Catholic view on utilitarianism

[LeafByNiggle]

Leaf, you mentioned you “don’t understand this moral object stuff”. That makes the analysis of the morality of human acts difficult. The term warrants use in the Catechism even.

As I understand the Catechism, the object is defined in CCC1751 as:

The object chosen morally specifies the act of the will, insofar as reason recognizes and judges it to be or not to be in conformity with the true good.

I don’t know exactly what this means, but I do think it means all consequences, otherwise the principle of double effect could never be applied ever.

 

[Rau]

The act itself is the act of throwing a switch.

This is why you need to do a little work yourself Leaf. A human “act” as the term is used in moral theology is not synonymous with “action” Eg throw a lever, flick a switch, pull a trigger.

 

[LeafByNiggle]

LeafByNiggle:

The act itself is the act of throwing a switch.

This is why you need to do a little work yourself Leaf. A human “act” as the term is used in moral theology is not synonymous with “action” Eg throw a lever, flick a switch, pull a trigger.

So you say. The Catechism that you said I should read does not say the act includes all the consequences.

 

[o_mlly]

Double effect does not countenance evil in the object. It is necessary to come to grips with the conclusion that the act to throw the lever is in itself evil. There’s a good object and an evil object. They can’t be traded off like mere consequences. I know, I know, just an assertion…

Yes. And the relativistic moral systems manipulate the object font in order to prohibit the expression of evil within in its domain.

Situational Ethics, condemned by Pius XII in 1952, was reinvented after Humanae Vitae and renamed as Proportionalism and Consequentialism. These later moralities were also condemned by St. JPII in 1993. All three deny, against the longstanding Tradition of the Church, the existence of an objective morality.

The systems seek to eliminate the existence of intrinsically evil acts. In order to do so, the systems manipulate the three fonts so as to disallow any evil effect from expression in the object font. How? They psychologize morality and make the determination of a good or evil act subjective, that is, dependent on the intention of the actor.

First, they define the object font as a derivative of the intent font. If an agent does not intend evil then the object font cannot express any foreseen evil, only the foreseen good. A good will is all that matters (Kant). Second, realizing that the evil effect needs a home, they relegate the evil effect as an indirect circumstance. How do they define all evil effects as indirect rather than direct? Ignoring the physics of cause and effect, the systems conveniently define all unintended effects as indirect effects. Circular logic, to say the best.

These systems are rightly condemned by our two popes as the systems can be and are used to justify contraception and direct abortion. Frankly, the systems can morally justify any act as long as the agent intends the good.

(Continued)

 

[o_mlly]

Now examine the assertions of our good interlocutor:

in shooting someone the effect … I think … is direct because the effect is contained within the definition of the object.

Circular.

Clearly the innocent person is killed by the trolley, the trolley was sent down the track when the switch was thrown, and throwing the switch with knowledge of that consequence was deliberate.

Passive voice employed. Why?

Clearly what is uppermost in the actor’s mind is saving the five …

The good intention specified.

With regard to the trolley it seems the object is “switching the trolley away from the five” which is clearly legitimate and direct. If the object was “switching the trolley at the one” that would be direct and illegitimate.

The good intention is now elevated as primary and controlling of the expression of the object font. The circularity of the logic employed is striking, “The intention is good. The intention defines the object. Therefore, the object is good.”

This misunderstanding of the fonts eliminates the objectivity in the object font. The font is now completely subjective. Morality becomes subjective.

Our good interlocutor does this by wrongly asserting that the object font is dependent on the intention font. The error has its origin in wrongly asserting that the “proximate end” and the "end in view” are synonymous. In Veritas Splendor (VS) p.78, JPII teaches about the moral object font explaining that intrinsically evil acts do exist and are evil independent of good intentions. In his condemnation of Consequentialism, he writes:

[The] object is the proximate end of a deliberate decision which determines the act of willing on the part of the acting person (VS p.78).

Going against the tenor of the entire paragraph explaining that intrinsically evil acts are independent of an agent’s intention, our good interlocutor misinterprets “proximate end” to be the agent’s intention or the “end in view”(finis operantis) rather than the immediate effects of the act itself (finis operis).

Our good interlocutor also seems to fail to draw a distinction between willed effects and an intended effect. All foreseen and deliberated effects are necessarily willed even though only one effect may be intended.

Finally, the direct and indirect confusion is part of the diversion to mask evil in the object font. The self-evident physical cause to its immediate effect is ignored as being self-evident. Never tiring in asking that the self-evident be defined, he instead argues that the direct and indirect adjectives are properly applied to the agent’s intention. The good effect if intended regardless of the physics involved becomes the direct effect and the unintended evil effect becomes the indirect effect.

Is there any act that cannot be justified in such a circular system? I cannot think of one.

 

[Elf01]

All foreseen and deliberated effects are necessarily willed even though only one effect may be intended.

