Did the Catholic Church's teaching on the death penalty change?

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Originally Posted by LongingSoul
This is how I understand ‘medicinal’ here.
Punishment has the primary aim of redressing the disorder introduced by the offense. …
Consider this explanation from a later chapter, ‘Beyond Retribution’ from the book which David Lukenbill has cited above.
Aquinas does not take issue with the general principle that human authority should imitate divine justice. He does however remind us that punishment in political society should have a somewhat different orientation than the punishments of God.
All who sin mortally are deserving of eternal death, as regards future retribution which is in accordance with the truth of divine judgement. But the punishments of this life are more of a medicinal character; wherefore the punishment of death is inflicted on those sins alone which induce to the grave undoing [pernicies] of others. 62
We have already seen that punishment can be medicinal. What we now learn is that the punishments ‘of this life’, which undoubtedly include those inflicted by political authority, are more medicinal than retributive. The fact that human punishments are ‘more of a medicinal character’ does not mean of course that they are exclusively medicinal. If they were, the equality of justice would be entirely beside the point of human punishments (which Aquinas obviously does not hold). It also does not mean that divine punishments are exclusively retributive. As Aquinas argues more than once, divine punishments are sometimes inflicted upon man “for the sake of his soul’s health and the glory of God”. Such is Aquinas’s explanation for the punishment of the blind man in chapter nine of Johns Gospel who was punished neither for his own sins nor the sins of his parents, but that the “works of God may be manifested, and from them that God be known”. We must take this remark to mean just what it says, namely, that human punishments are more medicinal than retributive, and should therefore be* primarily *designed to restore criminals back to wilfully law abiding citizens (just as medicines restore sick people to health), protecting society and deterring other potential criminals, since ”the punishment inflicted according to human laws is not always intended as a medicine to the one who is punished, but sometimes only for others … that at least they may be deterred from crime through fear of punishment.”
Thomas Aquinas and the Philosophy of Punishment, by Peter Karl Koritansky, pp 166-167
If you allow this singular passage in all of Aquinas discussion on punishment and the death penalty, to have its rightful place in defining the nature of human punishment, it becomes easy to understand the teachings of the post-conciliar Church and how they are in keeping with the doctrines of punishment and of man’s sacredness and inviolability .
 
By the principle of double effect, Aquinas preserves the sacredness of the fifth commandment free of clauses and loopholes.
Is this a trick question??

Summa Theologica (II-II, Qu. 64, Art.7).
Question 64. Murder
Article 2. Whether it is lawful to kill sinners?
…Now every part is directed to the whole, as imperfect to perfect, wherefore every part is naturally for the sake of the whole. For this reason we observe that if the health of the whole body demands the excision of a member, through its being decayed or infectious to the other members, it will be both praiseworthy and advantageous to have it cut away. Now every individual person is compared to the whole community, as part to whole. Therefore if a man be dangerous and infectious to the community, on account of some sin, it is praiseworthy and advantageous that he be killed in order to safeguard the common good, since “a little leaven corrupteth the whole lump” (1 Corinthians 5:6).
Reply to Objection 1. Our Lord commanded them to forbear from uprooting the cockle in order to spare the wheat, i.e. the good. This occurs when the wicked cannot be slain without the good being killed with them, either because the wicked lie hidden among the good, or because they have many followers, so that they cannot be killed without danger to the good, as Augustine says (Contra Parmen. iii, 2). Wherefore our Lord teaches that we should rather allow the wicked to live, and that vengeance is to be delayed until the last judgment, rather than that the good be put to death together with the wicked. When, however, the good incur no danger, but rather are protected and saved by the slaying of the wicked, then the latter may be lawfully put to death.
Reply to Objection 2. According to the order of His wisdom, God sometimes slays sinners forthwith in order to deliver the good, whereas sometimes He allows them time to repent, according as He knows what is expedient for His elect. This also does human justice imitate according to its powers; for it puts to death those who are dangerous to others, while it allows time for repentance to those who sin without grievously harming others.
Reply to Objection 3. By sinning man departs from the order of reason, and consequently falls away from the dignity of his manhood, in so far as he is naturally free, and exists for himself, and he falls into the slavish state of the beasts, by being disposed of according as he is useful to others. This is expressed in Psalm 48:21: “Man, when he was in honor, did not understand; he hath been compared to senseless beasts, and made like to them,” and Proverbs 11:29: “The fool shall serve the wise.” Hence, although it be evil in itself to kill a man so long as he preserve his dignity, yet it may be good to kill a man who has sinned, even as it is to kill a beast. For a bad man is worse than a beast, and is more harmful, as the Philosopher states (Polit. i, 1 and Ethic. vii, 6).
 
