Criteria of 'Existence'

[Oreoracle]

I would say that because the concept of sphere predates ellipsoid that the concept of sphere is the generalization, and the ellipisoid is the particular encompassed in the generalization.

Certainly more fundamental notions are more general in a way. But what I meant by saying that ellipsoids are more general is that the set of spheres is a subset of the set of ellipsoids. Likewise, the conic sections are generalizations of these, and the quadric surfaces are generalizations of those, and so on.

I’m currently debating with myself on whether my explanation is satisfactory, though. Is it enough to say that our senses can get us “in the ballpark” as far as the ideals are concerned, and then we whittle down the possibilities using logic until an ideal agrees with experimental results?

In the material world there is no perfect circle, it exists in the conceptual world.

I agree. We should be able to test whether a surface conforms to a sphere to a certain degree of accuracy, however.

 

[polytropos]

That is the standard definition of a physical law, though.

As I said, if physicists restricted their use of the term to this definition, I would not substantially object.

Any hoped for explanation of a law is hostage to an exception being discovered, at which point the law is summarily binned, and in any event both science and the world will sail on regardless with or without an explanation.

But again, the idea of an “exception” has to be clarified. For most laws in physical theories, the exact circumstances of the antecedent of the if-then conditional never actually obtains. But we don’t regard these as “exceptions”–we regard them as instances where what the “law” gestures toward is operative even if the formal conditions aren’t present.

This is not a critique of the idea of a law. I’m not expressing any skepticism at the capacity of science to formulate generalizations that are accurate and predictive. But I am pointing out that when we think of an “exception” we are thinking of it in terms of ceteris paribus dispositions that go beyond the actual statement of the law.

Here’s Isaac Newton:

“I have not as yet been able to discover the reason for these properties of gravity from phenomena, and I do not feign hypotheses. For whatever is not deduced from the phenomena must be called a hypothesis; and hypotheses, whether metaphysical or physical, or based on occult qualities, or mechanical, have no place in experimental philosophy. In this philosophy particular propositions are inferred from the phenomena, and afterwards rendered general by induction.”

For centuries no one knew how the Sun reaches out and pulls at the Earth, until it was eventually resolved by Einstein. So between “shut up and calculate” and navel gazing, there is a third option - patience.

I think laws are generally extracted from theories, and it’s the job of the theory to say how or why, while the law is just a useful generalization for predictive purposes.

You suggest that the explanatory (as opposed to predictive or descriptive) element of physics come from “theories” rather than the laws themselves (the laws being “extracted from” the theories). From what I can tell, you regard relativity as explaining (giving the “how or why” of) gravity.

For example, relativity employs a model of space-time and also includes laws that replace the less accurate “laws” of Newton. Is there anything else? Are the models explanatory? (What do they have in addition to the mathematical formulations of the theory’s laws?) Since you concede that laws are not meant to be explanatory, there will need to be something in addition to the “if [conditions], then [phenomena]” generalizations to do the explanatory work, ie. something in addition to the fitting of empirical results to formulas.

I’m not sure if you’re reading more into the laws than perhaps you should. They sort of bubble up by common consent from the much larger number of theories.

Well, it’s difficult. By your account, everyone acknowledges that the “laws of physics” are just useful generalizations, whereas other scientists (Hawking) have said that the laws of physics caused the universe to come into being.

I think your view works pretty well for scientific practice. My only concern is that not everyone appreciates its explanatory modesty.

 

[polytropos]

It had always been my understanding that laws aren’t meant to be explanatory. Inocente pointed out the example of Newton’s Law of Gravitation. It is not an explanation; it’s only meant to be predictive.

I do agree that, in order to explain phenomena, you need to create an idealized model in your mind.

Regarding the laws of physics: I’ll just repeat my sympathy. If it is your view that the laws of physics are non-explanatory, and that if we want explanations we must look elsewhere (or discard the idea of “explanation” altogether–perhaps it is a philosophical prejudice), then I don’t object. I think it’s plausible to suspect that reality underwrites the laws of physics; I see no a priori reason to rule it out. Perhaps the question is unanswerable from the perspective of physics (or from the perspective of physics alone), and perhaps a few people who are interested in physics don’t find themselves interested in it, but it is an interesting topic nonetheless.

