Cardinal Muller: no need to clarify Amoris Laetitia [CC]

  • Thread starter Thread starter Catholic_Press
  • Start date Start date
Status
Not open for further replies.
You dont need history to determine slippery slope. You just need a principle that can be applied to anything. .
Spoken like a true rationalist.
Now all you have to do is find some way of proving this apriori assertion is actually real.
 
Because nobody is arguing the matter of a couple that is living as brother and sister. Who here has a debate about that? The issue has to do precisely with the matter where the couple is NOT required to commit to living as brother and sister before they can approach communion which is what John Paul II taught MUST be the case. The matter is those who now claim a couple can keep an active sexual life without either annullment or repentance (which would require the intention to live as brother and sister as taught by JPII and BXVI) and STILL approach communion nonetheless. Please read the posts I have written to Pnewton just above.
So why then did pnewton comment?: “The family synod rejected those who wanted communion opened for the divorced and remarried across the board, but it also rejected those that wanted it defined as doctrine that such a one was forbidden from communion”.
 
Tell you what. I suggest a dare - that we continue the discussion without either party using the word “you” or “your” once, except as indefinite pronouns. We just limit ourselves to the subject matter of each other’s posts.

Whaddaya say?
Sorry, I long ago gave up the Socratic view that insight/apologetics/conversion is simply a matter of communicating/arguing impersonal objective knowledge.
Christianity witnesses to the messy reality that one must at some point engage the individual person…and oneself. Polite “you” talk is essential.
 
So why then did pnewton comment?: “The family synod rejected those who wanted communion opened for the divorced and remarried across the board, but it also rejected those that wanted it defined as doctrine that such a one was forbidden from communion”.
Please read the debate. He has been defending the practice of dioceses permitting sexually active remarried to communion without requiring either repentance (which means committment to abstinence from sex) or annullment first. I don’t know how you decide to go after me who has been opposing these practices precisely because the church had always required abstaining from sex until a nullity was declared before one could make a valid confession and therefore approach communion. Pnewton and those arguing with him insist that these allowance by these dioceses can somehow be legitimate and also contained to just the remarried and no other sinners. Also, he says the synod rejected the position that the remarried must not be permitted communion except for annullment and the continence requirement. This is why I referrered to JPII saying it was not jut forbidden but IMPOSSIBLE to permit communion reception where the couple remained sexually active. How exactly dd you miss that in this long debate???

EDIT: I have re-read your first post and I believe I see your confusion: Let me explain. Pnewton referred to persons still in a “state of grace” but in “objective adultery”. You of course assume this must mean they are not engaged in sexual activity. What you have missed is Pnewton’s attempt to square the circle by arguing that someway somehow the couple could be sexually active with no intention of stopping, having been made aware of their state by the church, and STILL be in a state of grace that permits communion without CEASING that sexual activity!!! That this was somehow allowed by the Synod. THAT IS THE ISSUE.
 
Habitual sins, a.k.a. vices, do not remove culpability. This is standard moral theology.
Like much of moral theology black and white statements are generally unhelpful as words and phrases are often ambiguous and so distinctions need to be made.

So I think one would be on safer ground to affirm that bad habits do not always mitigate culpability.

At the same time the CCC does appear to support pNewton’s common sense pastoral and theological observations: “To form an equitable judgment about the subjects’ moral responsibility and to guide pastoral action, one must take into account …force of acquired habit…”

A complicating factor in such analysis is that Aristotle’s philosophy of “habit” re the moral order (which Aquinas uses) does not quite have the same meaning that contemporary culture gives to the word “habit”.

So to uncritically accept anything transliterated from latin “habitus” to English “habit” is a risky business indeed, interpreting such texts is not for the uninitiated nor the faint hearted.
 
Sorry, I long ago gave up the Socratic view that insight/apologetics/conversion is simply a matter of communicating/arguing impersonal objective knowledge.
Christianity witnesses to the messy reality that one must at some point engage the individual person…and oneself. Polite “you” talk is essential.
Well, I can’t force someone to avoid ad hominem statements like:
If you were a recently ordained priest I am afraid I don’t know any experienced priest who would recommend you for Confessional faculties on the basis of these statements
But don’t mind if henceforth I just ignore them.

