Capital Punishment

[Ender]

Fairly clearly Card Dulles in his “should not” , if he was not stating something is immoral but rather counselling a choice that is more virtuous, then the common expression for counselling between two acceptable choices would rather be “It would be better if…”.

Given that Dulles said the position of the pope and Magisterium was prudential…*The Pope and the bishops, using their prudential judgment, have concluded that in contemporary society, at least in countries like our own, the death penalty ought not to be invoked, because, on balance, it does more harm than good.
*…and that he also said prudential judgments did not require our assent…*Their prudential judgment, while it is to be respected, is not a matter of binding Catholic doctrine. To differ from such a judgment, therefore, is not to dissent from Church teaching.
*…it is evident that to disagree with his “should not” cannot be immoral.

Ender

 

[Ender]

I have gone to some trouble to provide you two examples of a moral norm.
Would you do us the courtesy of speaking to these more simple examples and explain your issue with them.

You have an infelicitous way of phrasing things that leave your ideas ambiguous or difficult to understand. I respond with counter examples to try and clarify the concepts and remove those issues, but point to the post you would like me to respond to, and I will.

Ender

 

[Blue_Horizon]

Given that Dulles said the position of the pope and Magisterium was prudential…*The Pope and the bishops, using their prudential judgment, have concluded that in contemporary society, at least in countries like our own, the death penalty ought not to be invoked, because, on balance, it does more harm than good.
*…and that he also said prudential judgments did not require our assent…*Their prudential judgment, while it is to be respected, is not a matter of binding Catholic doctrine. To differ from such a judgment, therefore, is not to dissent from Church teaching.
*…it is evident that to disagree with his “should not” cannot be immoral.

Ender

How you wiggle and squirm to avoid accepting you can make public error .
Why is this so difficult for you to ever accept.

It is crystal what Dulles believes the Papal position to be. Namely, as I stated, the choice is immoral if reasonable bloodless means are available. It is more than just a wise counsel to make a more virtuous choice as you have repeatedly and mistakenly opined on this thread.

Sure, it is not immoral to conscientiously object to this Papal position.
But pilease don’t pretend or obfuscate that this is not the Papal position according to your pin-up hero Card. Dulles.

 

[Blue_Horizon]

You have an infelicitous way of phrasing things that leave your ideas ambiguous or difficult to understand. I respond with counter examples to try and clarify the concepts and remove those issues, but point to the post you would like me to respond to, and I will.

Ender

I have used non emotive examples common amongst the doctors of the Church.
They are not difficult to understand if one is not committed to a set position that one is unwilling to budge from.

I am quite willing to explain any ambiguity you feel is present in my example.

For example, why do you feel the major premise in the fornication example is not a determination of objective reason, does not contain a universal and does not have moral consequence if it is denied?

Likewise with the universal moral norm “it is always unjust for me to kill someone who is not attacking me” conveniently named murder.

 

[Ender]

It is crystal what Dulles believes the Papal position to be. Namely, as I stated, the choice is immoral if reasonable bloodless means are available.

Dulles called the “Papal position” a prudential judgment. He also said such judgments are not matters of binding doctrine, and that dissent from judgments is not a dissent from church teaching. It’s not clear how you can read his comments and come to the conclusion that he is saying we may dissent from such judgments…but it is immoral to do so.

Sure, it is not immoral to conscientiously object to this Papal position.

So which is it? In this sentence you say it is not immoral to object, but in the previous one you say that it is immoral. If even you have trouble keeping your positions straight you can appreciate how hard it is for others to understand them.

But pilease don’t pretend or obfuscate that this is not the Papal position according to your pin-up hero Card. Dulles.

I would have thought that citing exactly what Dulles said would have pretty much clarified his position, but even his own statements cannot stand up to your re-interpretation.