I doubt, though, that models will help as far as explanation is concerned. What do they give over and above the laws reporting generalized conditionals? Presumably they are (like the laws) devised by induction from particular cases. Often they are probably constructed directly from the statements of the laws themselves (free-body diagrams, for example). To convey the relationships that obtain in the law, scientists construct a model that makes the statement of the law more concrete and perhaps aids our understanding of it by analogy with something more geometrical.

Or, as I asked inocente, am I missing something about what might be contained in a model or broader theory but manages to avoid the explanatory vacuity of the laws themselves?

A model might be explanatory if it can be confirmed as an actual (or probably actual) representation of the relationships that really obtain in the instance of a law (ie. when the conditions denoted by the antecedent more or less obtain, and the phenomenon follows). But in this case, the explanatory power of the model is parasitic on the explanatory nature of the relationships that obtain in the real world, so it does not render otiose the metaphysicians claim that laws will have to be underwritten by causal dispositions of things in the world.

 

[Charlemagne_III]

Perhaps its just a matter of linguistic convention, but it would seem useful to have a precise criteria for existence. Can someone come up with a good definition?

This is difficult to do. A “table” has a precise definition as a thing that exists somewhere outside the human body. It is composed of atoms, etc. But as for the universal “table” existing only in my mind, is that “table” an entity that can be defined according to precise criteria? Is it also composed of atoms, etc.? In other words, are all my thoughts really atoms activating in my brain, or are they something else? And what would be the criteria for calling them existent atoms in my brain as opposed to existent particles of my noumenon?

 

[Nihilist]

This is difficult to do. A “table” has a precise definition as a thing that exists somewhere outside the human body. It is composed of atoms, etc. But as for the universal “table” existing only in my mind, is that “table” an entity that can be defined according to precise criteria? Is it also composed of atoms, etc.? In other words, are all my thoughts really atoms activating in my brain, or are they something else? And what would be the criteria for calling them existent atoms in my brain as opposed to existent particles of my noumenon?

Good point. Perhaps this leads us to the scholastic issue of essences- the accidents of the table are its physical substance (its color, shape, the fact that it is made of atoms), but its essence is its use/usability as a table.

 

[Charlemagne_III]

Good point. Perhaps this leads us to the scholastic issue of essences- the accidents of the table are its physical substance (its color, shape, the fact that it is made of atoms), but its essence is its use/usability as a table.

Here is a paragraph from the Catholic Encyclopedia describing Aquinas’ distinction between Essence and Existence.

“Existence is that whereby the essence is an actuality in the line of being. By its actuation the essence is removed from the merely possible, is placed outside its causes, and exists in the world of actual things. St. Thomas describes it as the first or primary act of the essence as contrasted with its secondary act or operation (I Sent., dist. xxxiii, Q. i, a. 1, ad 1); and again, as “the actuality of all form or nature” (Summa, I, Q. iii, a. 4). Whereas the essence or quiddity gives an answer to the question as to what the thing is, the existence is the affirmative to the question as to whether it is. Thus, while created essences are divided into both possible and actual, existence is always actual and opposed by its nature to simple potentiality.”

So, since the Schoolmen had no familiarity with later developments in atomic theory. it would seem that by our present way of looking at the difference between essence and existence, St. Thomas, if he was alive today, might see existence as the underlying real atomic structure of the essences perceived to come and go with time. But even this is not adequate, since atoms come and go with time, are transformed by their association with each other, are lumped together differently in different molecules, and can even be split. So, taking modern atomic theory as a definition of existence (as opposed to essence) it would seem it’s not even true that “existence is always actual and opposed by its nature to simple potentiality.”

