Catholic view on utilitarianism

[Freddy]

Freddy:

But there’s someone in the field. We’re not going to be able to avoid him.

The man may duck. No such potential in the trolley case. Throwing the switch is inherently targeting the individual.

You are welcome to hold to your view that there is no distinction. The trolley case makes it crystal clear that to act is impermissible. How you see the pilot case is up to you.

One doesn’t intentionally target either person. The guy in the field or the one on the track. One intentionally avoids causing multiple deaths. Surely you see the difference.

 

[Rau]

One doesn’t intentionally target either person. The guy in the field or the one on the track. One intentionally avoids causing multiple deaths. Surely you see the difference.

The question is not about what we desire (intend). There are some things we can’t do by virtue of the inherent evil in the act. So while we wish/intend noones death, we may not choose an act where the death is inherent to the act. That’s the case with the trolley, it’s not the case with licit ectopic pregnancy treatment (although we know the baby will die). And you can choose in the case of a pilot veering from a high rise.

 

[Freddy]

Freddy:

One doesn’t intentionally target either person. The guy in the field or the one on the track. One intentionally avoids causing multiple deaths. Surely you see the difference.

And you can choose in the case of a pilot veering from a high rise.

So you can choose to land in a field and kill one person as opposed to doing nothing and kill many.

 

[Rau]

So you can choose to land in a field and kill one person as opposed to doing nothing and kill many.

You’ll need to judge that for yourself. I’ve offered a moral analysis in the context of the trolley scenario where the nature of the act open to the bystander is clear.

 

[Freddy]

Freddy:

So you can choose to land in a field and kill one person as opposed to doing nothing and kill many.

You’ll need to judge that for yourself. I’ve offered a moral analysis in the context of the trolley scenario where the nature of the act open to the bystander is clear.

You’re free to give a moral analysis on the guy in the field as well. I see no difference but you seem to see one.

 

[Rau]

You’re free to give a moral analysis on the guy in the field as well. I see no difference but you seem to see one.

Leaf has given an analysis of that one. He claims the pilot directly kills the guy (in which case he ought to know the act is impermissible). Me, I’m not convinced of that. I explained why I say there is probably no direct killing there, but Leaf responds that I simply don’t understand piloting…); I say the pilot scenario is not neatly constrained the way the trolley case is - you guys say it is!

In the trolley case, no one invokes special knowledge of how tracks and trains work - we’re all clear on the real-world issues, leaving just the moral principles to be addressed.

At the end of the day, the attraction to the view that throwing the lever is ok is based on the attractiveness of stepping in to reduce loss of life. That is appealing. But our moral theology does not sanction all acts that lessen the foreseeable loss of life. The act itself is scrutinized. And sometimes it turns out that there is no good act that can halt or eliminate the evil already in train (excuse the pun!).

 

[LeafByNiggle]

Leaf has given an analysis of that one. He claims the pilot directly kills the guy

I made no such absolute claim about the pilot “directly” killing the man in the field. I said that there is no difference in directness between the pilot and the bystander. Your reliance on the term “direct” which you do not define in moral terms masks an inability to distinguish between the two cases.

I say the pilot scenario is not neatly constrained the way the trolley case is - you guys say it is!

How is the neatness of the constraints morally relevant? It does not make sense to say one may make a choice if the choices are messy, but may not make the same choice if the choices are neat.

In the trolley case, no one invokes special knowledge of how tracks and trains work

It takes knowledge that a particular switch will affect a particular track. That is just as special knowledge as a pilot knowing how to steer a plane. In fact I would go so far as to say there are more people who know how to steer a plane than who know how to read and operate a railroad (or trolley) switch yard. Chances are any random bystander wouldn’t have the foggiest idea how to divert an impending trolley disaster. I direct your attention to the switchboard in the Pixar short, “Lifted”.

But our moral theology does not sanction all acts that lessen the foreseeable loss of life. The act itself is scrutinized. And sometimes it turns out that there is no good act that can halt or eliminate the evil already in train.

That our theology sometimes concludes that sometimes there is no good act that can halt the evil in progress, that does not mean the trolley case is one of them. We already know of two cases where our theology does allow such action. One is in tubal excision for ectopic pregnancy and the other is a pilot landing a plane that has run out of fuel.

Regarding the pilot landing the plane in the field:

The man may duck. No such potential in the trolley case. Throwing the switch is inherently targeting the individual.

This does not distinguish the cases either. A man on the tracks may indeed “duck” by lying down between the rails and letting the trolley pass over him. I think his chances are better than the chances of the man in the middle of a field with a huge jet airplane bearing down on him at 240 miles per hour. There is no difference in how much the unintended death is “inherently” targeted.

 

[Bender]

Exactly right.

Co-pilot: But there’s someone in the field. We’re not going to be able to avoid him.
Pilot: I have no choice. It’s him or the office buildings.

