Capital Punishment

[Blue_Horizon]

… and we were permitted to pursue precisely his (the aggressor’s) death. Something we can’t do to an innocent.

Everything was good until this.

“Permitted to pursue precisely his death…” sounds very much like what theologians call a “direct intention”. Which explains why it cannot justify death of the innocent.

However when it comes to the guilty (as in lethal self defence) this same “permitted to pursue precisely his death…” you use as if it means indirect intention (which it must be for justly killing an aggressor).

This is inconsistent use of your expression and thus seems illogical to me.

If we were consistent with your “permitted to pursue precisely” re both innocent and guilty alike we would logically conclude that:

Either (A) we speak of an indirect intent above so:
We are “permitted to pursue precisely his (the aggressor’s) death” AND we may apply the same sort of “permission” to 1cm of fallopian tube with a live embryo inside (the innocent);

Or (B) we speak of a direct intent above so:
We are NOT “permitted to pursue precisely his (the aggressor’s) death” NOR may we apply the same sort of “permission” to 1cm of fallopian tube with a live embryo inside;

 

[Blue_Horizon]

So long as there is no reasonable alternative, I believe one may choose in an act of self defense something that will clearly cause death. What is forbidden is deliberately killing the attacker if a non-fatal option is available. This is a clear case of double effect, but double effect does not apply to capital punishment.

Ender

" one may **choose something **that will clearly cause death" suggests the something is a means to an end called “death”.
Therefore the death is directly intended with this “choosing” of something is it not?

"What is forbidden is **deliberately killing **the attacker if a non-fatal option is available. "
This suggests you believe the attacker may be killed with a direct intention if a non-fatal option is unavailable?

Both the above, if so, would then seem to contradict the CCC.

Or do you mean “deliberate killing” signifies an indirect intent?
If so would you object to describing an ectopic pregnancy procedure also as a licit “direct killing.”

 

[Rau]

Everything was good until this.

“Permitted to pursue precisely his death…” sounds very much like what theologians call a “direct intention”. Which explains why it cannot justify death of the innocent.

However when it comes to the guilty (as in lethal self defence) this same “permitted to pursue precisely his death…” you use as if it means indirect intention (which it must be for justly killing an aggressor).

By that set of words I mean the same thing - a focussed choice on death as means, selected because no other means is foreseen to reasonably achieve the (good) ends.

I may not ever choose such means against an innocent, yet I may against a non-innocent.

If we were consistent with your “permitted to pursue precisely” re both innocent and guilty alike we would logically conclude that:

Either (A) we speak of an indirect intent above so:
We are “permitted to pursue precisely his (the aggressor’s) death” AND we may apply the same sort of “permission” to 1cm of fallopian tube with a live embryo inside (the innocent);

Or (B) we speak of a direct intent above so:
We are NOT “permitted to pursue precisely his (the aggressor’s) death” NOR may we apply the same sort of “permission” to 1cm of fallopian tube with a live embryo inside;

This is confused. It is clear that cutting 1cm of mother’s tube about to rupture is a medical procedure directed at the mother’s body to prevent her imminent bleeding to death. The impact on the baby enclosed is evidently unintended and unavoidable. I think it is clear how the child suffers an “indirect abortion” from this procedure. I trust it is clear that when a methotrexate injection instead is used as means (to achieve the identical good end), this is directed solely at the child, and kills the child. This is direct abortion.

 

[Rau]

If so would you object to describing an ectopic pregnancy procedure also as a licit “direct killing.”

It may be direct or indirect according to the procedure selected, as I explained in the just prior post. Given the child is innocent, there is no possibility of a direct killing being licit.

 

[o_mlly]

Agreed. And while this looks like an a posteriori prudential judgement which leaves open a principled theoretic right to CP… it doesn’t for the old retributive justice justification argument of Ender or the old divine right of kings (Rau?).

The only principled basis that now remains is self defence … which in most countries calls for incarceration not death in practise as you observe.

