Catholic view on utilitarianism

[o_mlly]

Unless there can be some agreement about the ethical system, it is impossible to discuss such question.

The agreement must first be on the highest human good. Second, the agreement must extend to the needs (not wants) of human beings necessary to achieve that highest good. This list of human needs translates immediately into a list of human rights. All human rights present to others (and self) a parallel list of human obligations to respect and respond to those rights. Only then can any system of morality be debated.

The highest good fundamental to Catholic moral theology determines the Catholic understanding of moral and immoral acts:

Premise 1: A free rational will determines a moral agent.

Definition: A rational will is a will informed by a reasoning intellect.

Definition: A moral agent is a person obliged to achieve the highest good possible for self and others.

Premise 2: The highest possible good is a perfect relationship with God.

Definition: Good is the property of existence.

Definition: Evil is the privation of existence.

Premise 3: Any and all acts which in themselves impair or diminish the moral agent’s relationship to God reduce the agent’s existence.

Conclusion 1: Any act which in itself privates the moral agent’s existence is evil (immoral).

Conclusion 2: Any act which in itself increases the moral agent’s existence is good (moral).

 

[Rau]

Throwing a switch to divert a trolley from hitting 5 people is in not inherently evil. It is not a direct attack on anyone.

The language here is expressed in a manner to overlook the true nature of the act. The act is clothed in its “intention” rather than it’s nature. The act can equally be described as directing the trolley to the one. Because that is equally inherent to the act. This is why the act has simultaneously a good and an evil moral object. And thus why it is impermissible.

 

[LeafByNiggle]

LeafByNiggle:

Throwing a switch to divert a trolley from hitting 5 people is in not inherently evil. It is not a direct attack on anyone.

The language here is expressed in a manner to overlook the true nature of the act. The act is clothed in its “intention” rather than it’s nature. The act can equally be described as directing the trolley to the one. Because that is equally inherent to the act. This is why the act has simultaneously a good and an evil moral object. And thus why it is impermissible.

I may not understand this “moral object” stuff, but I do understand examples. Perhaps you could explain how this dual moral object analysis that you just gave for the trolley problem does not apply to two other cases of double effect that most people say are permissible (both of which have appeared in this thread, so I am merely repeating):

The first example is that of a pilot of an airplane that has run out of fuel over a busy city. On its present autopilot glide path, if the pilot did nothing, it would descend straight into an apartment building and kill hundreds. But if he turns the plane slightly to the right he can make an open field where just one child is playing. Everywhere else he could reach is highly-populated. Can he morally “throw the switch” to direct the plane away from the apartment building and toward the one child in the middle of a park? (The plane is big. There is no way to land it in the park without striking the child.)

The second example is that of ectopic pregnancy treated by tubal excision. In this case the surgeon takes an action that can be described as removing a diseased tube from the mother. But the language here is expressed in such a manner to overlook the fact that it can also be described as cutting off the flow of nutrients to the baby, killing the baby.

When explaining these two cases, be sure not clothe the act with “intention” rather than the nature of act that I have described, so that I may understand why your argument applies to the trolley problem and not to these other two cases.

 

[EndTimes]

It’s just another - and in that case very highly improbable - suppositional → “What If?”

How about - switch the lever and Pray the one on the other track jumps out of the way?

 

[Ender]

The language here is expressed in a manner to overlook the true nature of the act. The act is clothed in its “intention” rather than it’s nature. The act can equally be described as directing the trolley to the one. Because that is equally inherent to the act. This is why the act has simultaneously a good and an evil moral object. And thus why it is impermissible.

The difficulty in resolving this issue lies in properly describing the object of the action. We all understand that the morality of an action depends on the morality of the intent, the object, and (to a lesser extent) the circumstances. Defining the intent is easy; it is the object that is the problem.

According to JPII “that object is the proximate end of a deliberate decision which determines the act of willing on the part of the acting person.” As I understand this there is an intent inherent in the act which is separate from the intent behind the action; and that intent is achieving the proximate end.

If this is true then directing the trolley at the one is a different object than directing the trolley away from the five because the proximate ends are different. The physical actions are identical, but the objects are not. It seems also that this distinction equally justifies the actions of the pilot and the physician where other explanations do not.

