Did God Create the Best Possible Universe?

[Achilles6129]

Prior to the beginning of this cosmos, God had a choice between an infinite (or nearly infinite) number of possible worlds that he could have created. God chose to create this one. This leads some philosophers to suggest that this is the best possible world that could have been created because obviously:

1. God is good
2. A good God would create the best possible world
3. Therefore, this must be the best possible world

The line of reasoning also works in reverse:

1. God is good
2. A good God would create the best possible world
3. This is not the best possible world
4. Therefore, God doesn’t exist

I would like to argue, however, that God is in no way obligated by his goodness to create the best possible world. The reason is because the “best possible world” can only be brought into existence by the creatures that God creates (by their obedience to his commands), and not by God himself. In other words, I think that premise 2 above is a non-sequitur: God is not required by his goodness to create the best possible world. I think it is clear that God could have chosen a world where more of his creatures obeyed his commands, but he did not. However, I fail to see how this impugns God’s goodness, because God’s intent toward his creatures is always the same: that they all be saved.

Therefore, I propose that God could freely choose a universe where more people go to hell over a universe where no-one goes to hell and still be just as morally good. In other words, he could freely choose to not create the best possible world and it would not affect his goodness at all. Am I wrong?

 

[Charlemagne_III]

Therefore, I propose that God could freely choose a universe where more people go to hell over a universe where no-one goes to hell and still be just as morally good. In other words, he could freely choose to not create the best possible world and it would not affect his goodness at all. Am I wrong?

We really don’t know how many worlds God has created. We know he created heaven and hell. Beyond that what could we know about other possible worlds or whether ours compares favorably or unfavorably with them? Is it possible for God to have created a world in which no one is bad? I suppose so. But then it seems hardly likely since free will would sooner or later burst the bubble of innocence, as it did in heaven and on earth with Satan and Adam.

 

[Tomdstone]

1. God is good
2. A good God would create the best possible world
3. Therefore, this must be the best possible world
   … Am I wrong?

You are making the assumption that God is all Powerful, and there are no limitations to His Power. If there were some limitations to His power, then He might intend to create the best possible world, but not succeed in doing so.
I know that Catholic theology says that God is all powerful, so that is the big objection. But consider this - already we know that God cannot make a Euclidean isosceles triangle with unequal base angles. That is outside His Power, since it would involve a contradiction to the Euclidean axioms. Perhaps there is some unseen contradiction at work which would prevent God from making a world with humans and their free will to be the best possible world.

 

[Nihilist]

Prior to the beginning of this cosmos, God had a choice between an infinite (or nearly infinite) number of possible worlds that he could have created. God chose to create this one. This leads some philosophers to suggest that this is the best possible world that could have been created because obviously:

1. God is good
2. A good God would create the best possible world
3. Therefore, this must be the best possible world

The line of reasoning also works in reverse:

1. God is good
2. A good God would create the best possible world
3. This is not the best possible world
4. Therefore, God doesn’t exist

I would like to argue, however, that God is in no way obligated by his goodness to create the best possible world. The reason is because the “best possible world” can only be brought into existence by the creatures that God creates (by their obedience to his commands), and not by God himself. In other words, I think that premise 2 above is a non-sequitur: God is not required by his goodness to create the best possible world. I think it is clear that God could have chosen a world where more of his creatures obeyed his commands, but he did not. However, I fail to see how this impugns God’s goodness, because God’s intent toward his creatures is always the same: that they all be saved.

Therefore, I propose that God could freely choose a universe where more people go to hell over a universe where no-one goes to hell and still be just as morally good. In other words, he could freely choose to not create the best possible world and it would not affect his goodness at all. Am I wrong?

I would say ‘yes’. But, I would add that, it is the ONLY world. We can ‘imagine’ another world, but that is purely imagination- we have no real evidence that another world is possible.

It’s like, if there was only ONE of something (one ‘you’, for example), is it meaningful to say ‘Are you the best possible you’? The answer is, of course, because you are the ONLY possible ‘you’.

