Criteria of 'Existence'

[ynotzap]

Metaphysics is clear, true, and objective it is not vague and unclear. the lack of clarity and vagueness exists in our minds. It is not an easy study and requires a lot of mental discipline and understanding of concepts. I speak of the Metaphysics of Scholasticism, St.Thomas Aquinas There are three conditions for knowing the truth, I wish I remembered them but age has taken its toll.

 

[Oreoracle]

You referred to ontology as vacuous it doesn’t effect what we know about science.

I don’t know if you’ve read my discussion with polytropos thus far. He made the statement that metaphysics wouldn’t impact the epistemology of physics. Since ontology is part of metaphysics, it seems to follow that ontology can’t affect what we know from science. In fact, polytropos has admitted that our underlying metaphysics may not have any impact on the practice of science.

As I’ve said, I’m perfectly alright with letting people have their philosophical puzzles. But if metaphysics doesn’t impact science, how can we tell if we have the “wrong” metaphysics? It’s relatively easy to tell when science needs to backtrack, because the result of an experiment won’t concur with theory. In other words, science is wrong when it fails to be useful (at making accurate predictions). Since metaphysics has no use, it’s pretty hard to tell when it’s wrong, isn’t it? In fact, I would say there seems to be no well-defined sense in which a metaphysics could be true or false.

An ontological approach would say that physical things have many states of existence eg. water can be ice, ice can be steam, but in all its states of existence it remains matter.

Okay, but physics already tells us this. Actually, physics would go on to say that there are more physical things than matter, such as energy.

If existence was it’s nature it would be all that it could be, and not subject to time and change. And that being the case matter would depend on something outside itself that caused its existence, and changes. If we follow the right logic we realize that something that gives existence to something has to have existence as it’s nature in order to give it.

But how do we know that’s the “right” logic? How do we know that existence needs to be given?

 

[inocente]

But the child need not merely be sensing the color he can’t name. (And Americans certainly can identify umami.)

Picture a painter, painting from memory. He can’t name the color he wants (say, the flesh of someone’s cheek). But he mixes two other colors to obtain it anyway.

I don’t see why a name is a necessary condition for concept possession.

Agreed, I wouldn’t say a verbal or textual name is necessary, as in my example of the stone age artist. Call it a token. For a musician it might be a key. But you could see someone sitting under a tree many times, and only after taking a photo do you notice they have a green caste caused by the light passing through the leaves. The caste was always there but some kind of conceptual leap is needed to move beyond autopilot sense experience.

 

[polytropos]

The problem would exist at each stage because of the way that deductive systems work. You will eventually reach a point where you can’t break your theory down any further, and you’ll end up with primitive (undefined) terms and axioms. Then someone can come along and ask, “Hey wait a minute, how do you justify those?” You’ll either say that they don’t need justification or you’ll develop a larger theory to encompass the old one.

Whoa, whoa, whoa. No one ever said that the reason “the laws of physics” require explanation outside of physics is that propositions in general require explanations (or must have some nontrivial sufficient condition), so that whatever proposition I invoke to explain something, I will have to invoke another.

My points have been that (a) physics does not and cannot provide an account of what the laws of physics are, (b) that question is not trivial though answers will not necessarily be falsifiable (the scientific method may not be capable of deciding between scientific realism and pragmatism, but practicing physicists as well as philosophers nevertheless, and in my view rightly, regard the dispute as being of great importance), and (c) the analysis of “the laws of physics” that I favor, and which I think is defensible, requires that they (or their instances, rather) require explanation.

I’ve said that I don’t know how I could fit my position into the schema you originally brought up. From (c), you actually can’t infer that whatever “metaphysical laws” turn out to be, they will require explanation themselves, and this is in no way special pleading. That would require that “metaphysical laws” and “the laws of physics” are “laws” in the same sense, and I see no reason to suppose that that is true (especially since the term “laws” in “the laws of physics” is known to bear connotations that are unacceptable given the current presuppositions of physics, ie. metaphysical naturalism).

I would perhaps change my mind if the extra level they postulate helped with the current level in some way, but by your own admission it doesn’t affect the practices of the current level, nor its epistemology.

