Did God Create the Best Possible Universe?

[Oreoracle]

I wouldn’t say that God’s goodness is axiomatic because it follows from recognizing that God’s nature is existence itself. Something is good if it perfects its nature, and God perfects His own nature since nothing is outside of His nature as existence itself.

So instead of assuming A, you’re assuming B, and then assuming that B implies A. The result is the same: you’ve deliberately constructed a belief system in which God cannot possibly be evil.

The impact on the OP’s question is also identical: God could design a less than ideal world and still be good because God is defined to be existence itself, and good is defined so that God’s goodness immediately follows from his characteristic property of “being existence itself”.

Indeed, any question of the form “Would God be good in this hypothetical scenario” can be addressed in the same manner. So as I said, these questions are trivial if you’ve already arranged your beliefs so that God must be good. Such questions are only interesting if God’s goodness doesn’t immediately follow from his definition a priori.

 

[Rhubarb]

What does “best possible world” mean? Can we even give a vigorous account of what it is for a world to be “best”?

 

[JapaneseKappa]

What does “best possible world” mean? Can we even give a vigorous account of what it is for a world to be “best”?

I don’t think so, at least not in the practical sense of “oh, well obviously the best world would have features x, y, z.” Instead, I think we have to simply argue that God has some criteria in mind (that we are ignorant of) and made the world that best met those criteria.

I think our consideration should focus on:
Suppose God didn’t have any criteria in mind when he made the world, so there was no “best” world.

Suppose God had some criteria in mind, but didn’t chose the best world according to those criteria.

Suppose God had some criteria in mind, and chose the world that best satisfied those criteria.

 

[Rhubarb]

I don’t think so, at least not in the practical sense of “oh, well obviously the best world would have features x, y, z.” Instead, I think we have to simply argue that God has some criteria in mind (that we are ignorant of) and made the world that best met those criteria.

I think our consideration should focus on:
Suppose God didn’t have any criteria in mind when he made the world, so there was no “best” world.

Suppose God had some criteria in mind, but didn’t chose the best world according to those criteria.

Suppose God had some criteria in mind, and chose the world that best satisfied those criteria.

It depends on what we’re arguing for. If Best Possible World is doing work to argue for or against the existence of God, we can’t beg the question by assuming God’s existence in the premise. Though that might not be here nor there.

 

[balto]

It doesn’t make any assumption about *what *criteria God would use to decide what world constitutes the best world. The assertion is that God has some criteria dictated by his nature, and he will make the world that best fits that criteria. The criteria God used to select the “best” world does not automatically need to be monotonically increasing, so your objection only applies to certain possible criteria.

Well it assumes that there is such a thing as a “best possible world” so there are other worlds God could create that are worse than this hypothetical world. That is only possible if you’re basically attaching price tags to things in these hypothetical worlds and God chooses the one with the highest value. I maintain that it is impossible to identify such a world under these assumptions.

Also, your objection could be circumvented in other ways. We could suppose God wants to maximize the population of heaven, in which case this world might not be a “best of all possible worlds.” However it is also possible that, to maximize the population of heaven, God created all possible worlds and we just don’t know about the other ones.

I don’t think it circumvents my argument because I specifically denied that this is the way morality works. God could create a world with a single tree in it and the tree perfects its nature as a tree and He could create a world with a single stone in it and the stone perfects its nature. I don’t know how you could say that one is better than another.

Now a more interesting conversation would involve whether or not it is really good that things grow towards a more perfected nature from imperfection as they do in this world. Admittedly I don’t know all that much about that subject, but I don’t think that tying goodness to the natures of things is an unreasonable thing to do.

Finally, it’s seems to me that your objection is a dangerous one. Specifically the objections that the concept of a best world is incoherent, or that there could be multiple possible “best” worlds. Why? Because it seems to me that these objections could also apply to the “God as best being” proofs for God.

Well I don’t know why this threatens God in any way. God’s nature just is existence itself, so He would be perfectly good because all of what it means “to be” is part of His nature. Your objection seems to rest on the premise that God is in some kind of specific class of being where He’s just one being among many, albeit a really powerful one, but not Being itself. That kind of God would be vulnerable to your argument but that is not how the classical theist conceives of God.

