Criteria of 'Existence'

[polytropos]

I know what you’re getting at though. You’re asking about an assertion such as “this object has moved a very small distance” and then we find out later that that distance was within the Planck length. Let’s say that the original claim was made within a Newtonian understanding of physics. Such a claim is falsifiable within the Newtonian framework because classical mechanics assumes continuity of space and offers no restrictions on the potential for measurement.

I should have been clearer on this. I take “falsifiability” to mean “falsifiable within the context of the theory in question”. I don’t intend to use it in some absolute sense. So the issue with the leprechaun should be clear now: It postulates something that is unfalsifiable in the context of our current understanding of physics. Perhaps our understanding of what is observable is not yet complete, but as you said, intention determines meaning. Someone who defines something so as to be undetectable within our current theories cannot be asserting that that thing corresponds to reality in any tangible sense. The statement may be understood by someone in the future under a different theory, but it is meaningless within the vocabulary of the current theory.

Can we agree on that much?

Yes, this is much clearer and I do not find it obviously objectionable. I am willing to admit that the immateriality of the soul or God would be unfalsifiable within the context of current physics. Where we would disagree, I suspect, would be on the question of whether those “hypotheses” (I use scare quotes because the claims are not and never have been hypotheses stated in the language of physics) are therefore rendered otiose (or rendered otiose for now), for I believe that there are domains of discourse above and beyond physics (“sciences” in a broader sense, the classical sense), where such claims as “the soul exists” or “God exists” are evaluable.

That the context of physics will not be exhaustive is, I think, apparent, since the method of physics can be critiqued and praised for reasons that are not justified from within. An example would be the Quine-Duhem thesis and the difficulties raised by falsification when one’s theory rests on several hypotheses. Such theories are based on logical and epistemological concerns that are necessarily distinct from the practice of physics itself. Another example would be the judgment that the scientific method itself is reliable.

Another potential issue in philosophy of science is that it is widely accepted that scientific practice has not proceeded by reducing the specialized sciences to physics. So claims of chemistry and biology are not currently falsifiable in terms of physics. So one must appeal to a disjunction of natural sciences that permit the autonomy of higher-level features or be an eliminativist with respect to the specialized sciences.

 

[Nihilist]

Any argument about existence must be grounded in the indisputable observation that reality exists at four levels: objective, subjective, rational, and transcendental.

Objective reality consists of changes in the configuration: (1) of the electrons and quarks that exist as matter and is manifested as ponderable energy; (2) of space that is manifested as radiant energy. And that is about all that objective reality consists of.

Subjective reality consists of the qualia, feelings, and emotions that sentient creatures experience. Most of what we perceive and sense exists within our minds. All creatures experience, at the minimum, a semblance of subjective reality.

Rational reality consists of the signals and symbols, and solely in the case of humans: words, thoughts, numbers, logic, and language and their associated meanings. Unlike subjective reality, rational reality is communicative and forms a repository of shared knowledge, a so-called noosphere.

Transcendental reality consists of those intellectual sensations such as justice, beauty, love, and truth that only humans experience.

Yppop

I don’t see how it is ‘indisputable’ or ‘evident’ that there are four levels of reality.

In fact, the question of the ‘reality’ of the ‘noosphere’ (if it can be granted or not), seems to go to the heart of the initial question- what are the criteria of existence?

I am not saying those things aren’t real. But what, precisely, are the criteria for existence? Instincively, we know it is true to say “The sun exists”, but false to say “Unicorns exist”. What are the criteria which makes one true, but the other false. And if one says it is “existence in the objective world”, on is, so to speak, begging the question.

Hence, my desire for a criteria for existence, not merely an assertion about ‘modes of existence’.

 

[Nihilist]

Falsifiability covers the potential for improved senses and technology. Again, Planck length serves as an example. You cannot observe a movement that is less than the Planck length no matter what technology or sensory perception you have. It’s a mathematical impossibility. If one couldn’t infer such movements indirectly, it would be unfalsifiable to say “X has moved a distance less than the Planck length”.

I see. But if potential senses and technology are extrapolated ‘infinitely’, surely ‘everything’ that exists must be falsifiable- even God and the soul.

I don’t understand this Plank length- but if it is genuinely unfalsifiable, it seems fair enough to call it non-existence.

I am thinking of Schlick position that a statement is only meaningful if its truth or falsehood makes a difference in the ‘state of things’. It seems to me that if something is genuinely and necessarily unfalsifiable (as you say the Planck length is), the statement that it exists is meaningless.

I just suggesting this- I am not a physicist…

 

[Oreoracle]

Where we would disagree, I suspect, would be on the question of whether those “hypotheses” (I use scare quotes because the claims are not and never have been hypotheses stated in the language of physics) are therefore rendered otiose (or rendered otiose for now), for I believe that there are domains of discourse above and beyond physics (“sciences” in a broader sense, the classical sense), where such claims as “the soul exists” or “God exists” are evaluable.

I suppose the higher domain you’re speaking of is metaphysics? I concede that you may be able to work out a metaphysical philosophy and argue that God’s existence makes sense within the context of that philosophy.