Hmm, I wouldn’t make too much of my concession there. The basic problem that physics faces is that it can keep working, but the question of what it discovers is left unsettled. I personally find it pretty obvious that this is an interesting, nontrivial question, and I think statements made by physicists and philosophers who have worried about this (ie. Einstein and Bohr would be examples) confirm this. This is hardly a matter of metaphysicians grasping at straws.

You say that metaphysics aids the ontology of physics, but ontology is a metaphysical concept. Physics doesn’t care about ontology, so metaphysics is basically trying to create a problem that only it can solve.

Ontology is just an inventory of what we take to exist. It is not the case that physics does not care about ontology. Contemporary physics has its own ontology that differs from the physics of the past; for certain reasons, we hold certain entities to exist that we once did not.

Where metaphysics comes in is in answering what are these entities. The problem is not created by metaphysics but by the insufficiency of physics to answer that question.

I’m sure I could invent something that metaphysics lacks (and doesn’t care about) conceptually, and then try to sell my invention to metaphysicians and convince them that they need it. It wouldn’t convince anyone.

Like what? Metaphysicians treat swaths of claims about what exists. That doesn’t mean they accept them all; some metaphysicians accept that bare particulars exist, others don’t. Some metaphysicians adopt a relational ontology, others adopt a constituent ontology. If there is an argument for one of these positions, then they evaluate it and assess whether it is a good argument or not. Metaphysicians generally are not beholden to making a priori positivist claims about what sorts of propositions should be rejected, if there is someone else willing to provide an argument for those propositions.

First you said that metaphysics doesn’t affect the epistemology of physics, but rather its ontology, and now you’re saying that ontology determines epistemology.

By saying that metaphysics doesn’t affect the epistemology of physics, I mean that physicists can go on formulating hypotheses and finding out, for instance, that “electrons exist” without direct recourse to metaphysics. I say metaphysics affects physics’ ontology because even after physics makes discoveries and creates a catalogue of entities it is committed to, it has not specified the nature of those entities (ie. “the laws of physics”).

And I did not say that ontology determines epistemology. I said that epistemology is defined in terms of ontology, which is just to say that when we talk about what we know (or believe for good reasons, or whatever), we are talking about the relationship between our cognitive state and the external world, the latter of which has to do with ontology. In other words, physics can’t be interested in epistemology alone.

 

[inocente]

I think the exact boundaries between the colors are just a matter of convention. If for some reason we were having a serious conversation about the colors of objects, we could agree beforehand on what the boundaries would be.

Coincidentally, this is exactly why I don’t like the field of ontology, as I mentioned to polytropos above. You’ll always find someone stubborn enough to insist that there is an objectively correct standard of what red is, perhaps in the form of an “essence of red” floating around somewhere, as if the universe cares about the classifications that we humans find useful.

I’d argue though that color exists for persons, and neither metaphysicians nor physicists bring much to the party. The metaphysician will rattle on about qualia and the physicist about wavelengths, but neither has any expertise in persons, neither of them is qualified to understand the meaning of red on a Ferrari or a sunset or a battlefield.

 

[inocente]

(a) physics does not and cannot provide an account of what the laws of physics are

While the slogan “shut up and calculate” may be going too far, isn’t a lot of navel gazing dispensed with if a physical law is defined as “a theoretical principle deduced from particular facts, applicable to a defined group or class of phenomena, and expressible by the statement that a particular phenomenon always occurs if certain conditions be present”? [Oxford]

 

[polytropos]

While the slogan “shut up and calculate” may be going too far, isn’t a lot of navel gazing dispensed with if a physical law is defined as “a theoretical principle deduced from particular facts, applicable to a defined group or class of phenomena, and expressible by the statement that a particular phenomenon always occurs if certain conditions be present”? [Oxford]

If physicists made an effort to apply this definition consistently (ie. in pop science tracts, when they are speaking publically, etc.), then I find little objectionable to it (granting that it is more of a necessary condition and does not preclude that the laws of physics are underwritten somehow by the nature of the phenomena they describe).

For example, the laws of physics under this rubric are non-explanatory. If a particular phenomenon occurs, I can’t explain it (non-circularly, at least) by appealing to a law that states that “[that] particular phenomenon always occurs if certain conditions [are] present.” Rather than invoking laws of physics as explanations, physicists would be constrained to “shut up and calculate.”

