Did God Create the Best Possible Universe?

[Aloysium]

Perhaps if there were more suffering, more would enter into heaven.
I think it is CS Lewis who states that God shouts to us in our pain and whispers in our pleasures.
I definitely suffering makes me listen more acutely, give up on empty satisfactions and makes earthly treasures meaningless.
Globally, I think there is enough suffering as it is.

 

[Tomdstone]

Exactly my point that God should be from our best viewpoint indistinguishable from all these good attributes. Anyone accusing God of murder of innocents needs to be reminded of this; so, even if it is a basic concept, returning to these basics is useful to recalibrate to a better viewpoint.

How do you explain: 1 Samuel 15:3 ?

 

[Achilles6129]

What does “best possible world” mean? Can we even give a vigorous account of what it is for a world to be “best”?

The “best possible world” would be the world where everyone (or the maximum amount of creatures created) obey(s) God’s commands and thus goes to heaven. You’ll notice that in my OP I phrased things that way for a reason: there really is no definition of “best possible world” otherwise.

 

[Achilles6129]

I hate to be insistent, but my point was actually highly relevant to this thread. If God’s goodness is axiomatic, then of course he will remain morally good no matter what. It’s not even an honest question if you assume the answer beforehand. You’re effectively saying, “God would be good no matter what. Now is it true that God would be good in this hypothetical situation?” The answer in that case is trivial if we assume the first premise.

No, that’s not what I’m saying. I’m saying that God’s goodness can’t be affected by the actions of free creatures, or, at least, that someone has yet to demonstrate effectively that it is.

I am assuming for the sake of argument here that it’s not good just because “God says so.” Many philosophers believe:

1. God is good
2. A good God would freely choose a world where the maximum number of his creatures obey his commands freely
3. This is not such a world
4. Therefore, a good God does not exist

It’s quite similar to the following argument:

1. God is good
2. A good God would create a world where Adam/Eve would freely choose to obey his commands instead of a world where Adam/Eve would freely choose to disobey his commands
3. There is such a world where Adam/Eve freely choose to obey God’s commands
4. Therefore, a good God does not exist

I am challenging premise 2 in each argument and claiming that it is a non-sequitur. I am saying that a good God would not necessarily have to choose the world where the maximum number of his creatures (or Adam/Eve) freely choose to obey his commands above another world where they do not. I am asking for a demonstration that this is in fact what a good God would do.

If you are allowing for the sake of argument that there is a standard of morality independent of God, so that God’s goodness can actually be judged in this matter rather than taken for granted, then we can have an interesting discussion.

For the sake of argument I will allow a standard of goodness based upon logic.

 

[Achilles6129]

The best possible world has to be the world that allows free will. The angels had it and so do we.

What we do with it is on us, not on God.

The point is that God has perfect foreknowledge of every world and thus can refrain from creating a world if, for example, he knows its first two inhabitants will eat of the tree of the knowledge of good/evil, or that the vast majority of that world’s inhabitants will end up in hell.

Prior to God’s creation of the cosmos he had a vast array of possible worlds to pick from. Why shouldn’t there have been one where Adam/Eve do not eat of the tree and where most enter heaven? Why did he pick this particular world?

 

[Achilles6129]

I am simply pointing out the emptiness of your definition of “God’s goodness.” I’m willing to grant that God can command atrocities and still be good. It’s just that the “good” that he is bears no resemblance to our everyday conceptions of goodness.

Well, a basic part of Biblical theology is that humanity (outside of God) doesn’t know the real difference between right and wrong and therefore doesn’t in fact know what “good” or “evil” really is. For that, we have to turn to God.

I would also argue that God is logic (at least, the true definition of logic, as people sometimes have different definitions of words), and that therefore the true definition of goodness would be based upon logic.

 

[balto]

I am simply pointing out the emptiness of your definition of “God’s goodness.” I’m willing to grant that God can command atrocities and still be good. It’s just that the “good” that he is bears no resemblance to our everyday conceptions of goodness. We could very easily solve the problem by saying that human nature is perfected by fulfilling God’s plans, and that God’s plan for Amalek was violent annihilation at the hands of God’s chosen people. Most people’s popular conceptions of goodness say that such annihilation is evil, but as I’ve been saying all along, their conceptions are not relevant at all to God’s goodness. We don’t even have a reason to suspect that God’s behavior in this case was wrong.