If that is true then removing a tube with a baby in it is immoral.

 

[o_mlly]

If that is true then removing a tube with a baby in it is immoral.

How so? …

 

[Freddy]

o_mlly:

Freddy:

Are you serious? I explained exactly what I meant using examples in the last post. Please don’t be obtuse.

Yes, I am serious. As I wrote, “No one is sacrificed in war.”

But as I explained, and gave examples, that is what exactly happens in combat situations. In a just war. By those who are justified in waging it.

You can choose to address that or not as you wish.

I guess not. I have to assume that the point made is not disputed.

 

[o_mlly]

I guess not. I have to assume that the point made is not disputed.

Good try, fred but silence does not equal consent.

 

[Freddy]

Freddy:

I guess not. I have to assume that the point made is not disputed.

Good try, fred but silence does not equal consent.

Then dispute.

 

[o_mlly]

Then dispute.

Fred, as I explained, this thread is not about just war theory, there is no unjust aggressor in the trolley case and we’re already past 1000 posts.

Yours is a good topic for the 'Morality" forum, I suggest you start one there. I’m sure you’ll get a good debate.

 

[LeafByNiggle]

Now examine the assertions of our good interlocutor:

Ender:

in shooting someone the effect … I think … is direct because the effect is contained within the definition of the object.

Circular.

No more so than o_mlly’s definitions of “direct” and “moral object”.

o_mlly:

Clearly the innocent person is killed by the trolley, the trolley was sent down the track when the switch was thrown, and throwing the switch with knowledge of that consequence was deliberate.

Passive voice employed. Why?

Because it accurately describes what is happening. But even if we use the active voice, one would say “the trolley kills the innocence person” which doesn’t do any more to further o_mlly’s view anyway.

o_mlly:

With regard to the trolley it seems the object is “switching the trolley away from the five” which is clearly legitimate and direct. If the object was “switching the trolley at the one” that would be direct and illegitimate.

The good intention is now elevated as primary and controlling of the expression of the object font.

Not so. Two potential objects are described and analyzed. There is no better way to describe them. They are distinct, although o_mlly tries to conflate them. To show they are distinct, consider the following different scenario:

A trolley is speeding toward 5 people tied to the track. There is a switch that will divert the trolley from the 5 people and hit no one. But the bystander does not have access to that switch. However he can cause that switch to actuate by closing a different switch that will divert a different trolley that will hit one man, causing him to fall on the switch that will save the 5 people. In that case the object of the act the bystander performs is to direct a trolley at an innocent person, because only by killing that innocent person can he cause the 5 people to be saved.

In this modified scenario, the principle of double effect is violated because the death of the one man is the means, not just the consequence, of saving five.

Continued…

 

[LeafByNiggle]

Continuing:

o_mlly:

Our good interlocutor also seems to fail to draw a distinction between willed effects and an intended effect. All foreseen and deliberated effects are necessarily willed even though only one effect may be intended.

There is no need to emphasize “deliberated” because if an effect is foreseen and the act is still performed, it was also “deliberated”. And we know from other accepted cases of double effect that some foreseen (and therefore deliberated) evil effects are licit. In this case o_mlly is also drawing an unjustified link between VS’s use of the word “deliberate” as in “deliberate decision” and “deliberated effect”. They are not the same usage. That VS says the object is the proximate end of a deliberate decision does not imply that every foreseen effect that the actor thinks about for two seconds (and therefore “deliberates”) is necessarily part of the object.

Finally, the direct and indirect confusion is part of the diversion …

A confusion that o_mlly has fostered by using the terms without any definition.

Never tiring in asking that the self-evident be defined, he instead argues that the direct and indirect adjectives are properly applied to the agent’s intention.

Any inadequacy in the understanding of direct and indirect is entirely the fault of o_mlly who has consistently introduced them, relied upon them, and refused to define them. When others try to define them in a manner acceptable to o_mlly and fail in the attempt, who is to blame for that?

 

[o_mlly]

o_mlly:

there is no unjust aggressor in the trolley case

Fred, let me correct myself. The bystander who acts becomes an unjust aggressor. His intended victim has a right to self-defense. The bystander cannot be just and unjust in the same act and circumstance. Others chose to ignore this important distinction I made several hundred posts ago. Perhaps you will respond. Does the innocent one have a right to lethally defend himself against the bystander in the act of throwing the switch?

I also note that the posters who would so quickly do in the innocent one, were reticent in the revised case to do themselves in instead. So much for heroic virtue.

Of course, we will always have, like the poor, navel-gazers who merely kibitz.

 

[o_mlly]

I also note that the posters who would so quickly do in the innocent one, were reticent in the revised case to do themselves in instead. So much for heroic virtue.