Or, perhaps, someone might argue that one can explain a phenomenon by saying that under similar conditions, that “always” happens. I think you’d be on weak ground, and, in any case, you’re back to navel gazing and away from experimental science.

 

[polytropos]

“a theoretical principle deduced from particular facts, applicable to a defined group or class of phenomena, and expressible by the statement that a particular phenomenon always occurs if certain conditions be present”? [Oxford]

I’ll add a couple other observations:
(1) Why does natural science seek to formulate expressions stating “that a particular phenomenon always occurs if certain conditions [are] present”? I think it is false that scientists are interested in such relationships for the thrill of correlating observations–fun as that pastime is.
(2) Often, the statement is something different. There is an issue in saying “if certain conditions [are] present”: in practice, it is impossible to isolate any single set of conditions. While in experimental set-ups we can very closely approximate this, we naturally take our generalizations to apply universally, even when there are other conditions that alter the resultant phenomenon, and even on inductive grounds. (In the case of some formulations, like Newton’s laws, the antecedent conditions never actually obtain.) For this reason, statements of laws often contain “ceteris paribus” (or all-other-things-being-equal) clauses. These tendencies in formulating definitions of the laws of physics suggest that we are interested in the dispositions of the conditions rather than merely in a correlation of conditions with phenomena. If the dispositions to certain behavior exist in the conditions, then we can rely on that behavior even when the conditions do not exactly obtain–as we generally do.
(3) Such formulations are predictively useful to be sure. Why are they useful? One plausible reason is that they are related to the nature of the conditions involved in the antecedent. Perhaps there is an alternative; I can’t think of one. We can also imagine someone who does not care about this consideration as to why such formulations are useful, but it’s unclear why we should regard such an attitude as relevant in theoretical disciplines.

So strict adherence to this definition requires that we abstain from regarding the laws of physics as explanatory. Furthermore, aspects of the definition are suggestive of an interest in metaphysical underpinnings.

 

[ynotzap]

I don’t know if you’ve read my discussion with polytropos thus far. He made the statement that metaphysics wouldn’t impact the epistemology of physics. Since ontology is part of metaphysics, it seems to follow that ontology can’t affect what we know from science. In fact, polytropos has admitted that our underlying metaphysics may not have any impact on the practice of science.

Ans:
Metaphysics can affect what we know about science eg. If Einstein’s theory of relativity doesn’t include an absolute, then the theory remains a theory, and not fact. And where do we get an absolute, by the observation of objective reality, and using the principles of universal truths, self-evident principles, and human experience.

As I’ve said, I’m perfectly alright with letting people have their philosophical puzzles. But if metaphysics doesn’t impact science, how can we tell if we have the “wrong” metaphysics? It’s relatively easy to tell when science needs to backtrack, because the result of an experiment won’t concur with theory. In other words, science is wrong when it fails to be useful (at making accurate predictions). Since metaphysics has no use, it’s pretty hard to tell when it’s wrong, isn’t it? In fact, I would say there seems to be no well-defined sense in which a metaphysics could be true or false.

Ans:
Science is wrong when it fails to be useful? If it works it must be true? I always thought if it exists is must be true., the meaning of truth, of concepts are not determined by their practical consequences, or being utilitarian. That which exists is true and , is right, that which doesn’t exist is false and is wrong

Okay, but physics already tells us this. Actually, physics would go on to say that there are more physical things than matter, such as energy.

Ans
I have already given you an example of where being concerned about existence would lead scientists and so it is very useful, instead of falling into mental traps as to the source of existence and the beginning of the universe or life, the existence of God, but thats were we leave empirical scientists behind who do not transcend to this truth If it isn’t the truth prove it.
As for energy the question of energy can be addressed by ontology and even answered. An ontologist would look at enery as scientists see it as matter in motion, E=MC2 then he would ask what is motion, is matter capable of moving itself? If it was it wouldn’t need an outside force. Human experience verifies that there is what scientist call kinetic energy, IOW motion is passed on to another object by contact. So there is a cause but if we trace the cause to the first cause then what would explain the motion of the first cause. Nothing would unless we found it necessary to have a cause that was an unmoved mover, so logically we call this unmoved mover God. From this we can see that energy in the final analysis is God causing the motion Of course empirical scientists and atheists wouldn,t accept this argument or skeptics either. But prove it wrong.