 

[inocente]

But again, the idea of an “exception” has to be clarified. For most laws in physical theories, the exact circumstances of the antecedent of the if-then conditional never actually obtains. But we don’t regard these as “exceptions”–we regard them as instances where what the “law” gestures toward is operative even if the formal conditions aren’t present.

This is not a critique of the idea of a law. I’m not expressing any skepticism at the capacity of science to formulate generalizations that are accurate and predictive. But I am pointing out that when we think of an “exception” we are thinking of it in terms of ceteris paribus dispositions that go beyond the actual statement of the law.

I’m not sure I understand your point. A law is something which can be relied on. It may have limitations, cases where it is known to give wrong predictions, for instance Newton’s law of gravity should only be used within limits as you mentioned, and Boyle’s Law only applies to ideal gases.

But an exception would be that once is a while, for no explained reason, a law is found to give a bad prediction. It can’t hold on to its status in those circumstances, as it can no longer be relied on.

You suggest that the explanatory (as opposed to predictive or descriptive) element of physics come from “theories” rather than the laws themselves (the laws being “extracted from” the theories). From what I can tell, you regard relativity as explaining (giving the “how or why” of) gravity.

For example, relativity employs a model of space-time and also includes laws that replace the less accurate “laws” of Newton. Is there anything else? Are the models explanatory? (What do they have in addition to the mathematical formulations of the theory’s laws?) Since you concede that laws are not meant to be explanatory, there will need to be something in addition to the “if [conditions], then [phenomena]” generalizations to do the explanatory work, ie. something in addition to the fitting of empirical results to formulas.

Yes, the curving of spacetime in the presence of matter is an excellent explanation of gravity. Not only is it otherwise difficult to see how the Sun reaches out and tugs at the Earth, but the model is easily visualized by analogy. Watch this demo by one teacher to others to see how many things it can explain - youtube.com/watch?v=MTY1Kje0yLg.

We don’t really need to know the law to understand any of that, and we don’t need to know any of that to use the law to make predictions.

*Well, it’s difficult. By your account, everyone acknowledges that the “laws of physics” are just useful generalizations, whereas other scientists (Hawking) have said that the laws of physics caused the universe to come into being.

I think your view works pretty well for scientific practice. My only concern is that not everyone appreciates its explanatory modesty.*

God never makes an appearance in any scientific theory, which leaves us with an interesting question: Suppose we had a detailed explanation for why the big bang occurred. Would God have to make an appearance in that theory, would it necessarily be the exception? I think not, and it would be like all the other theories. In which case if you were so minded, it would appear that the patterns which underlie the laws are the cause. So in that sense perhaps Hawking is correct, since otherwise we would have to turn God into a scientific hypothesis.

 

[inocente]

I’ll use an example. Let’s say we have a ball and we are under the impression that it is spherical. Our everyday experience with these “spheres” leads to a formal definition of a sphere. After some mathematics, we conclude that spheres have interesting properties, and we can test whether the ball is really a sphere by checking to see if it has these properties. If the ball passes the tests, it can rightly be called a sphere.

Where I’m having difficulty sorting this out is the first step: Since we don’t begin by knowing that the ball is spherical, how do we know to proceed with the formulation and study of idealized spheres? Maybe we could say that our senses were reliable enough to conclude that the ball was at least ellipsoidal, and by testing it for spherical properties we were just whittling down the possibilities. But that has two issues: 1) Firstly, it postpones the problem–how did we know the ball was ellipsoidal? However, I would argue that it’s easier to tell whether something is of a more general shape than a more particular shape. 2) This doesn’t reflect how we actually think about spheres and ellipsoids. The concept of a sphere predates the concept of an ellipsoid, with the ellipsoid being a generalization of the sphere. But perhaps our intuition works in reverse from the general to the particular.

Not sure. We’re adapted to recognize highly complicated shapes such as our mother’s face, so in comparison perhaps a sphere is easily conceptualized. And stone age people would have seen the Moon and perhaps guessed that it’s 3D from the shading. But also I think we take lots or shortcuts in recognition, we’re not bothered that a rugby or NFL ball is ovoid or other balls are spheres, we still put them in the same class.