The sad thing is that sometimes one has only two choices, to cause lesser harm or to choose greater harm. And in such cases one is expected to cause the lesser harm. If the non-action will cause greater harm, then non-action should be avoided. Is this still not obvious?

 

[Inquiry]

No, there are definitely times where the lesser harm is impermissible. That’s part of why the principle of double effect even exists. In the ectopic pregnancy case, the lesser harm scenario is clearly saving the mother, yet directly killing the baby is still wrong and impermissible and it would remain impermissible so even if that was the only course of action that would save the mother.

 

[Freddy]

Freddy:

Exactly right.

Co-pilot: But there’s someone in the field. We’re not going to be able to avoid him.
Pilot: I have no choice. It’s him or the office buildings.

The sad thing is that sometimes one has only two choices, to cause lesser harm or to choose greater harm. And in such cases one is expected to cause the lesser harm. If the non-action will cause greater harm, then non-action should be avoided. Is this still not obvious?

Blazingly so.

 

[o_mlly]

It is not simply that you reject my argument, but that you do not recognize what it is.

It is difficult to recognize what your argument is unless you are clear and consistent in your claims. To wit:

The consequences, good and bad, are part of the circumstance font, and cannot be included in the object or the intent fonts.

Our intent goes to what consequence we want to achieve, and the object includes the action we take that we hope will lead to that end.

Your statements are in the same posting and seem, at worst, to contradict each other and, at best, make scrambled eggs out of the three fonts. Immediately before these confusing statements, you affirmed your argument as follows:

Is this a fair analysis of your argument on the morality of the bystander’s act?

Moral object: Throw the switch to divert the trolley.
Intent: Save five.
Circumstances: Foresees five saved.
Foresees one killed.

And I went with it. And then showed how logically the claims were in error and cited in VS teachings that are the opposite to your claims. ? And now you write that I do not recognize your argument?

 

[Bender]

No, there are definitely times where the lesser harm is impermissible. That’s part of why the principle of double effect even exists. In the ectopic pregnancy case, the lesser harm scenario is clearly saving the mother, yet directly killing the baby is still wrong and impermissible and it would remain impermissible so even if that was the only course of action that would save the mother.

The whole “double effect” is a cop-out. If you point a gun to the head of a terrorist to prevent that terrorist from detonating a bomb, then you cannot “defend” yourself with "but I did not intend to kill him, it was just a foreseen, but unintended consequence of pulling the trigger that prevented him to carry out his intent.

The situation is simple:

1. a terrorist intends to detonate a bomb
2. there is only one way to prevent it, by pointing a gun and KILLING the terrorist - this is a DIRECT killing
3. if there would be another way to prevent the act, then that action should be used.

That is the whole analysis. The same applies to the ectopic pregnancy. The whole point is that if there is no other solution but “direct” killing, then that is procedure one must follow.

You (in general!) are unable to present any logical or rational argument for: “direct killing is always impermissible”. And as such your argument is discarded. The terrorist is a much better example than the ectopic pregnancy because NO one values the life of the terrorist higher than the life of the potential victims (except another terrorist, of course. ).

 

[Inquiry]

@o_mlly, I’m sorry to say this, but it really looks like the communication problem is on your end. You are consistently unclear in how you area applying the references you cite, and when we ask for further clarification you either will not or cannot give it. You frequently miss that other people are reading the same sources you are and coming to a different understanding of what the original author meant. And I may be wrong on this last one, but when reading either sources or opposing arguments you seem to latch on to a single line and grant it disproportionate importance (for instance, @ender very specifically showed he had some reservations about how the object and circumstances were stated, but you ignored that part and focused only on the assent. You took the ‘qualified’ out of his qualified agreement).

Bottom line: You very well may be right in this moral debate, but if you can’t communicate your reasoning we’re never going to know it.

 

[o_mlly]

What he [JPII] did not say was that there is no degree of intent in the object.

I think what you need is not the negative but the affirmative to support your argument.

As far as the direct/indirect distinction is concerned, the direct action is on the switch; the bystander commits no direct act against the “ person-body ” of the one on the track.

Sigh … foreseeable unmediated outcomes are direct and willed outcomes.

If the doctor does not act then the innocent fetus does not die (yet).

The mother is the primary moral agent in an ectopic pregnancy, the doc is secondary. Compare her moral status to the bystander.

The moral agency of the bystander, although not determinative, may be instructive. The bystander’s life is not in peril whether he acts or not. The life of the mother in a tubal pregnancy situation is in peril.

Does one attempting to save one’s own life not have a greater moral license to kill than a bystander? The bystander has a moral duty to protect others from harm but only through morally licit means. If the mother whose own life is at risk may not attack the child then how could the bystander possibly acquire the moral authority to kill?

CCC#2264 “… since one is bound to take more care of one’s own life than of another’s.”

