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LongingSoul
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Consider this explanation from a later chapter, ‘Beyond Retribution’ from the book which David Lukenbill has cited above.Originally Posted by LongingSoul
This is how I understand ‘medicinal’ here.
Punishment has the primary aim of redressing the disorder introduced by the offense. …
Aquinas does not take issue with the general principle that human authority should imitate divine justice. He does however remind us that punishment in political society should have a somewhat different orientation than the punishments of God.All who sin mortally are deserving of eternal death, as regards future retribution which is in accordance with the truth of divine judgement. But the punishments of this life are more of a medicinal character; wherefore the punishment of death is inflicted on those sins alone which induce to the grave undoing [pernicies] of others. 62We have already seen that punishment can be medicinal. What we now learn is that the punishments ‘of this life’, which undoubtedly include those inflicted by political authority, are more medicinal than retributive. The fact that human punishments are ‘more of a medicinal character’ does not mean of course that they are exclusively medicinal. If they were, the equality of justice would be entirely beside the point of human punishments (which Aquinas obviously does not hold). It also does not mean that divine punishments are exclusively retributive. As Aquinas argues more than once, divine punishments are sometimes inflicted upon man “for the sake of his soul’s health and the glory of God”. Such is Aquinas’s explanation for the punishment of the blind man in chapter nine of Johns Gospel who was punished neither for his own sins nor the sins of his parents, but that the “works of God may be manifested, and from them that God be known”. We must take this remark to mean just what it says, namely, that human punishments are more medicinal than retributive, and should therefore be* primarily *designed to restore criminals back to wilfully law abiding citizens (just as medicines restore sick people to health), protecting society and deterring other potential criminals, since ”the punishment inflicted according to human laws is not always intended as a medicine to the one who is punished, but sometimes only for others … that at least they may be deterred from crime through fear of punishment.”If you allow this singular passage in all of Aquinas discussion on punishment and the death penalty, to have its rightful place in defining the nature of human punishment, it becomes easy to understand the teachings of the post-conciliar Church and how they are in keeping with the doctrines of punishment and of man’s sacredness and inviolability .Thomas Aquinas and the Philosophy of Punishment, by Peter Karl Koritansky, pp 166-167