Catholic Theology: Thomas Aquinas and Predestination

[Saul.Tentmaker]

Perhaps, although Justin Martyr and other early Christians categorically deny the “natural immortality” of the soul…

And they were wrong; the spiritual soul cannot be destroyed. Their views were not consistant with dogma, and so they were in error. They are certainly no longer in error, as they are now in Heaven with Christ.

It would be better to accept a contingent universal salvation, where God gives all the grace necessary to attain eternal life, and that everyone accepts freely this grace. Hell must be a possibility, but it need not be an actuality, as an end.

However, I find more useful the idea (which may amount to the same thing) that God doesn’t take back His gifts–rather, if we misuse them they remain in effect and become something twisted and powerful for evil.

And eternally so. This is what we call hell.

The Wesleyan concept of universally offered prevenient grace, whatever its problems, at least allows free will to have some meaning while preserving the Augustinian doctrine that human beings can’t turn back to God of themselves.

Agreed. It trades one problem for another. Free will is more meaningful, but then the question arises as to whether God truly has providence, as people may will not as God wills. So, their wills being effective, they create situtations that violate God’s will, so God’s will is not purely effective, and God is not all-powerful (though possibly by His own will, He limits his power). If God were truly all powerful, and has not placed these limits on Himself, in such a manner, then there can be no situtation that violates God’s will. So all who are in hell would not have been predestined by God. They still chose hell through their sin and their free rejection of grace. But God operates in both of these freedoms (freedom of act and of will), for we cannot will but what we desire to will.

Thank you very much for the extra sources, and for the very good points. I will have to ponder some of what you have said more carefully, in light of a more fulfilling response.

In Christ,

Paul

 

[Jerry-Jet]

I think Father Most comes closest to the truth by stating that we don’t have a choice between “Choosing For God” or “Against God” but either “Choosing Against God” or being “Neutral to God”.

That way God can do all the saving while we are "Neutral to God"in choice and man can cooperate with his Free Will and yet do Nothing to save himself!

God’s election and man’s Freedom of Will are both preserved!

Couple that with God being able to Predestine the Elect And perfectly Foreknowing Simultaneously where one aspect doesn’t influence the other and both the Thomists and the Molinists can both be right!

That sounds a little paradoxical and I guess I haven’t explained it too well but something tells me that the Truth of the matter probably involves a paradox like that!

 

[Saul.Tentmaker]

Couple that with God being able to Predestine the Elect And perfectly Foreknowing Simultaneously where one aspect doesn’t influence the other and both the Thomists and the Molinists can both be right!

Though Father Most’s position requires some very serious consideration (something I will have to work through over a time), it would not allow the Thomists and the Molinists to both be right, because consistant Thomism at least would reject Father Most’s premise, that we can even choose to be neutral toward God unless God first loved us to will in us the good of being neutral.

It may allow Molinism to be correct, though in a very different form.

Likely, if this is true, then both Thomism and Molinism are false.

But none of this means that Father Most is wrong in the slightest, or that his arguments are unconvincing. I simply need to read more into what he is saying to understand them.

 

[Saul.Tentmaker]

That sounds a little paradoxical and I guess I haven’t explained it too well but something tells me that the Truth of the matter probably involves a paradox like that!

Definitely. And it is both worthy and a source of great happiness to meditate on these paradoxes.

 

[Evoken]

Definitely. And it is both worthy and a source of great happiness to meditate on these paradoxes.

Greetings Saul. Tentmaker. I am also a Thomist myself. I wonder though, what do you think of the objection Molinists raise against physical premotion? Physical premotion is explained in CE as follows:

• “From the idea that God is the primal cause (causa prima) and the prime mover (motor primus), it is concluded that every act and every movement of the thoroughly contingent secondary causes (causae secundae) or creatures must emanate from the first cause, and that by the application of their potentiality to the act. But God, respecting the nature of things, moves necessary agents to necessary, and free agents to free, activity – including sin, except that God is the originator only of its physical entity, not of its formal malice. Inasmuch as the Divine influence precedes all acts of the creature, not in the order of time, but in that of causality, the motion emanating from God and seconded by free intelligent agents takes on the character of a physical premotion (proemotio physica) of the free acts, which may also be called a physical predetermination (proedeterminatio physica), because the free determination of the will is accomplished only by virtue of the divine predetermination.”*

While this concept is very coherent and straightforward, there is a strong objection raised against it, the objection is:

• “…sin, as an act, demands the predetermining activity of the “first mover”, so that God would according to this system appear to be the originator of sinful acts. The Thomistic distinction between the entity of sin and its malice offers no solution of the difficulty. For since the Divine influence itself, which premoves ad unum, both introduces physically the sin as an act and entity, and also, by the simultaneous withholding of the opposite premotion to a good act, makes the sin itself an inescapable fatality, it is not easy to explain why sin cannot be traced back to God as the originator.”*

Evo

 

[Saul.Tentmaker]

While this concept is very coherent and straightforward, there is a strong objection raised against it, the objection is:

• "…sin, as an act, demands the predetermining activity of the “first mover”, so that God would according to this system appear to be the originator of sinful acts. The Thomistic distinction between the entity of sin and its malice offers no solution of the difficulty. For since the Divine influence itself, which premoves ad unum, both introduces physically the sin as an act and entity, and also, by the simultaneous withholding of the opposite premotion to a good act, makes the sin itself an inescapable fatality, it is not easy to explain why sin cannot be traced back to God as the originator.*

An excellent point!

God does move all things, some directly, and some through secondary causes. This does not mean all motion is in accord to God’s proximate will, but rather to God’s ultimate will (in that God allows evil to occur for the sake of a greater good).

That God would seem to cause sin by the Thomistic description is undeniable, and the answer I can give to that is necessarily weak. Nevertheless, take of it what you will.

Sin is always an act that is rooted in some good (it moves to an end), but in a disordered way. Sex is good, but sex before marriage is disordered in terms of time (as well as other factors). So sin would always be an act rooted in some good, but with a disorder in it, or with a privation (something lacking).

Another example, death is a good, as it is the just consequence of sin. But murder is bad, as it is a disordered application of death upon a person, and is disordered in the person applying the punishment, which is God’s alone to apply.

So God still causes all things, insofar as these things are truly acts toward an end. But He does not cause them in their specific order, in their quantity, with the privations, etc.

That these privations, excesses, and actions out of order exist more or less in a certain person is, proximately, a result of their willing to sin, and ultimately a result of God’s loving some people more than others.

If you have questions and criticisms (and, given the explanation in front of you, you should), please ask away.

 

[Jerry-Jet]

Does anyone know what theologians besides Father Most occupy the position between Thomism and Congruism?

What do they say?

And is Father Most’s assertion correct that what St. Thomas Aquinas would say about Predestination and what present day Thomists would say about Predestination is not exactly identical?

And lastly would most Jesuits say that they were more comfortable with the Congruist position–Father Most’s position–or the Thomist position?

 

[Evoken]

That these privations, excesses, and actions out of order exist more or less in a certain person is, proximately, a result of their willing to sin, and ultimately a result of God’s loving some people more than others.

First, thanks for your response Saul.Tentmaker, I agree with what you said. I believe that the difficulty for Thomism and the doctrine of physical pre-motion lies in this part of your post.

I think that a distinction can be made between natural (ordinary good things not done out of faith) and supernatural (meritorious works of faith) good. We, even in our fallen nature can do the first but we cannot do the former without grace. Now, for falling into sin we do not need any divine assistance, since it is within the capacity of our nature to fall into sin out of our own power. So, while we need divine help to direct ourselves to our final end (eternal glory), we do not need divine help to turn away from that end and do evil.

Here is what St. Thomas says :

But in the state of corrupt nature, man falls short of what he could do by his nature, so that he is unable to fulfil it by his own natural powers. Yet because human nature is not altogether corrupted by sin, so as to be shorn of every natural good, even in the state of corrupted nature it can, by virtue of its natural endowments, work some particular good, as to build dwellings, plant vineyards, and the like; yet it cannot do all the good natural to it, so as to fall short in nothing (ST IIa q. 109 a. 2)

That it is within the nature of fallen man to fall into sin by his own powers is why God can merely permit that a person falls into sin, instead of actively making a person commit sin, and is also why he can hold people accountable for it. St. Thomas sees this as the basis for the punishment due to sin:

Whence, although anyone reprobated by God cannot acquire grace, nevertheless that he falls into this or that particular sin comes from the use of his free-will. Hence it is rightly imputed to him as guilt. (ST I q. 23 a. 3)

So, God moves humans according to their nature so that they act freely, but the nature of humans, even in their fallen state does not forces them to sin, so that all they do is sin without divine help (as some Calvinists believe). So, by God moving them to act freely, he is not forcing them to sin nor does the fact that he does not grants them the grace necessary for salvation forces them to sin, as St. Thomas points above.

I think this or something like this can avoid the fatalism implied by the objection to physical pre-motion.