But how do we know that’s the “right” logic? How do we know that existence needs to be given?

Ans.
I gave you and example of right logic in one of my posts. Logic is made up of premises, or axioms. Usually consisting of two premises and a conclusion it is called a syllogism, reasoning from the major premise or general to the particular or the minor premise We establish what is, a fact gathered from real life, and establish again a related truth or . fact and conclude with another fact An axiom is a statement universally accepted as true
If we find some contradiction in our conclusion, or some error in our premises than we know our logic is false, again this is attained by what exists and what doesn’t this is how we establish facts and they always are related to the external, outside world which makes them objective. We must be consistent in our objectivity in our thought process, making sure that we are consistent with the universal self-evident principles.and objective facts
As Shakespeare said, "To be, or not to be is the question…
Existence needs to be given because our nature is not "Existence’ we are not “existence” for if we were we would have always existed, this is contrary to human experience, we had a beginning and it’s conceivable to even calculate our conception date, let alone our birth date. Knowing human nature that possesses consciousness and intelligence we would have known if we existed prior to our conception date, but we don"t. And if existence was our nature we wouldn’t be dependent on anything outside ourselves, such is not our experience. Our human experience is the criterion of all our knowledge. So I can rightly conclude we were given existence by God upon whom we have complete dependence.

 

[Nihilist]

I’ve been reading W.V.O. Quine- who says ‘existence’ is just a mattere of what linguistic rules we choose to adopt. Anything can ‘exist’, depending upon how we chose to apply language (ideas may exist, events may exist).

So, ‘existence’ is part of our conceptual/linguistic scheme, rather than something which actually inheres in some ‘external world’.

 

[Bahman]

It seems a lot of disputes have at their heart disagreement about what constitutes ‘existence’ (e.g. does God exist, does the soul exist, etc.)

Now, what would be the definite criteria for existence, such that, if X meets them, I may say, “X exists”.

My proposal is that the criteria might be the occupation of space and/or time. Some things (people, rocks) ocuppy both space and time, and truly ‘exists’. Other things, like thoughts and actions (and thus the mind) occupy only time, without space, but are also truly said to ‘exist’. Things like abstract concepts do not occupy either space nor time, and therefore do not exist in themselves (although the ‘act of thinking them’, as occupying time, does exist)

Perhaps its just a matter of linguistic convention, but it would seem useful to have a precise criteria for existence. Can someone come up with a good definition?

Existence is primary and has infinite forms so it cannot be defined in term of other things.

 

[polytropos]

I’ve been reading W.V.O. Quine- who says ‘existence’ is just a mattere of what linguistic rules we choose to adopt. Anything can ‘exist’, depending upon how we chose to apply language (ideas may exist, events may exist).

So, ‘existence’ is part of our conceptual/linguistic scheme, rather than something which actually inheres in some ‘external world’.

Quine says that “to exist is to be the value of a bound variable,” which is only to say that we are committed to all things over which we quantify in our discourse. To if there are scientific theories that cannot be stated without numbers, then number “exist.”

This does not really preclude that existence is something that inheres* in the external world; it is a logical stipulation that we admit into our ontology whatever we talk about.

• I would follow Barry Miller and say that existence does not inhere in the external world but rather “bounds” the entities which possess it. Most property instances inhere in substances, but inherence suggests ontological posteriority to the thing in which it inheres. Existence cannot be posterior to things with respect to actuality because the things must exist before anything can inhere in them! So existence is prior to things with respect to actuality.

Quine’s thesis requires that all predications of exist are second-order, but the first-order reading is more plausible when existence is predicated of individuals. If I say, “Nihilist exists” I am predicating existence of you. I charge that unless we have a reason to reject the straightforward analysis, then we should not accept Quine’s tortured one (ie. “There exists an x such that x Nihilizes” where Nihilizing is an unanalyzable property introduced so that there is something that identifies you uniquely. However, the identification is merely extensional; you are the only thing that Nihilizes as it happens, but that you are the only one that can possess it cannot be “built into” the property, which ex hypothesi is unanalyzable.).

