Catholic view on utilitarianism

[Ender]

The setup of the trolley scenario makes explicit that the death of the one is inherent to the act of throwing the lever.

Define “inherent” so that we can understand why it applies in the trolley case and not to the operation.

The act of throwing the lever is equivalent to pointing a rifle at the victim and shooting.

This is an assertion that can be “refuted” by another assertion: no, it isn’t. Provide an argument that supports your claim, something other than “because I say so.”

This is the meaning of “directly” killed. The taking of life is the moral object.

The definition of the moral object has been discussed for hundreds of posts now without making much progress. According to JPII it consists of the act and the proximate end, and quite clearly the proximate end of throwing the switch is not the death of the innocent person. That is an inevitable consequence, but that’s not the same thing.

 

[Rau]

Define “inherent” so that we can understand why it applies in the trolley case and not to the operation.

If I direct the train to the one, or I switch the electricity flow to the one, or I switch the rifle to the one, do I attack the one? These acts by there nature are directed, inherently, to deprive an innocent of life. Do you see how removing a tube soon to rupture is a procedure directed at mum? Compare with a procedure to scrape the baby out. At whom is that directed?

I referred a moral theology online resource to you long ago, and o_mlly references it in this thread. Read how it describes the moral object.

 

[LeafByNiggle]

That’s not the matter at issue Leaf. The question of morality is (as u say in another post) whether In throwing a switch which directs a train at a man fixed to the tracks (think: move the rifle to point at an innocent man’s heart…) the actor directly takes the life of the innocent man.

Excuse me, but the comparison between the pilot case and the bystander case is the matter at issue because you claim that one of them is licit and the other one is not. Therefore no matter what argument you use to support your view, it is incumbent upon you to show how it applies to one of those cases and not the other. That is you need to show a difference between the two that is morally meaningful - not irrelevancies like “the man might duck” or “the situation requires specialized knowledge.”

If I direct the train to the one, or I switch the electricity flow to the one, or I switch the rifle to the one, do I attack the one? These acts by there nature are directed, inherently, to deprive an innocent of life. Do you see how removing a tube soon to rupture is a procedure directed at mum? Compare with a procedure to scrape the baby out. At whom is that directed?

We all agree on the difference between scraping out the tube and cutting out the tube. But you left out the pilot case. So I will add it back in now. Following on to what you said, if the pilot directs the plane to a field where as man is standing, does he attack the one?

 

[Rau]

We all agree on the difference between scraping out the tube and cutting out the tube. But you left out the pilot case. So I will add it back in now. Following on to what you said, if the pilot directs the plane to a field where as man is standing, does he attack the one?

If you recognise the trolley case matches directing the knife to the child, not the tube, that is key.

As to the pilot case, whether the pilot attacks the one depends on many circumstances unspecified - and hard to specify I think. Do you see the simplicity in the ”real-world” trolley setup - it’s as simple as the surgeon’s knife targets the child. I say again - you call the aeronautical case as you see it. I am quite fine with you saying the pilot targets the one. Or not. In different variations of aeronautical scenarios, perhaps it can go either way.

 

[LeafByNiggle]

LeafByNiggle:

We all agree on the difference between scraping out the tube and cutting out the tube. But you left out the pilot case. So I will add it back in now. Following on to what you said, if the pilot directs the plane to a field where as man is standing, does he attack the one?

If you recognise the trolley case matches directing the knife to the child, not the tube, that is key.

No I didn’t say that at all. All I said about the ectopic pregnancy is that I see the moral difference between the two methods discussed. I said nothing about it applying to the trolley case.

As to the pilot case, whether the pilot attacks the one depends on many circumstances unspecified - and hard to specify I think. Do you see the simplicity in the ”real-world” trolley setup.

No, I do not. I mentioned the possible complexities of the trolley setup. But the cosmetic complexities of landing a plane have nothing to do with the moral decision to fly the plane to the field where the man is standing.

I am quite fine with you saying the pilot targets the one. Or not.

OK, fill out whatever details you need to show how the pilot case might target the one. I think I already specified all the relevant details, but go ahead and see if you can add more the change the moral outcome.

 

[Rau]

No I didn’t say that at all. All I said about the ectopic pregnancy is that I see the moral difference between the two methods discussed. I said nothing about it applying to the trolley case.

Perhaps you should opine on that then?

No, I do not. I mentioned the possible complexities of the trolley setup.

You mentioned the man might move, apparently forgetting he’s fixed to the track. The scenario makes little sense if it’s a given he can step off the track (or move to a position of safety).

OK, fill out whatever details you need to show how the pilot case might target the one.

You introduced the loosely defined aeronautical scenario. You should define it. But I think it’s hard to do, unlike the trolley where the actions, and the circumstances (Eg. Tracks direct trains, man fixed on tracks etc) make the analysis easy.

