Capital Punishment

[Rau]

“If bloodless means are sufficient to defend human lives against an aggressor and to protect public order and the safety of persons…”

The protection of public order is a wide remit, and goes well beyond the “defend society from this criminal” (given that is amply addressed separately). Punishment can certainly contribute to protecting the public order.

If the conditions in EV are met, what further good might be delivered by CP to offset the bad of the criminal’s death?

 

[Blue_Horizon]

There is no Catholic “official” philosophy. There is only dogma, doctrine and teaching. The theories of the nature of punishment do not restrict the Magisterium in her teachings. If a theory of punishment argues against dogma, doctrine or teaching then that theory is incorrect. Unlike your approach, the Catholic theologian’s initial premise is that the dogma, doctrine and teaching is true and proceed to demonstrate that right reason agrees.

What is the teaching? It’s is plain enough:
"If bloodless means are sufficient to defend human lives against an aggressor and to protect public order and the safety of persons, public authority must limit itself to such means, because they better correspond to the concrete conditions of the common good …” Evangelium Vitae 56 (emphasis mine).
The development in the teaching of the moral use of capital punishment contained in EV does allow a prudential judgment. But the prudential judgment is limited to whether or not the state has a secure penal system – a bloodless means.

If one’s prudence judges the state’s penal system to be secure then that state must not execute. EV specifies that the act of capital punishment in the concrete always occurs in two ways – in states that have or do not have secure penal systems. In state without secure penal systems capital punishment may be moral. In states with secure penal systems, the act of capital punishment is intrinsically evil.

While JPII did not claim infallibility for paragraph 56 in EV in 1995, the bishops of the world have reinforced the teaching within their dioceses and regional synods over the past 22 years. A Catholic who silently rejects the teaching in EV does so at his own risk. The Catholic who is not a bishop and publicly denies the teaching is in a somewhat more dire circumstance.

You have well summarised the essential points…all very obvious really.

 

[Ender]

You have cited quite a few documents but many are not magisterial.

And with that are dismissed all of the Fathers and Doctors of the Church. Aquinas: irrelevant; Augustine: ditto ditto ditto.

Where you have cited magisterial documents, they have not supported your claim against JPII’s teaching in EV.

True. They support my claim against your interpretation of EV.

In a prior post you had mistakenly claimed that EV and the Catechism are self-referential. If you examine the dates of publication, you will see that EV p. 56 refers to the 1992 Catechism and the 1995 Catechism p. 2267 refers to EV p. 56. Archbishop Gregory made that quite clear in a prior post.

Well I’ve learned something then, but this brings up an even more interesting question: if a doctrine in a catechism has no authority except that which it already possesses, how can the doctrine in 2267 (1st ed) have any authority at all since it possesses none external to itself? It was created in the first edition. Edition two points to EV, and EV cites edition one, but edition one cites…nothing at all.

I understand that you do not accept but I believe your citations do not support your interpretation. And we certainly must dismiss any non-magisterial documents that claim EV p. 56 is in error.

Let me say this again: I do not claim that EV is in error. I claim that your understanding of that document is wrong.

Do you? Or, do you only agree only with certain sentences? It appears the latter is the case.

Dulles asserted that JPII’s comments about the death penalty were prudential judgments. He said the same thing about the Magisterium. I agree with that.

Read my post again. Disagreeing with the Catholic teaching in a public Catholic forum does put one in the breach.

I am agreeing with Dulles, with Ratzinger, with Bellarmine, with Pius XII, with Aquinas et al. I’ll take my chances with them. My concern with EV regards the judgment of the appropriateness of capital punishment in modern societies. That is a prudential issue, not a doctrinal one.

Ender

 

[Ender]

“If bloodless means are sufficient to defend human lives against an aggressor and to protect public order and the safety of persons…”

The protection of public order is a wide remit, and goes well beyond the “defend society from this criminal” (given that is amply addressed separately). Punishment can certainly contribute to protecting the public order.

If the conditions in EV are met, what further good might be delivered by CP to offset the bad of the criminal’s death?

You’ve asked the right question: what does “protect public order” mean? It clearly means more than protecting the safety of persons or they wouldn’t have added “and the safety of persons” to “protect public order”. Those are different things, and focusing solely on public safety really does ignore what is most important. This from Pius XII:‘this retributive function of punishment is concerned not immediately with what is protected by the law but with the very law itself. There is nothing more necessary for the national and international community than respect for the majesty of the law and the salutary thought that the law is sacred and protected, so that whoever breaks it is liable to punishment and will be punished’.

