Catholic view on utilitarianism

[Elf01]

A direct cause acts on the object (cancerous womb) itself.

An indirect cause acts on a third party (excised womb), which then acts on the object (baby’s death).

Could a case not be made that the switch acts on a third party (either the trolly or the tracks)

 

[LeafByNiggle]

Suppose you are tied to the tracks along with the 5 others. If the trolley continues on its present course, it will hit you and the other 5 and kill all six of you. But only you can reach the switch that will divert the trolley to the other track where there is the one man, also tied to the track. Is it moral to divert the trolley away from you and the 5 others and save your own life? Or is the only moral choice to accept your own death along with the 5 others?

 

[Gorgias]

Nevertheless I was cited by the moderators for doing exactly what you did. So take it as a friendly warning.

LOL! OK…

Just only one question:
Would you Gorgias divert the trolley from one track to another, for the reason to minimize the number to die.

No. That’s utilitarianism, and that’s not something that Catholic moral theology sees as good.

My answer to the same question is:
I would divert the trolley from one track to another, for the reason to minimize the number to die.

So you would murder one, in order to prevent five from being killed. Got it.

No, it is onefold. To divert the trolley from the track that would kill 5 people.

No, that’s the intent, not the object of the act.

There is a general principle of “do not steal”. It is juxtaposed by the attempt to help the starving. Therefore the principle of “helping the starving” overrides the prohibition against theft.

No… what it does is diminish the culpability for the theft. The theft itself remains sinful; however, the culpability for the theft becomes essentially negligible.

There’s a world of different between those two views!

Physically it is a direct attack on the baby but morally it does not count as a direct attack on the baby, because without removing the fallopian tube, both mother and baby would die.

No, it’s an indirect attack on the baby. He dies, but not because we killed him directly.

I think the introduction of the concept of “direct” vs “indirect” into this discussion has been to confuse rather than to clarify, because we can’t seem to agree on what “direct” means.

Perhaps. But, I think it’s present in the discussion in order to attempt to demonstrate that the nature of the direct act is good, even if the indirect effect is not.

And of course the same four conditions apply to the trolley problem, which is also an example of valid double effect.

It doesn’t, since the act itself (“place the trolley on the track with one bystander”) is neither “morally good or indifferent.” It’s morally evil to turn a trolley on a bystander.

The current policy is that dissenting opinions are tolerated, if they are expressed in a polite and respectful fashion.

And… umm…

Is it moral to divert the trolley away from you and the 5 others and save your own life? Or is the only moral choice to accept your own death along with the 5 others?

Different question. Calls for a different discussion.

 

[LeafByNiggle]

Here is another difficult variation. Suppose there are two trolleys. One of them is heading toward the 5 people and the other one is heading toward the one man. If you do nothing, all 6 people will be killed. But you have a switch that can switch one of the trolleys away from the 5 and onto the track where the one man is tied. If you throw the switch, both trolleys will hit the one man and the 5 will be saved. But, the trolley you diverted will hit him first. Then the second on will hit him. Is it moral to throw the switch in that case?

 

[LeafByNiggle]

LeafByNiggle:

No, it is onefold. To divert the trolley from the track that would kill 5 people.

No, that’s the intent, not the object of the act.

CCC 1751 states “The object chosen is a good toward which the will deliberately directs itself.”

There is no way you can twist that definition to say the object is the direct killing of the one person, as o_milly claimed.

I think the introduction of the concept of “direct” vs “indirect” into this discussion has been to confuse rather than to clarify, because we can’t seem to agree on what “direct” means.

Perhaps. But, I think it’s present in the discussion in order to attempt to demonstrate that the nature of the direct act is good, even if the indirect effect is not.

Then once that distinction has been made, let’s put aside “direct” and “indirect” so they don’t get mixed in where they should not be.

And of course the same four conditions apply to the trolley problem, which is also an example of valid double effect.

It doesn’t, since the act itself (“place the trolley on the track with one bystander”) is neither “morally good or indifferent.” It’s morally evil to turn a trolley on a bystander.