The point I am trying to make by grounding goodness in the specific natures of things is to give it an objective founding. I don’t think it would be correct to say that God’s plan for Amalek was violent annihilation, as if that would be good for Amalek. Violent annihilation is not good for anybody since everybody is a living thing and it is not within the nature of living things to naturally desire death. If it were the case that violent annihilation was good for Amalek given his nature (if it were even possible to make logical sense of that), then it would follow that Amalek is not of the same substance as everyone else. But Amalek is a human like everyone else.

I used the word ambiguity before, and this is precisely what I meant. It is always possible to invent creative definitions of nature or perfection that support whatever moral conclusion we want. Don’t want people desecrating your communion wafer? Just say that it has some unknowable nature that makes mistreatment a serious offence. Don’t like some community’s sexual practices? Just say that sex has some nature that isn’t perfected by their practices. Want to keep owning slaves? Just say that there is no aspect of human nature that is a-priori non-perfectible under slavery.

Well simply raising the possibility that someone could be mistaken about what the specific nature of something is does not establish that they indeed are mistaken about its nature and certainly doesn’t establish that natures are not real. If natures are not real and nominalism is true, then all moral claims are subjective, so the one arguing for slavery is as objective as the one arguing against it, which is to say neither is objective at all. Same thing with any other issue.

It seems your only two options if you abandon natures are rooting morality in arbitrary societal preferences or rooting it in divine fiat. The first option establishes nothing objective since society’s preferences are always changing. A majority of people now think that slavery is wrong. Great. But how can we say that in the 1800s they were wrong to own slaves? Back then a majority of people thought it was okay, so they were right back then. Hopefully 100 years from now people will think that abortion is wrong. Will they be wrong to think it because we disagree with the hypothetical society? No, a majority of people then would be against it so they would be right 100 years from now. Rooting it in divine fiat presents all the problems you’ve been discussing. Why can’t God command anything He wants since He’s omnipotent?

And it gets worse if you’re someone who thinks society is wrong. How does a nineteenth century abolitionist argue against slavery? Can’t appeal to the intrinsic nature of humanity because that’s not real and nobody could know what it is anyway.

 

[balto]

I would also argue that God is logic (at least, the true definition of logic, as people sometimes have different definitions of words), and that therefore the true definition of goodness would be based upon logic.

I don’t know that God is logic, since logic is a way that humans think about truth, but it is correct to say that God is Truth which is what I think you are getting at. And truth is closely related to goodness. Truth is just “being” when viewed from the aspect of intelligibility. Goodness is just “being” when viewed from the aspect of desirability. Which leads into the whole point I have been trying to make about natures and goodness. The intellect apprehends the natures of things and hopefully forms true understandings of its nature and the will seeks what is desirable in these natures. If you cut natures out of the equation, then there’s nothing objective in the intellect’s endeavors to understand reality, so what the will seeks is consequently not anything objective either.

 

[JapaneseKappa]

The point I am trying to make by grounding goodness in the specific natures of things is to give it an objective founding. I don’t think it would be correct to say that God’s plan for Amalek was violent annihilation, as if that would be good for Amalek.

But whatever God does is by definition good, so if God annihilated Amalek, the annihilation of Amalek was good. The fact that we both think it isn’t good is irrelevant.

And it gets worse if you’re someone who thinks society is wrong. How does a nineteenth century abolitionist argue against slavery? Can’t appeal to the intrinsic nature of humanity because that’s not real and nobody could know what it is anyway.

Keep in mind that the Catholic Church doesn’t believe slavery is inherently wrong.
newadvent.org/cathen/14039a.htm

The later moralists, that is to say, broadly speaking, those who have written since the end of the eighteenth century, though in fundamental agreement with their predecessors, have somewhat shifted the perspective… While they admit that it is not, theoretically speaking at least, contrary to the natural law, they hold that it is hardly compatible with the dignity of personality, and is to be condemned as immoral on account of the evil consequences it almost inevitably leads to.