I believe that Evangelium Vitae (EV) does exactly that: retributive justice is not a moral argument for the state’s use of capital punishment.

“Redress the disorder” and “retribution” are not synonyms. Redress includes all the acts necessary to restore and maintain the order in society disrupted by sin, one of which is retribution, the just punishment due the sinner.

Retribution is nothing more than instruction which holds the state to **limited **penalties as taught in “an eye for an eye, tooth for tooth.” If retribution instructed the state to exact penalties identical to the crime then retribution would require that the state rape the rapist, steal from the thief, and lie to the liar. Retribution does not require but merely allows capital punishment. EV limits the state’s license to kill to only circumstances where bloodless means are not available.

Also, the principle of the double effect I think, clearly does not apply to capital punishment for two reasons: death is the intended end, and the good effect (protection of society) proceeds from that death. Evil may never be intended; the good end may not proceed from the evil (end justifies the means).

 

[Ender]

“Redress the disorder” and “retribution” are not synonyms. Redress includes all the acts necessary to restore and maintain the order in society disrupted by sin, one of which is retribution, the just punishment due the sinner.

Since a great deal of confusion would be clarified by settling this question, let’s analyze this point.

Redress is defined by the catechism as the primary objective of punishment. Dulles has identified four such objectives: protection, deterrence, rehabilitation, and retribution, and the question is: to which of these does redress refer?

Regarding the meaning of redress, it is defined as “to remedy, or to set right.” That is, it refers to repairing something, so while I agree with you that it involves “restoring”, there is no concept in the term for “maintaining.” Maintaining is not restoring; these are different concepts.

So, of the four ends of protection, which ones deal with restoring or remedying something? Certainly deterrence does not; that is about preventing future disruptions, not remedying old ones. The same argument is true of protection; redress cannot refer to it either. Rehabilitation is at least a possibility. Certainly one could look at restoring the moral health of an individual as redressing his disorder, but the entire phrase is *“The primary scope of the penalty is to redress the disorder caused by the offense.” *What is being referred to here is the disorder caused to the social order, which is more than simply rehabilitating a disordered individual.

Given that deterrence and protection redress nothing at all, and rehabilitation ignores the impact on society, the most reasonable conclusion is that redress refers to retribution as the primary end of punishment.

Retribution is nothing more than instruction which holds the state to **limited **penalties as taught in “an eye for an eye, tooth for tooth.”

The concept of an eye for an eye limits the penalties; it is this limitation that determines the justness of a retributive punishment.

If retribution instructed the state to exact penalties identical to the crime then retribution would require that the state rape the rapist, steal from the thief, and lie to the liar.

But the catechism does not mandate this. As it clearly states, the severity of the punishment must be “commensurate” with the severity of the offense, not identical. Retribution does not “instruct”. It is an act of justice.We speak of merit and demerit, in relation to retribution, rendered according to justice. Now, retribution according to justice is rendered to a man, by reason of his having done something to another’s advantage or hurt. (Aquinas ST I-II 21,3)

Retribution does not require but merely allows capital punishment.

You assert this but provide nothing to support the claim. Justice requires that the punishment be as severe as the crime, and it seems that God himself has identified death as the just punishment for murder.

Also, the principle of the double effect I think, clearly does not apply to capital punishment for two reasons: …

I agree with both of these reasons.

Ender

 

[o_mlly]

Since a great deal of confusion would be clarified by settling this question, let’s analyze this point.

Redress is defined by the catechism as the primary objective of punishment. Dulles has identified four such objectives: protection, deterrence, rehabilitation, and retribution, and the question is: to which of these does redress refer?

Regarding the meaning of redress, it is defined as “to remedy, or to set right.” That is, it refers to repairing something, so while I agree with you that it involves “restoring”, there is no concept in the term for “maintaining.” Maintaining is not restoring; these are different concepts.