However, I am highly skeptical of the “relevance” (for lack of a better word) of metaphysics. The usual argument is that the laws of physics are not able to account for their own existence or for the way in which they exist, thus a metaphysical viewpoint is needed. Frankly I’ve never understood why I cannot simply extend this argument to metaphysics itself. Perhaps metaphysical principles cannot account for themselves, so we need a meta-metaphysics. I’ve had lots of people scoff at that argument, but it’s essentially the same reasoning. Yet metaphysicists never lose sleep over the lack of a meta-metaphysics, just as I never lose sleep over not worrying about metaphysics.

That the context of physics will not be exhaustive is, I think, apparent, since the method of physics can be critiqued and praised for reasons that are not justified from within. An example would be the Quine-Duhem thesis and the difficulties raised by falsification when one’s theory rests on several hypotheses. Such theories are based on logical and epistemological concerns that are necessarily distinct from the practice of physics itself. Another example would be the judgment that the scientific method itself is reliable.

We may assuage our egos by pretending that we have philosophized something like the scientific method into existence, but I think the reason it has prevailed is because it works. It provides a framework by which we can predict how the things we sense will behave reliably enough to manipulate them.

I admit that there is a philosophical component involved when we ask ourselves how “convincing” an explanation is. Nonetheless, the ultimate test of a theory is practical, not philosophical. I am more than happy to concede what (if I recall) has been called instrumentalism: the goal of science is to form useful models of reality. Whether the models are “true” or not is immaterial.

Another potential issue in philosophy of science is that it is widely accepted that scientific practice has not proceeded by reducing the specialized sciences to physics. So claims of chemistry and biology are not currently falsifiable in terms of physics. So one must appeal to a disjunction of natural sciences that permit the autonomy of higher-level features or be an eliminativist with respect to the specialized sciences.

This reminds me of so-called “physics-envy”, which is the jealousy of other disciplines toward the applicability of math in physics. I think that is the problem: physics is stated in a language that makes its relationship with math obvious. It isn’t so obvious how we could convert the question “Are these two animals of the same species?” into a mathematical problem, though we may be able to imagine converting the biology problem into a chemistry problem, and then into a physics problem, and finally into a math problem.

I’m not saying that all disciplines should use mathematical language, either. But to argue that the other sciences aren’t reducible to physics is like saying quantum principles don’t govern the world because physicists haven’t modeled the motion of large-scale objects by using those principles (ignore gravitational effects). If we broke everything down into particles, then we may succeed in doing so, but that’s impractical. Still, every physicist I’ve ever read states that reality is ultimately governed at the quantum level even though our macroscopic equations are used for convenience.

I see. But if potential senses and technology are extrapolated ‘infinitely’, surely ‘everything’ that exists must be falsifiable- even God and the soul.

I don’t understand this Plank length- but if it is genuinely unfalsifiable, it seems fair enough to call it non-existence.

No, it is falsifiable, otherwise it wouldn’t be part of science. I am just using it as an example of something which is physical-sounding that is unobservable in at least one respect–by direct measurement of the object that’s moving. We have technology that depends on the Uncertainty Principle from which the Planck length arises, so rest assured that it is falsifiable.

But I do want to stress that even an indefinite increase in our technological capacity wouldn’t make sub-Planck length motion observable. A good analogy would be the resolution of a picture. You can zoom in all you want, but you can’t see any more details than what the pixels offer. The pixels in this case are the units of Planck length.

 

[ynotzap]

The criteria of 'Existence: self-evident to the senses, and self-evident to the mind, or intellect
If it didn’t exist as an external object it wouldn’t be evident to the senses, if it didn’t exist as a comprehension or a concept abstracted from an external object (external to the mind) it would not be evident to the mind. Its a matter of being and non-being Also employing the self-evident principle that a thing can be, and not be at the same time. It’s the difference between objectivity and subjectivity, truth is external to the mind. Ontologically Existence is the uncaused cause, whose nature is Existence, I am Who Am. Existence is an attribute to created reality, where as Existence is God, for God is His attributes

 

[polytropos]

I suppose the higher domain you’re speaking of is metaphysics?

More or less. Philosophy of science and epistemology as well.

However, I am highly skeptical of the “relevance” (for lack of a better word) of metaphysics. The usual argument is that the laws of physics are not able to account for their own existence or for the way in which they exist, thus a metaphysical viewpoint is needed. Frankly I’ve never understood why I cannot simply extend this argument to metaphysics itself. Perhaps metaphysical principles cannot account for themselves, so we need a meta-metaphysics. I’ve had lots of people scoff at that argument, but it’s essentially the same reasoning.

I think there would be difficulties if one did not try to root things in something that is self-explanatory, which is what metaphysics (or Thomistic metaphysics, at least) aims to do. The question is what sort of thing would be self-explanatory. (I have seen this point argued before, and it basically vindicates the Thomist position on the Fifth Way–that if there is a “metaphysical law” that things tend to act for ends, that will not itself be self-explanatory. The Thomist arguments, though, generally include premises about the impossibility of an infinite regress. So while they might admit that in a sense there will be principles accounting for metaphysical principles, there will not be a “…meta-meta-metaphysics” where there are infinitely many meta’s.–This is a somewhat facetious explanation, but I think it gets across how Thomists aim to ground metaphysical principles by reasoning that they must come to an end in a particular sort of being, ie. a purely actual being with other equivalent features like having no privations/potentialities that it could in principle have fulfilled, ie. nothing it could be directed at.)