This is a misunderstanding of what it means for an act to be good or indifferent in and of itself. The act, strictly speaking is moving a switch so that a trolley takes a different path. That is the act, and it is not intrinsically evil. Only when you add in the unintended side effect does an evil consequence appear. As I said, all four conditions of double effect apply.

 

[Wozza]

Men are four:
He who knows not and knows not he knows not, he is a fool—shun him;
He who knows not and knows he knows not, he is simple—teach him;
He who knows and knows not he knows, he is asleep—wake him;
He who knows and knows he knows, he is wise—follow him!

‘I am wiser than this man, for neither of us appears to know anything great and good; but he fancies he knows something, although he knows nothing; whereas I, as I do not know anything, so I do not fancy I do. In this trifling particular, then, I appear to be wiser than he, because I do not fancy I know what I do not know.’ Socrates.

 

[Wozza]

LeafByNiggle:

Nevertheless I was cited by the moderators for doing exactly what you did. So take it as a friendly warning.

My answer to the same question is:
I would divert the trolley from one track to another, for the reason to minimize the number to die.

So you would murder one, in order to prevent five from being killed. Got it.

I think that the term ‘sacrifice’ would be more applicable here. In the same manner as someone who throws themselves on a grenade doesn’t want to die and is not committing suicide but is sacrificing his life for others.

No-one wants to kill the single guy on the track. And no-one wants him to die. But some would be prepared to sacrifice his life for the sake of five others. One would imagine quite a negative reaction to any suggestion that he was intentionally murdered. And rightly so.

 

[Wozza]

MAGA-huelye:

There is a general principle of “do not steal”. It is juxtaposed by the attempt to help the starving. Therefore the principle of “helping the starving” overrides the prohibition against theft.

No… what it does is diminish the culpability for the theft. The theft itself remains sinful; however, the culpability for the theft becomes essentially negligible.

There’s a world of different between those two views!

Can we not apply the same principle to the trolley problem?

I have no problem in you suggesting that the person throwing the switch has almost zero culpability but you believe that it is still a sin/morally wrong.

Everyone goes home happy. Well, except the one guy run over by the trolley…

 

[LeafByNiggle]

Latin:

My answer to the same question is:
I would divert the trolley from one track to another, for the reason to minimize the number to die.

So you would murder one, in order to prevent five from being killed. Got it.

This is called begging the question. That is where the debater assumes the truth of the proposition he is trying to prove in order to prove that very proposition.

In this case the proposition is that “it is immoral to divert the trolley which then kills one man.” In order to “prove” this proposition, Gorgias casually labels the act “murder”, which of course means the unjustified killing of an innocent person. But that presumes the immorality of the act was already established, which it has not been.

 

[Michael_Anthony]

While it applies to the Nazi dilemma, the moral solution would be something to the effect of having your wife/kids bring them in, and you telling the Nazis “I have not brought any jews in here” since the Nazis are seeking to do evil, they are not entitled to the whole truth, and so you are telling the truth, just not filling in the minute blanks that your wife/kids did bring them in.

 

[Gorgias]

First of all, “sin” is a religious concept, it has no place in philosophy.

How odd… philosophers have talked about sin throughout history. Perhaps you should tell them that they’re mistaken!

Second, the theft is theft, except in this case it can be JUSTIFIED.

No: it’s still theft… but the culpability is diminished. You might want to read up on cases in the legal tradition.

Come clean, just once, just for the fun of it.

If you insist: I’ll come clean and admit that your assertions are bunk.

If you will admit that the life of a Mother Teresa is more valuable (expressed by healing her and NOT Dahmer), we have made a huge step toward establishing your rationality.

No. Not “more valuable”. Equally valuable as anyone who ever drew breath. Our value as humans does not depend on our accomplishments… but on the dignity having been given us by God. Sorry… that’s pretty rational.

But some would be prepared to sacrifice his life for the sake of five others.

“Sacrifice”? Not given freely, but imposed? That’s no sacrifice at all… it’s murder.

These “some” are murderers, plain and simple.