Consider this explanation from a later chapter, ‘Beyond Retribution’ from the book which David Lukenbill has cited above.

If you allow this singular passage in all of Aquinas discussion on punishment and the death penalty, to have its rightful place in defining the nature of human punishment, it becomes easy to understand the teachings of the post-conciliar Church and how they are in keeping with the doctrines of punishment and of man’s sacredness and inviolability .
Koritansky then goes on to say:

“But why are human punishments more medicinal? Looking back upon Aquinas’s argument for the debt of punishment (upon which the entire institution of punishment’s legitimacy depends), he seemed to say that the punishments of political society are independent of those inflicted by God.” (p. 167)

And aren’t the punishments inflicted by God models of those preached by the Church?

I am not debating the right of worldly governments, like your country, to abolish capital punishment, nor would I describe them as being anti-Christian; but we all know who is the prince of this world and he absolutely loves any manifestation of degradation of the sanctity of life, which I think abolishing capital punishment certainly does.

The Church stands on truth and the ancient truth of the Church is that of lex talionis, as validated through her only universal catechisms, Trent and Vatican II.

The language may have softened, Peter may bend to the spirit of the age and agree with many of the bishops in calling for an abolition—but again, I think this is based on an incorrect analysis of the ability of penal technology to protect the innocent from the unjust aggressor—but through it all the truth stands, the Church supports capital punishment.
 
“…Aquinas does not adhere to a strict version of the *lex talionis *which demands that punishment return the same kind of evil upon the criminal that he himself perpetuated. Instead, it is sufficient that the criminal’s sinful will be repressed by the infliction of some contrary evil, not necessarily for the purpose of rectifying the criminal’s will, but for repairing the order of justice that was damaged by the original act. … Again, this dimension of Aquinas’s understanding of punishment has emphatically retributive overtones…”(pp. 105-106) Koritansky
I’ve engaged in this debate for a half dozen years now and the one point that is consistently misunderstood is the meaning of “redressing the disorder.” This is unfortunate inasmuch as this is given in the catechism as the primary purpose of punishment. Koritansky’s comment about Aquinas believing that the purpose of punishment is “repairing the order of justice” means exactly the same thing and this is why Koritansky finds within Aquinas’ works “retributive overtones.” Redressing the disorder, repairing the order of justice, and retribution all mean the same thing. Even the USCCB has said as much:*The third justifying purpose for punishment is retribution or the restoration of the order of justice which has been violated by the action of the criminal. *(1980 statement on capital punishment)
Aquinas explains this in his section on the debt of punishment:*the act of sin makes man deserving of punishment, in so far as he transgresses the order of Divine justice, to which he cannot return except he pay some sort of penal compensation, which restores him to the equality of justice *(ST I-II 87,6)
Ender
 
I’ve engaged in this debate for a half dozen years now and the one point that is consistently misunderstood is the meaning of “redressing the disorder.” This is unfortunate inasmuch as this is given in the catechism as the primary purpose of punishment. Koritansky’s comment about Aquinas believing that the purpose of punishment is “repairing the order of justice” means exactly the same thing and this is why Koritansky finds within Aquinas’ works “retributive overtones.” Redressing the disorder, repairing the order of justice, and retribution all mean the same thing.
Koritansky goes on to say on p168…
Far from enjoying independence from divine providence, human affairs are embraced by the eternal law which Aquinas understands as nothing other than “the very idea of the government of things in God, the ruler of the universe”. In a way, then, the punishments of political society still originate in God “at whose behest” and according to whose providence are carried out by legitimate human authorities. This may explain, therefore, why Aquinas does not consider it the primary responsibility of human law to punish with a view to “future retribution”. Although a crime that goes unpunished results in a real injustice, humans may take comfort in the inevitable retribution that God will render to everyone for their violations of human and divine law alike. For this reason Aquinas can emphasise the validity of retribution in matters of criminal punishment without insisting upon it’s centrality. Far more central, it seems, is the stability, order, and moral virtue of political society that would be compromised without human punishments on account of those who “pay little attention to the punishments inflicted by God”. … Considering the additional (and often competing) “medicinal” goals of punishment, the limitations of the human condition, and the larger order of divine providence of which human society is only a part, Aquinas can only recommend a retributive theory of punishment that considerably understates the necessity of retribution. P168
 
