Catholic view on utilitarianism

[o_mlly]

By citing one way in which the surgeon may cause the immediate death of the child (the scalpel cutting into the child’s body) you conveniently ingnore the other way the surgeon may cause the death of the child - namely by subjecting it to the cold table of the operating room and cutting off its supply of nutrients.

You’re adorable, what a poor memory and active imagination! So, now you reverse yourself and claim Fr. Pacholczyk is mistaken, that salpingectomy directly kills the child (on a cold operating table, no less!) and is, therefore immoral.

You can’t have it both ways. Either, as the good Father states, salpingectomy indirectly kills the child and is permissible or it is not. I agree with Father, it is permissible.

What is not permissible is the surgeon who directs his surgically lethal tool in salpingostomy at the person-body of the baby and the bystander who directs just as lethal an object at the person-body of an innocent one. I’m moving on. Thanks for the chuckle.

 

[LeafByNiggle]

LeafByNiggle:

By citing one way in which the surgeon may cause the immediate death of the child (the scalpel cutting into the child’s body) you conveniently ingnore the other way the surgeon may cause the death of the child - namely by subjecting it to the cold table of the operating room and cutting off its supply of nutrients.

You’re adorable, what a poor memory and active imagination! So, now you reverse yourself and claim Fr. Pacholczyk is mistaken, that salpingectomy directly kills the child (on a cold operating table, no less!)

I have done nothing of the sort. And I would appreciate it if you would keep your personal comments about me to yourself. Your joking is a poor attempt to hide the fact that you have no argument to prove that the death of the one man on the track is any more direct than the death of the baby whose warmth and nutrition have been cut off. Remember, I am using the words “direct” and “indirect” only because you insist they are the thing that makes the difference between the two cases. My view is that they are both indirect. But if you want to claim only one of them is direct then you should be able to explain how they are different with regard to directness, or indeed different morally in any way at all.

After all, death by being hit by a trolley is no different morally than death by starvation and freezing, which is how the baby dies.

What is not permissible is the surgeon who directs his surgically lethal tool in salpingostomy at the person-body of the baby and the bystander who directs just as lethal an object at the person-body of an innocent one.

As I said, talking about other ways the baby could die is not relevant to this discussion and only deflects from the consideration of how the baby actually did die, which is by starvation and cold.

 

[Wozza]

Wozza:

Do you think that there is a major difference between that which has minimal culpabitity and that which you consider to be a sin?

All sins have culpability.

OK, then ‘reduced culpability’. This implies that there is less blame associated with one action rather than the other.

I’m good with that.

 

[o_mlly]

As I said, talking about other ways the baby could die is not relevant to this discussion and only deflects from the consideration of how the baby actually did die, which is by starvation and cold.

And if the bystander did not throw the switch to murder the innocent one and the innocent one having already been tied to the tracks for days died of starvation and cold, the bystander would have done no evil.

The sanity of your position is questionable as you keep putting up the same argument again and again hoping for a different outcome. I see why you would like to run away from the ectopic pregnancy example that you introduced; the case proves you wrong.

 

[LeafByNiggle]

And if the bystander did not throw the switch to murder the innocent one and the innocent one having already been tied to the tracks for days died of starvation and cold, the bystander would have done no evil.

That’s not the scenario. In fact the original statement of the problem said nothing about the man being tied. That was my addition. It said only that he would be hit and there was no time or means to warn him. But even assuming the similarity, the action of the surgeon brings about the death of the baby sooner than would have otherwise happened. That is not the case with the observer doing nothing about the man tied to the tracks. (Honestly, do you think nobody would untie him until he dies of starvation?)

The sanity of your position is questionable as you keep putting up the same argument again and again hoping for a different outcome.

I keeping asking for the moral difference between the two actions and you continue to avoid giving one, despite your assertion that they are different.

Actually, there is a difference, and its a pretty compelling one, so I am surprised you have not brought it up yet. If the man on the tracks is not hit by the trolley, there is every reason to believe he can shortly be freed from the tracks and go on to live a normal life. But with the ectopic pregnancy, there is every reason to believe that the baby would shortly die anyway when the tube ruptures. So it is tempting to say this is the factor that makes cutting out the tube moral and diverting the trolley immoral.

