Catholic Theology: Thomas Aquinas and Predestination

[Bishopite]

The topic is rife with deep and dangerous questions. Which is why it is best to talk about aspects of it, so that people are prepared when talking to people who’ve honored human will too much (Pelegians), and people who don’t think God came to save the world, that we have no free will, and are just robots, i.e. Calvinists/Jansenists.

Agreed.
However, just for the record, I have spoken with many TULIP 5 point Calvinists who would argue that they believe in free will, but that they believe the unregerated are predestined only to choose evil via their free will because God predestined them not to be regenerated or to be part of the elect. You know this of course I’m just saying it for those who don’t know. Calvinists often accuse Catholics of being Pelagianist’s (ironic if you read the council of Orange 529 AD, canons 18-20 which vehemently opossed Pelagian himself, let alone his heresy!)
And you are correct that there is a balance between divine predestination and mans free will, both validly take part in salvation; I’ll use that evil word for Calvinists, synergism.
I would have to agree with St. Thomas Aquinas’ statement here… “God changes the will without forcing it. But he can change the will from the fact that he himself operates in the will as he does in nature,” (De Veritatis 22:9.) because it shows God’s sovereignty and also explains the scriptural support for predestination. God can change the will but doesn’t force the will.

And someone else brought up the idea that predestination and reprobation are different; I’m not sure I see the difference between the two. Could you or someone else give me an example of the difference?

 

[Jerry-Jet]

God Predestines the Elect but does not Predestine the reprobates to Hell–they go their by their own choice–the Catholic Church has always taught this!

 

[Pug]

And someone else brought up the idea that predestination and reprobation are different; I’m not sure I see the difference between the two. Could you or someone else give me an example of the difference?

I’m not sure what you are asking, since it is you who made the post quoting Ott above that highlights the differences.

There are some words that can be applied to reprobation which might be helpful to discuss. Reprobation could be theorized as conditional or unconditional. A Thomist likely sees it as conditional with regard something, namely, our sins. Also, reprobation can be seen as negative or as positive. A Thomist will see it in a negative sense where it is seen as not being selected for heaven. A few Protestants see it in a positive sense, as God deliberately picked the person to go to hell. It is like a non-picking verses a picking. (A distinction which I emotionally dislike).

I suppose also one sees a contrast in the understanding of grace and sins. One must ask, does God merely allow the sins that we do that send us to hell, or does he cause the sin. And in its turn, we must consider grace, and if it is merely allowed or if it is caused. (or, maybe that should be cooperation with grace, and not just grace,…hmmmm)

Anyway , for a Thomist, predestination (to heaven) and reprobation (to hell) get a different mix of the two distinctions (conditional/unconditional and positive/negative). So this is one way they are different. But your posts make it look like you know this already, so I suspect you are like me and dislike that picking verses non-picking thing.

 

[Contarini]

Nonetheless, the thought of hell, and even of being predestined to hell (that I do not accept) has been seen as important by different denominations, like the Reformed Calvinists, and the Anglicans, the Anglicans in articles X (denying free will), XVI (setting up something very close to a double predestination).

I see no double predestination in XVI. I see something pretty close to the Thomist position–a very careful affirmation of single predestination and single predestination only. Nor do I see Article 11 as saying anything significantly different from the Council of Trent on this point. I would argue that the Articles represent a moderate Reformed position that (on this particular set of issues–obviously not on others) is practically indistinguishable from Catholic Thomism.

That being said, I have never professed allegiance to the Articles–I subscribe to them insofar as they are compatible with the faith of the Universal Church, and no further.

Denial of hell, however, at any level, means denial that our actions have real and dire consequences. The wicked who prosper in this world really do prosper. Even if we accept that there is temporary punishment, we deny God’s justice, for it is justice that those outside His grace should be dealt with according to their merits achieved outside His love, which are none, for they would not exist without His love.

To me that points toward a doctrine of annihilation.