Consider this explanation from a later chapter, ‘Beyond Retribution’ from the book which David Lukenbill has cited above. " We must take this remark to mean just what it says, namely, that human punishments are more medicinal than retributive, and should therefore be* primarily *designed to restore criminals back to wilfully law abiding citizens (just as medicines restore sick people to health), protecting society and deterring other potential criminals, since ”the punishment inflicted according to human laws is not always intended as a medicine to the one who is punished, but sometimes only for others … that at least they may be deterred from crime through fear of punishment.”
I disagree with Koritansky; he has misinterpreted what Aquinas said. First of all we cannot accept that punishment is “primarily designed to restore criminals back to willfully law abiding citizens …, protecting society and deterring other potential criminals” as this would directly contradict what the catechism says, which is that "The primary scope of the penalty is to redress the disorder caused by the offense."

What Koritansky lists are the three secondary objectives of punishment: rehabilitation, protection, and deterrence. What the catechism names as the primary objective is … retribution. It should be unmistakably clear that of these four objectives the only one directed at past actions is retribution. Protection and deterrence are directed at preventing future crimes and rehabilitation is directed at repairing the criminal but even perfect rehabilitation on his part does nothing to repair the disorder caused by his crimes. If Koritansky is right then Aquinas has completely misunderstood punishment.
If you allow this singular passage in all of Aquinas discussion on punishment and the death penalty, to have its rightful place in defining the nature of human punishment…
It is not a singular passage; it is a part of the whole. It is not possible to believe Aquinas felt retribution was to be left to God when he explicitly says otherwise:* … in every community, he who governs the community, cares, first of all, for the common good; wherefore it is his business to award retribution for such things as are done well or ill in the community. *(ST I-II 21,4) It is true that punishments in this life are medicinal. It is also true that retribution (in this life) is medicinal.
… man’s sacredness and inviolability .
You keep implying things about which you are unwilling to be explicit. If you believe that man’s life is inviolable - meaning that it may never be taken under any circumstance - then say so. It is inappropriate and misleading to use a term while intentionally leaving its meaning ambiguous.

Ender
 
Is this a trick question??

Summa Theologica (II-II, Qu. 64, Art.7).
Question 64. Murder
Article 2. Whether it is lawful to kill sinners?
There is nothing in this section that relates to the principle of double effect. I’m sure Aquinas addresses this principle somewhere, but he doesn’t do it here. There are four criteria that must be satisfied for the principle to justify an action and none of the four are identified in this section. When and if you find Aquinas’ explanation of the principle of double effect you will likely find that it does not apply to capital punishment.*The personal self-defender needs to be forced into performing the lethal action; the soldier, the minister of the judge, and the executioner do not. Since the latter three figures do not necessarily act on the spur of the moment and since, when not so acting, they have various means at their disposal, force (in the sense we have been discussing) cannot be the morally decisive factor. ***In other words, given their shared context as officers of the law, the principle of double effect as set out by Aquinas cannot apply to them. **(Kevin L. Flannery, S.J.)
Ender
 