Most of the modern theories of penal law explain penalty and justify it in the final analysis as a means of protection, that is, defense of the community against criminal undertakings, and at the same time an attempt to bring the offender to observance of the law. In those theories, the penalty can include sanctions such as the diminution of some goods guaranteed by law, so as to teach the guilty to live honestly, but those theories fail to consider the expiation of the crime committed, which penalizes the violation of the law as the prime function of penalty
The expiation of the crime committed - the restoration of the order of justice - is the prime function of punishment. That concept has simply been lost.*For the fundamental demand of justice, whose role in morality is to maintain the existing equilibrium, when it is just, and to restore the balance when upset. It demands that by punishment the person responsible be forcibly brought to order; and the fulfillment of this demand proclaims the absolute supremacy of good over evil; right triumphs sovereignly over wrong. *
It is the loss of a sense of a divine will that has led to our confusion over punishment.In the metaphysical order, penalty is a consequence of dependence on the supreme will, dependence which exists in the deepest recesses of created being. If it is ever necessary to hold back the revolt of the free being and re-establish the violated law, it is when that is required by the supreme Judge and supreme Justice.
Ender

 

[o_mlly]

And with that are dismissed all of the Fathers and Doctors of the Church. Aquinas: irrelevant; Augustine: ditto ditto ditto.

No, of course not. What must be dismissed is any and all erroneous claims and interpretations that contradict magisterial teaching. Do you deny EV p.56 is magisterial?

They support my claim against your interpretation of EV.

It appears you support your claim by citing as authorities those whom you do not accept as authorities unless, in a tortured extract, they can be made to appear to agree with you. That makes you an authority unto yourself. This entire thread is an argument from authority. Or, in an irrational tactic you argue that which is clear and unambiguous is too opaque to be taken at face value and subject it to the “It depends on what the meaning of the word ‘is’ is” type of argument.

Well I’ve learned something then, but this brings up an even more interesting question: if a doctrine in a catechism has no authority except that which it already possesses, how can the doctrine in 2267 (1st ed) have any authority at all since it possesses none external to itself? It was created in the first edition. Edition two points to EV, and EV cites edition one, but edition one cites…nothing at all.
Let me say this again: I do not claim that EV is in error. I claim that your understanding of that document is wrong.

I don’t possess the 1992 Catechism to examine the footnotes. Reread Archbishop Gregory’s commentary. He explains the changes.
*This earlier edition of the catechism retains the traditional teaching of the church, permitting the use of capital punishment to defend life and protect public order, thereby redressing the disorder caused by the offense. The preference for the use of “bloodless means” is in line with the whole tradition of the church because, even in lawfully carrying out justice for the sake of society, Christians are called to show mercy and not vengeance.

When the second edition of the Catechism of the Catholic Church appeared in 1997, some readers were surprised to discover that the purpose of capital punishment as restitution of public order had been removed from the discussion. In addition, the corresponding notion of capital punishment as deterrence to further capital crimes was also reduced. Between the publication of the first edition and that of the official Latin version, Pope John Paul II had issued an important encyclical letter titled “On Human Life” (Evangelium Vitae, 1995) that took up a number of moral issues related to the defense of human life and dignity, including the death penalty. It appears that the late pontiff’s analysis on capital punishment had an impact on the Vatican commission charged with overseeing the revisions of a teaching instrument that is normative for the moral discernment of the world’s 1.1 billion Catholics.

Once the 1997 version of the catechism eliminated the protection of public order as an argument, the only justification for the deterrent value of capital punishment was that it defended human beings against an aggressor. In looking at the revised version of the text, one would have to conclude that the only purpose that would render an execution morally licit, according to Catholic teaching, is the defense of society from the particular criminal whose sentencing is under question.*

What does your bishop say? Your argument is not with me but with your bishop. If your bishop agrees with your interpretation then peace be with you. If not, you have some work to do within your own community.

Now I will really leave this thread! Pax vobiscum.

 

[Rau]

“If bloodless means are sufficient to defend human lives against an aggressor and to protect public order and the safety of persons…”

The protection of public order is a wide remit, and goes well beyond the “defend society from this criminal” (given that is amply addressed separately). Punishment can certainly contribute to protecting the public order.

If the conditions in EV are met, what further good might be delivered by CP to offset the bad of the criminal’s death?

I note that the “IF” in the above quoted extract can’t be assessed solely by gauging the security of the penal system.

