Catholic view on utilitarianism

[Rau]

This can’t be right because I can apply it to tubal excision. When the surgeon cuts out the tube, by virtue of what the scalpel does, both a direct killing of the baby occurs because it starves the baby of nutrients and warmth, and the direct saving of the mother.

The baby’s death is indirect - the direct act is on the mother who stands in need of medical treatment.

 

[Rau]

Of course I reject your characterization of the act as “directing the trolley at the one”

You used that characterization in your revised scenario. For the original trolley, you’d require an Intention to kill the one, then you’d change the characterization, right?

 

[LeafByNiggle]

LeafByNiggle:

This can’t be right because I can apply it to tubal excision. When the surgeon cuts out the tube, by virtue of what the scalpel does, both a direct killing of the baby occurs because it starves the baby of nutrients and warmth, and the direct saving of the mother.

The baby’s death is indirect - the direct act is on the mother who stands in need of medical treatment.

Ah, yes, retreat to the safety of the undefined “direct” vs “indirect” ambiguity. So what exactly makes the trolley more direct than starvation and freezing? The speed at which it happens? OK, fine. Modify the trolley problem so the one man is tied to the track a ways down the track so that the trolley will get there is 2 hours. But despite the delay, there is no way to intervene in those two hours to save the one man after the trolley has been diverted onto his track. Does that make it “indirect”? If so, at what point does it switch from direct to indirect? After a 5 second delay? After 30 seconds? After 10 minutes?

You’d require an Intention to kill the one, then you’d change the characterization, right?

I don’t understand this. So let me repeat, I reject your characterization of the act as “directing the trolley at the one”. I would prefer “directing the trolley away from the 5, which just happens to put it on a track that will eventually hit the one man.”

 

[Rau]

So what exactly makes the trolley more direct than starvation and freezing?

The inherent nature of the act. Tube is about to rupture. Mother may treat herself. Tube is cut. The direct act is on the mother - no immorality. The death is an indirect result of that act.

 

[Rau]

I reject your characterization of the act as “directing the trolley at the one”. I would prefer “directing the trolley away from the 5, which just happens to put it on a track that will eventually hit the one man.”

There is no objective basis for your preference since the act done is both simultaneously. Your preference arises from you desire (intention) to save, rather than kill.

 

[LeafByNiggle]

LeafByNiggle:

So what exactly makes the trolley more direct than starvation and freezing?

The inherent nature of the act. Tube is about to rupture. Mother may treat herself. Tube is cut. The direct act is on the mother - no immorality. The death is an indirect result of that act.

Circular. You can’t define direct in terms of “indirect.” And the “nature of the act” is no less inclusive of the death of the baby as the nature of switching the trolley is inclusive of the death of the one man.

 

[Rau]

If so, at what point does it switch from direct to indirect? After a 5 second delay? After 30 seconds? After 10 minutes?

Time delays might be suggestive of “indirect” but are not the key factor. You need to look at the act itself.Look at the act. The trolley is turned on the one (no less than it is turned away from the 5).

 

[Rau]

And the “nature of the act” is no less inclusive of the death of the baby as the nature of switching the trolley is inclusive of the death of the one man.

No Leaf. The knife was not directed at the baby, the trolley was directed at the one.

 

[LeafByNiggle]

LeafByNiggle:

And the “nature of the act” is no less inclusive of the death of the baby as the nature of switching the trolley is inclusive of the death of the one man.

No Leaf. The knife was not directed at the baby, the trolley was directed at the one.

“Directed at?” That sounds like intention, which you say is from a different font. To see this more clearly, suppose the women did not have an ectopic pregnancy, but simply wanted an abortion. Suppose she came to the surgeon shortly after the embryo had implanted in the uterus and asked the surgeon to carefully cut out the part of the uterus that had the baby attached to it. Would you say the knife was not directed at the baby, but only at a small portion of uterus wall? Of course not! So the only difference between that case and the case before is the intention. In the first case the surgeon cuts out the portion of the tube because he intends to remove a tube that is diseased. In the second case he does a very similar thing, except that his intention is to end the pregnancy by killing the baby. So your description of the knife not being “directed” at the baby is unconvincing. I could just as well say that the trolley was not directed at the one man, but it went there anyway.

 

[Rau]

“Directed at?” That sounds like intention, which you say is from a different font.

It is what is inherent to the act. Explain to me how throwing the lever does not inherently direct the trolley at the one?

 

[Freddy]

Freddy:

Then dispute.

Fred, as I explained, this thread is not about just war theory, there is no unjust aggressor in the trolley case and we’re already past 1000 posts.

Yours is a good topic for the 'Morality" forum, I suggest you start one there. I’m sure you’ll get a good debate.

The thread is about utilitarianism. The discussion has been about whether you can sacrifice one life for the sake of saving many. There have been various scenarios proposed. The one I have proposed isn’t a hypothetical. It has ocurred very many times and will do again. It’s a real life trolley problem.

How do you respond?

 

[LeafByNiggle]

LeafByNiggle:

“Directed at?” That sounds like intention, which you say is from a different font.