 

[Charlemagne_III]

God never makes an appearance in any scientific theory, which leaves us with an interesting question: Suppose we had a detailed explanation for why the big bang occurred. Would God have to make an appearance in that theory, would it necessarily be the exception? I think not, and it would be like all the other theories. In which case if you were so minded, it would appear that the patterns which underlie the laws are the cause. So in that sense perhaps Hawking is correct, since otherwise we would have to turn God into a scientific hypothesis.

It’s already been done.

“This most beautiful system [the solar system] could only proceed from the dominion of an intelligent and powerful Being.” Isaac Newton

 

[ynotzap]

There is another thought to consider: Before we can have fiction or theories, we must have non-fiction, things that we come into contact in our real world. I t is from these conceptions of the objective world around us that we get whatever we have in our minds. We do obtain conceptual truth from this objectivity. We also find a consistency in things we regard as laws, we did not create them but discovered them in nature, the physical world, they are recognized as universal principles, principles that are self-evident.

 

[polytropos]

I’m not sure I understand your point. A law is something which can be relied on. It may have limitations, cases where it is known to give wrong predictions, for instance Newton’s law of gravity should only be used within limits as you mentioned, and Boyle’s Law only applies to ideal gases.

But an exception would be that once is a while, for no explained reason, a law is found to give a bad prediction. It can’t hold on to its status in those circumstances, as it can no longer be relied on.

What I mean is this: Take one of Newton’s laws. If no forces act on a body, then it will continue at constant velocity. The conditions in the antecedent never obtain: there never has been a body on which no forces have acted. But we still take the law to hold in approximate circumstances, in spite of interference. My point is that what we really care about is the disposition that the law suggests is characteristic of all bodies, not any particular matching of conditions to phenomena.

Since the conditions never obtain, there is never a counterexample/exception in the strict logical sense: we never observe a body on which no force acts but which does not continue at constant velocity. For a counterexample to a generalization “if [conditions], then [phenomenon]” would have to be “[conditions] and not-[phenomenon]”, and “[conditions]” never obtains in the case of some laws. But strictly speaking we regard the law as actually falsified nevertheless. Our understanding of the falsification (by Einstein’s theory) only makes sense in the context of a disposition that is operative even when the precise conditions do not obtain.

In other words, we regard Newton’s law to be false not because we took a case where the antecedent obtains and found that the consequent did not correspond. Rather, we found that in general, Newton’s law does not disclose an actual disposition of matter, whether or not the precise condition of the conditional obtains.

Yes, the curving of spacetime in the presence of matter is an excellent explanation of gravity. Not only is it otherwise difficult to see how the Sun reaches out and tugs at the Earth, but the model is easily visualized by analogy. Watch this demo by one teacher to others to see how many things it can explain - youtube.com/watch?v=MTY1Kje0yLg.

That is my point. The explanatory force of the theory/law depends on the nature of the underlying reality (space-time, matter). As we have agreed, laws don’t explain why matter curves space-time or why bodies travel along geodesics. Laws report that they do, and scientists characteristically seek reasons why laws obtain. It is still plausible to hope for explanations of the underlying phenomena (even if a particular scientist is uninterested in this question). It’s natural, even–the theory is invoked to explain other phenomena, and the explanatory nature of the theory has to do with particular phenomena that are not simply the laws.

I don’t really think that the example of space-time satisfied my questions though. The question was: what in the theory, besides the laws that are generalized from induction which we admit is not explanatory, leads to the theory’s explanatory power? You seem to say now that it has to do with the entities that the theory posits. I don’t find this objectionable, but qualify with a response I made to Oreoracle:

A model might be explanatory if it can be confirmed as an actual (or probably actual) representation of the relationships that really obtain in the instance of a law (ie. when the conditions denoted by the antecedent more or less obtain, and the phenomenon follows). But in this case, the explanatory power of the model is parasitic on the explanatory nature of the relationships that obtain in the real world, so it does not render otiose the metaphysicians claim that laws will have to be underwritten by causal dispositions of things in the world.