Although I think the broader problem with physics is simply that there is no coherent understanding of what “the laws of physics” are. Neither the pre-moderns nor the post-moderns would probably describe the generalizations that physics aims to find as “laws.” The idea is from Newton, who thought there was a lawgiver. Since today most scientists have dropped the historical signification of the term, the term “the laws of physics” is in need of rehabilitation. But most pop scientists use it thoughtlessly. (I believe Stephen Hawking was attracted to the idea of laws of physics that cause the universe to come into existence by their perfection. But what does he think the laws of physics are? Abstract entities in a Platonic third realm? How does the law of gravitation stand in causal relations besides instances of the law, ie. when massed objects act on other massed objects?)

So the question is what does physics actually discover? That question can’t be resolved from within physics. Some physicists are positivists, some are scientific realists, some are pragmatists. That dispute won’t be resolved without appealing to philosophical concerns. But the dispute is hardly contentless; the status of “the laws of physics” is of immense interest to anyone who has a theoretical interest in the field, which is to say a lot of people. It’s a question which practicing physicists care about, though it doesn’t necessarily affect their practice itself.

We may assuage our egos by pretending that we have philosophized something like the scientific method into existence, but I think the reason it has prevailed is because it works. It provides a framework by which we can predict how the things we sense will behave reliably enough to manipulate them.

Well, the scientific method has its roots in Harvey and Galileo’s (and other similar 17th century scientists) application of middle-term demonstrations outlined in the Posterior Analytics. Its origin was hardly detached from philosophy.

I admit that there is a philosophical component involved when we ask ourselves how “convincing” an explanation is. Nonetheless, the ultimate test of a theory is practical, not philosophical. I am more than happy to concede what (if I recall) has been called instrumentalism: the goal of science is to form useful models of reality. Whether the models are “true” or not is immaterial.

They are models of reality. Of course it is relevant whether or not they are “true” (or close to true). To find models that approximate reality is to find models that approximate truth, unless you’re working with a bizarre conception of “reality” somehow disconnected from truth.

But to argue that the other sciences aren’t reducible to physics is like saying quantum principles don’t govern the world because physicists haven’t modeled the motion of large-scale objects by using those principles (ignore gravitational effects). If we broke everything down into particles, then we may succeed in doing so, but that’s impractical. Still, every physicist I’ve ever read states that reality is ultimately governed at the quantum level even though our macroscopic equations are used for convenience.

Well, I think the philosophers of science who take this position do so simply based on the observation of scientific practice. It’s impractical. People have contrary intuitions. But it’s not a scientific finding (and certainly not a physical finding) that any specialized science reduces to some other specialized or fundamental science. But if it isn’t a finding of physics, then we do not know whether it is possible in principle to express the higher-level special sciences in term of physics, so under the given criterion of meaning (ie. expressability in principle in present physics) we do not know that chemistry and biology are meaningful.

 

[Oreoracle]

(I have seen this point argued before, and it basically vindicates the Thomist position on the Fifth Way–that if there is a “metaphysical law” that things tend to act for ends, that will not itself be self-explanatory. The Thomist arguments, though, generally include premises about the impossibility of an infinite regress. So while they might admit that in a sense there will be principles accounting for metaphysical principles, there will not be a “…meta-meta-metaphysics” where there are infinitely many meta’s.

You can’t have a metaphysical principle which says that metaphysical principles needn’t be accounted for. That would be a meta-metaphysical principle since it is a principle about metaphysical principles. It’s the same difficulty that would arise if we proposed a law of physics which said that the laws of physics needn’t be accounted for.

So the question is what does physics actually discover? …] It’s a question which practicing physicists care about, though it doesn’t necessarily affect their practice itself.

And it is no doubt an interesting question. If people want to speculate about such things, that’s fine. Far be it from me to try to take someone’s puzzle away! I can sympathize since I find metalogic, metamathematics, and metalanguage interesting.

But here’s the difference. Logicians will concede that there are different ways of thinking about logic and math (there is no “correct” meta for a given logic or mathematics) and they will admit that the meta’s can go on forever. Metaphysicians are quite adamant that 1) their way is correct and 2) their meta is the last one.

You seem to be fairly moderate when it comes to metaphysics, though. I have encountered some who claim that not only is there only one meta and it’s the absolutely correct one, they hold that knowledge of their meta is necessary for science. Of course they would never claim that knowledge of meta-metaphysics is necessary for metaphysics.

Well, the scientific method has its roots in Harvey and Galileo’s (and other similar 17th century scientists) application of middle-term demonstrations outlined in the Posterior Analytics. Its origin was hardly detached from philosophy.

History tends to remember the big names. Plenty of people think Pythagoras discovered the Pythagorean Theorem. Ideas are used far earlier than they are formalized.

They are models of reality. Of course it is relevant whether or not they are “true” (or close to true). To find models that approximate reality is to find models that approximate truth, unless you’re working with a bizarre conception of “reality” somehow disconnected from truth.

Approximations of reality? I don’t know what you’re talking about. I said they were useful, not approximations.

I of course agree with you, but let the record show that you connected the dots from useful to approximately true, not me. So I think the fact that science approaches truth is self-evident. Notice how you treated “useful” as “approximately true” because it is self-evident and doesn’t require metaphysical justification.

But if it isn’t a finding of physics, then we do not know whether it is possible in principle to express the higher-level special sciences in term of physics, so under the given criterion of meaning (ie. expressability in principle in present physics) we do not know that chemistry and biology are meaningful.