Back to the subject matter.
Like much of moral theology black and white statements are generally unhelpful as words and phrases are often ambiguous and so distinctions need to be made.
Sometimes. And sometimes not. In this case, not. A Catholic couple in an irregular union who know the teaching of the Church and who engage in sex without one partner forcing it on the other (e.g. rape) are committing subjective mortal sin as there is nothing that diminishes their consent to the point of removing culpability or at least reducing it to a venial sin. No amount of distinctions or subdistinctions can change that reality.

A parallel case to make it clear: a Mafia hitman who carries on killing people is gravely culpable even if he fears he cannot make a living otherwise. Something that removes full consent would have to be something that substantially overrides free will, like drugging or immediate and direct fear of his life (the Capo is holding a gun to his head).
So I think one would be on safer ground to affirm that bad habits do not always mitigate culpability.
Bad habits of themselves do not remove full consent. No matter how habitual a mortal sin, committing it is still gravely sinful.
At the same time the CCC does appear to support pNewton’s common sense pastoral and theological observations: “To form an equitable judgment about the subjects’ moral responsibility and to guide pastoral action, one must take into account …force of acquired habit…”
See above comment.
A complicating factor in such analysis is that Aristotle’s philosophy of “habit” re the moral order (which Aquinas uses) does not quite have the same meaning that contemporary culture gives to the word “habit”.
So to uncritically accept anything transliterated from latin “habitus” to English “habit” is a risky business indeed, interpreting such texts is not for the uninitiated nor the faint hearted.
Irrelevant. We both understand what is meant by ‘habitual’ in the context of remarried divorcees. And bravehearts and fainthearts can both understand the Church’s perennial teaching on not giving Communion to sexually active couples in irregular unions. It is not an obtuse theological subject like Predestination.
 
Is a material sin a moral evil? No. How can a transgression which is not even a “human act” be anything more than a form of sleep-walking?
I’m actually surprised you misunderstand this.52. Q. What is actual sin?
  • A. Actual sin is any willful thought, word, deed or omission contrary to the law of God. *(Baltimore Catechism)
    Two points: first, there is nothing there that raises the question of culpability. That is, culpability is not an issue in determining whether a sin has occurred. Second, the conditional word is “willful” (not culpable). If a man gets into bed with a woman he thinks is his wife he does not commit adultery. If he knowingly has sex with another woman he has committed a sin whether or not he is culpable for it. The choice remains objectively a disorder - a sin. That fact is not changed by the validity of his judgment in choosing the act.*It is possible that the evil done as the result of invincible ignorance or a non-culpable error of judgment may not be imputable to the agent; but even in this case it does not cease to be an evil, a disorder in relation to the truth about the good. *(JPII, Veritatis splendor #63)
Is it a “sin”? Strictly speaking no, loosely yes. (Only mortal sin is “true” sin). Its a very subtle distinction. Is just the “material” component of a “substance” enough to name the “substance” (these are scholastic philosophic terms).
So a material sin is, strictly speaking, not a sin? JPII disagrees: * the Church teaches that “there exist acts which per se and in themselves, independently of circumstances, are always seriously wrong by reason of their object” *(Reconciliatio et paenitentia)Again, culpability does not condition the nature of these acts: they are “always seriously wrong”. That is, they are always sins as they are always acts “contrary to the law of God.” Responsibility for the act does not change the nature of the act.

A material sin is still a sin because what was willfully chosen is contrary to God’s law. That fact is not changed by the determination that the individual is not culpable for the error of his choice.

Ender
 
Please read the debate. He has been defending the practice of dioceses permitting sexually active remarried to communion without requiring either repentance (which means committment to abstinence from sex) or annullment first. I don’t know how you decide to go after me who has been opposing these practices precisely because the church had always required abstaining from sex until a nullity was declared before one could make a valid confession and therefore approach communion. Pnewton and those arguing with him insist that these allowance by these dioceses can somehow be legitimate and also contained to just the remarried and no other sinners. Also, he says the synod rejected the position that the remarried must not be permitted communion except for annullment and the continence requirement. This is why I referrered to JPII saying it was not jut forbidden but IMPOSSIBLE to permit communion reception where the couple remained sexually active. How exactly dd you miss that in this long debate???