To destroy the soul creates even more problems, for God made the soul to be eternal in its essence, and in destroying souls, God would violate completely the nature of what He created.

Perhaps, although Justin Martyr and other early Christians categorically deny the “natural immortality” of the soul. Perhaps it is different when you see nature as something created by God (which I don’t think the pagan Platonists did exactly). However, I find more useful the idea (which may amount to the same thing) that God doesn’t take back His gifts–rather, if we misuse them they remain in effect and become something twisted and powerful for evil.

It is important to remember, when wrestling with the real difficulties of reconsiling hell with God’s love and mercy, that we do have a free will (at least those of us who have reached an age of reason), and freely choose either God’s grace, or its lack, which can only be outside His perfect presence.

And that’s where Thomists often seem to me to be playing with words. If those who are not elect are inevitably going to choose to reject God and be damned, then it’s hard not to see “free will” as an empty phrase–which was essentially Calvin’s position (i.e., he didn’t deny that there was a kind of free will, but he didn’t see that it was relevant for a discussion of soteriology). The Wesleyan concept of universally offered prevenient grace, whatever its problems, at least allows free will to have some meaning while preserving the Augustinian doctrine that human beings can’t turn back to God of themselves. I know that the sufficient/efficient grace distinction is supposed to do the same thing, but again I find it an empty formula.

What evil would God be willing?

Since evil is a privation of good, it would appear that if God does not choose to cause a good that belongs to the nature of some creature, He is in some sense willing the privation of that good to exist. I.e., if God does not choose to cause a good will in human beings, He is permitting them to fall short of the good for which they were made. I understand that there is a difference between permission and active will, and I would not say that it is meaningless. But it is not particularly helpful in avoiding the charge of God causing evil, it seems to me, particularly since evil is not a thing in itself (and thus really cannot be willed as an object).

I am unfamiliar with this view. What is it?

A short version of it is found here. The full text used to be available on the Internet–I couldn’t find it just now. Another brief treatment, however, is here.

In Christ,

Edwin

 

[ChadS]

In other words, the perfection of Calvinism is Thomism.

No question in my mind, Molinism is valid in the sense of Church doctrine. I simply think it is the less elegant of the two possibilities.

Thomism in no way represents the perfection of Calvinism. I think a more apt description of Calvinism would be a sort of “vulgar Thomism” – meaning that Calvinism robs Thomism of several key aspects or distorts them and the end result can lead to a very fatalistic theology that at times seems to rejoice in the damnation of others. This opinion of mine comes from a distate I developed for Calvinism in my years as a Methodist.

I’m not sure I’m a Molinist, but growing up I definitely came from an Arminian background. These are issues I’ve been trying to think about and work through for a few years now and this thread has provided some excellent information and given me fresh insights into Thomism. I admire St. Thomas deeply and would love to delve more deeply into his works. I appreciate the distinction made between reprobation and predestination – that I believe is one distinction missing from traditional Calvinism.

I’m not in a position to express my self as eloquently as some others have on this thread but my views are something along these lines: Ultimately God knows where each and every person’s eternal soul will end up, whether it be in heaven or in hell. At some point in a person’s life God provides us with sufficient grace to cause our salvation. At that point a person exercises their free will to accept or reject that free gift of grace. God knows the choice and the outcome but in no way wills the choice.

I hope I made some sense but feel I haven’t.

ChadS

 

[drpmjhess]

Isn’t the discussion of election and reprobation like arguing about the precise length and width of the Yellow Brick Road?

 

[jimmy85]

Thank you for another wonderful and thoughtful post. It is good to keep these things in mind.

It would be grand to hear the views from a Molinist, as you have stated. Jesuits traditionally take this path.

Any Jesuits interested in commenting (whether Thomist, or no)?

I would also recommend to anyone for future reading, Garrigou-Lagrange’s work on the subject, titled “Predestination.”

I really like the works of Garrigou-Lagrange, especially his syntesis on the thomistic thought.

I was wondering whether or not God “knows” if someone will go to hell before that person exist?