 

[Blue_Horizon]

Actually I would put those comments in the “so obviously true they hardly need mentioning” category, but what this indicates is the extent to which you have managed to misunderstand what I’ve been saying.

Ender

Great, we are agreed that it is immoral to impose the death penalty if retribution and restoration ends can be equally well or better achieved by bloodless means.

 

[Blue_Horizon]

You need to complete the idea Blue - not cut it short - leaving others to interpolate, perhaps differently and/or inadequately. It is not sufficient to appeal to “reasonable” bloodless means - go back and read Dulles - he was much more specific.

Do enlighten me as to the subtleties then.

But CP applied in the belief that more good than harm results; that chooses CP believing it to have the best effect of the available options, is not immoral, let alone intrinsically so.

You need to decide what meaning of the ambiguous word “immoral” you mean here.
If you mean actual sin, correct…its not this sort of immoral.
However, believing you understand what you are doing does not make something objectively mortally sinful not mortally sinful.
Was Oedipus objectively mortally sinning or not?
So too, just because you believe that CP is not objectively immoral because you believe its a better option than reasonable bloodless means does NOT make it objectively so.
The Popes may well be objectively right - all CP under such conditions is always and everywhere wrong. As is killing those who are not attacking you. Very similar allegedly “prudential” moral norms.

The way I use the language is to say that an act properly called CP has a good moral object.

We’ve been over this. Its bollocks. You are just incompletely describing the moral object…as is the case when we speak of “killing” without more detail.

The conditions for an act to be moral are well known, and depend on the judgements of the one who acts.

And if the original moral object is incompletely described then what you might now call “circumstances” are in fact likely to contain details that better describe the moral object and, tada, make it objectively immoral…just as recent Popes seem to be saying. That is State executions when reasonable bloodless means are available describe a sub-class of SE that is always and everywhere immoral. But perhaps only venially so.

I have attempted to complete your remark to align it with what Dulles has said. It is evident that gauging the truth of the “red rider” requires a prudential judgment, and the Magisterium, Dulles and I (ok, that last one adds not much) all agree on that judgement.

Prudential hudential. Its a red herring. Its no more prudential (by which you seem to mean dependent on additional circumstances yet to be agreed ) than moral norms such as “killing those who aren’t attacking me is immoral”. Such “prudential” judgements can be universal and objective and therefore intrinsically disordered in the object font if described correctly.

 

[Blue_Horizon]

Originally Posted by Ender View Post
Quote:
We do not say that killings are unjust. We do not say that state killings are unjust. Yet we do judge that killing those who are not attacking us (murder) is unjust. Is that a prudential judgement?

A strange view.
You do not believe that moral judgements/determinations take place in formulating moral norms?
On what basis then are such norms considered certain:

• self evident truth
• natural law?
• accepting alleged Revelation straight from God’s mouth…what you blindly agree to when signing up to be a Catholic?

Clearly formulation of moral norms involves moral judgements - though they are clearly different in character from prudential ones such as “John unjustly killed Bill.”

I’m not sure I understand your question.
Ender

What is so hard to understand?
You have denied that judgements with moral consequences are involved in asserting moral norms. I find that strange. When conscience decides whether something here and now is immoral it is a two step “syllogism”. e.g.
The first statement is a universal judgement:
(1) All fornication is immoral.
The second statement is a particular judgement:
(2) What my long term girlfriend and I intend to do tonight seems right but its called fornication.

So from this syllogism conscience decides - it is immoral for me have sex with my girlfriend.

Now there seem to be a number of judgements of reason that have gone on here and at least two of them have significant moral content.

Why would you disagree?

 

[Ender]

No, of course not. What must be dismissed is any and all erroneous claims and interpretations that contradict magisterial teaching. Do you deny EV p.56 is magisterial?

First you reject my sources as not being magisterial, and then in this post you reject my observation that this would include Aquinas, Augustine and all the other Fathers and Doctors. It would seem that while you don’t reject them in general you do reject them when they “contradict magisterial teaching.” Of course the other way to look at this is that they are contradicting your interpretation of what is being said.

It appears you support your claim by citing as authorities those whom you do not accept as authorities unless, in a tortured extract, they can be made to appear to agree with you.

I have never rejected someone for being insufficiently authoritative, and the reason my citations appear to agree with me is simple: they do, or rather, I agree with them. They are, after all, what the church teaches.

This entire thread is an argument from authority.

This seems an odd objection from someone who won’t believe anything unless it is “magisterial”.

I don’t possess the 1992 Catechism to examine the footnotes.