When I defined it as expressible in terms of physics, I assumed that my position regarding the supremacy of physics would be accommodated. I can extend the definition to include any of the disciplines that conform to the scientific method if you like.

 

[inocente]

Hmm… Isn’nt saying existence is having objective or subjective reality or being just a tautological paraphrase- since reality and being are basically just synonyms for ‘existence’.

Like saying, ‘being red is having subjective or objective redness or reditude’ (sorry for the last word!). Yet it doesn’t actually provide a criterion of ‘being red’…IMHO

I’d say that if one agent (person, animal, machine(?)) has a feeling / thought / sensation / whatever then it exists for that agent. If the agent has a memory of the feeling or thought or sensation then the memory exists for that agent. If it is or can be sensed reliably by more than one agent then it exists independently as a matter of fact. Otherwise if it has or can be communicated then it exists independently as an idea or relationship of ideas.

Reditude can be communicated to someone else, so it exists independently as an idea. They might subjectively experience it differently, or not at all, but the idea of a red stop light is still meaningful.

Some cultures don’t have separate words for blue and green, so I don’t think blueitude exists for them. Birds can see ultraviolet while humans can’t, so the idea of them seeing the color ultraviolet exists for us, even though we can’t sense it ourselves.

How’s that?

 

[Oreoracle]

I’d say that if one agent (person, animal, machine(?)) has a feeling / thought / sensation / whatever then it exists for that agent. If the agent has a memory of the feeling or thought or sensation then the memory exists for that agent.** If it is or can be sensed reliably by more than one agent then it exists independently as a matter of fact.**

This definition is probably the most pragmatic one because it reflects how we establish facts in many informal situations. We feel that our views are more realistic when more people agree with us, there’s no doubt about that.

But there are a couple of problems. For one, the human mind is easy to influence with the power of suggestion. I remember playing with one of my friends in the dark as a kid when we looked at a neighbor’s porch. The porch was distant, and on the edge of it we saw a pot on the railing. With the darkness and the shape of the pot, it looked a bit like someone’s head was turning to look at us. I offered this idea to my friend, and he agreed that the similarity to a head was striking. As we talked about it more, I began to feel certain that it must be someone watching us. The idea felt real when someone agreed, and it was easy for someone to agree when I suggested it first.

A more interesting problem is when someone has discovered something new so that they can’t yet corroborate their opinion with others. For example, it was once believed that the moon’s surface was perfectly smooth. Galileo designed a telescope powerful enough to view that surface in detail for the first time. He told people that the conventional belief in perfection among the celestial bodies due to Aristotle must be wrong, as anyone who looked through the telescope could tell. In response, religious leaders refused to look through the telescope.

But what if they had? They may have argued that, by suggesting the coarseness of the moon’s surface, Galileo was tricking people into seeing it, just like you can trick people into thinking that songs played backwards have meaningful lyrics. Indeed, Galileo’s critics argued that the apparent coarseness was just an optical illusion. To deal with this problem without any hand-waving, you would need a theory of optics, which is precisely what had to come about before people would accept it.

So the novelty of a discovery coupled with the power of suggestion makes the idea of real-by-consensus problematic. Take the issue of deciding what “red” is as an example. Ultimately red is defined by something objective: a range of wavelengths of light. In this way even colorblind people can agree that something is, in fact, red.

 

[polytropos]

You can’t have a metaphysical principle which says that metaphysical principles needn’t be accounted for. That would be a meta-metaphysical principle since it is a principle about metaphysical principles. It’s the same difficulty that would arise if we proposed a law of physics which said that the laws of physics needn’t be accounted for.

You’ve kind of repeated your original argument… but that doesn’t really address the issue. My point was that if metaphysical principles need to be accounted for, then eventually the explanations come to an end, for if they don’t, there is no explanation when they “bottom out.” (I am speaking loosely here–sorry.)

We wouldn’t be able to say exactly at which point the explanations come to an end. That would constitute the “taxicab fallacy”–obeying the principle of sufficient reason until you get somewhere you like, and then stopping. But that they must come to an end somewhere could be argued.

And it is no doubt an interesting question. If people want to speculate about such things, that’s fine. Far be it from me to try to take someone’s puzzle away! I can sympathize since I find metalogic, metamathematics, and metalanguage interesting.

But here’s the difference. Logicians will concede that there are different ways of thinking about logic and math (there is no “correct” meta for a given logic or mathematics) and they will admit that the meta’s can go on forever. Metaphysicians are quite adamant that 1) their way is correct and 2) their meta is the last one.

Well, meta-metaphysics actually is a discipline, but it refers to something else than what you have in mind.

Metaphysics is to meta-metaphysics as logic is to meta-logic (or as ethics is to metaethics). However, it is not the case that physics is to metaphysics as logic is to meta-logic. Nowadays, when meta is prefixed on a discipline, one is usually talking about a higher-level field that investigates the structure of the lower. That is not what the original division of metaphysics and physics denotes; they were simply the titles that Aristotle gave to two of his books.

If there are principles that explain metaphysical principles, then they will also be metaphysical principles. (It’s not like there are several levels of reality or explanation, each denoted by some “meta.”) To put the matter in Aristotelian-Thomistic terms that are sure to incense anyone with scientistic leanings, metaphysics is the study of being as being, and physics is the study of particular being as quantity. (I don’t know if he would accept this understanding precisely, but physics these days is more mathematical than his was.)