I have no problem in you suggesting that the person throwing the switch has almost zero culpability but you believe that it is still a sin/morally wrong.

We haven’t been discussing culpability, however. We’ve been discussing whether it’s morally upright. It ain’t.

In this case the proposition is that “it is immoral to divert the trolley which then kills one man.” In order to “prove” this proposition, Gorgias casually labels the act “murder”, which of course means the unjustified killing of an innocent person. But that presumes the immorality of the act was already established, which it has not been.

No: it’s not a ‘proof’, it’s an ‘assertion’. So, no “begging the question”.

It is worse than that. It is an unfair or even malicious distortion because he has no rational argument.

Keep on keeping on, brother. I can say this for you: at least you’re consistent.

 

[o_mlly]

Could a case not be made that the switch acts on a third party (either the trolly or the tracks)

The “party”, is this sense, is a moral agent, i.e., a human being. If the foreseeable outcome of throwing the switch would send the trolley off a cliff instead of directly killing an innocent person, the moral object of the act would be singular – to save the five – and would be permitted.

 

[o_mlly]

You are free to ignore my posts.

At last, finally some good advise from you.

 

[Wozza]

Wozza:

I have no problem in you suggesting that the person throwing the switch has almost zero culpability but you believe that it is still a sin/morally wrong.

We haven’t been discussing culpability, however. We’ve been discussing whether it’s morally upright. It ain’t.

Do you think that there is a major difference between that which has minimal culpabitity and that which you consider to be a sin?

To be honest, I could care less if something is classed as a sin as long as there is no culpability. If you want to say that throwing the switch is a sin/is morally wrong but has no culpability, then so be it.

But if you say it is better that five die rather than one then I don’t think that that is a realistic position to hold.

 

[LeafByNiggle]

Elf01:

Could a case not be made that the switch acts on a third party (either the trolly or the tracks)

The “party”, is this sense, is a moral agent, i.e., a human being. If the foreseeable outcome of throwing the switch would send the trolley off a cliff instead of directly killing an innocent person, the moral object of the act would be singular – to save the five – and would be permitted.

So then would the moral object of cutting out a fallopian tube be twofold - one to save the life of the mother and two to cause the baby to die one day earlier than he would have if he were left alone? There is little doubt that the baby is not yet dead when the tube is removed and would have lived at least one day longer if left alone. Consistency, please!

 

[o_mlly]

So then would the moral object of cutting out a fallopian tube be twofold - one to save the life of the mother and two to cause the baby to die one day earlier than he would have if he were left alone? There is little doubt that the baby is not yet dead when the tube is removed and would have lived at least one day longer if left alone. Consistency, please!

Good, this is progress – you now realize the moral object may be twofold, as it is in this case.

The next step is to understand the difference between direct and indirect outcomes as in direct and indirect abortion. The former is always immoral, the latter may be tolerated if unintended and a proportionate good is realized.

The child will die. The mother will die if the diseased portion of her tube is not removed. The timing of the procedure for the life of the mother is crucial as the exact time the tube will rupture is unknown, only that its rupture is certain. Must the surgeon wait unit the tube ruptures killing the child and possibly or probably killing the mother? No. He may directly act by performing a salpingectomy to save the mother and indirectly hasten the death of the child. The death of the child is an indirect abortion.

 

[LeafByNiggle]

You just said the moral object of cutting out the tube includes the death of the child, but that it is indirect, and therefore allowed. And you claim that the moral object of diverting the trolley includes the death of the one man, and that it is direct and not allowed.

Then what you cannot prove is that the death of the one man on the track is any more direct than the death of the baby when the tube is removed. Calling one of them direct and the other one indirect without any support other than the claim that it is so seems like a convenience to establish the point that you cannot prove any other way.

So how is the death of the man on the track “direct” in a way that the death of the baby is not?

In both cases a conscious action is taken that immediately brings about the death of the innocent person. The fact that the baby is sitting in the wrong place (in the fallopian tube) is unfortunate. The fact that the man is tied to the track is unfortunate in the same way. Saying one is more direct than the other is a distinction without a difference.