Koritansky goes on to say on p168…"Aquinas does not consider it the primary responsibility of human law to punish with a view to “future retribution”.
I’m not sure what Koritansky means by this. Aquinas surely accepted that the final retribution would be God’s, not man’s - and this punishment by the way would not be medicinal. Man nonetheless has his responsibility to impose punishment in this life as justly as he can.
Although a crime that goes unpunished results in a real injustice, humans may take comfort in the inevitable retribution that God will render to everyone for their violations of human and divine law alike. For this reason Aquinas can emphasise the validity of retribution in matters of criminal punishment without insisting upon it’s centrality. Far more central, it seems, is the stability, order, and moral virtue of political society that would be compromised without human punishments on account of those who “pay little attention to the punishments inflicted by God”
I think Koritansky fails to appreciate the connection between retribution and the order of society inasmuch as he sees these as separate rather than dependent. The order of society is restored by retributive punishment which is an obligation of justice.God does not delight in punishments for their own sake; but He does delight in the order of His justice, which requires them. (ST I-II 87, 3 ad 3)

the act of sin makes man deserving of punishment, in so far as he transgresses the order of Divine justice, to which he cannot return except he pay some sort of penal compensation, which** restores him to the equality of justice** (Ibid 87,6)
I think Koritansky confuses divine retribution with man’s retributive punishment and believes that because Aquinas said “retribution is reserved to the Divine judgment” he also meant that retribution is denied to man, but this is not at all what was meant, for Aquinas also said this:Now the punishments* of this life** are sought, not for their own sake, because this is not the final time of retribution, but in their character of medicine, conducing either to the amendment of the sinner, or to the good of the commonwealth whose calm is ensured by the punishment of evil-doers.* (ST II-II 68,1)
This is exactly what Long meant when he said:The end is not punishment, but rather the manifestation of a divine norm of retributive justice, which entails proportionate equality vis-à-vis the crime. While this end is in the wide sense medicinal, its form is retributive
Justice is itself medicinal and conducive to the good of the commonwealth *“because the judge has care of the common good, which is justice.” *(ST I-II 19,10)

Ender
 
I may be in over my head here and way late to the game. But I just checked the U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops Web site and they seem united against the death penalty.

usccb.org/issues-and-action/human-life-and-dignity/death-penalty-capital-punishment/

Also, has anyone discussed this quote?

“The dignity of human life must never be taken away, even in the case of someone who has done great evil. Modern society has the means of protecting itself, without definitively denying criminals the chance to reform.”
–Pope John Paul II, Evangelium Vitae, 1995
 
I just checked the U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops Web site and they seem united against the death penalty.
There is no doubt but that the USCCB and probably most bishops as well oppose the application of capital punishment, but the real issue is not whether they personally oppose its use but whether there is a moral reason to oppose it. The church has throughout her entire history recognized the right of states to employ it so the question is this: do the bishops oppose the death penalty for practical or moral reasons?
Also, has anyone discussed this quote?
“The dignity of human life must never be taken away, even in the case of someone who has done great evil. Modern society has the means of protecting itself, without definitively denying criminals the chance to reform.”
–Pope John Paul II, Evangelium Vitae, 1995
My objection here is not to what is said - after all, who would support denying a person’s human dignity? - but to what is implied: that capital punishment in fact does just that. If we concede that this is true then we also have to concede that the church supported something that would seem to be evil for 20 centuries. I’m not willing to concede that.

Ender
 
There is no doubt but that the USCCB and probably most bishops as well oppose the application of capital punishment, but the real issue is not whether they personally oppose its use but whether there is a moral reason to oppose it. The church has throughout her entire history recognized the right of states to employ it so the question is this: do the bishops oppose the death penalty for practical or moral reasons?
My objection here is not to what is said - after all, who would support denying a person’s human dignity? - but to what is implied: that capital punishment in fact does just that. If we concede that this is true then we also have to concede that the church supported something that would seem to be evil for 20 centuries. I’m not willing to concede that.

Ender
I think if we follow Church teaching on this matter, there are people who are too dangerous to live behind bars. A case in point involves leaders of the Aryan Brotherhood prison gang ordering murders even while in solitary confinement.

adl.org/combating-hate/domestic-extremism-terrorism/c/four-aryan-brotherhood.html

Serving life sentences in solitary confinement, they have nothing to lose by ordering murders. Execution is the only way to prevent future murders – at least at the orders of these men.

Others would include spies who could continue leaking information dangerous to our country even while behind bars. Robert Hanssen comes to mind.

And there are those who may serve as a rallying point for other criminals.

In any case, I think there is some wiggle room here. And an absolute ban against the death penalty is not the way to go.
 
