Catholic view on utilitarianism

[Bender]

This is a misunderstanding of the conditions for double effect.

If you foresee an outcome, and perform it, you cannot say: “it was just a foreseen, but unintended result”. Whether you “intended” it or not is irrelevant.

The other two procedures are invalid because they accomplish their good end by means of what is does to the baby.

This is why the ectopic pregnancy is an incomplete approach. One can put the life of someone else in lethal jeopardy - unknowingly and unintentionally. Does the self-defense (or the defense of others) still apply? Are you allowed to use lethal force if someone is a carrier of a lethal virus, and the only way to prevent the virus to mow down people is by killing the carrier?

 

[o_mlly]

The first statement is clear and needs no further explanation.

The first statement is in error. Consequences that are “repugnant” to reason go to the moral object font as per Aquinas. The definition of “consequences” as the word relates to moral theology needs clarification. Consequences are only those circumstances accidental to the act, i.e., person, place, when, how, etc. (consult the several moral theology sources previously given). Consequences that are substantial to the act must be in the object font.

That said, what makes an act a murder? Essential to the definition is the intent to kill. A killing is not murder if it is not intended. So, if murder is an intrinsically evil object independent of the reason one commits it, but an act is not a murder unless it is intended, then there must be an intent in the act of murder…which is an object, therefore there is an intent buried in the object distinct from the intention font.

You make my point. Intrinsically evil acts by definition include in their moral object, not in the intent or circumstance font, the substantial elements that determine the inherent evil in the act.

A commentator of note makes the same distinction:

https://jimmyakin.typepad.com/defensor_fidei/2006/11/intrinsic_evil.html

It would then follow that when intention and circumstances are spoken of as sources of morality over and above the object of the act that we are speaking of intentions and circumstances over and above those included in the definition of the act itself.

This fits exactly with JPII’s definition of the object as an action and its proximate end. It is the immediate objective, which is often distinct from the final objective which is defined by the intention font.

No, it does not. The moral object only includes intent, the primary end in view, if the act itself by definition does so. The murder examples muddles rather than clarifies. The direct killing of an innocent is also intrinsically evil; good intent does not change the evil in the act.

 

[LeafByNiggle]

If you foresee an outcome, and perform it, you cannot say: “it was just a foreseen, but unintended result”. Whether you “intended” it or not is irrelevant.

In double effect intention is relevant. It is not everything, but it is something relevant. Read what Thomas Aquinas has to say about double effect and you will see that is true.

One can put the life of someone else in lethal jeopardy - unknowingly and unintentionally . Does the self-defense (or the defense of others) still apply? Are you allowed to use lethal force if someone is a carrier of a lethal virus, and the only way to prevent the virus to mow down people is by killing the carrier?

Yes, but only if that is the only way to neutralize the threat posed by the person carrying the virus. Practically speaking, that scenario just cannot happen. I cannot imagine any scenario in which the only way to avoid having others die is to to kill the person with the virus. For example, everyone could just run away from him. He could be put into isolation by people with hazmat suits on.

 

[o_mlly]

… but if you never show how you are we are never going to know.

I see that you joined this thread at post #591, more than half-way through the latest post.

If you have read all my posts and do not understand my arguments then I cannot make those arguments any clearer for you. But if you have not read all my posts and still claim I do not explain myself then you are being unfair.

 

[Bender]

In double effect intention is relevant. It is not everything, but it is something relevant. Read what Thomas Aquinas has to say about double effect and you will see that is true.

Aquinas’ opinion is just another opinion. It does not constitute a rational argument.

Yes, but only if that is the only way to neutralize the threat posed by the person carrying the virus.

That is the point. If there is no other way to neutralize the virus. Whether this scenario is practical or not is irrelevant. Whether you can imagine such a scenario is beside the point. We are talking about a basic principle. The point is that someone might put the live(s) of others into lethal danger, unknowingly and unintentionally, and that fact does not invalidate the use of lethal force to defend against the danger.

 

[LeafByNiggle]

Inquiry:

… but if you never show how you are we are never going to know.

I see that you joined this thread at post #591, more than half-way through the latest post.

If you have read all my posts and do not understand my arguments then I cannot make those arguments any clearer for you. But if you have not read all my posts and still claim I do not explain myself then you are being unfair.

It is not only Inquiry. Everyone opposed to o_mlly’s position has noted o_mlly’s tendancy to blame others for not understanding when they disagree.

 

[Ender]

Consequences that are “repugnant” to reason go to the moral object font as per Aquinas.

Aquinas said no such thing. All of the consequences, good and bad, are together in the same moral font, and that is the circumstance font. A consequence cannot go in the object font because by definition a consequence occurs subsequent to an action, and while the object does include the proximate end, an end is an objective, an intended consequence. It is not the consequence itself.