 

[o_mlly]

I’m sorry to say this, but it really looks like the communication problem is on your end.

No, I think not. Did you look up communication theory as suggested?

That you cannot see it does not mean that it has not been demonstrated. Lookup “communication theory”, it seems you may have a decoding problem.

 

[LeafByNiggle]

The whole “double effect” is a cop-out. If you point a gun to the head of a terrorist to prevent that terrorist from detonating a bomb, then you cannot “defend” yourself with "but I did not intend to kill him, it was just a foreseen, but unintended consequence of pulling the trigger that prevented him to carry out his intent.

This is a misunderstanding of the conditions for double effect. First of all, the case you cited is not even a case of double effect. It is a case of legitimate self-defense. If the threat is imminent, one is allowed to use the minimal force sufficient to meet the threat, even if that minimal level of force is lethal.

The same applies to the ectopic pregnancy. The whole point is that if there is no other solution but “direct” killing, then that is procedure one must follow.

I don’t know which procedure you refer to, as there are two procedures that have been discussed. (Actually, three if you count methotrexate). All three procedures save the life of the mother. But only one of them does so by acting on the diseased tube as the problem. The other two procedures are invalid because they accomplish their good end by means of what is does to the baby.

 

[Ender]

It is difficult to recognize what your argument is unless you are clear and consistent in your claims. To wit:

(Please Note: This uploaded content is no longer available.) Ender:

The consequences , good and bad, are part of the circumstance font, and cannot be included in the object or the intent fonts.

The first statement is clear and needs no further explanation. As to the second, the “consequence we want to achieve” is another way of saying the objective, the final end. In the trolley case our intent is to save the five and our hope is that that will be the actual consequence. The final end is based on the expectation of certain consequences, but it is not the consequences itself. Those statements are not self contradictory.

And then showed how logically the claims were in error and cited in VS teachings that are the opposite to your claims.

You cited VS and asserted I was in error, but the citation did not justify your claim.

You have claimed that the intention font is the only place where intention resides, that there is no other intent in the object font. I can show that this is not so by using murder as an example. This is an intrinsically evil object that is never justified regardless of one’s intent in committing it.

That said, what makes an act a murder? Essential to the definition is the intent to kill. A killing is not murder if it is not intended. So, if murder is an intrinsically evil object independent of the reason one commits it, but an act is not a murder unless it is intended, then there must be an intent in the act of murder…which is an object, therefore there is an intent buried in the object distinct from the intention font.

This fits exactly with JPII’s definition of the object as an action and its proximate end. It is the immediate objective, which is often distinct from the final objective which is defined by the intention font.

 

[Ender]

Sigh … foreseeable unmediated outcomes are direct and willed outcomes.

That you don’t actually mean this is demonstrated by the fact that you have never defined “direct”, and this definition would apply to the death of the fetus. This doesn’t even agree with your position on the chain of dominoes where you said pushing over the first domino was direct and the fall of all the others was indirect.

The mother is the primary moral agent in an ectopic pregnancy, the doc is secondary. Compare her moral status to the bystander.

The mother is not the primary moral agent any more than are the five people tied to the tracks. We are moral agents when we take an action that may be morally evaluated. The mother takes no action; it is the doctor who acts. It is his actions that are judged.

Does one attempting to save one’s own life not have a greater moral license to kill than a bystander?

No. We are all constrained by the same laws. You can do no more in the defense of your own life than can a bystander defending it for you.

If the mother whose own life is at risk may not attack the child then how could the bystander possibly acquire the moral authority to kill?

“Attack” is a loaded word and is not meaningful here. The child will die as a result of the action of the doctor. The one on the track will die as a result of the action of the bystander. Aside from asserting that the actions are different you have provided no argument to sustain your position.

 

[Inquiry]

This is exactly what I am talking about. You just offered a vague suggestion as a backup to your blanket denial as if it somehow justifies you completely. It would be as if I asked you to look up the Dunning-Kruger effect as if that somehow proved you were overestimating your own abilities (for the record I have no idea if you are or not).

Even if you are right, and there is a coding/decoding problem here, the whole point of my last post was that it appears to be on your end. Simply accusing other people of having that problem doesn’t show that they are having one. Indeed the way that you repeatedly insist that your own words are clear when other people do not shows that the problem is very likely on your end. Or not.

Again, you may be right but if you never show how you are we are never going to know.

 

[Ender]

So while we wish/intend noones death, we may not choose an act where the death is inherent to the act. That’s the case with the trolley, it’s not the case with licit ectopic pregnancy treatment (although we know the baby will die).

Now you need to explain what “inherent to the act” means so we can understand why it condemns throwing the trolley switch but permits the operation. To me this seems like a reprise of the direct/indirect distinction which has never been explained but only asserted. Unless these terms are defined they cannot be meaningfully applied.