It is tempting to say that, but a little reflection and one can see it doesn’t quite work. We see from euthanasia that it is never moral to bring about the death of a person today even if you are quite sure he will likely die tomorrow. Also, one could ask if the trolley problem would be any different if the one man on the tracks was known to be a terminal cancer patient with one week to live. Catholic moral teaching says no. It would not be any different, and I agree.

Another thing to consider is that when dealing with life and death issues we are always dealing with probabilities about the future - never certainties. Today an ectopic pregnancy is a considered certain death for the baby regardless of what we do. Future medical technology may very well find a way to move the wrongly-attached fetus along to the womb where it can have a proper attachment and develop normally. Maybe that technology will be available tomorrow. So if a surgeon cuts out a tube today, he may have been doing so unnecessarily.

Similarly, the observer in the trolley problem may have been mistaken in his assessment that the trolley was going to hit the 5 people. Maybe the trolley was headed down a different track and would have missed everyone. We never know for sure. We can only act on what we reasonably believe to be true.

 

[LeafByNiggle]

I want to say one more thing about directness and indirectness and why I think it is irrelevant in this discussion of morality. Consider this indirect killing. I see a precariously balanced rock at the top of a cliff just above someone whom I hate. I take out my slingshot and knock away a crucial support and the big rock comes tumbling down the cliff and kills the man. Very indirect, and very immoral.

Now consider a killing as direct as you can get. My house has been broken into numerous times by gangs of thugs and I sleep in fear. One night I hear the front door open and someone comes in at 2 AM. I immediately pick up a kitchen knife and stab the intruder to death, only to find out he was my son come to pay me a surprise visit. As sad as that death is, it is not immoral. Given the circumstances I could reasonably have been led to believe the intruder was a thug intending to do me harm. Very direct and still moral.

So let’s stop using the terms direct and indirect as if they have any application to questions of morality. In particular I noted a while ago that the four conditions for moral double effect do no use the words direct or indirect either, and for this very reason.

 

[Gorgias]

OK, then ‘reduced culpability’. This implies that there is less blame associated with one action rather than the other.

I’m good with that.

See! You’re better with Catholic theology than you ever imagined!

What would you do then? Flip a coin?

No. Naturally, we’d expect a rational discussion that brings all the circumstances of the situation to bear.

Welcome to the real world. You are given ALL the available information.

No – you just said “which would you choose, Dahmer or Mother Theresa”. If that were the extent of the “available information”, then my answer holds: we can’t make the decision based on our assessment of the moral quality of the person. (You do realize, don’t you, that the “quality of the person” notion was exactly the tack used to justify the Holocaust, don’t you?)

So let’s stop using the terms direct and indirect as if they have any application to questions of morality.

Your “slingshot and rock” example is a good one.

I think the ‘usefulness’ of the distinction comes into play in cases in which you’re comparing two acts, not just isolating one.

 

[o_mlly]

Even a niggler has some trivial basis for arguing. But you have none. You continue to prattle-on altering the case into ever more bizarre scenarios, or, as in your latest effort, creating a strawman to argue against. I cannot help you. Suggest an altered pseudonym to consider “LeafByPrattle”.

So let’s stop using the terms direct and indirect as if they have any application to questions of morality.

This comment displays a profound ignorance regarding Catholic moral theology.

 

[LeafByNiggle]

LeafByNiggle:

So let’s stop using the terms direct and indirect as if they have any application to questions of morality.

Your “slingshot and rock” example is a good one.

I think the ‘usefulness’ of the distinction comes into play in cases in which you’re comparing two acts, not just isolating one.

Please elaborate on how the directness comes into play when comparing two acts, for my example shows that it is irrelevant to the moral question.

 

[Gorgias]

Please elaborate on how the directness comes into play when comparing two acts, for my example shows that it is irrelevant to the moral question.

No, you took two distinct scenarios. I’m talking about a single scenario in which there are two consequences. The ‘tubal pregnancy’ example is a good one of my point. At best, if we want to follow your train of thought, we might say that the death of the child isn’t indirect so much as it was the case that the good effect didn’t flow from the bad effect.

 

[LeafByNiggle]

Even a niggler has some trivial basis for arguing. But you have none. You continue to prattle-on altering the case into ever more bizarre scenarios, or, as in your latest effort, creating a strawman to argue against. I cannot help you. Suggest an altered pseudonym to consider “LeafByPrattle”.