In the case of ‘the world’ (defined as ‘the totality of what there is’) there is necessarily only one (which is implied in the very name, Universe). So, we can talk of imaginary worlds, but I think it is meaningless to talk about possible worlds.

So, yes, it can be thought of as ‘the best possible world’- but that does not mean that every particular experience is either pleasant or good, or even that the number of pleasant and good experiences outnumber the unpleasant and bad ones.

 

[tonyrey]

You are making the assumption that God is all Powerful, and there are no limitations to His Power. If there were some limitations to His power, then He might intend to create the best possible world, but not succeed in doing so.
I know that Catholic theology says that God is all powerful, so that is the big objection. But consider this - already we know that God cannot make a Euclidean isosceles triangle with unequal base angles. That is outside His Power, since it would involve a contradiction to the Euclidean axioms. Perhaps there is some unseen contradiction at work which would prevent God from making a world with humans and their free will to be the best possible world.

Giving us free will implies that God imposes a limit on His own power. Otherwise the prayer “Thy Will be done” wouldn’t be necessary.

 

[Achilles6129]

Could God have simply refrained from creating Adam/Eve until he knew that they wouldn’t eat of the tree of the knowledge of good/evil? If so, would it be morally wrong for God to create an Adam/Eve who he foreknew would disobey his commands above them?

I guess the entire crux of my point is that this argument is a non-sequitur: God can create any possible world he wants and still be just as morally good. I do believe that it is a formidable atheological argument, however.

 

[abucs]

No, God did not create the best possible universe because I am in it.

But He did give me the chance to become good. For which I am eternally grateful.

 

[tonyrey]

No, God did not create the best possible universe because I am in it.

But He did give me the chance to become good. For which I am eternally grateful.

You underestimate not only yourself but God into the bargain…

 

[Oreoracle]

God is not required by his goodness to create the best possible world. I think it is clear that God could have chosen a world where more of his creatures obeyed his commands, but he did not. However, I fail to see how this impugns God’s goodness, because God’s intent toward his creatures is always the same: that they all be saved.

Therefore, I propose that God could freely choose a universe where more people go to hell over a universe where no-one goes to hell and still be just as morally good. In other words, he could freely choose to not create the best possible world and it would not affect his goodness at all. Am I wrong?

I think the fundamental problem here is that Christians begin with defining God to be good from the outset. God’s goodness is axiomatic to them. Naturally, any consistent use of logic from that starting point will never lead to the conclusion that God’s goodness could be, as you put it, impugned.

So what you really meant to ask was something to the effect of “God is good, so what misunderstanding about morality do we have that leads us to occasionally feel otherwise?”

 

[Achilles6129]

I think the fundamental problem here is that Christians begin with defining God to be good from the outset. God’s goodness is axiomatic to them. Naturally, any consistent use of logic from that starting point will never lead to the conclusion that God’s goodness could be, as you put it, impugned.

I suppose this is correct. However, for the sake of argument that’s not what I’m trying to say here. I’m asking if God can choose a universe other than the “best possible world” and still remain morally good.

Suppose God has two choices:

1. Universe A: Adam/Eve obey God’s commands and everyone (of their own free choices) goes to heaven
2. Universe B: Adam/Eve disobey God’s commands and everyone (of their own free choices) goes to hell

Could God freely choose to create Universe B and still be just as morally good as if he freely chose to create Universe A? I’m suggesting that he could. I think most philosophers (and laypeople) would suggest otherwise.

So what you really meant to ask was something to the effect of “God is good, so what misunderstanding about morality do we have that leads us to occasionally feel otherwise?”

That’s certainly an issue, but not what this thread is about.

 

[Tomdstone]

In the best possible universe, would there be people born with a same sex attraction, which has been said to be disordered by Father Hardon? Is it best that there be people born with a same sex attraction?