 

[Ender]

If I direct the train to the one, or I switch the electricity flow to the one, or I switch the rifle to the one, do I attack the one? These acts by there nature are directed, inherently, to deprive an innocent of life.

Again, these are assertions. What we need are definitions of the terms so they can be applied consistently.

I referred a moral theology online resource to you long ago, and o_mlly references it in this thread. Read how it describes the moral object.

We’re 1000 posts into this thread and I have no idea where your reference is, but if you extract the part you think is relevant I will address it.

 

[Rau]

Again, these are assertions. What we need are definitions of the terms so they can be applied consistently.

How about just the first part then: “If I direct the train to the one, or I switch the electricity flow to the one, or I switch the rifle to the one, do I attack the one?”

 

[Rau]

We’re 1000 posts into this thread and I have no idea where your reference is, but if you extract the part you think is relevant I will address it.

Well yes, Ender but I thought you might have bookmarked that on-line resource, read it a bit, given it was given to you (more than once) because it was quite on-point for a discussion of just these issues.

 

[Ender]

If you recognise the trolley case matches directing the knife to the child, not the tube, that is key.

Is it correct to say you consider those cases the same because in one the knife is the specific cause of the death of the fetus and in the other the trolley is the specific cause of the death of the person on the track?

If so, would it change the morality of the act if the trolley didn’t kill the person but set off a secondary cause that brought about the death?

 

[LeafByNiggle]

LeafByNiggle:

No I didn’t say that at all. All I said about the ectopic pregnancy is that I see the moral difference between the two methods discussed. I said nothing about it applying to the trolley case.

Perhaps you should opine on that then?

I have. I said that it is similar to the pilot having to land the plane.

No, I do not. I mentioned the possible complexities of the trolley setup.

You mentioned the man might move, apparently forgetting he’s fixed to the track.

No one said how he is fixed to the track. Perhaps he is tied to the track in such a way that he can avoid the wheels. It does not matter because however inevitable the death of the man on the tracks is made to be, the death of the man in the field where a jet is going to land on top of him is just as certain.

The scenario makes little sense if it’s a given he can step off the track (or move to a position of safety).

And the scenario of the landing plane makes little sense if the man in the field can merely get out of the way of the landing plane. Let us specify that in both cases the death is inevitable and we can stop squabbling about variations of the scenarios.

OK, fill out whatever details you need to show how the pilot case might target the one.

You introduced the loosely defined aeronautical scenario. You should define it.

I did. It is not so loosely defined. The man in the field will definitely die if the plane lands in that field.

But I think it’s hard to do, unlike the trolley where the actions, and the circumstances (Eg. Tracks direct trains, man fixed on tracks etc) make the analysis easy.

It is not hard. Just assume the man in the field cannot get out of the way, for whatever reason.

 

[Rau]

If so, would it change the morality of the act if the trolley didn’t kill the person but set off a secondary cause that brought about the death?

One is tempted to think the tube removal is like that. The death is one step away, but still caused by the act. But that’s not the right moral analysis because to act on the woman’s body in the circumstances is right and proper.

But physical knock on effects don’t necessarily change the moral directness. Eg. A sabotage that results in foreseeable (inevitable?) death is likely more properly deemed a homocide than vandalism with an incidental death.

 

[Rau]

I have. I said that it is similar to the pilot having to land the plane.

You’re not being serious.

Let us specify that in both cases the death is inevitable and we can stop squabbling about variations of the scenarios.

Inevitability of death does not amount to morally direct. As in removing the tube.

It is not hard. Just assume the man in the field cannot get out of the way, for whatever reason.

If the pilot’s act to avoid the high rise is at the same time an act which precisely targets some other innocent (like direct the train on a track does) then the moral analysis is the same as the trolley. To my non-pilot mind however, that doesn’t reflect the real world situation. But you are welcome to call this scenario whichever way you want.

 

[Freddy]

LeafByNiggle:

I have. I said that it is similar to the pilot having to land the plane.

You’re not being serious.

Let us specify that in both cases the death is inevitable and we can stop squabbling about variations of the scenarios.

Inevitability of death does not amount to morally direct. As in removing the tube.

It is not hard. Just assume the man in the field cannot get out of the way, for whatever reason.

If the pilot’s act to avoid the high rise is at the same time an act which precisely targets some other innocent (like direct the train on a track does) then the moral analysis is the same as the trolley. To my non-pilot mind however, that doesn’t reflect the real world situation. But you are welcome to call this scenario whichever way you want.

Good grief. Why are these hypotheticals so difficult to answer. May I suggest a scenario?

A plane load of people is out of fuel. It is gliding. Runway 1 ahead has five people on it. If you do nothing you are going to land there and you will kill them. Or you could divert to Runway 2 which has one person on it. Land there and you will kill him.