Once again the silence is deafening but not surprising. To wit:

Judith Jarvis Thomson (1986) modified the case so that it was a bystander, not the driver, who had to make the choice. The difference was important, since the bystander is clearly choosing between killing and letting die and yet it still seems permissible to turn the trolley.

Recently, Thomson (2008) has argued that the consensus that it is permissible for the bystander to turn the trolley was mistaken. She argues by way of offering the reader a third option, of turning the trolley onto and killing oneself. Obviously, few of us would take that option. If so, she argues, we are not entitled to turn the trolley onto a stranger.

 

[LeafByNiggle]

Freddy:

o_mlly:

there is no unjust aggressor in the trolley case

Fred, let me correct myself. The bystander who acts becomes an unjust aggressor. His intended victim has a right to self-defense. The bystander cannot be just and unjust in the same act and circumstance. Others chose to ignore this important distinction I made several hundred posts ago. Perhaps you will respond. Does the innocent one have a right to lethally defend himself against the bystander in the act of throwing the switch?

I also note that the posters who would so quickly do in the innocent one, were reticent in the revised case to do themselves in instead. So much for heroic virtue.

Of course, we will always have, like the poor, navel-gazers who merely kibitz.

Don’t fall for this deflection as it has nothing to say about the trolley question itself. We might just as well ask if the baby in the ectopic pregancy case, about have the tube he is in cut out by the surgeon, has a right to shoot the surgeon who he sees as an unjust agressor toward him - if indeed the baby could think and do those things. Silly, isn’t it? So is o_mlly’s “modification.”

 

[LeafByNiggle]

Recently, Thomson (2008) has argued that the consensus that it is permissible for the bystander to turn the trolley was mistaken. She argues by way of offering the reader a third option, of turning the trolley onto and killing oneself. Obviously, few of us would take that option. If so, she argues, we are not entitled to turn the trolley onto a stranger.

OK, I’ll take this one. (But of course o_mlly won’t see my response because I am blocked by o_mlly.)

Fear of dying might indeed make most people reluctant to turn the trolley toward themselves. But we do know from heroic actions of trench warefare that there were many instances where a soldier has fallen on a grenade about to explode in order to save his fellows. So it is not unheard of. The claim is that it is rarer than a bystander turning the trolley to kill a stranger. But we don’t know that for sure either because to my knowledge there has never been a case where a bystander has been in the exact position of this trolley problem. Therefore it is only speculation that most of them would throw the switch. I think it is much more likely that a bystander will chose to do nothing out of fear of making the wrong decision. So there you go. It is one specious speculation vs another speculation. And of course none of that has any bearing on the morality of the act itself.

 

[Rau]

Fred, let me correct myself. The bystander who acts becomes an unjust aggressor. His intended victim has a right to self-defense.

Yes, I can see no reason why the one would be prevented from taking steps to stop the attack on him. His first reaction ( assuming he is privy to the full picture) might be to shout - “It’s terrible about the 5, but you have no right to (directly) kill me. Find another way.” And if the bystander responds “sorry, this is necessary”…

 

[Rau]

Two potential objects are described and analyzed. There is no better way to describe them. They are distinct, although o_mlly tries to conflate them.

Objects are moral things (hence “moral object”) Eg deprive an innocent of his life. In the trolley, by virtue of its design, both a (direct) killing and a (direct) saving are simultaneously chosen. Can’t get one without the other. The distinction Ender wishes to draw is intention, but that is a matter for the other font.

In that case the object of the act the bystander performs is to direct a trolley at an innocent person, because only by killing that innocent person can he cause the 5 people to be saved.

You seem to be thinking that the death of the one needs to be a prerequisite or in a causal chain to a “saving” result to make the act immoral. That’s one way, but not the only way for the act to be immoral. Directing the trolley at the one is enough.

 

[LeafByNiggle]

LeafByNiggle:

Two potential objects are described and analyzed. There is no better way to describe them. They are distinct, although o_mlly tries to conflate them.

Objects are moral things (hence “moral object”) Eg deprive an innocent of his life. In the trolley, by virtue of its design, both a (direct) killing and a (direct) saving are simultaneously chosen.

This can’t be right because I can apply it to tubal excision. When the surgeon cuts out the tube, by virtue of what the scalpel does, both a direct killing of the baby occurs because it starves the baby of nutrients and warmth, and the direct saving of the mother. The surgeon simultaneously chooses both. See? That can’t be right. So can you fix your argument so that it won’t apply to this case?

In that case the object of the act the bystander performs is to direct a trolley at an innocent person, because only by killing that innocent person can he cause the 5 people to be saved.

You seem to be thinking that the death of the one needs to be a prerequisite or in a causal chain to a “saving” result to make the act immoral. That’s one way, but not the only way for the act to be immoral. Directing the trolley at the one is enough.

Of course I reject your characterization of the act as “directing the trolley at the one”.