You seem to be fairly moderate when it comes to metaphysics, though. I have encountered some who claim that not only is there only one meta and it’s the absolutely correct one, they hold that knowledge of their meta is necessary for science. Of course they would never claim that knowledge of meta-metaphysics is necessary for metaphysics.

I don’t think I’m moderate. I just don’t like to beg questions, so I am willing to assume some of your positions for the sake of argument.

I think (my) metaphysics may be a condition (ontologically speaking) for science, but it certainly isn’t a condition epistemologically speaking. As I’ve explained, “meta” prefixes do not really denote what you are taking them to denote.

History tends to remember the big names. Plenty of people think Pythagoras discovered the Pythagorean Theorem. Ideas are used far earlier than they are formalized.

Well, Harvey and Galileo would still be early instances of the success of the scientific method. There were others, of course. But before Harvey and Galileo were swaths of late medieval scholastics.

Approximations of reality? I don’t know what you’re talking about. I said they were useful, not approximations.

I of course agree with you, but let the record show that you connected the dots from useful to approximately true, not me. So I think the fact that science approaches truth is self-evident. Notice how you treated “useful” as “approximately true” because it is self-evident and doesn’t require metaphysical justification.

I treated “model,” not “useful,” as “approximation.” When I build a model, I am modeling something and trying to represent it accurately. Often my model is not useful. If it is useful in making predictions about reality, then I probably take that to be because it is a good model, ie. representation, of reality.

 

[polytropos]

Some cultures don’t have separate words for blue and green, so I don’t think blueitude exists for them.

But take a child who has words only for the primary colors. Show him some intermediary color that he lacks a word for. Does his lack of a word mean that that color does not exist for him?

It’s kind of like how most Americans don’t know the word umami. But they still taste umami things.

 

[inocente]

This definition is probably the most pragmatic one because it reflects how we establish facts in many informal situations. We feel that our views are more realistic when more people agree with us, there’s no doubt about that.

But there are a couple of problems. For one, the human mind is easy to influence with the power of suggestion. I remember playing with one of my friends in the dark as a kid when we looked at a neighbor’s porch. The porch was distant, and on the edge of it we saw a pot on the railing. With the darkness and the shape of the pot, it looked a bit like someone’s head was turning to look at us. I offered this idea to my friend, and he agreed that the similarity to a head was striking. As we talked about it more, I began to feel certain that it must be someone watching us. The idea felt real when someone agreed, and it was easy for someone to agree when I suggested it first.

I added “sensed reliably” in the hope of overcoming that objection. It was never a fact that you were being watched, but your feeling of being watched existed and was real to you, and your memory of the feeling exists, and since my mirror neurons can empathize with your description, it now exists as an idea independent of your memory. And will do as long as it’s remembered or communicated.

A more interesting problem is when someone has discovered something new so that they can’t yet corroborate their opinion with others. For example, it was once believed that the moon’s surface was perfectly smooth. Galileo designed a telescope powerful enough to view that surface in detail for the first time. He told people that the conventional belief in perfection among the celestial bodies due to Aristotle must be wrong, as anyone who looked through the telescope could tell. In response, religious leaders refused to look through the telescope.

I never understood why people saw the Moon as perfect, when even with the naked eye it’s obviously pockmarked. Perhaps the Moon really did look smooth until Galileo’s act of observing (Schrödinger’s Telescope ). Or everyone was exceptionally myopic in medieval Europe. Or they saw what they were taught to see in a real life Emperor’s New Clothes.

*But what if they had? They may have argued that, by suggesting the coarseness of the moon’s surface, Galileo was tricking people into seeing it, just like you can trick people into thinking that songs played backwards have meaningful lyrics. Indeed, Galileo’s critics argued that the apparent coarseness was just an optical illusion. To deal with this problem without any hand-waving, you would need a theory of optics, which is precisely what had to come about before people would accept it.

So the novelty of a discovery coupled with the power of suggestion makes the idea of real-by-consensus problematic. Take the issue of deciding what “red” is as an example. Ultimately red is defined by something objective: a range of wavelengths of light. In this way even colorblind people can agree that something is, in fact, red.*

Yes, agreed. There does need to be some fairly straightforward method for agreeing matters of fact though, something about repeatable observations or such. And I think it must leave room for doubt, a mustard seed of doubt can move mountains.

(Not sure about defining red by range of wavelengths. It’s a convenient classification but is somewhat artificial. It seems to say that a red car is no longer red when illuminated by a blue spotlight. And is 620 nm red or orange? If we dial down the saturation, when does it become pink, and then gray? If we dial down the brightness, when does it become brown? Perhaps something like “the color of oxygenated blood” might be a better definition.)

 

[inocente]

But take a child who has words only for the primary colors. Show him some intermediary color that he lacks a word for. Does his lack of a word mean that that color does not exist for him?

It’s kind of like how most Americans don’t know the word umami. But they still taste umami things.

Some caution might be in order. Before learning the word, the color exists for the child as a sense impression, although he might not distinguish it as such or be aware of the concept of colors. So the sense impression exists for him but the color doesn’t. Similarly for umami.

There’s a big leap from sensing something to identifying it, to giving it a name and an existence as an idea. A rose by any other name would smell as sweet, but if it had no name then it would only exist as part of a background.