We don’t really need to know the law to understand any of that, and we don’t need to know any of that to use the law to make predictions.

Well, we can tell students that there is such a thing as space-time. We can get them to understand what we mean by that without showing them the equations.

But in general, this looseness between laws and the entities the theories postulate does not hold. There is a reason that our notion of space-time originated with Einstein: before him, it was not mathematically forced on us. Knowing that it satisfies the right equations, we certainly can teach it to others non-mathematically and without invocation of laws. That is teaching on the basis of authority; our teachers and textbooks probably won’t lie about this to us even though they haven’t sufficiently explained (at least in this hypothesized case) why scientists adopt space-time rather than earlier models.

 

[polytropos]

God never makes an appearance in any scientific theory,

Persons generally don’t enter into scientific theories (the complaints of economists and psychologists notwithstanding).

Suppose we had a detailed explanation for why the big bang occurred. Would God have to make an appearance in that theory, would it necessarily be the exception? I think not, and it would be like all the other theories. In which case if you were so minded, it would appear that the patterns which underlie the laws are the cause. So in that sense perhaps Hawking is correct, since otherwise we would have to turn God into a scientific hypothesis.

I don’t think God would enter into a scientific theory. Those are not the sort of explanations that God provides (in my view). However, a consequence might simply be an epistemological impasse: some phenomenon (the big bang, say) remains resistant to scientific scrutiny, but we never rule out all physical causes in principle.

I doubt that would give us any warrant for the bolded hypothesis (by process of elimination?), for I regard it to be incoherent. How could patterns be a cause of anything? A pattern by definition is a higher-level feature that is parasitic upon certain lower-level features (in this case instances of the law in question, the sort of instances from which the higher-level generalization was made). A law (at least on that temperate view) is not something above its instances and the fact that it continues to correlate conditions to phenomena. I can’t make any sense of the claim that a law, so construed, causes anything.

 

[Charlemagne_III]

I don’t think God would enter into a scientific theory. Those are not the sort of explanations that God provides (in my view). However, a consequence might simply be an epistemological impasse: some phenomenon (the big bang, say) remains resistant to scientific scrutiny, but we never rule out all physical causes in principle.

Nor need we rule out non-physical causes in principle.

That is why Newton, Einstein, and so many other scientists of note (even Darwin) refer to God.

But that is a philosophical/theological observation, not a scientific one per se.

We can’t put God into the equations, but we can reasonably consider whether God breathes fire into the equations.

 

[Oreoracle]

I doubt, though, that models will help as far as explanation is concerned. What do they give over and above the laws reporting generalized conditionals?

I think the most honest answer is that a phenomenon seems to be explained to us when we reach the point that the process by which it occurs seems intuitive. For example, we have popular conceptions such as gravity “pulling” objects, mass “distorting” spacetime, etc. Obviously we’ve never actually witnessed any pulling or distortion; we just see the objects move. Those words just give us a way to visualize what’s happening to make it seem intuitive. Or, if you prefer, they provide a useful analogy to everyday experience.

 

[ynotzap]

posted by inocente: God never makes an appearance in any scientific theory.

And what would you look for to recognize Him? Who do you think gives origin to thoughts? Who do you think gives scientists the intellectual appetite for the truth and knowledge of scientific matters? Who gives validity to laws? Who provides the objects of scientific speculation? These questions can not be answered by empirical science, but they are addressed by Metaphysics. What you will hear a Scholastic Metaphysician say, you are asking questions about spiritual realities and this is not your field of expertise. Much is taken for granted. Are these empty questions? Not to some, are they crucial in delving into the ultimate causes of the reality of this world, or universe? Not to some, but I’m afraid to some they are useless.

 

[inocente]

What I mean is this: Take one of Newton’s laws. If no forces act on a body, then it will continue at constant velocity. The conditions in the antecedent never obtain: there never has been a body on which no forces have acted. But we still take the law to hold in approximate circumstances, in spite of interference. My point is that what we really care about is the disposition that the law suggests is characteristic of all bodies, not any particular matching of conditions to phenomena.