LeafByNiggle:

So let’s stop using the terms direct and indirect as if they have any application to questions of morality.

This comment displays a profound ignorance regarding Catholic moral theology.

Dear readers: Please note that o_mlly would rather find ways to say others are ignorant than to answer any objection to his/her assertions. You can draw your own conclusions about whether o_mlly actually has an argument. As for me, I am still waiting for o_mlly to back up the assertion that the trolley problem is morally different than dealing with ectopic pregnancy with something more than put-downs and literal name-calling.

 

[o_mlly]

Please elaborate on how the directness comes into play when comparing two acts, for my example shows that it is irrelevant to the moral question.

Fair enough.

It is not permissible, however, to initiate or to recommend treatments that have as their purpose or DIRECT effect the removal, destruction, or interference with the implantation of a fertilized ovum.

Abortion (that is, the DIRECTly intended termination of pregnancy before viability or the DIRECTly intended destruction of a viable fetus) is never permitted.

Abortion (that is, the DIRECTly intended termination of pregnancy before viability or the DIRECTly intended destruction of a viable fetus) is never permitted.

Operations, treatments, and medications that have as their DIRECT purpose the cure of a proportionately serious pathological condition of a pregnant woman are permitted when they cannot be safely postponed until the unborn child is viable, even if they will result in the death of the unborn child.

In case of extra uterine pregnancy, no intervention is morally licit which constitutes a DIRECT abortion.

(continued)

 

[o_mlly]

DIRECT sterilization of either men or women, whether permanent or temporary, is not permitted in a Catholic health care institution. Procedures that induce sterility are permitted when their DIRECT effect is the cure or alleviation of a present and serious pathology and a simpler treatment is not available.

Medicines capable of alleviating or suppressing pain may be given to a dying person, even if this therapy may inDIRECTly shorten the person’s life so long as the intent is not to hasten death.

Formal cooperation “occurs when an action, either by its very nature or by the form it takes in a concrete situation, can be defined as a DIRECT participation in an [immoral] act . . . or a sharing in the immoral intention of the person committing it.

Therefore, cooperation is formal not only when the cooperator shares the intention of the wrongdoer, but also when the cooperator DIRECTly participates in the immoral act, even if the cooperator does not share the intention of the wrongdoer, but participates as a means to some other end.

The cooperation is material if the one cooperating neither shares the wrongdoer’s intention in performing the immoral act nor cooperates by DIRECTly participating in the act as a means to some other end, but rather contributes to the immoral activity in a way that is causally related but not essential to the immoral act itself.

Catholic health care organizations are not permitted to engage in immediate material cooperation in actions that are intrinsically immoral, such as abortion, euthanasia, assisted suicide, and DIRECT sterilization. Catholic health care organizations are not permitted to engage in immediate material cooperation in actions that are intrinsically immoral, such as abortion, euthanasia, assisted suicide, and DIRECT sterilization.

Catholic health care organizations are not permitted to engage in immediate material cooperation in actions that are intrinsically immoral, such as abortion, euthanasia, assisted suicide, and DIRECT sterilization.

Ethical and Religious DIRECTives for Catholic Health Care ServicesSixth Edition

UNITED STATES CONFERENCE OF CATHOLIC BISHOPS

 

[o_mlly]

… something more than put-downs and literal name-calling.

Man up. Claiming victim status is childish. If one repeatedly make statements that have been refuted then they are either being deceitful or ignorant. It is not a put-down or name calling. I am ignorant about many things but not about Catholic morality.

 

[LeafByNiggle]

You have cited lots of instances of the word DIRECT appearing in Catholic teaching. In every case they were being used for emphasis; nowhere did any of those citations say that the moral judgement would have been different if the action had been INDIRECT. For example,

In case of extra uterine pregnancy, no intervention is morally licit which constitutes a DIRECT abortion.

Does this means intervation would be OK if it constituted an INDIRECT abortion, whatever that is? No. If it were indirect it would also be unintended.

DIRECT sterilization of either men or women, whether permanent or temporary, is not permitted

Does this mean INDIRECT sterilization is permitted? No. Only if it is unintended.