 

[ynotzap]

Existence is primary and has infinite forms so it cannot be defined in term of other things.

I agree existence is primary, but has form which determines things in the material universe, and I agree it can not be defined in terms of other things, Existence is to be fully real, total being and pure act when speaking of God. Existence in the material world is not to be fully actualized or possessing total being. The nature of material and even spiritual things is characterized by the condition of potency and act. Potency is the real capacity for change, and act is the fulfillment of that capacity In our world and nature the change never reaches its complete fulfillment. So consequently we say that our “being” is not complete fulfillment but :becomming, Life for us is dynamic, constant movement, physical and spiritual, it is a movement towards fulfillment of being. We don’t have the capacity to contain total being. So our nature is determined by Potency and Act, God is Pure Act. Material reality doesn’t have infinite forms, but indefinite numbers of form

We came to be (exist) and our complete existence demonstrates a complete dependence.
Our being is not a static being, but a dynamic or becomming being, we are constantly in a flux of movement, or change towards fulfillment or perfection, or total being. We show characteristic of matter,form, essence, existence, potency and act. with total dependence, for existence is not our nature,it is given as all the other characteristic.

Ontologically we say Essence and Existence are one in God who is Pure Act, Pure, total Being, Pure independence, subsistent, Our Faith indentifies this God, as the "I Am, who Am, Jesus Christ.

We can come to the existence of God by reason, but it is our Faith that identifies Him.

Existence is defined as the actuality of an essence, the act by which something is

Bahman: Your getting much better

 

[Nihilist]

Quine says that “to exist is to be the value of a bound variable,” which is only to say that we are committed to all things over which we quantify in our discourse. To if there are scientific theories that cannot be stated without numbers, then number “exist.”

This does not really preclude that existence is something that inheres* in the external world; it is a logical stipulation that we admit into our ontology whatever we talk about.

• I would follow Barry Miller and say that existence does not inhere in the external world but rather “bounds” the entities which possess it. Most property instances inhere in substances, but inherence suggests ontological posteriority to the thing in which it inheres. Existence cannot be posterior to things with respect to actuality because the things must exist before anything can inhere in them! So existence is prior to things with respect to actuality.

Quine’s thesis requires that all predications of exist are second-order, but the first-order reading is more plausible when existence is predicated of individuals. If I say, “Nihilist exists” I am predicating existence of you. I charge that unless we have a reason to reject the straightforward analysis, then we should not accept Quine’s tortured one (ie. “There exists an x such that x Nihilizes” where Nihilizing is an unanalyzable property introduced so that there is something that identifies you uniquely. However, the identification is merely extensional; you are the only thing that Nihilizes as it happens, but that you are the only one that can possess it cannot be “built into” the property, which ex hypothesi is unanalyzable.).

Well, I think it is reasonable to extrapolate Quine further- building upon Schlick’s proof that the ‘external world’ is a metaphysical concept, rather than an empirical on.

To illustrate, one person might say:
“Many things exist. Not just objects, plants and animals, but ideas, concepts, relationships, tendencies, and thus, literally, everything you can name or think of, exists!”

Another person might say:
“The works of Dickens do not exist! All there is a bits of paper with marks on them, compiled into bound piles. Concept do not exist- there are mere thoughts!”

While these two examples seem extreme, they seem to stem from different linguistic choices- in particular, about the appropriateness of the application of the term ‘exist’. Schlick’s argument is that the predication of the ‘reality’ of something is meaningless. For example, if someone said “The perceived world is unreal”, or someone else said “Concept have absolute reality”- neither actually contain any empirical content which can be tested.

My own suggestion- based on Quine and Schlick- is that when we predicate existence of something, we are really proposing a linguistic rule- that the term ‘existence’ be applied to that particular thing.

Of course, the exception would be if we said such a statement in such a way that was subject to empirical verification, e.g. “White lions DO exist!”, “There IS an apple in the fridge.” But if we say “The events of dreams ARE real!” (or something else not empirically verifiable), it is nothing more than proposing a linguistic rule, that the ‘existence’ be used in such a way to include the events of dreams. Or when a nihilist says “Nothing exists”…

Does this seems right?