 

[Shike]

You are making the assumption that God is all Powerful, and there are no limitations to His Power. If there were some limitations to His power, then He might intend to create the best possible world, but not succeed in doing so.
I know that Catholic theology says that God is all powerful, so that is the big objection. But consider this - already we know that God cannot make a Euclidean isosceles triangle with unequal base angles. That is outside His Power, since it would involve a contradiction to the Euclidean axioms. Perhaps there is some unseen contradiction at work which would prevent God from making a world with humans and their free will to be the best possible world.

I would say Omnipotence is at the heart of the issue. I see no reason why God could not create a world that has more goodness in it. All I can say if someone disagrees is why not; what reason do you have.

Tomdstone, what you give us to consider is already very much a part of Catholic theology and philosophy. A logical impossibility is not something that affects omnipotence because a logical impossibility is something not possible… and omnipotence has to do with what is possible only.

Good point, however.

 

[Shike]

In the best possible universe, would there be people born with a same sex attraction, which has been said to be disordered by Father Hardon? Is it best that there be people born with a same sex attraction?

Given some form of the cosmological argument being sound, and given the omnipotence of God being a consequence from such arguments, the burden of proof lies with those who want to prove this world is the best possible.

And I await a good argument for why it is the best possible world.
Premise 2 from both arguments from the OP are flawed in that it assumes a best possible world is possible, that a maximally great world is possible, that there would be no further improvement possible. Given omnipotence, I do not see how a best possible world is possible.

 

[Oreoracle]

I suppose this is correct. However, for the sake of argument that’s not what I’m trying to say here. I’m asking if God can choose a universe other than the “best possible world” and still remain morally good.

I hate to be insistent, but my point was actually highly relevant to this thread. If God’s goodness is axiomatic, then of course he will remain morally good no matter what. It’s not even an honest question if you assume the answer beforehand. You’re effectively saying, “God would be good no matter what. Now is it true that God would be good in this hypothetical situation?” The answer in that case is trivial if we assume the first premise.

If you are allowing for the sake of argument that there is a standard of morality independent of God, so that God’s goodness can actually be judged in this matter rather than taken for granted, then we can have an interesting discussion.

 

[Charlemagne_III]

I see no reason why God could not create a world that has more goodness in it.

Perhaps he has already done that, or will eventually do that if he has not already done it. There may be other planets with other races of creatures who possess free will and have done better with their free will than we have done with ours. Then again, perhaps in the future our world will also have more goodness in it because by the grace of God our world will have finally found out how to tame the evil spirits in us. Seems unlikely at present, but who knows?

These are all idle speculations.

 

[balto]

Perhaps he has already done that, or will eventually do that if he has not already done it. There may be other planets with other races of creatures who possess free will and have done better with their free will than we have done with ours. Then again, perhaps in the future our world will also have more goodness in it because by the grace of God our world will have finally found out how to tame the evil spirits in us. Seems unlikely at present, but who knows?

These are all idle speculations.

I think the point he’s trying to make is that the notion of a “best possible world” is logically incoherent. It implicitly assumes that utilitarianism, maximizing value, is the correct view on morality which I would argue is not the case. Here’s an example to illustrate the dilemma. Suppose all God cares about is making sure righteous people end up in Heaven and evil people end up in Hell. So He creates a world with 1 million people in it, half are righteous, half are evil and everybody ends up where they belong. Is this the “best possible world?” Why can’t He just create a world with 2 million people in it and everybody ends up where they belong. Isn’t that better than a world with 1 million people in it? You can always add more value to the system if you implicitly assume utilitarianism is true.

 

[balto]

I hate to be insistent, but my point was actually highly relevant to this thread. If God’s goodness is axiomatic, then of course he will remain morally good no matter what. It’s not even an honest question if you assume the answer beforehand. You’re effectively saying, “God would be good no matter what. Now is it true that God would be good in this hypothetical situation?” The answer in that case is trivial if we assume the first premise.