What is the thomistic view about this?

 

[drpmjhess]

Predestination – whether to election or to eternal damnation – is a repugnant doctrine, inconsistent with the idea of God as loving Father. It is also incompatible with the idea of eternal beatitude, for if there were only one person who is eternally damned, then there would be at least two parents of that person who are eternally grieving that eternal damnation. Eternal reprobation would only make sense if (1) God and the parents were sadists, or (2) God were to expunge completely from those parents’ memories the recollection of the eternally damned person, so that their eternal and perfect beatitude would not be sullied by even a hint of grief over their child lost forever to the torments of hell.

 

[cpayne]

And that’s where Thomists often seem to me to be playing with words. If those who are not elect are inevitably going to choose to reject God and be damned, then it’s hard not to see “free will” as an empty phrase–which was essentially Calvin’s position (i.e., he didn’t deny that there was a kind of free will, but he didn’t see that it was relevant for a discussion of soteriology). The Wesleyan concept of universally offered prevenient grace, whatever its problems, at least allows free will to have some meaning while preserving the Augustinian doctrine that human beings can’t turn back to God of themselves. I know that the sufficient/efficient grace distinction is supposed to do the same thing, but again I find it an empty formula.

Since evil is a privation of good, it would appear that if God does not choose to cause a good that belongs to the nature of some creature, He is in some sense willing the privation of that good to exist. I.e., if God does not choose to cause a good will in human beings, He is permitting them to fall short of the good for which they were made. I understand that there is a difference between permission and active will, and I would not say that it is meaningless. But it is not particularly helpful in avoiding the charge of God causing evil, it seems to me, particularly since evil is not a thing in itself (and thus really cannot be willed as an object).

Hi, Contarini. Bishopite has quoted (twice) a passage from De Veritate I think is relevant: “God changes the will without forcing it. But he can change the will from the fact that he himself operates in the will as he does in nature” (De Veritatis 22:9.)

You used the term “inevitably,” as in “inevitably choose to reject God.” But I’d dispute that. What’s inevitable about it? “If God knows I will get up from my chair in two minutes, I will get up from my chair in two minutes”—this seems intrinsically and necessarily true. But this is not: “If God knows I will get up from my chair in two minutes, it is inevitable and necessary that I will get up from my chair in two minutes.” This statement is neither intrinsically true nor necessary.

I think the key is in the words “operates in the will as He does in nature.” How does God operate in nature? Isn’t it by the fulfillment of natural teleologies? Likewise by the choice of some to pursue eternal life in Him—isn’t it the fulfillment of the natural teleology of humans to pursue eternal happiness? Those who do not choose to do so do not fulfill a natural teleology, but is it “inevitable” that they choose not to fulfill that aspect of their nature?

I’m not sure, as you put it, that this is the same thing as God willing a privation in their natures. Are these the same thing: “I will this privation” and “By the act of creation itself, I will to permit some privations”? This is not a rhetorical question, by the way; I really am not sure if the two statements are the same. Any thoughts?

 

[cpayne]

II was wondering whether or not God “knows” if someone will go to hell before that person exist?

What is the thomistic view about this?

Yes.

 

[JaneFrances]

Predestination – whether to election or to eternal damnation – is a repugnant doctrine, inconsistent with the idea of God as loving Father. It is also incompatible with the idea of eternal beatitude, for if there were only one person who is eternally damned, then there would be at least two parents of that person who are eternally grieving that eternal damnation. Eternal reprobation would only make sense if (1) God and the parents were sadists, or (2) God were to expunge completely from those parents’ memories the recollection of the eternally damned person, so that their eternal and perfect beatitude would not be sullied by even a hint of grief over their child lost forever to the torments of hell.

Careful. . .Predestination is a Catholic doctrine. Double predestination may be viewed as “repugnant” in that it is not supported by the Catholic position, but “predestination” is very much in concert with Catholic soteriology.