But if you’re tired of Dulles let me cite a different cardinal. In response to a question about the relationship between the 1992 catechism and the encyclical EV, Cardinal Ratzinger said this:Thus where other means for the self-defense of society are possible and adequate, the death penalty may be permitted to disappear.
According to you, capital punishment “is immoral if reasonable bloodless means are available”, but according to Ratzinger it simply “*may be permitted to disappear”. *Those are entirely different - and completely incompatible - positions. His position is of course completely compatible with the one (actually) held by Dulles.

Ender

 

[Ender]

I have used non emotive examples common amongst the doctors of the Church.
They are not difficult to understand if one is not committed to a set position that one is unwilling to budge from.

I am quite willing to explain any ambiguity you feel is present in my example.

Start by pointing to the original post you would like me to respond to.

Ender

 

[LucyEm]

It is crystal what Dulles believes the Papal position to be. Namely, as I stated, the choice is immoral if reasonable bloodless means are available. It is more than just a wise counsel to make a more virtuous choice as you have repeatedly and mistakenly opined on this thread.

OMG This is argument for its own sake. You’re both right. The recent Popes have made a prudential judgement about the adequacy of non-lethal means in current day modern societies. [NB: They could be right; they could be wrong.]. To accept that judgement (and no one is required to), but to pursue CP anyway, would be at best “less moral” because, by virtue of that prudential judgement, it does more harm than an alternative. Post #577 seemed to say this pretty clearly and no one objected.

according to your pin-up hero Card. Dulles.

LOL. That’s really crass!

 

[LucyEm]

…But if you’re tired of Dulles let me cite a different cardinal. In response to a question about the relationship between the 1992 catechism and the encyclical EV, Cardinal Ratzinger said this:Thus where other means for the self-defense of society are possible and adequate, the death penalty may be permitted to disappear.
According to you, capital punishment “is immoral if reasonable bloodless means are available”, but according to Ratzinger it simply “*may be permitted to disappear”. *Those are entirely different - and completely incompatible - positions. His position is of course completely compatible with the one (actually) held by Dulles.

But hey, Ratzinger here does not address morality.

Does killing the criminal amount to more harm than incarcerating? If the answer is yes and the public order is no better off (assumed), then how is the killing justified? Are you arguing both acts are “moral”, though the incarceration (given assumptions) is better due to less harm? If so - which should be chosen?

 

[Blue_Horizon]

Start by pointing to the original post you would like me to respond to.

Ender

I have absolutely no respect for the position of anyone, however smart or self-educated who plays these silly games when they are unable to shore up their bridges too far.

It is clear you have no coherent understanding of the traditional differences between prudential determinations, the role of “prudence” in formulating derived moral precepts and the prudential conclusion of syllogistic moral decision making.

You are doomed to languish in your misunderstandings of C. Dulles, the Popes, Aquinas, the CCC and indeed tradition.

For those following this thread:
There is every reason to believe the Popes are in fact slowly introducing a derived moral norm/precept from natural law that applies always and everywhere when their precisely stated conditions re a sub-class of State Executions are met.
Just like asserting “sex between the unmarried is always objectively immoral”.
That is not the conclusion of a syllogistic prudential moral judgement but the very beginning of one. It is a completely different sort of moral judgement - which you clearly deny.

And that precept/norm/universal is “State Executions where reasonable bloodless means are (ie incarceration) available are unjust.”

In which case those who cannot accept this prudential moral precept (as opposed to an individual prudential judgement that reasonable incarceration is not available) may well be non-culpable (invincibly ignorant) yet in objective error.

Ultimately those who sincerely oppose the Popes on this matter will find themselves conscientious objectors because they deny a moral universal and are consequently objectively in sin (if they deny the precept/norm) even if not culpable.

They will not simply be prudentially disagreeing over objectively indeterminate individual cases (where either side may be objectively correct re reasonableness of alternative means to CP). They will be denying a moral precept/universal “prudentially” formulated by the Popes. Call that judgement a form of “commandment” if you like. If its a valid expression of natural law (like the immorality of usury) those who disagree are on an objective slippery slope.

Over and out.

 

[LucyEm]

I have absolutely no respect …

It is clear you have no coherent understanding…

You are doomed to languish in your misunderstandings…

LOL. I’m sure that will do wonders for your relationship with Ender and your rep on the forum!!