There is no doubt but that the USCCB and probably most bishops as well oppose the application of capital punishment, but the real issue is not whether they personally oppose its use but whether there is a moral reason to oppose it. The church has throughout her entire history recognized the right of states to employ it so the question is this: do the bishops oppose the death penalty for practical or moral reasons?
My objection here is not to what is said - after all, who would support denying a person’s human dignity? - but to what is implied: that capital punishment in fact does just that. If we concede that this is true then we also have to concede that the church supported something that would seem to be evil for 20 centuries. I’m not willing to concede that.

Ender
Dear Ender,

Cordial greetings and a very good day. Hope all is well.

Indeed, dear friend, how could Holy Mother Church have been so mistaken throughout its entire history as regards its endorsement of capital punishment for the heinous crime of murder? This surely is the pressing question that demands an answer from our abolitionist brethren. Following the divine mandate of Genesis 9; 6, did it not believe and teach that the death penalty was an appropriate and fitting punishment for those found guilty of murderous violence?

Moreover, dear friend, is it not the dignity of man being made in the image of God that actually warrants the death penalty for murder, rather than forbids it? The reference to the image of God in Genesis 9: 6 gives the whole rationale for the death penalty, not the protection of society, though that would not, of course, be excluded. Besides, how is it possible for any evolution in thought to alter or invalidate this original divine mandate, which must be as true today as it was Noah’s times since there has been no suspension of man being made in the image of God? It surely follows then that if there has been no abrogation of man being made in the image of God, then the divine mandate continues to be standing Church teaching, as does the whole rationale for the death penalty. Indeed, according to the present Church Catechism, after referencing Genesis 9: 6, it clearly states that “This teaching remains necessary for all time” (para. 2260). How would those who argue for the abolition of the death penalty, on the grounds that it is cruel and harsh and has no place in a civilised society, respond to this?

God bless.

Warmest good wishes,

Portrait

Pax
 
Dear Portrait:

What do you make of this statement from the Catechism 2267?

If, however, non-lethal means are sufficient to defend and protect people’s safety from the aggressor, authority will limit itself to such means, as these are more in keeping with the concrete conditions of the common good and more in conformity to the dignity of the human person.

Today, in fact, as a consequence of the possibilities which the state has for effectively preventing crime, by rendering one who has committed an offense incapable of doing harm - without definitely taking away from him the possibility of redeeming himself - the cases in which the execution of the offender is an absolute necessity “are very rare, if not practically nonexistent.” (Emphasis mine)
 
Dear Portrait:

What do you make of this statement from the Catechism 2267?

If, however, non-lethal means are sufficient to defend and protect people’s safety from the aggressor, authority will limit itself to such means, as these are more in keeping with the concrete conditions of the common good and more in conformity to the dignity of the human person.

Today, in fact, as a consequence of the possibilities which the state has for effectively preventing crime, by rendering one who has committed an offense incapable of doing harm - without definitely taking away from him the possibility of redeeming himself - the cases in which the execution of the offender is an absolute necessity “are very rare, if not practically nonexistent.” (Emphasis mine)
Dear njlisa,

Cordial greetings and a very good day. Thankyou for your response.

What I think, dear friend, is that the current Church teaching on capital punishment is a mess and ought to be revisited without delay so that the confusion can be resolved for the faithful. The multiple threads here on these boards, for example, only highlights the genuine confusion that sadly exists, not that there are a handful of rebellious people who obstinately refuse to accept a change in Church teaching. Many good men accept paras. 2260 and 2266 without reservation, but would contend that one cannot concur with those sections *and * with para. 2267. Moreover, as Ender has endlessly pointed out, one cannot harmonise para. 2267 with the constant teaching of Holy Mother Church for two millennia on the issues of punishment, expiation, retributive justice and restitution et al.

It is, dear friend, an incontrovertible fact that there has been a radical shift in the Church’s understanding of capital punishment in recent years. Indeed, one might even characterise it as a major U-turn. Here is what Mr. Keating (founder of Catholic Answers) has said:

“the “Catechism” has not dealt with the death penalty in a sufficiently full way. It has limited itself to just one aspect, public safety, while not even discussing the other traditional purpose of punishment. Beyond that it has included a prudential judgement (the only such one in the Catechism on any topic, so far as I am aware) that, by its nature, cannot be binding in conscience”

(Karl Keating’s E Letter, 2nd March 2004).