 

[balto]

Then don’t call it goodness, call it “Oogieness.”

I’m not sure how arguing over semantics is going to get us anywhere.

You’re tiptoeing around the relevant and practical issue: defining “God’s goodness” in this way means that it is completely and entirely divorced from our everyday conceptions of right and wrong. God can order humans to commit atrocities and that would be fine because “the rules aren’t important, God perfects his own nature.”

I guess I should not have assumed that people knew what I was talking about when I was talking about a thing’s nature, so I apologize for that. How could God order humans to commit atrocities since atrocities hamper our ability to flourish as living creatures? Killing someone is wrong because it deprives them of their ability to live, and living is part of what it means to be a human. Lying to people is wrong, because part of what it means to be a human is that you possess a rational intellect that desires truth, and concealing or misleading people from truth frustrates that part of their nature as a human. That’s what I am arguing goodness is rooted in.

You keep talking about “goodness” and are acting like it is self-evident what you mean by it, but it is not evident at all. What makes anything good if it is not rooted in a thing’s nature or even reality in general? Popular consensus? What do you think it means that something is “good?”

Therefore, to avoid accidentally thinking that our own conceptions of goodness are relevant to “God’s goodness” we shouldn’t use the term goodness in both cases; instead, we will say that God’s is oogieness itself, and something is oogy if it perfects its nature.

Again, changing the word from “good” to “oogy” doesn’t address anything I’ve argued.

 

[Tomdstone]

Well it assumes that there is such a thing as a “best possible world” so there are other worlds God could create that are worse than this hypothetical world. That is only possible if you’re basically attaching price tags to things in these hypothetical worlds and God chooses the one with the highest value. I maintain that it is impossible to identify such a world under these assumptions.

Perhaps you could not identify the best possible world exactly, but there are some things you would expect not to occur in such a best possible world, but which are present in this world. For example, according to Father Hardon, same sex attraction is a disordered condition. In the best possible world, then, you would expect that no one be born with the disordered condition of SSA.

 

[balto]

So instead of assuming A, you’re assuming B, and then assuming that B implies A. The result is the same: you’ve deliberately constructed a belief system in which God cannot possibly be evil.

The impact on the OP’s question is also identical: God could design a less than ideal world and still be good because God is defined to be existence itself, and good is defined so that God’s goodness immediately follows from his characteristic property of “being existence itself”.

Indeed, any question of the form “Would God be good in this hypothetical scenario” can be addressed in the same manner. So as I said, these questions are trivial if you’ve already arranged your beliefs so that God must be good. Such questions are only interesting if God’s goodness doesn’t immediately follow from his definition a priori.

Goodness is just being when viewed from the aspect of desirability. I should have mentioned that earlier but for some reason I wasn’t thinking as clearly earlier today and it may have avoided some confusion. I was thinking it the whole time but just realized I didn’t actually say it. Ugh, sorry about that.

Take the example I gave in the previous post to JapaneseKappa. Humans are rational animals and hence desire truth. Acquiring truth perfects our nature as rational animals which is why it is good for us to pursue truth and evil to conceal the truth or lie to others. We desire things because our current state of being is somehow lacking. God just is Being itself, God is ultimately what is desirable and hence good in any other created reality (since the desire is for some kind of being and God just is Being itself, so it is ultimately a desire for some limited aspect of God’s nature). Asking why God cannot be evil is really asking whether Being itself can be lacking something in His nature, which is to ask a nonsensical question.

Does that make things clearer?

 

[balto]

Perhaps you could not identify the best possible world exactly, but there are some things you would expect not to occur in such a best possible world, but which are present in this world. For example, according to Father Hardon, same sex attraction is a disordered condition. In the best possible world, then, you would expect that no one be born with the disordered condition of SSA.

It’s a good question, and unfortunately I don’t know how to respond to it adequately at the moment. I presume the response would involve discussion of the nature of free will and the fallen state of man. It is something I’d like to look into more in the future though.

 

[JapaneseKappa]

It depends on what we’re arguing for. If Best Possible World is doing work to argue for or against the existence of God, we can’t beg the question by assuming God’s existence in the premise. Though that might not be here nor there.