Since the conditions never obtain, there is never a counterexample/exception in the strict logical sense: we never observe a body on which no force acts but which does not continue at constant velocity. For a counterexample to a generalization “if [conditions], then [phenomenon]” would have to be “[conditions] and not-[phenomenon]”, and “[conditions]” never obtains in the case of some laws. But strictly speaking we regard the law as actually falsified nevertheless. Our understanding of the falsification (by Einstein’s theory) only makes sense in the context of a disposition that is operative even when the precise conditions do not obtain.

In other words, we regard Newton’s law to be false not because we took a case where the antecedent obtains and found that the consequent did not correspond. Rather, we found that in general, Newton’s law does not disclose an actual disposition of matter, whether or not the precise condition of the conditional obtains.

Sorry about the delay in replying.

I looked at this for a while before seeing what imho is the problem. It is the pithy way that laws are stated (and in this case you unintentionally shortened it too far by omitting to say net forces). Newton’s first law applies to any and every object, with or without a net force acting, although it may not be much use if the net force is large or difficult to work out. The principle is that Aristotle was wrong, matter has no desire to move or to not move. Matter is inert, and when left to itself will always keep on doing whatever it has been doing.

So when sat in a fast moving car with a glass of milk, if the driver slams on the brakes then you keep going until stopped by your seat belt, and your milk also keeps going until stopped by the windscreen. The car may have been accelerating at the time, and so the net force was non-zero, but we care not, since that’s just how the law is expressed. If we want we can calculate that force and subtract it from the before and after.

We now know that the first law is limited to particular observers, but it still works for everyday use.

That is my point. The explanatory force of the theory/law depends on the nature of the underlying reality (space-time, matter). As we have agreed, laws don’t explain why matter curves space-time or why bodies travel along geodesics. Laws report that they do, and scientists characteristically seek reasons why laws obtain. It is still plausible to hope for explanations of the underlying phenomena (even if a particular scientist is uninterested in this question). It’s natural, even–the theory is invoked to explain other phenomena, and the explanatory nature of the theory has to do with particular phenomena that are not simply the laws.

I don’t really think that the example of space-time satisfied my questions though. The question was: what in the theory, besides the laws that are generalized from induction which we admit is not explanatory, leads to the theory’s explanatory power? You seem to say now that it has to do with the entities that the theory posits.

I’m not sure where you’re going here.

Newton proposes a phenomenon called universal gravitation, which he uses to explain planetary motion and why things fall. He explains how it works (within the confines of the data available to him) but not why it should be, and so leaves an open question.

Einstein proposes a phenomenon called spacetime, which he uses to explain what gravity is. He explains how spacetime works but not why it should be, and so leaves an open question.

Science is an exploration and there will always be another mountain to climb before we can see further. Einstein had to go beyond known physics to see the concept of spacetime, but that concept had eluded metaphysicians. Have there been cases, say post-Newton, where armchair metaphysicians have proposed a concept such as spacetime or quanta which later was useful in science? There is lots of pure math that later turned out to be useful in science, but I’m not sure the same can be said for metaphysics.

 

[inocente]

Well, we can tell students that there is such a thing as space-time. We can get them to understand what we mean by that without showing them the equations.

But in general, this looseness between laws and the entities the theories postulate does not hold. There is a reason that our notion of space-time originated with Einstein: before him, it was not mathematically forced on us. Knowing that it satisfies the right equations, we certainly can teach it to others non-mathematically and without invocation of laws. That is teaching on the basis of authority; our teachers and textbooks probably won’t lie about this to us even though they haven’t sufficiently explained (at least in this hypothesized case) why scientists adopt space-time rather than earlier models.