…Ender

To analyze retribution and redress, I think one must separate the act (redress) from its intended ends (retribution, rehabilitation, defense against the criminal, and deterrence).
The purposes of criminal punishment are rather unanimously delineated in the Catholic tradition. Punishment is held to have a variety of ends that may conveniently be reduced to the following four: rehabilitation, defense against the criminal, deterrence, and retribution (Avery Dulles).

• Retribution is the primary but not the only end intended by the act of redress.
• Therefore, redress is incomplete if it accomplishes retribution only.
• The maintenance of societal order are effected in the ends of rehabilitation, defense against the criminal, and deterrence.
• These ends are secondary but still necessary.
• Therefore, the act of redress must include ends aimed at the maintenance as well as restoration of order.

 

[Blue_Horizon]

By that set of words I mean the same thing - a focussed choice on death as means, selected because no other means is foreseen to reasonably achieve the (good) ends.

I may not ever choose such means against an innocent, yet I may against a non-innocent.

This is confused. It is clear that cutting 1cm of mother’s tube about to rupture is a medical procedure directed at the mother’s body to prevent her imminent bleeding to death. The impact on the baby enclosed is evidently unintended and unavoidable. I think it is clear how the child suffers an “indirect abortion” from this procedure. I trust it is clear that when a methotrexate injection instead is used as means (to achieve the identical good end), this is directed solely at the child, and kills the child. This is direct abortion.

I find it fascinating that instead of arguing from consistent particular facts to deduce what particular moral principles are at work you do the reverse! From an as yet unjustified application of particular principles you argue what must or must not be the case re what a person is allegedly doing …even when doing so introduces factual inconsistency.

This seems an apriori rationalism, not the moderate realism of the Church I suggest.

To suggest that a doctor, in cutting out 1cm of tube with an implanted embryo does not intend a death in the same way a defender might do by shooting his intruder in the head is beyond credibility. Both are exactly chosen as the only practical means to securing a legitimate greater good. Indeed a focused choice on death as a means and whether the unfortunate victim is guilty or innocent makes little difference in these two PODE examples.

My point is not that this intent is direct or indirect. I am not quite sure of that. But in both cases whatever it is they are the same. The objective innocence of the victim or not does not magically make the agent’s same practical intent different.

I respect Ender’s approach here, he at least is willing to accept that in PODE scenarios the defender does choose the death of his attacker and doesn’t pretend the defender only chooses to pull the trigger or the doctor only chooses to remove 1cm of tube with unconvincing mental reservations on the certain deaths that follow.

My observation on his approach is that he seems to assume this is a direct intention. I disagree, it can still be an indirect one. That is what I am currently trying to understand from him.

I believe you are too wedded to the notion that choosing death as a means must always indicate direct intention.

Personally it seems to me we need to develop a better philosophy of means and intent.
It seems there are two sets of means/intent in play in these sort of PODE scenarios. One is merely practical/mechanical, the other at a deeper level.

 

[Blue_Horizon]

It may be direct or indirect according to the procedure selected, as I explained in the just prior post. Given the child is innocent, there is no possibility of a direct killing being licit.

Let’s wait for Ender, he best knows what he meant.

 

[Blue_Horizon]

By that set of words I mean the same thing - a focussed choice on death as means, selected because no other means is foreseen to reasonably achieve the (good) ends.

This is confused. It is clear that cutting 1cm of mother’s tube about to rupture is a medical procedure directed at the mother’s body to prevent her imminent bleeding to death. The impact on the baby enclosed is evidently unintended and unavoidable.

How confused?

If one chooses a practical means that one knows unavoidably results in death how is this not directly intended?

Yet you apply this definition (a focussed choice on death) as legitimate in self defence which we know cannot be justified except by indirect intent?

 

[Blue_Horizon]

I believe that Evangelium Vitae (EV) does exactly that: retributive justice is not a moral argument for the state’s use of capital punishment.

“Redress the disorder” and “retribution” are not synonyms. Redress includes all the acts necessary to restore and maintain the order in society disrupted by sin, one of which is retribution, the just punishment due the sinner.