No, I’m pretty sure it’s safe to say that the question “Did God create the best possible universe” assumes that God exists. If you can show that the answer leads to some sort of contradiction, you might be able to say God doesn’t exist.

 

[JapaneseKappa]

I guess I should not have assumed that people knew what I was talking about when I was talking about a thing’s nature, so I apologize for that. How could God order humans to commit atrocities since atrocities hamper our ability to flourish as living creatures?

Like this: 1 Samuel 15:3

Now therefore go, and smite Amalec, and utterly destroy all that he hath: spare him not, nor covet any thing that is his: but slay both man and woman, child and suckling, ox and sheep, camel and ***.

You keep talking about “goodness” and are acting like it is self-evident what you mean by it, but it is not evident at all. What makes anything good if it is not rooted in a thing’s nature or even reality in general? Popular consensus? What do you think it means that something is “good?”
Again, changing the word from “good” to “oogy” doesn’t address anything I’ve argued.

We have a wide array of preconceived notions about goodness, but none of them apply here. I’m not arguing that you can’t define things the way you have, just that you need to be very careful not to subsequently use “popular” conceptions of goodness for your definition of “God’s goodness.”

You argue that goodness is that which perfects a things nature. If I held up an object for you to inspect, what tests would you perform to determine it’s nature? I say that all you’ve really done is kicked the ambiguity away from goodness and on to nature/perfection.

 

[wmw]

I don’t think so, at least not in the practical sense of “oh, well obviously the best world would have features x, y, z.” Instead, I think we have to simply argue that God has some criteria in mind (that we are ignorant of) and made the world that best met those criteria.

I think our consideration should focus on:
Suppose God didn’t have any criteria in mind when he made the world, so there was no “best” world.

Suppose God had some criteria in mind, but didn’t chose the best world according to those criteria.

Suppose God had some criteria in mind, and chose the world that best satisfied those criteria.

The best picture of the perfect world that God did make is Eden. God Created a perfect sinless place, but it would be a Stephford wife type horror story if he made us unfree/unable to rebel and sin.

If God were to make an instant erase all sin and it’s effects type earth then the good grain would come up with the weeds and none would be saved. To understand that God is in control means that this is the most perfect result of freedom, justice, and mercy. There really is no option other than something came from nothing or some similar illogical magic.

Yes, killing all the tribes including children that God commanded is part of this perfection. Some cancers just need to be cut upon. God has the knowledge and authority to judge this, but no man has either the knowledge or authority; therefore, what man is commanded not to do, God can do and did it in perfect justice and mercy.

 

[JapaneseKappa]

The best picture of the perfect world that God did make is Eden. God Created a perfect sinless place, but it would be a Stephford wife type horror story if he made us unfree/unable to rebel and sin.

If God were to make an instant erase all sin and it’s effects type earth then the good grain would come up with the weeds and none would be saved. To understand that God is in control means that this is the most perfect result of freedom, justice, and mercy. There really is no option other than something came from nothing or some similar illogical magic.

Yes, killing all the tribes including children that God commanded is part of this perfection. Some cancers just need to be cut upon. God has the knowledge and authority to judge this, but no man has either the knowledge or authority; therefore, what man is commanded not to do, God can do and did it in perfect justice and mercy.

I can think of a few examples off the top of my head where God seemed to be trying to erase sin and its effects: Noah, Sodom, and Mary’s immaculate conception.

If you’ve been following my discussion with Balto, you’ll see that we need to be careful when talking about God’s goodness, freedom, justice, and mercy. It is claimed that in each case that God is those properties. God IS goodness, God IS mercy, etc. Therefore, when you say that the actions God takes re manifestations of his perfect justice and mercy, you’re not actually saying anything useful. In other words, even if we had a complete view of the a situation, we still might not perceive God’s responses as just or merciful by any conventional standards. The justice and mercy that God IS has no necessary relationship to our conception of justice and mercy.