Medicines capable of alleviating or suppressing pain may be given to a dying person, even if this therapy may inDIRECTly shorten the person’s life so long as the intent is not to hasten death.

Here “indirectly” is used to emphasize that the intention is not to shorten the person’s life.

Ethical and Religious DIRECTives for Catholic Health Care ServicesSixth Edition

Here I think your global search and replace function on your text editor got carried away

In every case cited above, the word “direct” goes along with the intention to cause the effect mentioned and the word “indirect” goes along with the effect being an unintended consequence. But in the trolley problem we have what you claim is a direct effect (the killing of the one man) even though it is not the intended effect. No where in Catholic teaching have you found any instance where the concept of “direct vs. indirect” can be the deciding factor in determining morality. And besides, you still haven’t shown that the trolley problem and ectopic pregnancy are different in directness, regardless of how you define the terms.

 

[o_mlly]

In every case cited above, the word “direct” goes along with the intention …

Wrong again. Reread the very first directive.

See you around.

 

[LeafByNiggle]

LeafByNiggle:

In every case cited above, the word “direct” goes along with the intention …

Wrong again. Reread the very first directive.

The very first directive you listed is this one:

It is not permissible, however, to initiate or to recommend treatments that have as their purpose or DIRECT effect the removal, destruction, or interference with the implantation of a fertilized ovum.

Here the word DIRECT is used to emphasize when it is the purpose to remove, destroy, or interfere with the implantation of the fertilized ovum. Again, it goes with something the actor intends as a means to achieve his end. It is still intention all over again.

So for you to use this concept to support your view of the trolley problem you would have to show that the purpose or intent of the observer in throwing the switch was to have the man killed, which is obviously not the case.

 

[o_mlly]

Here the word DIRECT is used to emphasize when it is the purpose to remove, destroy, or interfere with the implantation of the fertilized ovum. Again, it goes with something the actor intends as a means to achieve his end. It is still intention all over again.

Wrong, again. The directive is either/or. Either any kind of intent or an effect that is direct makes the act impermissible.

It is not permissible, however, to initiate or to recommend treatments that have as their purpose or DIRECT effect the removal …

Explain why salpingectomy is moral and salpingostomy is immoral, as Fr. Pacholczyk explains. In your misinterpretation both are moral.

 

[LeafByNiggle]

Explain why salpingectomy is moral and salpingostomy is immoral, as Fr. Pacholczyk explains. In your misinterpretation both are moral.

Referring to the four necessary conditions for valid double effect:

1. The nature-of-the-act condition. The action, apart from the foreseen evil, must be either morally good or indifferent.
2. The means-end condition. The bad effect must not be the means by which one achieves the good effect. Good ends do not justify evil means.[3]
3. The right-intention condition. The intention must be the achieving of only the good effect, with the bad effect being only an unintended side effect. All reasonable measures to avoid or mitigate the bad effect must be taken.
4. The proportionality condition. There must be a proportionately grave reason for permitting the evil effect.

Removal of the tube satisfies all four of them because the nature of the act, apart from foreseen evil, is morally good. It is the removal of a diseased tissue. The death of the baby is not the means by which the good of removing the diseased tissue is achieve. The intention is right, and proportionality is satisfied because both choices will likely result in some death, but this one results in lesser death.

Cutting out the baby from the tube satisfies #3 and #4 but it does not satisfy #1 or #2. The problem with #1 is that the act itself, removing the living child from the tube, is evil in and of itself. And even if one disagrees about #1, there is no doubt about #2. The removal of the baby is not just a side-effect but is the means by which the cure is effected. This is not allowed.

Now how does this relate to the trolley problem?

 

[o_mlly]

Removal of the tube satisfies all four of them because the nature of the act, apart from foreseen evil, is morally good.

All well and good.

But we are looking for the reasons Fr. Pacholczyk gives that justifies tube removal (salpingectomy), “Importantly, the surgeon is choosing to act on the tube (a part of the mother’s body) rather than directly on the child.”

And the reason Fr. condemns salpingostomy, “[Because it] also raises obvious moral objections because it directly causes the death of the child.”

He sums up the essential difference, “We may never directly take the life of an innocent human being, though we may sometimes tolerate the indirect and unintended loss of life.”

Now explain to us how the bystander who throws the switch only indirectly kills the innocent man.