is his rejection of the claim that an execution where there is no concern for security is by nature evil. That claim invariably arises in capital punishment discussions.
The second is his rejection of the idea that capital punishment is equivalent to self-defense, another assertion that regularly arises.
Ender
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Rau
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The excellent text you quote in post #543 is not from Dulles, but from Rau. Apologies for not distinguishing quote from comment more clearly.
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Rau
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Final thoughts from Dulles (really):
"The death penalty should not be imposed if the purposes of punishment can be equally well or better achieved by bloodless means, such as imprisonment.
“The sentence of death may be improper if it has serious negative effects on society, such as miscarriages of justice, the increase of vindictiveness, or disrespect for the value of innocent human life.”
“Catholics, in seeking to form their judgment as to whether the death penalty is to be supported as a general policy, or in a given situation, should be attentive to the guidance of the pope and the bishops. Current Catholic teaching should be understood, as I have sought to understand it, in continuity with Scripture and tradition.”
[Emphasis added]
"The death penalty should not be imposed if the purposes of punishment can be equally well or better achieved by bloodless means, such as imprisonment.
“The sentence of death may be improper if it has serious negative effects on society, such as miscarriages of justice, the increase of vindictiveness, or disrespect for the value of innocent human life.”
“Catholics, in seeking to form their judgment as to whether the death penalty is to be supported as a general policy, or in a given situation, should be attentive to the guidance of the pope and the bishops. Current Catholic teaching should be understood, as I have sought to understand it, in continuity with Scripture and tradition.”
[Emphasis added]
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Rau
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Typos corrected above. You are welcome.It doesn’t matter, the authority of the arguments is much the same and as they both -]superficially/-] appear to confirm Ender in his -]unusual/-] views it doesn’t really matter anyways
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Blue_Horizon
Guest
Hmmmn, sounds like not doing reasonable bloodless options is “immoral” to me (rather than Ender’s “deserved but unwise” summation of prior discussion).
And insofar as we can describe a sub-class of State executions that are of this type - then all of them are as a norm immoral. And intrinsically so.
Whether “CP” is to be identified with the superset (State Executions) or is another subset that does not intersect with the immoral subset just identified (executions where bloodless means are reasonably available) I am easy on Rau.
You seem to opt for the latter because you seem to hold all CP is moral by definition. This would mean the superset is SE with two subset types of execution. The always moral subset is called CP and the always immoral subset are called “executions in the face of bloodless means”.
Perhaps one day, like the superset called killing, we will have a range of readily identifiable subset variants with their own dedicated words like “manslaughter” or “lethal self defence” or “homicide” or “murder” or “patricide” or “fratricide” or “genocide”. These variant names and careful definitions tend to arise under the influence of criminal law.
Perhaps when a few more States get tried in international courts new terminology for the immoral class of executions the Popes speak of will evolve.
Oops, sorry to use that word (evolve). I really meant “be more clearly explicitated” from the original deposit of faith.
Anyways, the above from Dulles doesn’t sound like anything Ender could sign up for. I wonder if he will store these lines in his neutral equal opportunity truth archives
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Rau
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No time to address and correct your post blow by blow, but the key point is that addressing ALL the purposes of punishment, and assessing all the consequences, is the criteria that Dulles offers, not simply the one about “protecting society from the criminal”. If bloodless means address the objectives of punishment as well as CP, then they are preferred.Hmmmn, sounds like not doing reasonable bloodless options is “immoral” to me (rather than Ender’s “deserved but unwise” summation of prior discussion).
And insofar as we can describe a sub-class of State executions that are of this type - then all of them are as a norm immoral. And intrinsically so.
Whether “CP” is to be identified with the superset (State Executions) or is another subset that does not intersect with the immoral subset just identified (executions where bloodless means are reasonably available) I am easy on Rau.
You seem to opt for the latter because you seem to hold all CP is moral by definition. This would mean the superset is SE with two subset types of execution. The always moral subset is called CP and the always immoral subset are called “executions in the face of bloodless means”.
Perhaps one day, like the superset called killing, we will have a range of readily identifiable subset variants with their own dedicated words like “manslaughter” or “lethal self defence” or “homicide” or “murder” or “patricide” or “fratricide” or “genocide”. These variant names and careful definitions tend to arise under the influence of criminal law.
Perhaps when a few more States get tried in international courts new terminology for the immoral class of executions the Popes speak of will evolve.
Oops, sorry to use that word (evolve). I really meant “be more clearly explicitated” from the original deposit of faith.
Anyways, the above from Dulles doesn’t sound like anything Ender could sign up for. I wonder if he will store these lines in his neutral equal opportunity truth archives
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Rau
Guest
You need to complete the idea Blue - not cut it short - leaving others to interpolate, perhaps differently and/or inadequately. It is not sufficient to appeal to “reasonable” bloodless means - go back and read Dulles - he was much more specific.