 

[Tomdstone]

Keep in mind that the Catholic Church doesn’t believe slavery is inherently wrong.
newadvent.org/cathen/14039a.htm

Didn’t the Bible say that slaves are supposed to obey their masters and therefore not try to obtain their freedom?
Ephesians 6:5
"Slaves, obey your earthly masters with fear and trembling, with a sincere heart, as you would Christ, "
Was the Bible wrong here?

 

[balto]

But whatever God does is by definition good, so if God annihilated Amalek, the annihilation of Amalek was good. The fact that we both think it isn’t good is irrelevant.

Keep in mind that the Catholic Church doesn’t believe slavery is inherently wrong.
newadvent.org/cathen/14039a.htm

I’m wondering if you even read the article you linked to, because it doesn’t undermine anything I have argued for concerning goodness defined by natures. For anyone who doesn’t want to read it, the article is discussing whether or not owning a man’s labor for his lifetime (where the man in question cannot leave the situation) is contrary to natural law and comes to the conclusion that it isn’t because it is not unnatural for a man to own another man’s labor for a short finite time (i.e. employment or indentured servitude) so it is not unnatural per se to own a man’s labor for his entire life. What JapaneseKappa conveniently does not quote is the following:

It must be observed that the defence of what may be termed theoretical slavery was by no means intended to be a justification of slavery as it existed historically, with all its attendant, and almost inevitably attendant, abuses, disregarding the natural rights of the slave and entailing pernicious consequences on the character of the slave-holding class, as well as on society in general. Concurrently with the affirmation that slavery is not against the natural law, the moralists specify what are the natural inviolable rights of the slave, and the corresponding duties of the owner. The gist of this teaching is summarized by Cardinal Gerdil (1718-1802):

Slavery is not to be understood as conferring on one man the same power over another that men have over cattle. Wherefore they erred who in former times refused to include slaves among persons; and believed that however barbarously the master treated his slave he did not violate any right of the slave. For slavery does not abolish the natural equality of men: hence by slavery one man is understood to become subject to the dominion of another to the extent that the master has a perpetual right to all those services which one man may justly perform for another; and subject to the condition that the master shall take due care of his slave and treat him humanely (Comp. Instit. Civil., L, vii).

Where do these “natural inviolable rights” come from? The nature of a human being, so we’ve come full circle and haven’t escaped human nature. Later in the article:

In possession of the bad historical record of slavery and familiar with a Christian structure of society from which slavery had been eliminated, these later moralists emphasize more than did the older ones the reasons for condemning slavery; and they lay less stress on those in its favour. While they admit that it is not, theoretically speaking at least, contrary to the natural law, they hold that it is hardly compatible with the dignity of personality, and is to be condemned as immoral on account of the evil consequences it almost inevitably leads to. It is but little in keeping with human dignity that one man should so far be deprived of his liberty as to be perpetually subject to the will of a master in everything that concerns his external life; that he should be compelled to spend his entire labour for the benefit of another and receive in return only a bare subsistence. This condition of degradation is aggravated by the fact that the slave is, generally, deprived of all means of intellectual development for himself or for his children. This life almost inevitably leads to the destruction of a proper sense of self-respect, blunts the intellectual faculties, weakens the sense of responsibility, and results in a degraded moral standard.

And how would we know that these consequences are evil? They hamper a person’s ability to fulfill the ends of their nature, so again full circle.

Now, in anticipation of the next accusation, “does that mean we can bring slavery (as defined in the abstract, theoretical case mind you) back as long as there’s no abuse of natural rights?” You’ll keep in mind that an act is morally justified if the matter and the intention and circumstances are just, which has always been the Church’s moral stance. If you’re intending to make this argument then I would think that the onus is on you to devise a situation whereby one could argue that a hypothetical would-be modern slaveowner can have good intentions given the circumstances of most modern societies and recent history. I can’t see a way that could be justified. So to say that the Church doesn’t believe that slavery is inherently wrong would seem to be false, unless one supposes that only the matter of the act is what is relevant, but that is to attack a strawman position that the Church has never held.