Section 2267 has none. Section 2266 has one, the same one that appears in 2266 of Edition 2.

Reread Archbishop Gregory’s commentary. He explains the changes.*This earlier edition of the catechism retains the traditional teaching of the church, permitting the use of capital punishment to defend life and protect public order, thereby redressing the disorder caused by the offense. …

When the second edition of the Catechism of the Catholic Church appeared in 1997, some readers were surprised to discover that the purpose of capital punishment as restitution of public order had been removed from the discussion.*

Here’s the problem: in Edition 1 we are told “The primary effect of punishment is to redress the disorder caused by the offense.” In Edition 2 it is said this way: “The primary scope of the penalty is to redress the disorder caused by the offense.” Here is the same passage in EV: “The primary purpose of the punishment which society inflicts is ‘to redress the disorder caused by the offence’.” These are all essentially the same.

According to Archbishop Gregory, however, "the purpose of capital punishment as restitution of public order had been removed from the discussion". That is, we are to accept that redressing the disorder is the primary objective of all punishment except capital punishment. Is that really the most reasonable interpretation?

The primary objective of punishment is universal; it is true in all cases, it is not a mere norm with random exceptions. This is because it is based on natural law, which is not susceptible to modification. This is a rather significant difficulty and suggests that an interpretation that creates an unsolvable problem is not likely the correct one.

*In addition, the corresponding notion of capital punishment as deterrence to further capital crimes was also reduced. …*Once the 1997 version of the catechism eliminated the protection of public order as an argument, the only justification for the deterrent value of capital punishment was that it defended human beings against an aggressor.

This is another problem perspective. Deterrence has always been a valid objective of punishment, and remains so today, so what does the “notion of capital punishment as deterrence…was also reduced” even mean? It cannot possibly have anything to do with its actual effectiveness (or lack of) in deterring crime; that certainly cannot be reduced by fiat.

Also, if deterrence has been eliminated as a concern for “the protection of public order” (which, for every other form of punishment is the primary objective), how does it become transmogrified into a means solely for the physical protection of the public, and if physical protection is now the primary objective then how can we possibly rule out the one action that is guaranteed to protect the public (at least from that particular threat)?

• In looking at the revised version of the text, one would have to conclude that the only purpose that would render an execution morally licit, according to Catholic teaching, is the defense of society from the particular criminal whose sentencing is under question.*

Here are the problems with this interpretation: it changes the natural law teaching about the primary objective of punishment for capital punishment alone, it defines a secondary objective (protection) as primary, it redefines deterrence as synonymous with protection, and it rejects the act which satisfies its own primary objective best. All in all, it is unconvincing.

Ender

 

[Ender]

Great, we are agreed that it is immoral to impose the death penalty if retribution and restoration ends can be equally well or better achieved by bloodless means.

It would be better to state exactly what I agreed with:* "The death penalty should not be imposed if the purposes of punishment can be equally well or better achieved by bloodless means, such as imprisonment.
As well as everything I said: (All right, I probably would hesitate over the “equally well” part.)
*Your reformulation is not far off, but it is different especially in that it assumes “should not be imposed” means it is immoral to do so. I haven’t conceded that point.

Ender

 

[Ender]

What is so hard to understand?
You have denied that judgements with moral consequences are involved in asserting moral norms.

I haven’t denied this because I don’t really understand it. What is a “moral norm”? Do you mean an objectively true moral law? I accept that judgment is involved in applying a moral law to a particular situation. This is Dulles’ formulation:* “Prudential” has a technical theological meaning… It refers to the application of Catholic doctrine to changing concrete circumstances.*
I’m just not sure what judgement is involved in discovering what those objectively true laws are. Nor is it clear what you mean by a “moral consequence”. If you mean only that the consequence of an act will be good or bad, then no, I do not accept the term. The consequences do not alter the nature of the act. If I believe the act will have a bad result, and do it anyway, then regardless of how it actually turns out my act is immoral. Conversely, if I do something for a good reason (and with due care), and it turns out badly, those bad consequences do no make the act immoral.

When conscience decides whether something here and now is immoral it is a two step “syllogism”. e.g.
The first statement is a universal judgement:
(1) All fornication is immoral.
The second statement is a particular judgement:
(2) What my long term girlfriend and I intend to do tonight seems right but its called fornication.

So from this syllogism conscience decides - it is immoral for me have sex with my girlfriend.

Now there seem to be a number of judgements of reason that have gone on here and at least two of them have significant moral content.

Why would you disagree?