That’s exactly the same scenario as Option A: Do nothing and crash into a building and kill many or Option B: Divert the plane, land in a field and kill one.

It’s also exactly the same as the trolley problem. Do nothing and have lots of people die, or divert the danger, save the people but kill one in the process.

Who on earth would say that the moral course of action is: Do nothing.

 

[o_mlly]

Do nothing and have lots of people die, or divert the danger, save the people but kill one in the process.

Who on earth would say that the moral course of action is: Do nothing.

The logic of the proportionalist, like the consequentialist, does not understand the Catholic valuation of human life. Commodifying human life into a number, they believe they may mathematically calculate a proportion that allows one to kill an innocent human being. The Church says, no, one may not condemn one human life “even to save a nation.”

Moreover, everyone recognizes the difficulty, or rather the impossibility, of evaluating all the good and evil consequences and effects — defined as pre-moral — of one’s own acts: an exhaustive rational calculation is not possible. How then can one go about establishing proportions which depend on a measuring, the criteria of which remain obscure? How could an absolute obligation be justified on the basis of such debatable calculations? (VS p. 77).

 

[Freddy]

Freddy:

Do nothing and have lots of people die, or divert the danger, save the people but kill one in the process.

Who on earth would say that the moral course of action is: Do nothing.

The logic of the proportionalist, like the consequentialist, does not understand the Catholic valuation of human life. Commodifying human life into a number, they believe they may mathematically calculate a proportion that allows one to kill an innocent human being. The Church says, no, one may not condemn one human life “even to save a nation.”

Moreover, everyone recognizes the difficulty, or rather the impossibility, of evaluating all the good and evil consequences and effects — defined as pre-moral — of one’s own acts: an exhaustive rational calculation is not possible. How then can one go about establishing proportions which depend on a measuring, the criteria of which remain obscure? How could an absolute obligation be justified on the basis of such debatable calculations? (VS p. 77).

I’m fully aware of that. And I disagree with it completely.

In a just war, you are allowed to kill the enemy. But you must also be willing to sacrifice the lives of some of your own combatants to save the lives of many. As per the trolley and plane scenarios, you don’t want anyone to be killed but the lives of many versus the life of one can be a simple calculation. Not easy. But simple.

 

[Inquiry]

LeafByNiggle:

It is not hard. Just assume the man in the field cannot get out of the way, for whatever reason.

If the pilot’s act to avoid the high rise is at the same time an act which precisely targets some other innocent (like direct the train on a track does) then the moral analysis is the same as the trolley. To my non-pilot mind however, that doesn’t reflect the real world situation. But you are welcome to call this scenario whichever way you want.

Thank you for being more specific. It’s been like pulling teeth trying to get someone to explain why the two are different.

To follow up, is the important element that the death is uncertain (for instance, one person will definitely be hit and there’s a 95% chance they will die) or that the path is uncertain (for instance, some people will be killed by the plane but the pilot doesn’t know which ones until well after he’s made his choice).

 

[Rau]

but the lives of many versus the life of one can be a simple calculation. Not easy. But simple.

The first order calc might be straightforward particularly in simple hypotheticals. But all the consequences go far beyond who and how many died.

 

[o_mlly]

In a just war, you are allowed to kill the enemy. But you must also be willing to sacrifice the lives of some of your own combatants to save the lives of many.

Self-defense against an unjust aggressor is long been held as permissible by the Church. No one “sacrifices the lives” of anyone in a just war. All homicides are evil.

As per the trolley and plane scenarios, you don’t want anyone to be killed but the lives of many versus the life of one can be a simple calculation.

There is no unjust aggressor in the trolley case so no comparison to a just war can be made. The communist adage that a few must be sacrificed for the good of the many is not Catholic thinking. You may, of course, believe what you will but the forum’s mission is to explain Catholic thinking.

 

[Bender]

You may, of course, believe what you will but the forum’s mission is to explain Catholic thinking.

Not just WHAT is the Catholic thinking, but WHY is the Catholic thinking “better” or “superior” or “more preferable” to the secular method. And that is what is sorely missing. Why is choosing the death of one person in the trolley example is “immoral”, while choosing the death of five people is not immoral? Sure, we hear that this is what the church teaches, but there is no argument for it. It is all: “because the church says so”.

The problem is, of course, more complicated. The concept of “unjust aggressor” is fine and good, and it makes perfect, secular, rational sense to take all the necessary steps to defend against it, including the application of lethal force (if no other method is available). But that is not the whole picture. It is possible that there is no aggressor - in the usual sense - but someone may place others into lethal jeopardy, - unknowingly and without intending to do so. So this person is “innocent of malice”, maybe even does not know what he was doing.

Not just “you”, but many foreseeable victims. What then? Are you expected to “roll over” and let many people die just because you did not do what was necessary to prevent this outcome?

Is there an explicit solution for this problem, suggested by the church?