Well if you’re working under a voluntarist conception of God that is implicitly assuming that deontology is true, then your point would be highly relevant to the thread. But something is not good merely because God says it is good, as if He could arbitrarily say anything is good and it was be good. I wouldn’t say that God’s goodness is axiomatic because it follows from recognizing that God’s nature is existence itself. Something is good if it perfects its nature, and God perfects His own nature since nothing is outside of His nature as existence itself. Other things are good only in as much as they are lacking nothing that they should have given their own natures. Whether or not they follow arbitrary rules is not important. The rules are there because they help us to do what is good for us given our natures as rational animals.

If you are allowing for the sake of argument that there is a standard of morality independent of God, so that God’s goodness can actually be judged in this matter rather than taken for granted, then we can have an interesting discussion.

Well it is easy to see why the Euthypro dilemma fails with the above reasoning. God is not arbitrarily setting moral standards, nor is He adhering to a higher one. God is Goodness Itself because He is Being itself. Everything that is lacking in other creatures is contained within God’s nature as Being itself.

 

[Charlemagne_III]

Therefore, I propose that God could freely choose a universe where more people go to hell over a universe where no-one goes to hell and still be just as morally good. In other words, he could freely choose to not create the best possible world and it would not affect his goodness at all. Am I wrong?

The best possible world has to be the world that allows free will. The angels had it and so do we.

What we do with it is on us, not on God.

 

[JapaneseKappa]

I think the point he’s trying to make is that the notion of a “best possible world” is logically incoherent. It implicitly assumes that utilitarianism, maximizing value, is the correct view on morality which I would argue is not the case. Here’s an example to illustrate the dilemma. Suppose all God cares about is making sure righteous people end up in Heaven and evil people end up in Hell. So He creates a world with 1 million people in it, half are righteous, half are evil and everybody ends up where they belong. Is this the “best possible world?” Why can’t He just create a world with 2 million people in it and everybody ends up where they belong. Isn’t that better than a world with 1 million people in it? You can always add more value to the system if you implicitly assume utilitarianism is true.

It doesn’t make any assumption about *what *criteria God would use to decide what world constitutes the best world. The assertion is that God has some criteria dictated by his nature, and he will make the world that best fits that criteria. The criteria God used to select the “best” world does not automatically need to be monotonically increasing, so your objection only applies to certain possible criteria.

Also, your objection could be circumvented in other ways. We could suppose God wants to maximize the population of heaven, in which case this world might not be a “best of all possible worlds.” However it is also possible that, to maximize the population of heaven, God created all possible worlds and we just don’t know about the other ones.

Finally, it’s seems to me that your objection is a dangerous one. Specifically the objections that the concept of a best world is incoherent, or that there could be multiple possible “best” worlds. Why? Because it seems to me that these objections could also apply to the “God as best being” proofs for God.

 

[JapaneseKappa]

Well if you’re working under a voluntarist conception of God that is implicitly assuming that deontology is true, then your point would be highly relevant to the thread. But something is not good merely because God says it is good, as if He could arbitrarily say anything is good and it was be good. I wouldn’t say that God’s goodness is axiomatic because it follows from recognizing that God’s nature is existence itself. Something is good if it perfects its nature, and God perfects His own nature since nothing is outside of His nature as existence itself. Other things are good only in as much as they are lacking nothing that they should have given their own natures. Whether or not they follow arbitrary rules is not important. The rules are there because they help us to do what is good for us given our natures as rational animals.

Well it is easy to see why the Euthypro dilemma fails with the above reasoning. God is not arbitrarily setting moral standards, nor is He adhering to a higher one. God is Goodness Itself because He is Being itself. Everything that is lacking in other creatures is contained within God’s nature as Being itself.

Then don’t call it goodness, call it “Oogieness.” You’re tiptoeing around the relevant and practical issue: defining “God’s goodness” in this way means that it is completely and entirely divorced from our everyday conceptions of right and wrong. God can order humans to commit atrocities and that would be fine because “the rules aren’t important, God perfects his own nature.” Therefore, to avoid accidentally thinking that our own conceptions of goodness are relevant to “God’s goodness” we shouldn’t use the term goodness in both cases; instead, we will say that God’s is oogieness itself, and something is oogy if it perfects its nature.