Imho it was a huge leap when that ancient artist first sprayed a mix of red ochre from her mouth over her hand onto the wall of the cave, and by doing so asserted her own existence.

 

[ynotzap]

If we say meta-meta physics, what is to prevent us from saying meta-meta-metaphysics and so on. It leads us into an infinite series, with no It beginning. In that case we are not dealing with the ultimate causes of reality, and being, every thing becomes relative. It eliminates any mental certitude of reality, IOW we can’t really know, our senses can deceive us, our minds are not established in absolute truth regarding our world, it can be, or it can’t be.
Metaphysics deals with the ultimate causes and effects in the universe, and reality. It involves the science of Being, and existence, first principles
The principle source of truth, or knowledge is whether a thing has being, exists or non-being,it doesn’t exist logically it follows that if it does we can know it, if it doesn’t, we can’t. It leads us back to whether we can trust our senses. Senses if they function normally react to stimuli, and from that stimuli we interpret what the cause is, a mental function. We make physical and mental contact with the world around us. Our interpretation of the cause of the stimuli can be wrong, but our sensation is not From this contact we abstract the concept, a mental image of the object,its existence and its nature. If we doubt that we can know, and not trust our senses, we resolve ourselves into the irrational corner of a true skeptic who contradicts himself when he states that he can’t be sure of anything, but he is sure that he can’t be sure

In logic this principle is active, the principle of being and non-being and it can be determined if the logic is erroneous. eg. lst premise: all human males are men, 2nd premise: Tom is a human male, 3rd conclusion: Tom is a man
first axiom or truth: all human males are men This is ascertained by our experience of objective reality our contact with an existing human male, the principle,or source of truth is evident, it exists

St.Thomas explains that we have three degrees of mental abstraction,.the concept( the mental representation of a thing,) mathematical,( quantitative), and the metaphysical, (the ultimate causes, and effects in reality.) The principle of truth, existence, underlies all sciences

 

[polytropos]

Some caution might be in order. Before learning the word, the color exists for the child as a sense impression, although he might not distinguish it as such or be aware of the concept of colors. So the sense impression exists for him but the color doesn’t. Similarly for umami.

There’s a big leap from sensing something to identifying it, to giving it a name and an existence as an idea. A rose by any other name would smell as sweet, but if it had no name then it would only exist as part of a background.

Imho it was a huge leap when that ancient artist first sprayed a mix of red ochre from her mouth over her hand onto the wall of the cave, and by doing so asserted her own existence.

But the child need not merely be sensing the color he can’t name. (And Americans certainly can identify umami.)

Picture a painter, painting from memory. He can’t name the color he wants (say, the flesh of someone’s cheek). But he mixes two other colors to obtain it anyway.

I don’t see why a name is a necessary condition for concept possession.

 

[Oreoracle]

My point was that if metaphysical principles need to be accounted for, then eventually the explanations come to an end, for if they don’t, there is no explanation when they “bottom out.” (I am speaking loosely here–sorry.)

We wouldn’t be able to say exactly at which point the explanations come to an end. That would constitute the “taxicab fallacy”–obeying the principle of sufficient reason until you get somewhere you like, and then stopping. But that they must come to an end somewhere could be argued.

If you admit that the problem will persist at each particular stage, then it doesn’t make sense to me to say that the very same reasoning won’t be applicable at some stage. It’s the same as the idea behind mathematical induction: if it’s true for the first step, and being true at one step implies its truth at the next step, then it’s true for every step.

The conclusion may be inconvenient for our ability to explain things, but calling it fallacious doesn’t make it go away. There is nothing inherently wrong with the notion of an infinite regress even though it may make us uncomfortable.

Metaphysics is to meta-metaphysics as logic is to meta-logic (or as ethics is to metaethics). However, it is not the case that physics is to metaphysics as logic is to meta-logic. Nowadays, when meta is prefixed on a discipline, one is usually talking about a higher-level field that investigates the structure of the lower. That is not what the original division of metaphysics and physics denotes; they were simply the titles that Aristotle gave to two of his books.

With all due respect to Aristotle, I’ve heard many definitions of “metaphysics”, as the subject has developed quite a bit since his time. We don’t generally restrict the domain of a discipline to the imagination of its founder.

But I’m fine with granting Aristotle the monopoly on the word. It doesn’t change my argument, which is that you still have an infinite regress to contend with.

I think (my) metaphysics may be a condition (ontologically speaking) for science, but it certainly isn’t a condition epistemologically speaking. As I’ve explained, “meta” prefixes do not really denote what you are taking them to denote.

We may as well not go there, as I’ve always thought of ontology as mental masturbation, for lack of a more vivid description. It reminds me of the very same vacuity I’ve been talking about. It doesn’t affect what we know about science or how we practice science, so I don’t see its relevance to science.

I never understood why people saw the Moon as perfect, when even with the naked eye it’s obviously pockmarked. Perhaps the Moon really did look smooth until Galileo’s act of observing (Schrödinger’s Telescope ). Or everyone was exceptionally myopic in medieval Europe. Or they saw what they were taught to see in a real life Emperor’s New Clothes.

Christians have often been criticized for trying to explain events with “God-did-it”. Medieval philosophers, on the other hand, were often guilty of explanations like “Aristotle-said-it”.