God bless.

Warmest good wishes,

Portrait

Pax
 
Dear Portrait:

Thank you so much for your very enlightening response.
Dear njlisa,

Hello again. You are more than welcome, dear friend, and I am pleased that it was of some help.

God bless.

Warmest good wishes,

Portrait

Pax:tiphat:
 
It is, dear friend, an incontrovertible fact that there has been a radical shift in the Church’s understanding of capital punishment in recent years.
I think there is not a better explanation of that shift than that by Romano Amerio, from his book Iota Unum: A Study of Changes in the Catholic Church in the XXth Century, (sections 187- 190) which we are blessed to have, in its entirety, online at
domid.blogspot.com/2007/05/amerio-on-capital-punishment.html
 
I think if we follow Church teaching on this matter…
One point that seems generally forgotten is that church teaching on this matter did not originate in 1995, that in fact it goes back to the beginning of the church and to “follow church teaching” means just that: following all the church does and has taught.
In any case, I think there is some wiggle room here. And an absolute ban against the death penalty is not the way to go.
There is no argument that the church has banned capital punishment. She cannot ban it absolutely without declaring it an intrinsic evil and that she will never do.*The death penalty is not intrinsically evil. Both Scripture and long Christian tradition acknowledge the legitimacy of capital punishment under certain circumstances. The Church cannot repudiate that without repudiating her own identity. *(Archbishop Chaput)
Ender
 
Indeed, dear friend, how could Holy Mother Church have been so mistaken throughout its entire history as regards its endorsement of capital punishment for the heinous crime of murder? This surely is the pressing question that demands an answer from our abolitionist brethren. Following the divine mandate of Genesis 9; 6, did it not believe and teach that the death penalty was an appropriate and fitting punishment for those found guilty of murderous violence?
I think this is a question that has no answer. The argument is made that the church supported capital punishment as a necessary means of protecting society but in fact that was never the argument she used. Rather it was that the crime of murder is abhorrent and capital punishment was necessary to impress on man the truly heinous nature of the sin. This point is made in the Catechism of Trent:Of these remedies {for the disease of murder}* the most efficacious is to form a just conception of the wickedness of murder. *
Aquinas made the same point in the Summa Contra Gentiles:*Now the will must withdraw from sin by taking the course contrary to that which led it into sin. But it was led into sin by appetite and delight in inferior things. Therefore it must withdraw from sin by certain penal inflictions. As delight drew it to consent to sin, so these inflictions strengthen it in abomination of sin. *(Bk III, Ch 151)
But the church’s understanding of sin is completely at odds with the modern perception of crime not as sin but as a social failure.*According to this usage … practically every sin is a social sin, in the sense that blame for it is to be placed not so much on the moral conscience of an individual but rather on some vague entity or anonymous collectivity, such as the situation, the system, society, structures, or institutions. *(JPII Reconciliatio et Paenitentia, #16)
What becomes of our understanding of punishment once we have lost our sense of sin?*Nothing but sin deserves punishment *(Aquinas)
*
A model of society which is mutilated or distorted in one sense or another, as is often encouraged by the mass media, greatly favors the gradual loss of the sense of sin. *(JPII)
If there is no sin how do we justify any punishment? because if crime is the fault of society and not the individual then even Catholics cannot believe it is just to punish someone. What we are left with is the rationalization that it is just to inflict hardship on someone - prison or death - to protect ourselves. That is, it is not punishment that is just but defense that is allowed.

The current opposition to the use of capital punishment is apparently because of the perception that modern societies fail to recognize the true nature of punishment. In this modern perspective, the death penalty expresses not the divine judgment on objective evil but rather the collective anger of the group. The retributive goal of punishment is misconstrued as a self-assertive act of vengeance. (Dulles)
I think the church has reinforced this error by not opposing it.* Now if the church is the pillar and bulwark of the truth and is placed in the world as mother and teacher, how could she neglect the task of teaching the truth which constitutes a path of life?* (JPII)
Ender
 
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