The issue is Thomist v. Molinist, although it is prudent to point out, I think, that a Catholic isn’t required to espouse either school.

 

[jimmy85]

Yes.

Let me play the devils advocate here.

If God knows in advance that some people will go to hell because of their own free will, why does he created them?

I would be better if he dosent create them in order that they will avoid the eternal conmdenation.

 

[Pug]

Eternal reprobation would only make sense if (1) God and the parents were sadists, or (2) God were to expunge completely from those parents’ memories the recollection of the eternally damned person, so that their eternal and perfect beatitude would not be sullied by even a hint of grief over their child lost forever to the torments of hell.

I think you may be hinting at discussing the doctrine that hell is eternal. I think this is a different topic from predestination. After all, one could imagine a scheme whereby the idea of reprobation still exists, but that it would be to annihilation, and not hell. I’m not saying such a scheme is true, but that such a scheme could still include reprobation. Your objection seems more about hell than reprobation. You are concerned with how someone will feel in heaven after someone is sent to hell. One could deny predestination and still have an issue with someone in heaven knowing that someone is in hell forever.

 

[cpayne]

Let me play the devils advocate here.

If God knows in advance that some people will go to hell because of their own free will, why does he created them?

I would be better if he dosent create them in order that they will avoid the eternal conmdenation.

This is sort of opening another problem, but here goes: Technically God doesn’t know anything “in advance.” He knows all things simultaneously, outside of time; in our condition this would appear like “advance” knowledge. So I’d fall back on the way it was put earlier: “By the act of creation itself, I will permit some privations.” This is a feature of creating the good of free will.

 

[mikeledes]

Predestination – whether to election or to eternal damnation – is a repugnant doctrine, inconsistent with the idea of God as loving Father. It is also incompatible with the idea of eternal beatitude, for if there were only one person who is eternally damned, then there would be at least two parents of that person who are eternally grieving that eternal damnation. Eternal reprobation would only make sense if (1) God and the parents were sadists, or (2) God were to expunge completely from those parents’ memories the recollection of the eternally damned person, so that their eternal and perfect beatitude would not be sullied by even a hint of grief over their child lost forever to the torments of hell.

Its a dogma of the Catholic Church.

God Bless,
Michael

 

[drpmjhess]

Pug, I recognize that predestination, reprobation, and election are concepts distinct from eternal dwelling in hell. I still find all three ideas theologically repugnant, in that they involve a God who arbitrarily wills destinies of created beings. But you are right that hell and heaven are different topics from the above. In my own (merely) human experience as a father who loves his children, I cannot imagine a God who either (1) Calvinistically wills reprobation for some, or (2) wills election only for some but not for all. If the latter is Catholic soteriology, it is based on a very different sense of justice and mercy than that with which I am familiar.
Petrus

 

[drpmjhess]

Its a dogma of the Catholic Church.

God Bless,
Michael

Who says some dogmas can’t be repugnant, even if they were true?

 

[mikeledes]

Who says some dogmas can’t be repugnant, even if they were true?

It may seem repugnant to you, but nothing that is of God is repugnant. God is ifinitely good, merciful, and wise. There are things we may not understand, but we know we can trust God. What is repugnant is any attempt to make God the cause of sin.

God Bless,
Michael

 

[jimmy85]

This is sort of opening another problem, but here goes: Technically God doesn’t know anything “in advance.” He knows all things simultaneously, outside of time; in our condition this would appear like “advance” knowledge. So I’d fall back on the way it was put earlier: “By the act of creation itself, I will permit some privations.” This is a feature of creating the good of free will.

Thanks, I was hoping for an answer like that. That explains very well the doctrine of the church, that there is no predestination to hell.

 

[mikeledes]

Thanks, I was hoping for an answer like that. That explains very well the doctrine of the church, that there is no predestination to hell.

He should definitely take part in the thread on Adam’s sin and God’s foreordaining of it. We’ve touched this topic and perhaps he can contribute.

God Bless,
Michael