(Not sure about defining red by range of wavelengths. It’s a convenient classification but is somewhat artificial. It seems to say that a red car is no longer red when illuminated by a blue spotlight. And is 620 nm red or orange? If we dial down the saturation, when does it become pink, and then gray? If we dial down the brightness, when does it become brown? Perhaps something like “the color of oxygenated blood” might be a better definition.)

I think the exact boundaries between the colors are just a matter of convention. If for some reason we were having a serious conversation about the colors of objects, we could agree beforehand on what the boundaries would be.

Coincidentally, this is exactly why I don’t like the field of ontology, as I mentioned to polytropos above. You’ll always find someone stubborn enough to insist that there is an objectively correct standard of what red is, perhaps in the form of an “essence of red” floating around somewhere, as if the universe cares about the classifications that we humans find useful.

 

[polytropos]

If you admit that the problem will persist at each particular stage, then it doesn’t make sense to me to say that the very same reasoning won’t be applicable at some stage. It’s the same as the idea behind mathematical induction: if it’s true for the first step, and being true at one step implies its truth at the next step, then it’s true for every step.

The conclusion may be inconvenient for our ability to explain things, but calling it fallacious doesn’t make it go away. There is nothing inherently wrong with the notion of an infinite regress even though it may make us uncomfortable.

Well, I should clarify what I hold and what I concede for the sake of argument.

I don’t think the problem persists at each particular stage. I think the difference can be clarified once one gives an account of the laws of physics. But from within physics, based on physics alone, there is no answer to this question, so from within physics, one can’t a priori decide whether metaphysical principles invoked to explain the laws of physics (whatever those are) are going to likewise call for explanation.

Further, suppose I did concede that metaphysics requires higher-level principles in the same sense that physics did. Even that doesn’t imply an infinite regress if I hold other plausible theses: that the infinite regress leaves each explanation ungrounded and therefore the whole chain ungrounded and that a particular sort of principle (ie. not just any principle) could be self-explanatory. (The reason for holding this latter principle need not be specified in an ad hoc way, given that there are legitimate reasons for believing that the laws of physics and their instances are contingent.)

With all due respect to Aristotle, I’ve heard many definitions of “metaphysics”, as the subject has developed quite a bit since his time. We don’t generally restrict the domain of a discipline to the imagination of its founder.

Right, but it doesn’t matter whether I appeal to Aristotle or philosophic practice in general: the analogies “physics is to metaphysics as ethics is to metaethics” or “physics is to metaphysics as metaphysics is to meta-metaphysics” don’t hold and never have. (A few recent thinkers–Sean Carroll, I think–have asserted that the “meaning” of metaphysics is that it should “follow our physics.” But this doesn’t resemble historic usage, so it is at best stipulation. Maybe it’s just the impression he got from the way the words sound, and he needed something to say while debating Craig.)

But I’m fine with granting Aristotle the monopoly on the word. It doesn’t change my argument, which is that you still have an infinite regress to contend with.

Well, this depends on how “the laws of physics” are cashed out. I don’t think it is “laws” themselves (if those are taken to be the exceptionless models/generalizations like the law of gravitation) are what need explanation, since I think those are mind-dependent intentional entities, manifestations of the dispositions of matter that we can quantify and refine. It is the dispositions that require explanation. (So I’m not really sure if I can fit my position into the “the laws of physics are explained by laws of metaphysics, which must be explained by…” mold.)

We may as well not go there, as I’ve always thought of ontology as mental masturbation, for lack of a more vivid description. It reminds me of the very same vacuity I’ve been talking about. It doesn’t affect what we know about science or how we practice science, so I don’t see its relevance to science.

Well, part of the trouble is that epistemology is generally defined in terms of ontology, so ontology is non-eliminable. (Trying to eliminate the external world and just accepting the “evidence” that we use as scientific material is basically to accept idealism–it’s just a different ontology.)

Ontology is not very complex. We have questions like, “Do electrons exist?” If we say yes (whether we claim that definitively or conditionally upon the current evidence), then we include them our ontology. Our reasons may depend on epistemological concerns.

We may also have considerations like: we talk about things like “the laws of physics.” What are these? (Are they things at all?) What does physics discover? Those are questions of ontology: what exists, how does it exist, what are they like? Someone can say they don’t find these questions interesting, but they are hardly irrelevant, and far from vacuous.

 

[Oreoracle]

I don’t think the problem persists at each particular stage. I think the difference can be clarified once one gives an account of the laws of physics. But from within physics, based on physics alone, there is no answer to this question, so from within physics, one can’t a priori decide whether metaphysical principles invoked to explain the laws of physics (whatever those are) are going to likewise call for explanation.

The problem would exist at each stage because of the way that deductive systems work. You will eventually reach a point where you can’t break your theory down any further, and you’ll end up with primitive (undefined) terms and axioms. Then someone can come along and ask, “Hey wait a minute, how do you justify those?” You’ll either say that they don’t need justification or you’ll develop a larger theory to encompass the old one.

Eventually one would find this frustrating and say that adding an extra level of abstraction to explain the previous level isn’t increasing our understanding. The difference between me and a metaphysician is that I tire of the abstractions one tier earlier than they do. I would perhaps change my mind if the extra level they postulate helped with the current level in some way, but by your own admission it doesn’t affect the practices of the current level, nor its epistemology. Likewise, they would feel the same way if I postulated an additional level of abstraction for their own theory.