Evo

 

[Saul.Tentmaker]

I think that a distinction can be made between natural (ordinary good things not done out of faith) and supernatural (meritorious works of faith) good. We, even in our fallen nature can do the first but we cannot do the latter (edit) without grace.

Though I also hold this, I would add that all good things we do, as well as all beauty and goodness that exists, exists only because God worked it out through us, and through all things. That some flowers are more beautiful than others is due to God loving some more than others. Predestination and reprobation follow in the same vein.

As this follows from acceptance of a prime mover in all things, denial of these good things moved into being by God, though He as a final cause and not the efficient cause which is our own free will, would be denial of the prime mover.

This is not necessarily wrong, but it is not Thomistic.

So, by God moving them to act freely, he is not forcing them to sin nor does the fact that he does not grants them the grace necessary for salvation forces them to sin, as St. Thomas points above.

This much is very true, and as you so excellently stated:

I think this or something like this can avoid the fatalism implied by the objection to physical pre-motion.

 

[mikee]

Saul.Tentmaker:

…consistant Thomism at least would reject Father Most’s premise, that we can even choose to be neutral toward God unless God first loved us to will in us the good of being neutral.

Hi,

Just to clarify, Fr. Most makes a distinction with regard to the non-resistance to grace:

"The absence of resistance: As we have already seen, there are two kinds of non-resistance. One type is a positive decision, a complete act, done with the formal intention of abstaining from resistance or from sin. This first kind is a positive salutary good act, and, as such, requires the movement of grace.

But we are speaking of the absence of resistance in another sense, of a non-resistance that is not a decision, nor an act of the will, but the mere absence of a bad decision in the first part of the process of conferring a grace: man merely does nothing, an ontological zero. This is a mere negative condition, and is in our own power." (Grace, Predestination and the Salvific Will of God: New Answers to Old Questions: Pt. 3, Ch. 18)

The absence of resistance he’s talking about here is neither a good or a bad act (it’s not a choice either way). This non-resistance is within man’s power just as it is within man’s power to sin – and what I mean by that is that when you look at the nature of any sinful action, one can say in a certain sense that God is the prime mover of the physical action (because without him, we cannot even begin to take a step in order to commit a sin), but the evil originates from us insofar as it is an absence of good (a “nothing”, so to speak, which is within man’s power to originate from).

So Fr. Most conjectures that if grace is confronted with this non-resistance (this ‘ontological zero’ or nothing), grace will move on to elicit within a man the co-operation necessary.

 

[Jerry-Jet]

I can see the problem that present day Thomsits might have with Father Most.

I think St. Thomas Aquinas himself would have less problems with Father Most.

In other words I don’t think that St. Thomas Aquinas and present day Thomism are 100% complete identical.

Are there any theologians in the present day Catholic Church who don’t agree with present day Thomism?

It seems like most seminarians are afraid not to worship at the altar of Present day Thomism.

Should they be afraid?

I don’t think John Paul II or St Bendict XVI would be afraid.

How do they differ from present day Thomistic Orthodoxy?

 

[cpayne]

I can see the problem that present day Thomsits might have with Father Most.

I think St. Thomas Aquinas himself would have less problems with Father Most.

In other words I don’t think that St. Thomas Aquinas and present day Thomism are 100% complete identical.

Are there any theologians in the present day Catholic Church who don’t agree with present day Thomism?

It seems like most seminarians are afraid not to worship at the altar of Present day Thomism.

Should they be afraid?

I don’t think John Paul II or St Bendict XVI would be afraid.

How do they differ from present day Thomistic Orthodoxy?

Hmmm. I have a different perspective, but it’s based on less experience, since I know next to nothing about the state of Catholic seminaries. What I read seems to run counter to what you are saying—I thought Thomists were in the minority today in Catholic theology?

Or does it depend on which seminary you look at?

 

[Jerry-Jet]

I think most lay Catholics would be closer to the congruisr position or Molinist position of the Jesuits.

Seminarians that I havre encountered who post at catholic forums such as this one usually support more the Thomistic position. It’s probably because at seminary and before in college that they have learned much philosophy and theology that come from St. thomas Aquinas.

It is a very precarious thing to contest St. Thomas aquinas at any Catholic seminary in any minute way without being thought of as ignorant.

But St. Thomas Aquinas didn’t believe in the Immaculate Conception–which of course wasn’t a sin because it hadn’t been defined at the time he lived

but that does go to show that St. Thomas Aquinas is not Perfectly right about everything.

Most present day Thomists would be loath to admit that.