 

[inocente]

If physicists made an effort to apply this definition consistently (ie. in pop science tracts, when they are speaking publically, etc.), then I find little objectionable to it (granting that it is more of a necessary condition and does not preclude that the laws of physics are underwritten somehow by the nature of the phenomena they describe).

For example, the laws of physics under this rubric are non-explanatory. If a particular phenomenon occurs, I can’t explain it (non-circularly, at least) by appealing to a law that states that “[that] particular phenomenon always occurs if certain conditions [are] present.” Rather than invoking laws of physics as explanations, physicists would be constrained to “shut up and calculate.”

Or, perhaps, someone might argue that one can explain a phenomenon by saying that under similar conditions, that “always” happens. I think you’d be on weak ground, and, in any case, you’re back to navel gazing and away from experimental science.

That is the standard definition of a physical law, though.

Any hoped for explanation of a law is hostage to an exception being discovered, at which point the law is summarily binned, and in any event both science and the world will sail on regardless with or without an explanation. Here’s Isaac Newton:

“I have not as yet been able to discover the reason for these properties of gravity from phenomena, and I do not feign hypotheses. For whatever is not deduced from the phenomena must be called a hypothesis; and hypotheses, whether metaphysical or physical, or based on occult qualities, or mechanical, have no place in experimental philosophy. In this philosophy particular propositions are inferred from the phenomena, and afterwards rendered general by induction.”

For centuries no one knew how the Sun reaches out and pulls at the Earth, until it was eventually resolved by Einstein. So between “shut up and calculate” and navel gazing, there is a third option - patience.

 

[inocente]

I’ll add a couple other observations:
(1) Why does natural science seek to formulate expressions stating “that a particular phenomenon always occurs if certain conditions [are] present”? I think it is false that scientists are interested in such relationships for the thrill of correlating observations–fun as that pastime is.

I think laws are generally extracted from theories, and it’s the job of the theory to say how or why, while the law is just a useful generalization for predictive purposes.



xkcd.com/643/

(2) Often, the statement is something different. There is an issue in saying “if certain conditions [are] present”: in practice, it is impossible to isolate any single set of conditions. While in experimental set-ups we can very closely approximate this, we naturally take our generalizations to apply universally, even when there are other conditions that alter the resultant phenomenon, and even on inductive grounds. (In the case of some formulations, like Newton’s laws, the antecedent conditions never actually obtain.) For this reason, statements of laws often contain "ceteris paribus" (or all-other-things-being-equal) clauses. These tendencies in formulating definitions of the laws of physics suggest that we are interested in the dispositions of the conditions rather than merely in a correlation of conditions with phenomena. If the dispositions to certain behavior exist in the conditions, then we can rely on that behavior even when the conditions do not exactly obtain–as we generally do.

Agreed that a law gives ideal results, but that’s to do with the criterion that only simple relationships can be nominated as laws.

The “if certain conditions [are] present” clause is there to indicate whether a law is applicable. For instance Boyle’s Law only applies to a gas, but also, and importantly, it always applies to a gas.

(3) Such formulations are predictively useful to be sure. Why are they useful? One plausible reason is that they are related to the nature of the conditions involved in the antecedent. Perhaps there is an alternative; I can’t think of one. We can also imagine someone who does not care about this consideration as to why such formulations are useful, but it’s unclear why we should regard such an attitude as relevant in theoretical disciplines.

I think laws are, as it were, self-selected to be useful. That is, they are basically rules of thumb. If conditions allow the required variables to be filled-in, the law can be used without necessarily understanding the underlying theory. But there is no infallible procedure for something being called a law. To get picked up by textbooks it must be highly stable with no exceptions, and for the most part simple enough to state in one line of math.

So strict adherence to this definition requires that we abstain from regarding the laws of physics as explanatory. Furthermore, aspects of the definition are suggestive of an interest in metaphysical underpinnings.

I’m not sure if you’re reading more into the laws than perhaps you should. They sort of bubble up by common consent from the much larger number of theories.