Consequences are only those circumstances accidental to the act, i.e., person, place, when, how, etc. (consult the several moral theology sources previously given). Consequences that are substantial to the act must be in the object font.

I’m not going looking for something that seems absurd on its face. If you have a source that says such a thing then you can cite it for us.

You make my point. Intrinsically evil acts by definition include in their moral object, not in the intent or circumstance font, the substantial elements that determine the inherent evil in the act.

A commentator of note makes the same distinction: (Jimmy Akin…)

I read the Akin article, and it doesn’t say what you think it does. First, I think you don’t properly distinguish between circumstances and consequences. Akin says a great deal about circumstances but virtually nothing about consequences, and what he was referring to were the circumstances that are a necessary condition in the definition of the act. He gave these examples:

It appears to me that every one of these definitions include elements referring to intention or circumstance.

Fornication includes a reference to the circumstance that neither of the parties is married.

Lying includes a reference to the intention of deceiving.

Now what he is referring to are the intrinsically evil objects of fornication and lying, where the first object includes a circumstance (not a consequence), and the second includes an intention…which is precisely what I have claimed.

 

[Inquiry]

That sounds like a reasonable point, except I am far from the only person to call you on not explaining yourself. Further there is no sign you were any clearer in the early thread, your behavior there is pretty much the same as now.

Also, you are trying to say you are being as clear as you can be, but you completely undermine that when you casually dismiss people who ask for clarification. Clarification is a way you can make things more clear. When you refuse to do so it indicates that either you cannot try, you will not try, or you don’t understand the request. All three imply that the communication problem is on your end.

 

[o_mlly]

Aquinas said no such thing. All of the consequences, good and bad, are together in the same moral font, and that is the circumstance font. A consequence cannot go in the object font because by definition a consequence occurs subsequent to an action, and while the object does include the proximate end, an end is an objective, an intended consequence. It is not the consequence itself.

Your own words betray the error in your argument.

All of the consequences … are in … the circumstance font.

Therefore, all consequences are circumstances.

A consequence cannot go in the object font …

If true then logically it follows that a circumstance cannot go in the object font. (You’ve just claimed all consequences are circumstances.)

But Aquinas did write “such a thing”:

St. Thomas Aquinas states, “A circumstance is sometimes taken as the essential
difference of the object, as compared to reason; and then it can specify a moral act. And it
must needs be so whenever a circumstances transforms an action from good to evil; for a
circumstance would not make an action evil, except through being repugnant to reason.”
Summa theologiae I-II.18.5 ad 4.

I’m not going looking for something that seems absurd on its face. If you have a source that says such a thing then you can cite it for us.

I cite and you ignore as in the above Aquinas citation. Why bother?

 

[Ender]

Your own words betray the error in your argument.

All of the consequences … are in … the circumstance font.

That all consequences are circumstances does not mean that all circumstances are consequences any more than the fact that all apples are fruits means that all fruits are apples.

If true then logically it follows that a circumstance cannot go in the object font. (You’ve just claimed all consequences are circumstances.)

Not at all. Since consequences are only a subset of all things that are circumstances it is only that subset that definitively cannot be in the object. There is nothing specifically that prevents the other aspects of the circumstances from being part of the object.

St. Thomas Aquinas states, “A circumstance is sometimes taken as the essential difference of the object, as compared to reason; and then it can specify a moral act. And it must needs be so whenever a circumstances transforms an action from good to evil; for a circumstance would not make an action evil, except through being repugnant to reason.”
Summa theologiae I-II.18.5 ad 4.

Yes, but this comment applies to circumstances, which are not synonymous with consequences. You cannot conflate the two. You provide citations but they don’t make the point you believe they do.

 

[Rau]

How is the neatness of the constraints morally relevant?

That’s the crux Leaf. The setup of the trolley scenario makes explicit that the death of the one is inherent to the act of throwing the lever. The act of throwing the lever is equivalent to pointing a rifle at the victim and shooting. Like treating ectopic pregnancy by scraping the tube. Like switching the high voltage charge away from the group and towards the one. This is the meaning of “directly” killed. The taking of life is the moral object.

Chances are any random bystander wouldn’t have the foggiest idea how to divert an impending trolley

Leaf - the problem is presented as “flick the lever”. We understand that. We then understand that the train is irrevocably aimed at the one and must continue and can’t miss. I leave you to judge whether the pilot faces an identical situation.

 

[Rau]

One is in tubal excision for ectopic pregnancy and the other is a pilot landing a plane that has run out of fuel.

Cutting the tube does not directly attack the child, rather the mother. The deprivation of life is not in the moral object. So delete that claimed analogy. And I leave it to you to judge the death in plane scenario as direct (like trolley) or indirect (like licit treatment of ectopic).