And I’m getting tired of beating around the bush and playing defense all the time. Offer an objective moral argument against slavery as I have done, without making recourse to natures or essences. I eagerly await your response.

 

[Aloysium]

Didn’t the Bible say that slaves are supposed to obey their masters and therefore not try to obtain their freedom?
Ephesians 6:5
"Slaves, obey your earthly masters with fear and trembling, with a sincere heart, as you would Christ, "
Was the Bible wrong here?

You addressed that passage also in response to a post I made on another thread.

I will add to my reply there:
You think you are not a slave. And, masters aren’t they far more slaves, to their masters. The President of United States, a pawn to all the political forces around him. Look up what Jesus said to Pilate.
“Power to the People!” Were you around for the Chicago Seven (eight with Bobby Seale) trial. That movement did catalyze some change in society, but it all remains the same.
Consumerism is such a great social narcotic. .

 

[Achilles6129]

I don’t know that God is logic, since logic is a way that humans think about truth, but it is correct to say that God is Truth which is what I think you are getting at.

By “logic” I mean real logic, not any human definition. And yes, logic would be closely tied in with truth. So I would accept a standard of goodness that is based upon true logic.

 

[aragonjohn1]

Prior to the beginning of this cosmos, God had a choice between an infinite (or nearly infinite) number of possible worlds that he could have created. God chose to create this one. This leads some philosophers to suggest that this is the best possible world that could have been created because obviously:

1. God is good
2. A good God would create the best possible world
3. Therefore, this must be the best possible world

The line of reasoning also works in reverse:

1. God is good
2. A good God would create the best possible world
3. This is not the best possible world
4. Therefore, God doesn’t exist

I would like to argue, however, that God is in no way obligated by his goodness to create the best possible world. The reason is because the “best possible world” can only be brought into existence by the creatures that God creates (by their obedience to his commands), and not by God himself. In other words, I think that premise 2 above is a non-sequitur: God is not required by his goodness to create the best possible world. I think it is clear that God could have chosen a world where more of his creatures obeyed his commands, but he did not. However, I fail to see how this impugns God’s goodness, because God’s intent toward his creatures is always the same: that they all be saved.

Therefore, I propose that God could freely choose a universe where more people go to hell over a universe where no-one goes to hell and still be just as morally good. In other words, he could freely choose to not create the best possible world and it would not affect his goodness at all. Am I wrong?

no He gives, away.

God bless

john -

 

[tonyrey]

But 1 Samuel 15:3 is pretty strong as it implies that it is OK to kill women and children in a war. I don’t think I could agree with that as children have not yet reached the age of reason and should not be held responsible. Take for example, the case of the 9 year old girl at a shooting range who accidentally shot off the head of her gun instructor. No one holds her responsible in the least and no one is thinking of punishing her. Children under 5 years old are never put in jail for punishment. Why does the Bible recommend it in this case?

Any interpretation of Scriptural texts that contradicts the teaching of Jesus that God is a loving Father is misguided. Only Fundamentalists believe every statement in the Old Testament is literally true.

 

[JapaneseKappa]

Now, in anticipation of the next accusation, “does that mean we can bring slavery (as defined in the abstract, theoretical case mind you) back as long as there’s no abuse of natural rights?” You’ll keep in mind that an act is morally justified if the matter and the intention and circumstances are just, which has always been the Church’s moral stance. If you’re intending to make this argument then I would think that the onus is on you to devise a situation whereby one could argue that a hypothetical would-be modern slaveowner can have good intentions given the circumstances of most modern societies and recent history. I can’t see a way that could be justified. So to say that the Church doesn’t believe that slavery is inherently wrong would seem to be false, unless one supposes that only the matter of the act is what is relevant, but that is to attack a strawman position that the Church has never held.