There is every reason to believe the Popes are in fact slowly introducing a derived moral norm/precept from natural law that applies always and everywhere when their precisely stated conditions re a sub-class of State Executions are met.

Do you mean they are pointing out we should not kill if the purposes of State imposed punishment can be met just as well without killing? Sounds reasonable. But it also seems to follow from moral theology 101.

And that precept/norm/universal is “State Executions where reasonable bloodless means are (ie incarceration) available are unjust.”

To prefer incarceration, we must be able to conclude that “bloodless means are sufficient to defend human lives against an aggressor and to protect public order and the safety of persons” - like the CCC says! That needs a judgement - not merely the simple observation that a good jail is available!

Ultimately those who sincerely oppose the Popes on this matter will find themselves conscientious objectors because they deny a moral universal and are consequently objectively in sin (if they deny the precept/norm) even if not culpable.

I haven’t heard anyone oppose the Pope(s). The debate is about the meaning and status of what they’ve said about CP vs bloodless means. Unless you are referring to opposing their *judgement *about the adequacy of incarceration - and of course it is not required that anyone accept THAT judgement.

They will not simply be prudentially disagreeing over objectively indeterminate individual cases (where either side may be objectively correct re reasonableness of alternative means to CP). They will be denying a moral precept/universal “prudentially” formulated by the Popes.

Anyone may disagree with the view that incarceration is sufficient *“to defend human lives against an aggressor and **to protect public order **and the safety of persons”. *But if someone **does **accept this - I’m yet to hear on what basis they would retain the view that CP is the way to go. Any thoughts Ender?

Over and out.

cheers!

 

[Ender]

The recent Popes have made a prudential judgement about the adequacy of non-lethal means in current day modern societies. [NB: They could be right; they could be wrong.]. To accept that judgement (and no one is required to), but to pursue CP anyway, would be at best “less moral” because, by virtue of that prudential judgement, it does more harm than an alternative.

I disagree that one position is either more or less moral than the other. In both cases the person is making a prudential judgment as to which action is better, so while one position will actually be better than the other, neither is morally superior.

Post #577 seemed to say this pretty clearly and no one objected.

I didn’t read it that way. It is presented that “If” not executing is as effective as executing then we should not execute. That’s probably true, but it’s also a pretty big “if”.

Ender

 

[LucyEm]

I disagree that one position is either more or less moral than the other. In both cases the person is making a prudential judgment as to which action is better, so while one position will actually be better than the other, neither is morally superior.

You’ve answered the wrong question, or misunderstood It.

Isn’t the better option that which fulfills the objectives (I’ve quoted them a few times) and does least harm? So…if incarceration fulfills the objectives, why kill? You’ve not answered this question !!

 

[Ender]

But hey, Ratzinger here does not address morality.

I think that’s true: he’s indicating that it is not a moral choice, but a practical one.

Does killing the criminal amount to more harm than incarcerating? If the answer is yes and the public order is no better off (assumed), then how is the killing justified?

In such a case an execution would not be justified, but there is no moral choice in determining which of two actions will lead to the preferred result.

Are you arguing both acts are “moral”, though the incarceration (given assumptions) is better due to less harm? If so - which should be chosen?

No, that is not my position. If I believe that incarceration is the better solution I have a moral obligation to choose it, but the same is true if I believe execution is the better solution. I am morally obligated to do what I think is best, but the determination of what will turn out for the best does not involve moral choices.

Ender

 

[Ender]

Do you mean they are pointing out we should not kill if the purposes of State imposed punishment can be met just as well without killing? Sounds reasonable. But it also seems to follow from moral theology 101.

Through the centuries, and from the very beginning, popes, Fathers, and Doctors, have spoken against the use of capital punishment, but never against its legitimacy. Your summary above falls into that category; this is not a new position for the church.

To prefer incarceration, we must be able to conclude that “bloodless means are sufficient to defend human lives against an aggressor and to protect public order and the safety of persons” - like the CCC says! That needs a judgement - not merely the simple observation that a good jail is available!