 

[o_mlly]

That all consequences are circumstances does not mean that all circumstances are consequences …

Since consequences are only a subset of all things that are circumstances …

And your point is?

Please argue against what I post and not strawmen. No one claimed only consequences are in the circumstance font.

What is challenged is your claim that all consequences are in the circumstance font. I claim that all substantial or essential consequences are in the object font. Only accidental consequences are in the circumstance font. You think that’s absurd. Look it up for yourself.

If what you claim is true then true then all consequences are merely circumstances. And that is the clever argument of the consequentialists who play a shell game with the three fonts. They argue, as you do, that putting consequences under the shell of circumstance instead of object relegates those consequences to merely mitigate or elevate blame or merit in the moral object but never change the species of the act.

In the trolley case, you put the evil effect of the death of an innocent into the circumstance font. Aquinas disagrees.

 

[Rau]

Test asdfghjkl

 

[Rau]

A man on the tracks may indeed “duck” by lying down between the rails and letting the trolley pass over him. I think his chances are better than the chances of the man in the middle of a field with a huge jet airplane bearing down on him at 240 miles per hour. There is no difference in how much the unintended death is “inherently” targeted.

The trolley scenario has the man tied to the tracks. He can’t avoid the train directed at his precise location at the precise moment the bystander make a precise adjustment to the path of the train. At that one moment - in that one act - he is condemned.

 

[Rau]

The sad thing is that sometimes one has only two choices, to cause lesser harm or to choose greater harm. And in such cases one is expected to cause the lesser harm. If the non-action will cause greater harm, then non-action should be avoided. Is this still not obvious?

Quite right - so long as your ethical system is that of the Consequentialist. If you subscribe to our catholic moral theology, you are bound to avoid evil acts, even if by committing them, lesser harm will result.

 

[LeafByNiggle]

That’s the crux Leaf. The setup of the trolley scenario makes explicit that the death of the one is inherent to the act of throwing the lever.

No, that’s your interpretation. You said the man in the field might “duck” from the landing plane. Well, if you are allowed to throw in possibilities that were not in the setup of the scenario, so am I. I could say that the man on the tracks might realize that he can lie down between the rails and not be hit.

This is the meaning of “directly” killed.

From all that I see of your use of the word “direct”, it seems to mean the killings that Rau does not want to call licit. You have yet to show how the trolley hitting the man on the track is any different from the plane hitting the man standing in the middle of the field. You say the man in the field is not targeted. I say the man on the tracks is not targeted either. There is no moral difference.

Leaf - the problem is presented as “flick the lever”. We understand that. We then understand that the train is irrevocably aimed at the one and must continue and can’t miss.

Similarly, once the pilot makes the decision to land in the field, the plane is irrevocably aimed at the man in the field.

If you subscribe to our catholic moral theology, you are bound to avoid evil acts, even if by committing them, lesser harm will result.

That’s true, but that does not say much about the trolley problem, since the whole point of disagreement is whether the throwing of the switch is an evil act.

 

[Rau]

You have yet to show how the trolley hitting the man on the track is any different from the plane hitting the man standing in the middle of the field.

That’s not the matter at issue Leaf. The question of morality is (as u say in another post) whether In throwing a switch which directs a train at a man fixed to the tracks (think: move the rifle to point at an innocent man’s heart…) the actor directly takes the life of the innocent man.

I’m happy for you, as a pilot, to make the call for an appropriate aeronautical scenario.

 

[Rau]

That’s true, but that does not say much about the trolley problem, since the whole point of disagreement is whether the throwing of the switch is an evil act.

Leaf - my response was to respond to another poster who did not address the trolley problem. What is the purpose of post?

 

[Bender]

Quite right - so long as your ethical system is that of the Consequentialist.

If you think about it, everyone is a consequentialist - you too. The only difference is to consider “what is the consequence” that one should avoid. For the non-religious it is the actual. physical harm is what must be avoided, or lessened. As such the killing of one person to save many is the preferred action. For the Christian the actual, physical harm is secondary, what needs to be avoided is the alleged and assumed displeasure of God. So for the Christian to step aside and allow the trolley to kill a bunch of people, when flipping the switch would lessen the overall harm.

But you have no evidence that God would prefer allowing a huge harm, by letting things happen, as opposed to commit a volitional act to minimize the harm - if it leads to some “intrinsically” evil action. Not to mention that the principle that some actions can be “intrinsically” evil - regardless of the means and the consequences is unacceptable. Everything needs to be taken into consideration. The act, the intended outcome, the means. You cannot separate the “act” - even if you call it “moral object” and make a value judgment based upon it alone.

If you subscribe to our catholic moral theology, you are bound to avoid evil acts, even if by committing them, lesser harm will result.

Besides, the term “consequentialist” is hazy, undefined or underdefined. The word alone would indicate that only the consequences matter, nothing else. But this is incorrect.