And please, do not quote any more treatises on the morality of removing a tubal pregnancy unless that treatise also includes a comment about the trolley problem, because it is the difference that I am after, not the absolute assignment of “indirect” to the tube removal, because I already said I agree that it is indirect. The only question is the trolley problem.

 

[o_mlly]

Then what you cannot prove is that the death of the one man on the track is any more direct than the death of the baby when the tube is removed.

It is self-evident as described in the OP’s scenario and the meaning of direct causation.

• The surgeon may not cause the scalpel to be the instrument that kills the child – that is a direct attack on the body-person of the child.
• The bystander may not cause the trolley to be the instrument that kills the innocent person – that is a direct attack on the body-person of an innocent person.

I’ve explained this before. I get it that you do not get it. Let’s move on.

And please, do not quote any more treatises on the morality of removing a tubal pregnancy …

Well, you initiated the comparison way back in post#144. You got it almost right then. What happened? I only corrected your misuse of terms. (The correct description of the death of the infant via salpingectomy is an “indirect abortion”, not as you wrote “an inessential consequence”.)

 

[LeafByNiggle]

LeafByNiggle:

Then what you cannot prove is that the death of the one man on the track is any more direct than the death of the baby when the tube is removed.

It is self-evident as described in the OP’s scenario and the meaning of direct causation.

• The surgeon may not cause the scalpel to be the instrument that kills the child – that is a direct attack on the body-person of the child.
• The bystander may not cause the trolley to be the instrument that kills the innocent person – that is a direct attack on the body-person of an innocent person.

I’ve explained this before. I get it that you do not get it. Let’s move on.

No, you have not proven your point. You have only re-asserted it.

By citing one way in which the surgeon may cause the immediate death of the child (the scalpel cutting into the child’s body) you conveniently ingnore the other way the surgeon may cause the death of the child - namely by subjecting it to the cold table of the operating room and cutting off its supply of nutrients.

When comparing to the man being hit by the trolley, would the death have been any more excusable if, instead of dying of blunt force trauma, the man had died of cold and starvation? The means by which death is brought about is no more or less direct if you use cold and starvation or blunt force trauma, or severing the body with a scalpel. No more or less direct no matter how you look at it.

 

[Gorgias]

Do you think that there is a major difference between that which has minimal culpabitity and that which you consider to be a sin?

Yes. You’re getting your Venn diagrams confused, it seems.

All sins have culpability. This isn’t an “intersection of sets” relation.

To be honest, I could care less if something is classed as a sin as long as there is no culpability.

I didn’t say “no culpability”; that’s a notion you just introduced.

However, not all grave sins are mortal sins. Some are venial, based on subjective considerations.

But if you say it is better that five die rather than one then I don’t think that that is a realistic position to hold.

I say that the person who caused the situation to occur in which five innocents were killed, has committed a grave sin. I also say that the person who caused the situation to occur in which one innocent was killed, has committed a grave sin. It’s not up to me to determine whether the grave sin was venial or mortal.

But since you neglected my direct question, namely: “Who would get the life saving medication, Jeffrey Dahmer or Mother Teresa”?

No, I didn’t. But, if you feel the need to hear an answer explicitly, here it is: both Dahmer and Mother Teresa are human beings and therefore, are worthy of life saving medication. The particular decision in a particular set of circumstances does not depend on whether I think one of them is virtuous or vicious.

You get no respect, because you are DISHONEST.

Right back at ya, brother…

It would be rational, if you could PROVE God’s existence.

Let’s not go down that route. You’d have to assert what counts as “proof” and why it’s a reasonable assertion… and you’d lose that one.

My direct question was simple, and connected to a basic ethical dilemma, what do you do, when there is a shortage of life-saving resources? Who will get the one dosage of life saving medication, a despicable criminal, or a good, decent person? That is the question that you keep on avoiding. And that is DISHONEST.

And here’s your “dishonesty” in the discussion: you’re asking for a particular answer, for a particular situation, without describing the particular circumstances. Pot, meet kettle.