A good teacher would certainly not appeal to authority. I’d expect the teacher to start by revising Newton’s gravity, then give a few examples of where it doesn’t work, how Einstein adds a corrective term to Newton’s equation, then launch into how he got there with spacetime, speed of light and so on. A good example for skeptics is GPS - the engineers followed Einstein to the letter in its design, and it is fairly easy to explain how it wouldn’t work if they hadn’t.

Although it is always possible, as a poster on another thread maintains, that spacetime is not really curved, and God and His angels are moving things around in an exact simulation to make us believe it is.

Persons generally don’t enter into scientific theories (the complaints of economists and psychologists notwithstanding).

*I don’t think God would enter into a scientific theory. Those are not the sort of explanations that God provides (in my view). However, a consequence might simply be an epistemological impasse: some phenomenon (the big bang, say) remains resistant to scientific scrutiny, but we never rule out all physical causes in principle.

I doubt that would give us any warrant for the bolded hypothesis (by process of elimination?), for I regard it to be incoherent. How could patterns be a cause of anything? A pattern by definition is a higher-level feature that is parasitic upon certain lower-level features (in this case instances of the law in question, the sort of instances from which the higher-level generalization was made). A law (at least on that temperate view) is not something above its instances and the fact that it continues to correlate conditions to phenomena. I can’t make any sense of the claim that a law, so construed, causes anything.*

By postulating mass-energy and spacetime, Einstein moves us to what might be called a metaphysical view that everything is everything.

According to this, there could never be a universe with the same physics as ours, but which consists of space without time, or spacetime without energy. All phenomena are interdependent. Not only is the sum of the parts greater than the whole, but the parts couldn’t exist without the entirety.

These “patterns” just are. Laws don’t exist in nature, according to the definition they are knowledge which we deduce. The phenomena don’t possess or need knowledge of laws, they just naturally make the patterns they do. They are the patterns.

Since everything is everything, since everything is interdependent, these patterns must resolve to one single pattern. According to my newly minted Principle of Conservation Of Physicality[sup]1[/sup], that pattern may just exist. We might not be happy with that, but as a certain cosmologist insists, the universe is the way it is whether we like it or not.

[sup]1[/sup] No physical phenomenon can falsifiably be explained by the supernatural.

 

[inocente]

It’s already been done.

“This most beautiful system [the solar system] could only proceed from the dominion of an intelligent and powerful Being.” Isaac Newton

That’s nicely poetic, but you won’t find Newton using God in any of his theories. There’s no way to make predictions, since God is everywhere and everywhen for a believer, and is nowhere and nowhen for a non-believer, and there is no experiment to separate them.

Newton was also wrong there. That you-tube I linked (post #67) gives a very simple demo of how blind forces caused all the planets to orbit the same way in one plane.

posted by inocente: God never makes an appearance in any scientific theory.

And what would you look for to recognize Him? Who do you think gives origin to thoughts? Who do you think gives scientists the intellectual appetite for the truth and knowledge of scientific matters? Who gives validity to laws? Who provides the objects of scientific speculation? These questions can not be answered by empirical science, but they are addressed by Metaphysics. What you will hear a Scholastic Metaphysician say, you are asking questions about spiritual realities and this is not your field of expertise. Much is taken for granted. Are these empty questions? Not to some, are they crucial in delving into the ultimate causes of the reality of this world, or universe? Not to some, but I’m afraid to some they are useless.

I wasn’t trying to say anything controversial. It’s simply a fact that God never appears in any scientific hypothesis, since to do so there would need to be an experiment which tested God. Nor is there any universally acclaimed logical proof or disproof of God.

As Monsignor Georges Lemaître said: “He (the Christian researcher) knows that not one thing in all creation has been done without God, but he knows also that God nowhere takes the place of his creatures. Omnipresent divine activity is everywhere essentially hidden. It never had to be a question of reducing the supreme Being to the rank of a scientific hypothesis.”

 

[ynotzap]

A good teacher would certainly not appeal to authority. I’d expect the teacher to start by revising Newton’s gravity, then give a few examples of where it doesn’t work, how Einstein adds a corrective term to Newton’s equation, then launch into how he got there with spacetime, speed of light and so on. A good example for skeptics is GPS - the engineers followed Einstein to the letter in its design, and it is fairly easy to explain how it wouldn’t work if they hadn’t.