You say that metaphysics aids the ontology of physics, but ontology is a metaphysical concept. Physics doesn’t care about ontology, so metaphysics is basically trying to create a problem that only it can solve. I’m sure I could invent something that metaphysics lacks (and doesn’t care about) conceptually, and then try to sell my invention to metaphysicians and convince them that they need it. It wouldn’t convince anyone.

Well, part of the trouble is that epistemology is generally defined in terms of ontology, so ontology is non-eliminable. (Trying to eliminate the external world and just accepting the “evidence” that we use as scientific material is basically to accept idealism–it’s just a different ontology.)

First you said that metaphysics doesn’t affect the epistemology of physics, but rather its ontology, and now you’re saying that ontology determines epistemology.

Those are questions of ontology: what exists, how does it exist, what are they like? Someone can say they don’t find these questions interesting, but they are hardly irrelevant, and far from vacuous.

It depends on how you interpret those questions. Those are questions that, given a certain interpretation, physics is highly interested in.

Question: What exists?

Physics’ Answer: Lots of things. Galaxies, atoms, spacetime, energy, and so forth.

Question: How do they exist?

Physics’ Answer: In order for something to exist in a certain form, usually its physical properties have to fall within a certain range. The solid, liquid, and gaseous phases of an element depend on temperature and pressure, for example.

Question: What are they like?

Physics’ Answer: Objects can be distinguished based on many properties such as their elements, shape, mass, location, momenta, etc.

Ontology is concerned with far more nebulous versions of these questions in my opinion.

 

[yppop]

Question: What exists?

Physics’ Answer: Lots of things. Galaxies, atoms, spacetime, energy, and so forth.

Question: How do they exist?

Physics’ Answer: In order for something to exist in a certain form, usually its physical properties have to fall within a certain range. The solid, liquid, and gaseous phases of an element depend on temperature and pressure, for example.

Question: What are they like?

Physics’ Answer: Objects can be distinguished based on many properties such as their elements, shape, mass, location, momenta, etc.

Ontology is concerned with far more nebulous versions of these questions in my opinion.

OREO
You seem to imply that all that exists is objective reality. I might ask: Does beauty exist? If you answer in the affirmative tell me how you think beauty exists.

After you’ve given that some thought let me ask you another question relative to objective reality: Can you explain what “energy” is and I don’t I want a scientific definition, this is a philosophy forum. Put on your philosophy hat and see if you can “explain” energy.

Yppop

 

[ynotzap]

The problem would exist at each stage because of the way that deductive systems work. You will eventually reach a point where you can’t break your theory down any further, and you’ll end up with primitive (undefined) terms and axioms. Then someone can come along and ask, “Hey wait a minute, how do you justify those?” You’ll either say that they don’t need justification or you’ll develop a larger theory to encompass the old one.

Eventually one would find this frustrating and say that adding an extra level of abstraction to explain the previous level isn’t increasing our understanding. The difference between me and a metaphysician is that I tire of the abstractions one tier earlier than they do. I would perhaps change my mind if the extra level they postulate helped with the current level in some way, but by your own admission it doesn’t affect the practices of the current level, nor its epistemology. Likewise, they would feel the same way if I postulated an additional level of abstraction for their own theory. Ontology is a science of being, existence, ultimate causes and effects.

You say that metaphysics aids the ontology of physics, but ontology is a metaphysical concept. Physics doesn’t care about ontology, so metaphysics is basically trying to create a problem that only it can solve. I’m sure I could invent something that metaphysics lacks (and doesn’t care about) conceptually, and then try to sell my invention to metaphysicians and convince them that they need it. It wouldn’t convince anyone.

First you said that metaphysics doesn’t affect the epistemology of physics, but rather its ontology, and now you’re saying that ontology determines epistemology.

It depends on how you interpret those questions. Those are questions that, given a certain interpretation, physics is highly interested in.

Question: What exists?

Physics’ Answer: Lots of things. Galaxies, atoms, spacetime, energy, and so forth.

Question: How do they exist?

Physics’ Answer: In order for something to exist in a certain form, usually its physical properties have to fall within a certain range. The solid, liquid, and gaseous phases of an element depend on temperature and pressure, for example.

Question: What are they like?

Physics’ Answer: Objects can be distinguished based on many properties such as their elements, shape, mass, location, momenta, etc.

Ontology is concerned with far more nebulous versions of these questions in my opinion.

You referred to ontology as vacuous it doesn’t effect what we know about science.

You answered a question as physics would answer "How do they exist, referring to “a lot of things”

An ontological approach would say that physical things have many states of existence eg. water can be ice, ice can be steam, but in all its states of existence it remains matter.
If existence was it’s nature it would be all that it could be, and not subject to time and change. And that being the case matter would depend on something outside itself that caused its existence, and changes. If we follow the right logic we realize that something that gives existence to something has to have existence as it’s nature in order to give it. Being an atheist this might be disturbing, because it will lead to a supernatural entity we call God. Empirical science does not transcend the material, if it isn’t physical it isn,t real.
Ontology is not vacuous, maybe some areas of our knowledge are vacuous. Some scientists are earth bound. Science is not restricted just to physics, it is concerned with all reality, physical and metaphysical, the word itself means “:to know” We have to be open minded, if we are not then our judgement become subjective and out of contact with reality.