Retribution is nothing more than instruction which holds the state to **limited **penalties as taught in “an eye for an eye, tooth for tooth.” If retribution instructed the state to exact penalties identical to the crime then retribution would require that the state rape the rapist, steal from the thief, and lie to the liar. Retribution does not require but merely allows capital punishment. EV limits the state’s license to kill to only circumstances where bloodless means are not available.

Also, the principle of the double effect I think, clearly does not apply to capital punishment for two reasons: death is the intended end, and the good effect (protection of society) proceeds from that death. Evil may never be intended; the good end may not proceed from the evil (end justifies the means).

Well put except for the last paragraph. It may be just semantics…but I define CP as pretty much the same as any State execution. In which case some cases could be justified on redress the disorder principles (but not retribution justice principles) if incarceration was not possible.

So when you say the PODE does not apply to CP do you mean only those State executions done purely for retribution justice reasons? Or do you mean even valid State executions (redressive justice), if any, are not examples of PODE either?

 

[Rau]

Let’s wait for Ender, he best knows what he meant.

By all means, but do you disagree with the moral anslysis I’ve provided of 2 possible ectopic pregnancy treatments? Do you agree they are morally different?

 

[Rau]

I find it fascinating …

Please spare us Blue. Focus on the issue.

To suggest that a doctor, in cutting out 1cm of tube with an implanted embryo does not intend a death in the same way a defender might do by shooting his intruder in the head is beyond credibility.

The doctor does not intend the death in any manner at all, for this reason -** the death does not in any way contribute to the Intention of saving the mother**. The doctor foresees and accepts the death, and proceeds anyway. This is called “indirect abortion”. An alternative procedure (methotrexate injection - directed at the child) in which the death itself leads to the good end is a “direct abortion”.

My point is not that this intent is direct or indirect. I am not quite sure of that. But in both cases whatever it is they are the same.

I trust you can see that 2 variants of acts to treat ectopic pregnancy both involve a child’s death, but one is a direct abortion, the other indirect. The question to be thought about is whether in self-defence, it is ever the case that the act is a “direct killing”, and whether “direct killing” is even a proper expression.

The objective innocence of the victim or not does not magically make the agent’s same practical intent different.

It does not change the practical nature of the means - the question is whether it changes the moral object.

…[Ender] at least is willing to accept that… the doctor [doesn’t pretend he] only chooses to remove 1cm of tube with unconvincing mental reservations on the certain deaths that follow.

The doctor knows full well the unfortunate consequences. But they (the death) are not the means thru which the good end is achieved, and thus are not “direct”.

My observation on his approach is that he seems to assume this is a direct intention. I disagree, it can still be an indirect one. That is what I am currently trying to understand from him.

I have been trying to understand the converse from you for months! Countless times I have asked how contraception to avoid a deformed baby is not, first and foremost, (direct) contraception - since the good end arises from that. But you simply repeat - it’s “indirect contraception”.

-]I believe you are too wedded to the notion/-] I disagree that choosing death as a means must always indicate direct intention.

I am open to a meaningful analysis of that point.

 

[Blue_Horizon]

Please spare us Blue. Focus on the issue.

I see your usual drawing of the mental blinds moment has arrived.
Rational and fruitful converse with you is no longer possible for the moment then…

 

[Rau]

…Rational and fruitful converse with you is no longer possible for the moment then…

:tsktsk:
What seems no longer possible is to bring you to address specifics.

 

[Blue_Horizon]

By all means, but do you disagree with the moral anslysis I’ve provided of 2 possible ectopic pregnancy treatments? Do you agree they are morally different?

I do not care to discuss your tangential concern at the moment.
My focus is, or was, why you believe the focus to kill in ectopic removal is different from that in self defence. You maintain its because the victim is innocent in one and guilty in the other. That’s a crock in my humble opinion.