Sure, the church may not have ever formally held the position that any treatment of slaves was acceptable, but they did act like it:
heinonline.org/HOL/LandingPage?handle=hein.journals/ljusclr158&div=6&id=&page=

There is no danger–no possibility, on our principles–that Catholic theology should ever be tinctured with the fanaticism of abolition

See also:
past.oxfordjournals.org/content/115/1/52.full.pdf

Both [Capuchin Missionaries] had been excommunicated in Havana in 1681 and subsequently arrested for behaviour which had resulted, so reported the local authorities, “in the gravest scandals”. They had preached that “the owners of Negro slaves should liberate them and their children and pay them for their labours”, and they had refused to give absolution to those who did not promise to do this. Both Capuchins had written defences of their position. Fray Francisco’s statement is a vibrant denunciation of the abuses and injustices that he had witnessed; Pere Epiphane was a competent canon lawyer and his statement marshals at length the case against the Atlantic slave trade.

My issue, of course, is precisely the passage I highlighted previously. It is understandable that the modern church would cast “theoretical-good” slavery as some sort of watered-down contractual agreement. After all, the Church prides itself on not changing it’s core teachings. Slavery, though, is inherently about owning people; and the church seems to be taking the position that this is not a-priori contrary to human nature. I will end by simply pointing out that it took a good 1500 years for Christians to realize that no one was doing slavery “right.”

I can very easily come up with an argument against slavery with no recourse to the nature of things. I could simply say that we should create a society that we would all want to live in if we didn’t know ahead of time how we would fit into that society. Given that rule, we would agree that we should not have slavery since it is possible that we would end up as a slave. You’re free to deny the previous rule, people were free to deny that slavery is inherently wrong in practice.

We are straying far from the original topic, though. I am pointing out that God’s conception of “goodness” when defined the way you did, means that we have no real understanding of what goodness is. The relevant-to-the-topic conclusion is that we have no idea what sort of world would constitute the “best” world as far as God is concerned. God could make this world nothing but suffering and misery for us humans and it wouldn’t give us any reason to doubt that such a world was still the best.

 

[Tomdstone]

Any interpretation of Scriptural texts that contradicts the teaching of Jesus that God is a loving Father is misguided. Only Fundamentalists believe every statement in the Old Testament is literally true.

So what is described in 1Samuel 15:3 is false?

 

[wmw]

But 1 Samuel 15:3 is pretty strong as it implies that it is OK to kill women and children in a war. I don’t think I could agree with that as children have not yet reached the age of reason and should not be held responsible. Take for example, the case of the 9 year old girl at a shooting range who accidentally shot off the head of her gun instructor. No one holds her responsible in the least and no one is thinking of punishing her. Children under 5 years old are never put in jail for punishment. Why does the Bible recommend it in this case?

This implication, marked in bold above, is a perfect example of a false interpretation. This is why the Church is the authority of Christ on earth not just anyone reading the Bible. In this paraphrase of the Commentary by Haydock we see the teaching of a good Catholic Theologian drawing the opposite conclusion:

The great master of life and death (who may end lives while they are children) has determined that sometimes to ordain that children should be put to the sword, in detestation of the crimes of their parents, and that they might not live to follow the same wicked ways. But without such ordinance of God, it is not allowable in any wars, however just, to kill children.

 

[wmw]

We are straying far from the original topic, though. I am pointing out that God’s conception of “goodness” when defined the way you did, means that we have no real understanding of what goodness is. The relevant-to-the-topic conclusion is that we have no idea what sort of world would constitute the “best” world as far as God is concerned. God could make this world nothing but suffering and misery for us humans and it wouldn’t give us any reason to doubt that such a world was still the best.

But God’s goodness is knowable and how we should act morally is knowable just as the Laws of Science are knowable though we may be living in a Dark Ages of understanding morality.

On the depths of suffering. No, God has not made this world one of total suffering though it may be very much so for some and they too are often innocent children. I believe that this is the best world in which God allows the right degree of evil and suffering, but we could do better in cooperating with and making it less evil and of less suffering.

 

[Tomdstone]

On the depths of suffering. No, God has not made this world one of total suffering though it may be very much so for some and they too are often innocent children. I believe that this is the best world in which God allows the right degree of evil and suffering, but we could do better in cooperating with and making it less evil and of less suffering.

Some natural events or diseases which cause suffering are not within our control.