 

[balto]

Like this: 1 Samuel 15:3

I knew that one was coming. Although interpretation of Scripture is tangential to the points I was making, I suppose this is a dilemma for someone who adopts a fundamentalist view of Scripture. I presume that the spiritual truth is that the wages of sin is death, and that is certainly true. It more likely that the human action of sin withdraws humanity from God and suffering is a natural result of that withdrawal. Did Israel destroy the Canaanites? Yes, but that doesn’t necessarily mean that God positively commanded it rather than God permitting their destruction. Scripture has both human and a divine perspective and the primitive human understanding of God is that “I beat the Canaanites up because God willed it directly.” You’ll also notice things like Scripture talking about God “breathing life” into Adam, yet God does not have a respiratory system. To ascribe fundamentalism to the Catholic view of Scripture is to interpret the Catholic position uncharitably, as Catholicism has always held the orthodox view that Scripture contains both literal and symbolic elements.

We have a wide array of preconceived notions about goodness, but none of them apply here. I’m not arguing that you can’t define things the way you have, just that you need to be very careful not to subsequently use “popular” conceptions of goodness for your definition of “God’s goodness.”

Your point is well taken. This is a valid concern. But I wasn’t trying to make any claim about a particular moral issue, but just a claim about goodness in general.

You argue that goodness is that which perfects a things nature.

That is correct.

If I held up an object for you to inspect, what tests would you perform to determine it’s nature? I say that all you’ve really done is kicked the ambiguity away from goodness and on to nature/perfection.

This sort of objection usually comes up and I am always confused as to why we’d need some kind of special test to determine something’s nature. We’d use the same methods we’ve always used to determine what a thing is. Having a nature doesn’t mean there is some extra thing to look for in the object, but rather is an observation about what it means to be a thing in the first place. There was a relevant thread on the topic here: What does “the nature of a thing” mean?. Saying that things have natures is simply to say that it is an objective fact that there are different types of things with different properties and characteristics, whatever those turn out to be. Extending it to include goodness is just to note that certain things tend towards certain ends and that acquiring these ends helps the thing in question to flourish as the type of thing it is.

 

[JapaneseKappa]

I knew that one was coming. Although interpretation of Scripture is tangential to the points I was making, I suppose this is a dilemma for someone who adopts a fundamentalist view of Scripture. I presume that the spiritual truth is that the wages of sin is death, and that is certainly true. It more likely that the human action of sin withdraws humanity from God and suffering is a natural result of that withdrawal. Did Israel destroy the Canaanites? Yes, but that doesn’t necessarily mean that God positively commanded it rather than God permitting their destruction. Scripture has both human and a divine perspective and the primitive human understanding of God is that “I beat the Canaanites up because God willed it directly.” You’ll also notice things like Scripture talking about God “breathing life” into Adam, yet God does not have a respiratory system. To ascribe fundamentalism to the Catholic view of Scripture is to interpret the Catholic position uncharitably, as Catholicism has always held the orthodox view that Scripture contains both literal and symbolic elements.

I am perfectly willing to grant that the massacre never happened in a historical sense, but its in the bible for a reason. You can try to de-fang it by saying it is some sort of metaphor for sin/death and that God didn’t actually command it, but do note what happens afterwards, in verses 9-11

But Saul and the army spared Agag and the best of the sheep and cattle, the fat calves and lambs—everything that was good. These they were unwilling to destroy completely, but everything that was despised and weak they totally destroyed.
Then the word of the Lord came to Samuel: “I regret that I have made Saul king, because he has turned away from me and has not carried out my instructions.” Samuel was angry, and he cried out to the Lord all that night.

This sort of objection usually comes up and I am always confused as to why we’d need some kind of special test to determine something’s nature. We’d use the same methods we’ve always used to determine what a thing is. Having a nature doesn’t mean there is some extra thing to look for in the object, but rather is an observation about what it means to be a thing in the first place. There was a relevant thread on the topic here: What does “the nature of a thing” mean?. Saying that things have natures is simply to say that it is an objective fact that there are different types of things with different properties and characteristics, whatever those turn out to be. Extending it to include goodness is just to note that certain things tend towards certain ends and that acquiring these ends helps the thing in question to flourish as the type of thing it is.

So if I gave you a communion wafer, you would be able to tell me if it was consecrated or not, and therefore you would know whether or not it was acceptable to throw in the garbage?