There are undoubtedly state executions in this world that are murder. But CP applied in the belief that more good than harm results; that chooses CP believing it to have the best effect of the available options, is not immoral, let alone intrinsically so.
The way I use the language is to say that an act properly called CP has a good moral object. The conditions for an act to be moral are well known, and depend on the judgements of the one who acts.
I have attempted to complete your remark to align it with what Dulles has said. It is evident that gauging the truth of the “red rider” requires a prudential judgment, and the Magisterium, Dulles and I (ok, that last one adds not much) all agree on that judgement.
Let’s wait and see. While Ender may not wish to share his personal judgement about whether CP is the good choice, I believe he would agree with the formulation of the judgement to be made.Anyways, the above from Dulles doesn’t sound like anything Ender could sign up for. I wonder if he will store these lines in his neutral equal opportunity truth archives
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Ender
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I certainly agree with this: we should do what is best; that’s not all that controversial. Where the controversy comes in is determining what is in fact “best”. (It should be obvious that this is a judgment, not a doctrinal determination.) It would be a start if we could even get agreement on what the purposes of punishment are. (All right, I probably would hesitate over the “equally well” part.)
Ender
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Ender
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Actually I would put those comments in the “so obviously true they hardly need mentioning” category, but what this indicates is the extent to which you have managed to misunderstand what I’ve been saying.
Ender
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o_mlly
Guest
There is no Catholic “official” philosophy. There is only dogma, doctrine and teaching. The theories of the nature of punishment do not restrict the Magisterium in her teachings. If a theory of punishment argues against dogma, doctrine or teaching then that theory is incorrect. Unlike your approach, the Catholic theologian’s initial premise is that the dogma, doctrine and teaching is true and proceed to demonstrate that right reason agrees.
What is the teaching? It’s is plain enough:
"If bloodless means are sufficient to defend human lives against an aggressor and to protect public order and the safety of persons, public authority must limit itself to such means, because they better correspond to the concrete conditions of the common good …” Evangelium Vitae 56 (emphasis mine).
The development in the teaching of the moral use of capital punishment contained in EV does allow a prudential judgment. But the prudential judgment is limited to whether or not the state has a secure penal system – a bloodless means.
If one’s prudence judges the state’s penal system to be secure then that state must not execute. EV specifies that the act of capital punishment in the concrete always occurs in two ways – in states that have or do not have secure penal systems. In state without secure penal systems capital punishment may be moral. In states with secure penal systems, the act of capital punishment is intrinsically evil.
While JPII did not claim infallibility for paragraph 56 in EV in 1995, the bishops of the world have reinforced the teaching within their dioceses and regional synods over the past 22 years. A Catholic who silently rejects the teaching in EV does so at his own risk. The Catholic who is not a bishop and publicly denies the teaching is in a somewhat more dire circumstance.
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Ender
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True. It would be the doctrines on the nature of punishment that would restrict her teachings.
That’s kind of been my argument.
My approach has been to cite 2000 years of church doctrine on the subject, and point to the difficulties in reconciling those doctrines with the interpretations being given to the documents that have appeared since 1995.
That passage actually begins: “In any event, the principle set forth in the new Catechism of the Catholic Church remains valid:…”, but the catechism doesn’t say “must limit”, rather it says “should limit”, so if the catechism is the controlling document then the word is should, not must. There is actually another problem, and it is this: *“The individual doctrines that the catechism affirms have no other authority than that which they already possess.” *(Cardinal Ratzinger) That is, doctrines are not authoritative because they are in the catechism, they are in the catechism because they are already authoritative. Except the doctrine proposed in 2267 doesn’t appear anywhere else so where does its authority come from?
This is a reasonable interpretation, but it isn’t the one I accept.
Cardinal Dulles disagrees with your interpretation, and I agree with his.
I really don’t think disagreeing with you carries that great a risk.
Ender
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o_mlly
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You have cited quite a few documents but many are not magisterial. Where you have cited magisterial documents, they have not supported your claim against JPII’s teaching in EV.
CCC # 2267 get its authority from EV. Look at the footnote. The authority in the Catechism are always in its footnotes referencing Scripture, Tradition and the Magisterium. The source magisterial document, EV, says “must.”
In a prior post you had mistakenly claimed that EV and the Catechism are self-referential. If you examine the dates of publication, you will see that EV p. 56 refers to the 1992 Catechism and the 1995 Catechism p. 2267 refers to EV p. 56. Archbishop Gregory made that quite clear in a prior post.
I understand that you do not accept but I believe your citations do not support your interpretation. And we certainly must dismiss any non-magisterial documents that claim EV p. 56 is in error.
Do you? Or, do you only agree only with certain sentences? It appears the latter is the case.
Of course not. Read my post again. Disagreeing with the Catholic teaching in a public Catholic forum does put one in the breach. Pride often blinds one with their own headlights.
I leave you on this topic with the hope that one day you will eventually give your assent.
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