I don’t disagree that there is judgment involved in the application of moral law in deciding what should or should not be done in a particular situation. The conscience can reach either a valid or an invalid conclusion as to what is right, and may (or may not) be held accountable for its error.

Ender

 

[Blue_Horizon]

It would be better to state exactly what I agreed with:* "The death penalty should not be imposed if the purposes of punishment* can be equally well or better achieved by bloodless means, such as imprisonment.
As well as everything I said:* (All right, I probably would hesitate over the “equally well” part.)
*Your reformulation is not far off, but it is different especially in that it assumes “should not be imposed” means it is immoral to do so. I haven’t conceded that point.

Ender

I am having some difficulty understanding why any Catholic would not understand that “should not” imposes moral accountability but rather reads this as merely a counsel to more perfect virtue.

 

[Blue_Horizon]

I haven’t denied this because I don’t really understand it. What is a “moral norm”? Do you mean an objectively true moral law? I accept that judgment is involved in applying a moral law to a particular situation. This is Dulles’ formulation:* “Prudential” has a technical theological meaning… It refers to the application of Catholic doctrine to changing concrete circumstances.*
I’m just not sure what judgement is involved in discovering what those objectively true laws are. Nor is it clear what you mean by a “moral consequence”. If you mean only that the consequence of an act will be good or bad, then no, I do not accept the term. The consequences do not alter the nature of the act. If I believe the act will have a bad result, and do it anyway, then regardless of how it actually turns out my act is immoral. Conversely, if I do something for a good reason (and with due care), and it turns out badly, those bad consequences do no make the act immoral.
I don’t disagree that there is judgment involved in the application of moral law in deciding what should or should not be done in a particular situation. The conscience can reach either a valid or an invalid conclusion as to what is right, and may (or may not) be held accountable for its error.

Ender

I have now provided you two examples of what I clearly mean by a moral norm.
Speak to the examples if you are still “confused” rather than try to insert even more abstract concepts into the question.

 

[Ender]

I have now provided you two examples of what I clearly mean by a moral norm.
Speak to the examples if you are still “confused” rather than try to insert even more abstract concepts into the question.

Let’s take abortion as an example: is it a moral norm? It is certainly considered a moral act by a great many people, so if moral normalcy is whatever large numbers of individuals accept then abortion is a moral norm. Of course, if moral norm means something that is objectively moral then the Catholic church would say no, it is not a moral norm.

So, is judgment involved in determining a moral norm? Perhaps, but if morality is nothing more than what the individual thinks will turn out best then the concept of morality is pretty meaningless. Believing that what was wrong yesterday could be considered right today simply because more people now want to do it makes morality an irrelevancy.

If, however, we accept that abortion is immoral is there judgement involved in determining what acts are in fact abortions? Yes. As I said before, prudential judgements are involved in the application of the law in specific instances. So, no, judgment is not involved (on our part) in determining what the moral laws are, but it is involved in applying those laws in our daily lives.

There is no such thing as a moral consequence; there are only moral, amoral, and immoral acts.

What does any of this have to do with capital punishment?

Ender

 

[Ender]

I am having some difficulty understanding why any Catholic would not understand that “should not” imposes moral accountability but rather reads this as merely a counsel to more perfect virtue.

Which of these seems the more common use of “should”:Thou shouldst not kill.
*You should not go out without a hat.
*What is the reason we “should not” impose capital punishment? Because it is immoral - in which case “may not” is the better way to state it - or because it is thought to be unwise? Is “should not” a command or a recommendation, an obligation or a probability? If it’s a moral obligation then it really should be expressed more explicitly, which is a good reason to suspect that it is an advisory, not a command.

Ender

 

[Blue_Horizon]

Let’s take abortion as an example: is it a moral norm? It is certainly considered a moral act by a great many people, so if moral normalcy is whatever large numbers of individuals accept then abortion is a moral norm. Of course, if moral norm means something that is objectively moral then the Catholic church would say no, it is not a moral norm.

So, is judgment involved in determining a moral norm? Perhaps, but if morality is nothing more than what the individual thinks will turn out best then the concept of morality is pretty meaningless. Believing that what was wrong yesterday could be considered right today simply because more people now want to do it makes morality an irrelevancy.

If, however, we accept that abortion is immoral is there judgement involved in determining what acts are in fact abortions? Yes. As I said before, prudential judgements are involved in the application of the law in specific instances. So, no, judgment is not involved (on our part) in determining what the moral laws are, but it is involved in applying those laws in our daily lives.