The issue with this passage is the meaning of “public order”. As it is phrased it is something different than merely “the safety of persons”, and this I would agree with. It is a distinction Pius XII made in 1953:*this retributive function of punishment is concerned not immediately with what is protected by the law but with the very law itself.
*It is when the “bloodless means” is applied solely to individual protection that this breaks down, as protection is only a secondary objective of punishment, and it is the primary objective that must (where possible) determine the extent of the punishment.

I haven’t heard anyone oppose the Pope(s).

One of the biggest arguments has been over whether it is personal protection alone that determines whether capital punishment may be used. I certainly disagree with that position.

Ender

 

[Ender]

You’ve answered the wrong question, or misunderstood It.

Isn’t the better option that which fulfills the objectives (I’ve quoted them a few times) and does least harm?

Of course. The questions arise over what the objectives are, and especially what is the primary objective, and whether incarceration actually better fulfills those objectives.

So…if incarceration fulfills the objectives, why kill? You’ve not answered this question !!

If we cannot agree on what the primary objective is we’re probably not going to agree on what action best satisfies it. The disagreement is not about whether we should “do what is best”, it is about (1) what is most important, and (2) how do we best satisfy that objective? Sure, if not killing is just as effective as killing we shouldn’t kill, but that’s not really the issue.

Ender

 

[LucyEm]

Sure, if not killing is just as effective as killing we shouldn’t kill, but that’s not really the issue.

Well, there are multiple issues, and this is definitely one of them!

And “effective” needs to be replaced by the factors being assessed. “Protection of public order” captures the key objective beyond the simple direct defense goal, right?

To be clear… you do agree that “if bloodless means are sufficient to defend human lives against an aggressor and to protect public order and the safety of persons”, then these means must be chosen. Yes?

 

[LucyEm]

One of the biggest arguments has been over whether it is personal protection alone that determines whether capital punishment may be used. I certainly disagree with that position.

It is clearly not just “personal protection from this criminal” alone. The CCC also includes the “public order” in the objectives. That is a broad term. It goes to the good of society that punishment can influence. That’s broad enough to encompass retribution and the point made by Pius XII.

 

[Ender]

And “effective” needs to be replaced by the factors being assessed. “Protection of public order” captures the key objective beyond the simple direct defense goal, right?

I don’t really like “protection of public order” because the phrase is vague, could mean most anything, and almost surely means something different to each of us.

To be clear… you do agree that “if bloodless means are sufficient to defend human lives against an aggressor and to protect public order and the safety of persons”, then these means must be chosen. Yes?

No, I don’t. The punishment that ought to be chosen is the one that best satisfies those objectives, not one that minimally satisfies them. Nor do I have any idea what it means specifically to “defend human lives against an aggressor.” For example, we know for certain that some killers who are captured, convicted, and imprisoned will kill again. So: how many recidivist murders do we accept before we say human lives are insufficiently protected? Where is the threshold between sufficient and insufficient protection, because if it’s only one repeat killing then we know for a fact that prison is inadequate. So: what is your limit on the number of repeat murders you will accept before you will say that the public is not adequately protected? If neither you nor anyone else can even define what adequate protection means how can it be claimed that prison can achieve it?

Ender

 

[Ender]

The CCC also includes the “public order” in the objectives. That is a broad term. It goes to the good of society that punishment can influence. That’s broad enough to encompass retribution and the point made by Pius XII.

What are the objectives of punishment?
What is the primary objective?
I had a very long discussion with someone else about this, and I keep coming back to it because until and unless these points are properly understood the debate cannot progress.

Ender

 

[LucyEm]

What are the objectives of punishment?
What is the primary objective?
I had a very long discussion with someone else about this, and I keep coming back to it because until and unless these points are properly understood the debate cannot progress.

Ender

The purposes of punishment are of an earthly nature, most especially CP. They are not a substitute for ultimate fate. You are reaching for an end which is not there. You depart from Dulles now.