 

[Gorgias]

None of those count as evidence for some absolute and objective ethical system.

No… none of those are accepted by you. Subtle, yet critical, difference.

This is really boring.

I agree. That’s kinda the effect your assertions tend to have.

Here’s the thing: if you’re gonna claim “there’s no such thing”, then you need to demonstrate that this is the case. Otherwise, all you have is a bald assertion, which we can only take on good faith. I’ve shown the counter-example, which you simply dismiss out of hand. Nevertheless, now it’s back in your court.

 

[o_mlly]

The physical actions are identical, but the objects are not.

The moral object necessarily includes more than the mere physicality of the act. If the physical act and the foreseeable moral effects are identical then the moral objects are identical.

As to the object’s proximate end being suffused with intent, in VS p. 79, JPII tells us of the three fonts, the moral object font is primary.

The primary and decisive element for moral judgment is the object of the human act

Logically, the primacy of the moral object font can only be true if the expression of the moral object is independent of any expression of the other two fonts. JPII tells us exactly so that in p. 80.

These are the acts which, in the Church’s moral tradition, have been termed “intrinsically evil” (intrinsece malum): they are such always and per se, in other words, on account of their very object, and quite apart from the ulterior intentions of the one acting and the circumstances.

Therefore, the proximate end of the the moral object cannot be colored by a particular actor’s intent, rather the moral object stands “quite apart” from the “ulterior intention” of any actor.

It seems also that this distinction equally justifies the actions of the pilot and the physician where other explanations do not.

In order to see the distinction between the indirect abortive act and the bystander’s act, first examine both abortive acts. Fr. Tad tells us that the act in the indirect abortion (excise disease tissue) is not identical to the act in the direct abortion (excise the child). Neither surgeon intends the death of the child. What makes one act moral and the other not?

The indirect abortion acts on the mother’s person-body. The direct abortion acts on the child’s person-body. This distinction in the physical acts in se allows the former and condemns the latter.

How can the moral object of the bystander’s act (now purged of a good intention) be other than physically an attack on the body-person of the innocent one? If the bystander does not act then the innocent one does not die. I do not see how one can assert that the direct cause (there has to be one) of the bystander’s death is the physical evil of a trolley impact when absent the hand of a moral agent the trolley would not impact the innocent man. Physical evils are just that, merely physical.

The pilot and the bystander face different moral choices. Perhaps a better stand-in to simulate the pilot would be an engineer on a trolley that lost its brakes. Both the pilot and the engineer have a moral duty to mitigate the effects of the physical evil in which they find themselves involved. Their options are limited to the realm of the possible. The engineer who cannot switch the track has no options to mitigate the loss of life. The pilot does have options as long as he can steer and foresees that doing one thing rather than another mitigates the physical evil effects.

 

[LeafByNiggle]

The pilot and the bystander face different moral choices.

This statement calls for an explanation, but it gets none.

Perhaps a better stand-in to simulate the pilot would be an engineer on a trolley that lost its brakes.

This is not a “better” stand-in if the engineer could not change tracks. A really good stand-in would be an engineer who could switch the tracks from where he sits. That would put him in the same moral position as the bystander and the pilot.

Both the pilot and the engineer have a moral duty to mitigate the effects of the physical evil in which they find themselves involved.

If the significant factor is that the engineer and the pilot had assigned jobs relating to the unfolding disaster, we can just as easily replace the bystander with a switchyard engineer who is standing in the same spot as the bystander and has access to the same switch as the bystander. We would then say the engineer has a moral duty to mitigate the effects of the physical evil before him. And therefore he could throw the switch that the bystander could not morally throw. But now suppose the engineer stepped out for a cup of coffee and the bystander saw what was happening and did the same thing the engineer did. It is not reasonable to say the engineer did right and the bystander did wrong when they both did exactly the same thing.

Their options are limited to the realm of the possible. The engineer who cannot switch the track has no options to mitigate the loss of life.

Therefore any consideration of the impotent engineer sheds no light at all on the question.

The pilot does have options as long as he can steer and foresees that doing one thing rather than another mitigates the physical evil effects.