There is no such thing as a moral consequence; there are only moral, amoral, and immoral acts.

What does any of this have to do with capital punishment?

Ender

I have gone to some trouble to provide you two examples of a moral norm.
Would you do us the courtesy of speaking to these more simple examples and explain your issue with them.
To try and take over absolute management of a discussion wholly on your own terms is not normally considered indicative of someone open to learning or truly engaging with others.

 

[Blue_Horizon]

Which of these seems the more common use of “should”:Thou shouldst not kill.
*You should not go out without a hat.
*What is the reason we “should not” impose capital punishment? Because it is immoral - in which case “may not” is the better way to state it - or because it is thought to be unwise? Is “should not” a command or a recommendation, an obligation or a probability? If it’s a moral obligation then it really should be expressed more explicitly, which is a good reason to suspect that it is an advisory, not a command.

Ender

Cardinal Dulles is a Moral Theologian writing a scholarly work on morality so when such a theologian in such a context writes “*The death penalty should not be imposed if the …” *I think it is abundantly clear what the face value of the expression is to most educated Catholics.

Only “flat-earthers” have such strong pre-set positions that they would use their pre-existing bias to attempt to unlikely interpret a fairly straight forward evidential statement that at face value contradicts their bias…and do so continuously for a mounting collation of strong evidence that at face value does likewise.

To operate in this fashion is to logically make one’s biased world-view uncontestable, infallible and immune to any criticism at all on apriori grounds.

It is certainly true that “an immovable object can never be shaken”. It is also true that “killing those who do not deserve to die is always unjust” But whether such apriori infallible positions have anything to do with the real world or actually advance learning or science or morality is a completely different matter.

This is the mental world of the “flat-earther” who can never be gain-sayed.
Your “arguments” exhibit all the same symptoms from what I can see.

Fairly clearly Card Dulles in his “should not” , if he was not stating something is immoral but rather counselling a choice that is more virtuous, then the common expression for counselling between two acceptable choices would rather be “It would be better if…”.

 

[Rau]

"In any event, the principle set forth in the new Catechism of the Catholic Church remains valid: “If bloodless means are sufficient to defend human lives against an aggressor and to protect public order and the safety of persons, public authority must limit itself to such means, because they better correspond to the concrete conditions of the common good and are more in conformity to the dignity of the human person”. [EV, 56 / CCC]

Q1: Is use of non-lethal means of punishment in the USA in 2017 sufficient to protect “public order” [or: “redress the disorder caused by the offence”] and the other objectives listed above?

Q2: Is the answer to Q1 properly a matter for individual judgement?

For me, the answer to both questions is yes. But for some, the answer to Q1 is no. It follows therefore, that such a person may justifiably call for use of CP.

Popes and Bishops call for abandonment of CP because, using their judgement, they answer Q1 “yes” - and hence find no further good arising form the death of the criminal.

Finally - if one answers Q1 “yes”, ought one to be obliged to prefer non-lethal means? Again, I would have thought the answer is “yes”, because I can find no further “good” to be achieved by killing the criminal.

 

[Blue_Horizon]

Do enlighten me as to the subtleties then.

You need to decide what meaning of the ambiguous word “immoral” you mean here.
If you mean actual sin, correct…its not this sort of immoral.
However, believing you understand what you are doing does not make something objectively mortally sinful not mortally sinful.
Was Oedipus objectively mortally sinning or not?
So too, just because you believe that CP is not objectively immoral because you believe its a better option than reasonable bloodless means does NOT make it objectively so.
The Popes may well be objectively right - all CP under such conditions is always and everywhere wrong. As is killing those who are not attacking you. Very similar allegedly “prudential” moral norms.

We’ve been over this. Its bollocks. You are just incompletely describing the moral object…as is the case when we speak of “killing” without more detail.

And if the original moral object is incompletely described then what you might now call “circumstances” are in fact likely to contain details that better describe the moral object and, tada, make it objectively immoral…just as recent Popes seem to be saying. That is State executions when reasonable bloodless means are available describe a sub-class of SE that is always and everywhere immoral. But perhaps only venially so.

Prudential hudential. Its a red herring. Its no more prudential (by which you seem to mean dependent on additional circumstances yet to be agreed ) than moral norms such as “killing those who aren’t attacking me is immoral”. Such “prudential” judgements can be universal and objective and therefore intrinsically disordered in the object font if described correctly.

Don’t expect me to answer until you respond to this.

In any case, once you decide what you actually mean by “immoral” (as per above) your questions will be half answered.