 

[Tomdstone]

I knew that one was coming. Although interpretation of Scripture is tangential to the points I was making, I suppose this is a dilemma for someone who adopts a fundamentalist view of Scripture. I presume that the spiritual truth is that the wages of sin is death, and that is certainly true. It more likely that the human action of sin withdraws humanity from God and suffering is a natural result of that withdrawal. Did Israel destroy the Canaanites? Yes, but that doesn’t necessarily mean that God positively commanded it rather than God permitting their destruction. Scripture has both human and a divine perspective and the primitive human understanding of God is that “I beat the Canaanites up because God willed it directly.” You’ll also notice things like Scripture talking about God “breathing life” into Adam, yet God does not have a respiratory system. To ascribe fundamentalism to the Catholic view of Scripture is to interpret the Catholic position uncharitably, as Catholicism has always held the orthodox view that Scripture contains both literal and symbolic elements.

Your point is well taken. This is a valid concern. But I wasn’t trying to make any claim about a particular moral issue, but just a claim about goodness in general.

That is correct.

This sort of objection usually comes up and I am always confused as to why we’d need some kind of special test to determine something’s nature. We’d use the same methods we’ve always used to determine what a thing is. Having a nature doesn’t mean there is some extra thing to look for in the object, but rather is an observation about what it means to be a thing in the first place. There was a relevant thread on the topic here: What does “the nature of a thing” mean?. Saying that things have natures is simply to say that it is an objective fact that there are different types of things with different properties and characteristics, whatever those turn out to be. Extending it to include goodness is just to note that certain things tend towards certain ends and that acquiring these ends helps the thing in question to flourish as the type of thing it is.

But 1 Samuel 15:3 is pretty strong as it implies that it is OK to kill women and children in a war. I don’t think I could agree with that as children have not yet reached the age of reason and should not be held responsible. Take for example, the case of the 9 year old girl at a shooting range who accidentally shot off the head of her gun instructor. No one holds her responsible in the least and no one is thinking of punishing her. Children under 5 years old are never put in jail for punishment. Why does the Bible recommend it in this case?

 

[balto]

I am perfectly willing to grant that the massacre never happened in a historical sense, but its in the bible for a reason. You can try to de-fang it by saying it is some sort of metaphor for sin/death and that God didn’t actually command it, but do note what happens afterwards, in verses 9-11

Well I actually wasn’t trying to deny that it was a historical fact, but rather stress the point that Scripture has both human authors and a divine author. The divine author gets the point across that leading a life of sin detaches oneself from God, who is the ultimate end of a human being, and suffering and death are the result of that. That is arguably as true now as it was then. Now the human author is writing from an ancient perspective and sees that the Canaanite society is evil and that they were able to destroy them, so “their” God must have willed it and given them the strength to eradicate the Canaanites and everything about them. Reading the Old Testament in light of the New, which is what St. Augustine called for I believe, is the appropriate way to judge that the spiritual, divine truth is correct and that the human understanding of God’s action in the world at the time was flawed.

Is that the correct understanding? I don’t know, and I shouldn’t pretend to be a valid interpreter of Scripture. But my point in making it is that reading Scripture is not simply as easy as understanding the literal words. The Catholic view has always been that Scripture is interpreted in the light of Tradition so a Catholic need not be committed to fundamentalism.

But the reason why I say Scripture is tangential to the original discussion is this: suppose for the sake of argument that you are correct that these Scripture passages are inconsistent with a good God and that there is no acceptable way to reconcile it. That would at worst prove that certain claims of Christianity are false, but would leave the classical theist’s notion of God as being Goodness itself unscathed. One would have to show that goodness is not interconvertible with being, but that would have the nasty side effect of undermining the objectivity of any moral claim.

So if I gave you a communion wafer, you would be able to tell me if it was consecrated or not, and therefore you would know whether or not it was acceptable to throw in the garbage?

Without any information other than the wafer itself, no I don’t think you could conclude that it was consecrated or not, although I would say that from a Catholic perspective one should err on the side of caution and assume it is consecrated. But I don’t see how this undermines the notion of a thing’s nature. Is the fact of the consecration epistemically accessible to me? No, but there still is an objective fact of the matter that it is either consecrated or not (i.e. it has a nature even if I don’t or even cannot fully know what it is). Other aspects of its nature are epistemically accessible to us. It seems that you are trying to imply that everything is epistemically knowable to us as humans, but I think one would have to argue for that viewpoint. It seems to me to be a dubious proposition because it seems to implicitly assume that idealism is true.