And now we see there is no difference between the pilot’s choices and the bystander’s choices. They can both “steer” and mitigate the physical evil effects unfolding. This comparison between the pilot and the bystander has never been explained away.

 

[Inquiry]

This, by the way, is what I was asking for earlier. An explanation of why the three scenarios were different. I’m not sure I agree with you, but I want to make sure I understand exactly what you are saying first.

The indirect abortion acts on the mother’s person-body. The direct abortion acts on the child’s person-body. This distinction in the physical acts in se allows the former and condemns the latter.

How can the moral object of the bystander’s act (now purged of a good intention) be other than physically an attack on the body-person of the innocent one? If the bystander does not act then the innocent one does not die. I do not see how one can assert that the direct cause (there has to be one) of the bystander’s death is the physical evil of a trolley impact when absent the hand of a moral agent the trolley would not impact the innocent man. Physical evils are just that, merely physical.

In the Trolley vs Ectopic problem your argument seems to be that the difference between the two is that the mother’s person-body is the target and the damage to baby’s person-body is a byproduct of the action on the mother. In the Trolley problem the target must be the one man because he is who is physically affected. The five people cannot be the target because they are not physically affected if the track is switched. Does that sum up what you were trying to say?

The pilot and the bystander face different moral choices. Perhaps a better stand-in to simulate the pilot would be an engineer on a trolley that lost its brakes. Both the pilot and the engineer have a moral duty to mitigate the effects of the physical evil in which they find themselves involved. Their options are limited to the realm of the possible. The engineer who cannot switch the track has no options to mitigate the loss of life. The pilot does have options as long as he can steer and foresees that doing one thing rather than another mitigates the physical evil effects.

The second case is less clear. In the first lines you seem to be saying that the pilot and trolley problems would be equivalent if the trolley operator was actually an engineer in the trolley. Your argument seems to be that when a person is physically part of the unfolding events their choices are different. Is that correct? Or are you assuming that both the pilot and engineer are at least partly responsible for the situation being the way it is, while a bystander would not be?

 

[o_mlly]

Does that sum up what you were trying to say?

No. I note that what I wrote is only 95 words and your “sum up” is 86 words. I’ll stay with the original. If you are trying to make a point then please do so.

In the first lines you seem to be saying that the pilot and trolley problems would be equivalent if the trolley operator (?) was actually an engineer (?) in the trolley.

No. I don’t seem to be saying that at all. Please read what I wrote.

The pilot and the bystander face different moral choices. Perhaps a better stand-in to simulate the pilot would be an engineer on a trolley that lost its brakes

 

[LeafByNiggle]

Inquiry:

Does that sum up what you were trying to say?

No. I note that what I wrote is only 95 words and your “sum up” is 86 words. I’ll stay with the original. If you are trying to make a point then please do so.

When Inquiry summarizes o_mlly’s argument, it is not for the purpose of reducing the number of words so much as it is an attempt to come to a common understanding of what was said. When all such summaries are rejected out of hand, it raises the question of whether or not o_mlly really wants the argument to be understood, or wants to maintain enough confusion that no progress can be made.

In the first lines you seem to be saying that the pilot and trolley problems would be equivalent if the trolley operator (?) was actually an engineer (?) in the trolley.

No. I don’t seem to be saying that at all. Please read what I wrote.

The pilot and the bystander face different moral choices. Perhaps a better stand-in to simulate the pilot would be an engineer on a trolley that lost its brakes

Inquiry’s conclusion was reasonable. Disregarding it without explanation is again an attempt to maintain confusion rather than understanding.

The pilot vs the the bystander comparison is the clearest example of why the bystander may throw the switch, and o_mlly refuses to take it head-on.

 

[Rau]

A pilot may not (and in the context of the imagined scenarios, “does not“) “steer” his plane into a small crowd in preference to a large one. An autonomous car may not elect to take out the lone pedestrian in preference to the crowd. That’s what the bystander stands accused of doing. The tracks are a sure targeting mechanism. They compel the death of the one who is tied to the other track to lie in the object. They ensure the action directly kills him.