Although it is always possible, as a poster on another thread maintains, that spacetime is not really curved, and God and His angels are moving things around in an exact simulation to make us believe it is.



By postulating mass-energy and spacetime, Einstein moves us to what might be called a metaphysical view that everything is everything.

According to this, there could never be a universe with the same physics as ours, but which consists of space without time, or spacetime without energy. All phenomena are interdependent. Not only is the sum of the parts greater than the whole, but the parts couldn’t exist without the entirety.

These “patterns” just are. Laws don’t exist in nature, according to the definition they are knowledge which we deduce. The phenomena don’t possess or need knowledge of laws, they just naturally make the patterns they do. They are the patterns.

Since everything is everything, since everything is interdependent, these patterns must resolve to one single pattern. According to my newly minted Principle of Conservation Of Physicality[sup]1[/sup], that pattern may just exist. We might not be happy with that, but as a certain cosmologist insists, the universe is the way it is whether we like it or not.

[sup]1[/sup] No physical phenomenon can falsifiably be explained by the supernatural.

I need to restate this sentence to understand it
No physical phenomenon can be proven to be false by the supernatural, is this right? In the event it is then I will state a real experience with a least fifteen people as witnesses. It happen at work. Two men stated they could lift me ( I weighed arpox. l65 lbs) with their fingers. Both men were short in stature with average build. They sat me down in a chair and they proceeded to press my head down, as if I was a spring. Then they placed on each side two fingers under my arm pits, and under my knees, one man on each side. They lifted me as if I was a feather, and they exerted little effort. I was a weight lifter, as I had a physical fitness studio at one time. I know how l65 lbs feels, and I know that they could not do it with eight fingers, four on each side with easy effort. I suspected paranormal activity. I made my suspicions known to everybody I then told them to pray to themselves and I would do the same, pray Father in the Name of Jesus expel this deceiving spirit. They agreed. I felt very confident I was right. I ask them to try again. This time I felt completely weightless, and the men stated they could have lifted me to the ceiling. I was troubled, because I was convinced I was right. I made some observations. I noticed they believe, strongly that they could be successful. This phenomenon was performed successfully elsewhere on the base. I was inspired to also manifest my belief strongly I told them what I was going to do. This time I said out loud “Father, in the Name of Jesus expel this deceiving spirit” I sat down again and this time they couldn’t lift me. Several people tried and they were unsuccessful. They moved me by shear force from side to side, but they could not lift me. My experience was that gravity had no effect on me, gravity is a physical law, ordained by God, and evil spirits have the power to interfere with this power by God’s permission, maybe so that I can witness to this truth. I was asked what was the reason for the phenomenon. At that time all I could think about was all the paranormal activity going one. ESP, fortune telling, quija board, clairvoyance, telekenisis, and astro-projection etc. It’s Satan’s way of deceiving people into thinking they have undiscovered powers, devinizing man’s capabilities, false gods. All of this is an offense against religion, and the First commandment. Let science try to explain this, or how a person can know that he knows, or what is spirit, especially to an empirical scientists. I found that Eintein in his “My later Years essays” was coming around to St. Thomas’s way of thinking, especially in the three degrees of abstraction, and the absence of light there may be more, it’s been a long time ago for me. The laws in science are true if they correspond to the universal sefl-evident truths that permeated our world, and they find their existence based on the eternal truth.

 

[inocente]

I will state a real experience with a least fifteen people as witnesses.

It’s a trick.

“Light as a feather, stiff as a board, sometimes known as Pig in a Blanket, Stiff as a Board, is a game played by children at slumber parties. The phrase has also become established in popular culture as a reference to a levitation trick, and has been referred to in various media accounts.” - en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Light_as_a_feather,_stiff_as_a_board

Demo’d by students here - youtube.com/watch?v=QZ9InzTLNjs