 

[balto]

But 1 Samuel 15:3 is pretty strong as it implies that it is OK to kill women and children in a war. I don’t think I could agree with that as children have not yet reached the age of reason and should not be held responsible. Take for example, the case of the 9 year old girl at a shooting range who accidentally shot off the head of her gun instructor. No one holds her responsible in the least and no one is thinking of punishing her. Children under 5 years old are never put in jail for punishment. Why does the Bible recommend it in this case?

I don’t know that the point of it being in Scripture is that it is a recommendation. See my previous post to JapaneseKappa. Is that scenario at least plausible?

I hope I am not sounding dismissive of yours and JapaneseKappa’s objections because I don’t mean to be. It really is something I have difficulty with as well.

 

[wmw]

I can think of a few examples off the top of my head where God seemed to be trying to erase sin and its effects: Noah, Sodom, and Mary’s immaculate conception.

If you’ve been following my discussion with Balto, you’ll see that we need to be careful when talking about God’s goodness, freedom, justice, and mercy. It is claimed that in each case that God is those properties. God IS goodness, God IS mercy, etc. Therefore, when you say that the actions God takes re manifestations of his perfect justice and mercy, you’re not actually saying anything useful. In other words, even if we had a complete view of the a situation, we still might not perceive God’s responses as just or merciful by any conventional standards. The justice and mercy that God IS has no necessary relationship to our conception of justice and mercy.

Exactly my point that God should be from our best viewpoint indistinguishable from all these good attributes. Anyone accusing God of murder of innocents needs to be reminded of this; so, even if it is a basic concept, returning to these basics is useful to recalibrate to a better viewpoint.

On erasing, my idea was that no sin or effect of sin would be allowed to exist but because so little or so few would continue to exist this is also less that the best possible Universe. Obviously our earth has sin. God has his perfect plan of interventions that guides the current most perfect Universe we do have. Noah, Sodom, and Mary’s immaculate conception are all part of those necessary interventions.

 

[JapaneseKappa]

But the reason why I say Scripture is tangential to the original discussion is this: suppose for the sake of argument that you are correct that these Scripture passages are inconsistent with a good God and that there is no acceptable way to reconcile it. That would at worst prove that certain claims of Christianity are false, but would leave the classical theist’s notion of God as being Goodness itself unscathed. One would have to show that goodness is not interconvertible with being, but that would have the nasty side effect of undermining the objectivity of any moral claim.

I am simply pointing out the emptiness of your definition of “God’s goodness.” I’m willing to grant that God can command atrocities and still be good. It’s just that the “good” that he is bears no resemblance to our everyday conceptions of goodness. We could very easily solve the problem by saying that human nature is perfected by fulfilling God’s plans, and that God’s plan for Amalek was violent annihilation at the hands of God’s chosen people. Most people’s popular conceptions of goodness say that such annihilation is evil, but as I’ve been saying all along, their conceptions are not relevant at all to God’s goodness. We don’t even have a reason to suspect that God’s behavior in this case was wrong.

Without any information other than the wafer itself, no I don’t think you could conclude that it was consecrated or not, although I would say that from a Catholic perspective one should err on the side of caution and assume it is consecrated. But I don’t see how this undermines the notion of a thing’s nature. Is the fact of the consecration epistemically accessible to me? No, but there still is an objective fact of the matter that it is either consecrated or not (i.e. it has a nature even if I don’t or even cannot fully know what it is). Other aspects of its nature are epistemically accessible to us. It seems that you are trying to imply that everything is epistemically knowable to us as humans, but I think one would have to argue for that viewpoint. It seems to me to be a dubious proposition because it seems to implicitly assume that idealism is true.

I used the word ambiguity before, and this is precisely what I meant. It is always possible to invent creative definitions of nature or perfection that support whatever moral conclusion we want. Don’t want people desecrating your communion wafer? Just say that it has some unknowable nature that makes mistreatment a serious offence. Don’t like some community’s sexual practices? Just say that sex has some nature that isn’t perfected by their practices. Want to keep owning slaves? Just say that there is no aspect of human nature that is a-priori non-perfectible under slavery.