EDIT: I have re-read your first post and I believe I see your confusion: Let me explain. Pnewton referred to persons still in a “state of grace” but in “objective adultery”. You of course assume this must mean they are not engaged in sexual activity. What you have missed is Pnewton’s attempt to square the circle by arguing that someway somehow the couple could be sexually active with no intention of stopping, having been made aware of their state by the church, and STILL be in a state of grace that permits communion without CEASING that sexual activity!!! That this was somehow allowed by the Synod. THAT IS THE ISSUE.
The pnewton statement made was about one “who is still in a state of grace” and yes there is the well known case of living as brother and sister mentioned, but are also other situations conceivable where there is non willful sexual activity.

Note also that threads have been merged by the moderator.
 
The pnewton statement made was about one “who is still in a state of grace” and yes there is the well known case of living as brother and sister mentioned, but are also other situations conceivable where there is non willful sexual activity.

Note also that threads have been merged by the moderator.
No one is talking about the brother/sister scenario nor one of non-willful sexual activity. 'm sorry but you are talking about something no one hereis debating. Since I have explained exactly what conversation/debate I was having with Pnewton and why I made the points I did, I simply will cease speaking further with you on this matter as you are in a totally different conversation apparently. We are all OK with people who live as brother and sister or are in non-willful objectively situations approaching communion. The debate is whether sexually active people who willfully continue their sexual relationships may approach. If you don’t understand that then you will keep speakin past me ad basically debating something that is not in contention which seems to me to a waste of time so forgive me but I will not continue in this line with you.
 
We have all been cautioned not to fling the word heresy about, which is surely a justifiable warning to the laity. We should therefore be all the more concerned when the topic is broached by bishops themselves.Notwithstanding repeated declarations concerning the immutability of the teaching of the Church concerning divorce, several particular churches nowadays accept divorce in their sacramental practice, and the phenomenon is growing. Only the voice of the Supreme Pastor of the Church can definitively impede a situation where in the future, the Church of our time is described with the following expression: “All the world groaned and noticed with amazement that it has in practice accepted divorce” (ingenuit totus orbis et divortium in praxi se accepisse miratus est), evoking an analogous saying by which St. Jerome described the Arian crisis.
Whatever concerns have been raised by those on these forums it is comforting to note that they are reflected by many of the bishops. I encourage people to read this article as it presents the issues in rather stark terms. This is a hugely significant issue and is a long way from being resolved.

Ender
 
Thank you,Thomas!
I read Blue’s and yours and I will be reading Truth and Conscience again. As both your posts again.
The objective and subjective is fairly clear.

I also went to our discussions in 2015 and found that I had already shared the Dallas 1991 with you.
There is this also from Ratzinger which is also beautiful to read ,it’ s short.
The centenary of Newmn s death

thepapalvisit.org.uk/Cardinal-Newman/The-Popes-on-Newman/Pope-Benedict-XVI-on-Newman

First centenary of the Death of Cardinal John Henry Newman

28 April 1990

Presentation by Cardinal Joseph Ratzinger:

It was from Newman that we learned to understand the primacy of the Pope. Freedom of conscience, Newman told us, is not identical with the right “to dispense with conscience, to ignore a Lawgiver and Judge, to be independent of unseen obligations”. Thus, conscience in its true sense is the bedrock of Papal authority; its power comes from revelation that completes natural conscience, which is imperfectly enlightened, and “the championship of the Moral Law and of conscience is its raison d’être”. … This teaching on conscience has become ever more important for me in the continued development of the Church and the world.

Newman had become a convert as a man of conscience; it was his conscience that led him out of the old ties and securities into the world of Catholicism, which was difficult and strange for him. But this way of conscience is everything except a way of self-sufficient subjectivity: it is a way of obedience to objective truth.

Newman’s teaching on the development of doctrine … I regard along with his doctrine on conscience as his decisive contribution to the renewal of theology.