We could ponder why there are patterns in the first place, and why these particular patterns, but without them we probably wouldn’t be around to do the pondering. History tells us that for centuries people thought we’re the center of the universe, then for the centuries people thought we live in a clockwork universe. Pondering should come with a warning that scientific knowledge is provisional.

 

[inocente]

I’ve been reading W.V.O. Quine- who says ‘existence’ is just a mattere of what linguistic rules we choose to adopt. Anything can ‘exist’, depending upon how we chose to apply language (ideas may exist, events may exist).

So, ‘existence’ is part of our conceptual/linguistic scheme, rather than something which actually inheres in some ‘external world’.

I’d say the issue with “a thing exists” is not with “exists” but with the concept “thing”. We are adapted to divide the world into things, but we take lots of shortcuts, we skip on the detail. If a thing can exist, if existence implies thinginess, then what does it mean to say nothing can exist? Is nothing a thing? I have a feeling that any division we make must necessarily exist, but dividing the world into things is just how we see the world.

 

[ynotzap]

As I see it: the Principle found in physics : for every action there is a reaction, can be translated into “: For every.effect there is a cause and for every cause there is an effect” This law (principle) applies to the physical as well as to the metaphysical. This metaphysical law is, found premeating all areas of our existence mental as well as physical.- IOW the law is universal and true. This law is found in Physics and Philosophy. What makes it valid, it is a fact, objective and doesn’t depend on our rationalizing, it is our human experience, and is self evident, shinning by its own light. Existence is what determines a thing to be fact, or real Nothing would be the absence of something. It’s saying something doesn’t exist.

 

[Oreoracle]

polytropos:

So strict adherence to this definition requires that we abstain from regarding the laws of physics as explanatory.

It had always been my understanding that laws aren’t meant to be explanatory. Inocente pointed out the example of Newton’s Law of Gravitation. It is not an explanation; it’s only meant to be predictive.

I do agree that, in order to explain phenomena, you need to create an idealized model in your mind. The problem is that it isn’t clear what we’re idealizing. As Heisenberg suggested when he grappled with the quantum world, it is unreasonable to expect physics to offer us a way of “visualizing” what is happening in the physical world, especially considering possibilities like particles occupying multiple places at once and higher-dimensional space. Physics’ goal lies in predictive power, because the world as we now understand it can’t be modeled in an intuitive way that neatly corresponds to “what’s really out there”.

So, after chewing it over, I think “idealization” is misleading, because this works in both directions. We create a model, usually beginning with some preconception of what is real, and then we say that the objects in the model correspond to real objects if the predictions agree with experimental results. The real objects motivate the ideals, and the ideals confirm that the objects are real. I’m not sure how to resolve the problem.

I’ll use an example. Let’s say we have a ball and we are under the impression that it is spherical. Our everyday experience with these “spheres” leads to a formal definition of a sphere. After some mathematics, we conclude that spheres have interesting properties, and we can test whether the ball is really a sphere by checking to see if it has these properties. If the ball passes the tests, it can rightly be called a sphere.

Where I’m having difficulty sorting this out is the first step: Since we don’t begin by knowing that the ball is spherical, how do we know to proceed with the formulation and study of idealized spheres? Maybe we could say that our senses were reliable enough to conclude that the ball was at least ellipsoidal, and by testing it for spherical properties we were just whittling down the possibilities. But that has two issues: 1) Firstly, it postpones the problem–how did we know the ball was ellipsoidal? However, I would argue that it’s easier to tell whether something is of a more general shape than a more particular shape. 2) This doesn’t reflect how we actually think about spheres and ellipsoids. The concept of a sphere predates the concept of an ellipsoid, with the ellipsoid being a generalization of the sphere. But perhaps our intuition works in reverse from the general to the particular.

 

[ynotzap]

I would say that because the concept of sphere predates ellipsoid that the concept of sphere is the generalization, and the ellipisoid is the particular encompassed in the generalization.
We have to establish what we mean by “sphere” the concept of a "perfect circle, and we can come to this idea mathematically. Once established we then can relate other circular shapes and give them identification, pear shape, elongated shape, semi-circular shape etc. related to the once established “ideal circle” which is inclusive of other related shapes, the general includes the particular. In the material world there is no perfect circle, it exists in the conceptual world.