It is what is inherent to the act. Explain to me how throwing the lever does not inherently direct the trolley at the one?

Your “inherent” is no better than your “direct”. I disagree that it is inherent.

 

[Freddy]

o_mlly:

Freddy:

o_mlly:

there is no unjust aggressor in the trolley case

Fred, let me correct myself. The bystander who acts becomes an unjust aggressor. His intended victim has a right to self-defense. The bystander cannot be just and unjust in the same act and circumstance. Others chose to ignore this important distinction I made several hundred posts ago. Perhaps you will respond. Does the innocent one have a right to lethally defend himself against the bystander in the act of throwing the switch?

I also note that the posters who would so quickly do in the innocent one, were reticent in the revised case to do themselves in instead. So much for heroic virtue.

Of course, we will always have, like the poor, navel-gazers who merely kibitz.

Don’t fall for this deflection as it has nothing to say about the trolley question itself. We might just as well ask if the baby in the ectopic pregancy case, about have the tube he is in cut out by the surgeon, has a right to shoot the surgeon who he sees as an unjust agressor toward him - if indeed the baby could think and do those things. Silly, isn’t it? So is o_mlly’s “modification.”

It changes the problem utterly and becomes a question of whether you value yourself over others. The question is not whether you would sacrifice yourself. But would you sacrifice a few to save many.

Your warfare comment which follows is pertinent as very many times generals have sent men into battle knowing with absolute certainty that they will be killed. And they do so for the greater good. That more men will ultimately be saved. They sacrifice a few to save many.

 

[Rau]

Your “inherent” is no better than your “direct”. I disagree that it is inherent.

Could you elaborate by adding a “because” to that last sentence?

 

[Rau]

Leaf, this reference may be helpful:

https://sensusfidelium.us/bible-catechesis/handbook-of-moral-theology-by-dominic-m-prummer-o-p/

 

[Ender]

Ender: in shooting someone the effect … I think … is direct because the effect is contained within the definition of the object.

Not a bit. This is an important distinction. The object includes the proximate end. In the case of shooting someone that is in fact the proximate end of firing the gun. It seems to me that this is a good definition of direct. It is surely better than the one you have so far failed to provide.

Ender: With regard to the trolley it seems the object is “switching the trolley away from the five” which is clearly legitimate and direct. If the object was “switching the trolley at the one” that would be direct and illegitimate.

Earlier you acknowledged that saving the five was the intention. Switching the trolley away from the five is the action taken to accomplish that goal. It is an action, not the intention. It is the action taken plus the proximate end of the action…which is the object.

Our good interlocutor does this by wrongly asserting that the object font is dependent on the intention font.

You have this perception in your mind and no matter how many times I reject it you continue to ascribe it to me. I have never made such a claim. Show us the comment you think justifies such a ridiculous assertion.

Going against the tenor of the entire paragraph explaining that intrinsically evil acts are independent of an agent’s intention , our good interlocutor misinterprets “proximate end” to be the agent’s intention or the “end in view”(finis operantis) rather than the immediate effects of the act itself (finis operis).

Serially repeating this canard doesn’t make it true. NO. This is a rather significant misrepresentation of my position. It’s not that complicated; I don’t know why you so completely fail to understand what I’ve said.

But you have raised one point I agree with: you say the proximate end is the immediate effect of the act. OK: what is the immediate effect of the act of throwing the switch?

 

[Ender]

The distinction Ender wishes to draw is intention, but that is a matter for the other font.

You too? How is it possible to so utterly misunderstand the rather straightforward assertion I’ve made?

I AM NOT DISCUSSING THE INTENTION FONT.

What I have said is that SEPARATE FROM THE INTENTION FONT there is an intention within the object. This really shouldn’t be that controversial. Here is a comment from the Jimmy Akin article o_mlly referenced:

Lying includes a reference to the intention of deceiving.

The point here is that lying is an intrinsically evil object, and essential to the act of lying is the intention of deceiving. AND THAT INTENT IS PART OF THE OBJECT.

So please, whether you agree with me (and Akin), let’s at least have no more nonsense about my believing that this intention has anything to do with the actual intention font.

 

[Ender]

There is no objective basis for your preference since the act done is both simultaneously. Your preference arises from you desire (intention) to save, rather than kill.

The action does indeed simultaneously direct the trolley away from the five and at the one. An action alone, however, is not an object since the object includes the proximate end. What, then is the proximate end of this action? Keep in mind that an end is “a goal or result that one seeks to achieve.”

 

[Rau]

An action alone, however, is not an object since the object includes the proximate end. What, then is the proximate end of this action? Keep in mind that an end is “ a goal or result that one seeks to achieve .”

The saving and the killing are simultaneously objects. The physical structure of the situation ensures that. Your goal in acting is surely only to save, but your choice of act entails both objects. There is no free pass on the bad one.

 

[Rau]

In the case of shooting someone that is in fact the proximate end of firing the gun.

True of flicking the electricity switch (electrocution) too. And of directing a speeding train at a stranded man.