 

[Ender]

The moral object necessarily includes more than the mere physicality of the act. If the physical act and the foreseeable moral effects are identical then the moral objects are identical.

As to the object’s proximate end being suffused with intent, in VS p. 79, JPII tells us of the three fonts, the moral object font is primary.

It is not simply that you reject my argument, but that you do not recognize what it is. Of course the object is more than the physical act. How many times have I said it is the act and the proximate end? Nor, other than asserting it, have you cited any source stating that the “foreseeable moral effects” are part of the object.

Therefore, the proximate end of the the moral object cannot be colored by a particular actor’s intent, rather the moral object stands “quite apart” from the “ulterior intention” of any actor.

What he said was that the object (font) is quite distinct from the intent (font). What he did not say was that there is no degree of intent in the object. An “end” is an objective, “a goal or result that one seeks to achieve.” The “proximate end” is the immediate goal one seeks to achieve with the act one commits, and this is quite apart from the ultimate goal of the intent font.

The indirect abortion acts on the mother’s person-body. The direct abortion acts on the child’s person-body.

As far as the direct/indirect distinction is concerned, the direct action is on the switch; the bystander commits no direct act against the “person-body” of the one on the track.

If the bystander does not act then the innocent one does not die.

If the doctor does not act then the innocent fetus does not die (yet).

As for the rest, it is covered by LeafByNiggle’s response.

 

[Ender]

A pilot may not (and in the context of the imagined scenarios, “does not“) “steer” his plane into a small crowd in preference to a large one.

We’re looking for an explanation of why this is so, not merely an assertion that it is. In real life when pilots do just that, steer away from heavily to less populated areas they are accounted to have done a heroic thing.

 

[LeafByNiggle]

A pilot may not (and in the context of the imagined scenarios, “does not“) “steer” his plane into a small crowd in preference to a large one.

I don’t think you seriously believe that. A plane is going down. You are the pilot steering the plane. It is going to hit someone. Are you telling me you must continue to fly straight ahead no matter what?

 

[Rau]

As far as the direct/indirect distinction is concerned, the direct action is on the switch;

Ender, were we in an English class, the everyday meaning of words like “direct” would serve us well. But in this subject area, words have established meanings particular to this context. Otherwise we conclude the object of squeezing the trigger is to move a hammer. The very unique characteristics of the trolley setup do indeed mean the one is “directly” killed by the Bystander.

 

[Rau]

Are you telling me you must continue to fly straight ahead no matter what?

No not at all. I’m telling you that train tracks make the trolley setup unique. Decisively so.

 

[Rau]

In real life when pilots do just that, steer away from heavily to less populated areas…

Put yourself in the pilot’s chair, think about what he is actually doing, the limited control he has. The lack of clarity, the range of possible outcomes… The trolley problem is chosen based on train tracks for a reason. The tracks are not an accidental inclusion.

 

[LeafByNiggle]

I’m telling you that train tracks make the trolley setup unique. Decisively so.

Put yourself in the pilot’s chair, think about what he is actually doing, the limited control he has. The lack of clarity, the range of possible outcomes… The trolley problem is chosen based on train tracks for a reason. The tracks are not an accidental inclusion.

These are not morally significant differences. Yes, the pilot has more places he could land, and the bystander has only two choices. The number of choices does not matter. What matters is that a choice is made that results in a death.

You claim there is limited control available to the pilot. So is there limited control available to the bystander.

You claim that the pilot has lack of clarity on the range of possible outcomes. As a pilot myself I can tell you that is just not true. A pilot faced with fuel exhaustion can certainly steer his gliding craft to anywhere he chooses within the gliding range of the craft. If he sees an open field, he can most definitely set the plane down there. The plane may crash on impact, but he has complete control over where that impact is. You have not yet shown any moral distinction between the choices of the pilot and the choices of the bystander.

 

[Rau]

You have not yet shown any moral distinction between the choices of the pilot and the choices of the bystander.

Actually, I think I’ve annunciated it clearly. Please think about the significance of Train tracks. They are what bind together the two moral objects - one good one evil. The act to save is precisely the act that (directly) kills. No wiggle room, no hope of another outcome, no possibility of a further adjustment. The death is inherent to the act - the tracks see to that.