You go even further and add that guilt or innocence changes the “moral object”.
That is also a crock. When dealing with PODE the killing is not in the 1st font material object (notice I removed your technically unhelpful and likely incorrect use of the adjective “moral”), the killing is in the 3rd font…circumstances.
At least you accept the 2nd font (intention) remains the same … although it remains to discern whether you speak of the direct intention (aimed at the 1st font) or the indirect intention (aimed at the 3rd font).

At this stage you seem to prevaricate and jump horses constantly re what you actually mean by focussed killing in different examples. Which you deny.

 

[Rau]

I do not care to discuss your tangential concern at the moment.
My focus is, or was, why you believe the focus to kill in ectopic removal is different from that in self defence.

Is it not evident that you must decide which ectopic pregnancy treatment you reference, given their morally different nature? Even if you reject that statement, please tell me which ectopic pregnancy you wish to be compared to self-defence and I will try and answer.

 

[o_mlly]

…So when you say the PODE does not apply to CP do you mean only those State executions done purely for retribution justice reasons? Or do you mean even valid State executions (redressive justice), if any, are not examples of PODE either?

I do not believe PODE applies to the death penalty in any case. Death is intended and any good effects proceeds only because of that death.

The examples discussed for irregular fetal implantation show this crucial difference. An ectopic pregnancy threatens the mother’s life via ruptured tube as the fetus grows. The excision of the tube saves the mother but kills the baby. The surgery is permissible since it is the tubal excision which saves the mother, not the indirect death of the encapsulated fetus. Hepatic pregnancy surgeries, on the other hand, are not justified because the procedure excises only the fetus and is, therefore, a direct attack on the life of an innocent.

 

[Ender]

To analyze retribution and redress, I think one must separate the act (redress) from its intended ends (retribution, rehabilitation, defense against the criminal, and deterrence).

This approach equates redress with punishment, but the catechism states that redress is an objective of punishment. Punishment has four ends, of which redress is one

Retribution is the primary but not the only end intended by the act of redress.

Again, you equate redress with punishment, but if they were the same the statement in the catechism would make no sense: “The primary scope of the penalty is to redress the disorder…” How can something be an act and the objective of that act?

Therefore, redress is incomplete if it accomplishes retribution only.

This depends on what is being redressed. If you equate redress with “making everything good” then this might be true, but what is in fact being redressed is the order of justice.

The maintenance of societal order are effected in the ends of rehabilitation, defense against the criminal, and deterrence.

Maintaining what is good is not the same as restoring what was damaged. These are two different concepts. Redress does not refer to maintenance.

These ends are secondary but still necessary.

While something may have more than one end, all other ends are necessarily subordinate to whatever is the primary end. (Roman Rota, 1944)

Therefore, the act of redress must include ends aimed at the maintenance as well as restoration of order.

There is no act of redress; there is an act of punishment which has the effect of redress.

Ender

 

[Ender]

" one may **choose something **that will clearly cause death" suggests the something is a means to an end called “death”. Therefore the death is directly intended with this “choosing” of something is it not?

No, I don’t think so. If I have a dead tree in my yard I will choose to take it down because it is dangerous. That there is a squirrel’s nest in that tree that will be destroyed when the tree falls does not mean I intend to destroy the nest. Even though I have chosen something that will clearly have that effect, there is no sense in which I directly intended that result.

"What is forbidden is **deliberately killing **the attacker if a non-fatal option is available. "
This suggests you believe the attacker may be killed with a direct intention if a non-fatal option is unavailable?

No, it means exactly the opposite.

Or do you mean “deliberate killing” signifies an indirect intent?

No. If I deliberately kill someone it means that killing him was the direct intent of my action. The action was taken precisely in order to kill.

If so would you object to describing an ectopic pregnancy procedure also as a licit “direct killing.”

No. I would accept it in the same sense that I accept the destruction of the squirrel’s nest. The outcome is inevitable but it is not the objective of the act.

Ender