The characteristic of the great Doctor of the Church, it seems to me, is that he teaches not only through his thought and speech but also by his life, because within him, thought and life are interpenetrated and defined. If this is so, then Newman belongs to the great teachers of the Church, because he both touches our hearts and enlightens our thinking.
Code:
                               -----------------------------------
Anyway,work and dialogue in progress.
We ll keep it in our hearts,as Mary did.
The beauty is also he became Pope in 2005…
Thanks again for the time to write long answers,Blue and you,Thomas.
Thanks, graciew. I found the words I emphasized in the Cardinal Ratzinger quotation–“development of doctrine”–of particular interest with respect to AL. I do not think there is coincidence in the use of certain terms in philosophy.

Not knowing how familiar you might be with Plato, I avoided unnecessary detail in my prior comment. But his concept of the true concerns what became known as the Platonic Form. This concerns a dualism of Form (or Idea) and Matter and ultimately of what is good and what is evil. This is the mind-body problem in metaphysics and is essential for an understanding of Aquinas and Scholasticism. Very shortly stated: in the Idea is found the good; in the body not so much. It has everything to do with the discussion of AL.
 
No matter how habitual a mortal sin, committing it is still gravely sinful.
I love emphatic tautologies, they sound so true and convincing ;).
Like immovable objects can never be forced or unjust killings are always and everywhere illicit.
 
I’m actually surprised you misunderstand this.52. Q. What is actual sin?
  • A. Actual sin is any willful thought, word, deed or omission contrary to the law of God. *(Baltimore Catechism)
    Two points: first, there is nothing there that raises the question of culpability. That is, culpability is not an issue in determining whether a sin has occurred. Second, the conditional word is “willful” (not culpable). If a man gets into bed with a woman he thinks is his wife he does not commit adultery. If he knowingly has sex with another woman he has committed a sin whether or not he is culpable for it. The choice remains objectively a disorder - a sin. That fact is not changed by the validity of his judgment in choosing the act.It is possible that the evil done as the result of invincible ignorance or a non-culpable error of judgment may not be imputable to the agent; but even in this case it does not cease to be an evil, a disorder in relation to the truth about the good. (JPII, Veritatis splendor #63)
    So a material sin is, strictly speaking, not a sin? JPII disagrees: * the Church teaches that “there exist acts which per se and in themselves, independently of circumstances, are always seriously wrong by reason of their object” *(Reconciliatio et paenitentia)Again, culpability does not condition the nature of these acts: they are “always seriously wrong”. That is, they are always sins as they are always acts “contrary to the law of God.” Responsibility for the act does not change the nature of the act.
A material sin is still a sin because what was willfully chosen is contrary to God’s law. That fact is not changed by the determination that the individual is not culpable for the error of his choice.

Ender
Sorry Ender, I am done on this one for the reasons given
 
Like much of moral theology black and white statements are generally unhelpful as words and phrases are often ambiguous and so distinctions need to be made.

So I think one would be on safer ground to affirm that bad habits do not always mitigate culpability.

At the same time the CCC does appear to support pNewton’s common sense pastoral and theological observations: “To form an equitable judgment about the subjects’ moral responsibility and to guide pastoral action, one must take into account …force of acquired habit…”

A complicating factor in such analysis is that Aristotle’s philosophy of “habit” re the moral order (which Aquinas uses) does not quite have the same meaning that contemporary culture gives to the word “habit”.

So to uncritically accept anything transliterated from latin “habitus” to English “habit” is a risky business indeed, interpreting such texts is not for the uninitiated nor the faint hearted.
That catechism passage pertains to masturbation, not adultery 😏

He answered, “Anyone who divorces his wife and marries another woman commits adultery against her. And if she divorces her husband and marries another man, she commits adultery.”

Mark 10:11-12
 
That catechism passage pertains to masturbation, not adultery 😏

He answered, “Anyone who divorces his wife and marries another woman commits adultery against her. And if she divorces her husband and marries another man, she commits adultery.”

Mark 10:11-12
Where does it say the one who is divorced commits adultery?
 
What do you mean? The scripture passage is right there.
Indeed. Where does it say the one who is divorced commits adultery?

The husband who divorces his wife and marries another woman commits adultery. The woman who divorces her husband and marries another man commits adultery. This is what the passage says–and no more. What of the man or woman who is divorced by their spouse? Where does it say they commit adultery?

Is this not Scripture?
 
Status
Not open for further replies.
Back
Top