I’m a 99.9% believer in what St. Thomas Aquinas says–I just don’t think he is 100% correct on everything and isn’t equivalent in authority with the Catholic Church’s magisterium on everything–

–which isn’t a knock on him–he’s probably more right more than any other theologian and is without a doubt the greatest Catholic theologian who has yet lived!

 

[Contarini]

It is a very precarious thing to contest St. Thomas aquinas at any Catholic seminary in any minute way without being thought of as ignorant.

I’m not sure about that. Generally I think Rahner is more prevalent in most seminaries than St. Thomas, unfortunately. That may be changing, though.

Edwin

 

[Contarini]

I can see the problem that present day Thomsits might have with Father Most.

I think St. Thomas Aquinas himself would have less problems with Father Most.

I am not sure about that. Just because later Thomism clarifies a number of things that Aquinas didn’t address and perhaps moves in some directions Thomas didn’t go doesn’t mean that St. Thomas himself would have fewer problems with Fr. Most. That’s a non sequitur, and I find Fr. Most’s claims in this regard to be wishful thinking. He claims that St. Thomas made statements that pointed in two different directions, and essentially he is taking one of them while the Thomists took the other. But for Aquinas himself I don’t think these things were contradictory.

In other words I don’t think that St. Thomas Aquinas and present day Thomism are 100% complete identical.

By “present-day Thomism” you appear to mean neo-Thomism as represented by Garrigou-Lagrange. Am I right? That is hardly a common perspective these days. Thomism is having a revival (as in the work of my friend Matthew Levering), but by and large I think it’s focused on Aquinas himself rather than the neo-Thomists (though some people do seem to be calling for a renewed respect for the neo-Thomists–see Rusty Reno’s article in First Things a few months ago).

Are there any theologians in the present day Catholic Church who don’t agree with present day Thomism?

If by “present day Thomism” you mean the views of someone like Garrigou-Lagrange, there would be very few theologians who would agree with that perspective, though the number may be growing.

If you want to see what contemporary Thomist scholarship looks like, I’d recommend Levering (mentioned above), Fr. David Burrell of Notre Dame, and of course Fr. Ralph McInerny, who really is an old-fashioned Thomist. Fr. Brian Davies is the author of perhaps the best introduction to Thomas. Other important names are Fr. Simon Tugwell, Norman Kretzmann, and the Protestant Thomist Eleanor Stump.

Edwin

 

[mikeledes]

An excellent point!

God does move all things, some directly, and some through secondary causes. This does not mean all motion is in accord to God’s proximate will, but rather to God’s ultimate will (in that God allows evil to occur for the sake of a greater good).

That God would seem to cause sin by the Thomistic description is undeniable, and the answer I can give to that is necessarily weak. Nevertheless, take of it what you will.

Sin is always an act that is rooted in some good (it moves to an end), but in a disordered way. Sex is good, but sex before marriage is disordered in terms of time (as well as other factors). So sin would always be an act rooted in some good, but with a disorder in it, or with a privation (something lacking).

Another example, death is a good, as it is the just consequence of sin. But murder is bad, as it is a disordered application of death upon a person, and is disordered in the person applying the punishment, which is God’s alone to apply.

So God still causes all things, insofar as these things are truly acts toward an end. But He does not cause them in their specific order, in their quantity, with the privations, etc.

That these privations, excesses, and actions out of order exist more or less in a certain person is, proximately, a result of their willing to sin, and ultimately a result of God’s loving some people more than others.

If you have questions and criticisms (and, given the explanation in front of you, you should), please ask away.

Hi Saul Tentmaker! Thank you so much for your very informative posts. I have a question that I raised on another thread but would like to ask you since you are so well informed. How does the Thomist explain the Fall? Was the Fall preordained, a decree of God? Was God the ultimate cause of the Fall?

God Bless,
Michael

 

[Jerry-Jet]

I disagree most with Garrigou-Lagrange.

I don’t know of any prominent Catholic theologians who would agree with the Congruist postion over the Thomist position concerning grace.

Are there any?

 

[cpayne]

Whoa! Contarini—Eleonore Stump is a Protestant? Say what?

 

[Jerry-Jet]

If any Protestant is a Thomist then by definition Thomism could not be the truth!

 

[cpayne]

If any Protestant is a Thomist then by definition Thomism could not be the truth!

How so? I know there are Protestant Thomists—I just didn’t think Eleonore Stump was one.

I am heading into Catholicism, but I’ve been a Protestant Thomist for years. I think we need a group hug here. :grouphug: