Does fatalism follow from Divine simplicity?

[CatholicSoxFan]

I’ve been looking a lot into the issue of free will recently, and I’m not sure how to answer this problem: basically (correct me if I’m wrong), Divine simplicity says that God’s essence is the same as His existence. And part of God’s essence is His knowledge. And since God’s existence is necessary, that would mean that God’s knowledge is also necessary. But doesn’t that mean fatalism? If any of God’s knowledge could have been different, that would mean that part of His essence, and thus His existence, isn’t necessary, and He isn’t a perfect being.

 

[Counterpoint]

I’ve been looking a lot into the issue of free will recently, and I’m not sure how to answer this problem: basically (correct me if I’m wrong), Divine simplicity says that God’s essence is the same as His existence. And part of God’s essence is His knowledge. And since God’s existence is necessary, that would mean that God’s knowledge is also necessary. But doesn’t that mean fatalism? If any of God’s knowledge could have been different, that would mean that part of His essence, and thus His existence, isn’t necessary, and He isn’t a perfect being.

It does imply the creation was necessary.

 

[davidv]

I’ve been looking a lot into the issue of free will recently, and I’m not sure how to answer this problem: basically (correct me if I’m wrong), Divine simplicity says that God’s essence is the same as His existence. And part of God’s essence is His knowledge. And since God’s existence is necessary, that would mean that God’s knowledge is also necessary. But doesn’t that mean fatalism? If any of God’s knowledge could have been different, that would mean that part of His essence, and thus His existence, isn’t necessary, and He isn’t a perfect being.

Given this:

Divine Simplicity
First published Mon Mar 20, 2006; substantive revision Fri Jul 2, 2010
According to the classical theism of Augustine, Anselm, Aquinas and their adherents, God is radically unlike creatures in that he is devoid of any complexity or composition, whether physical or metaphysical. Besides lacking spatial and temporal parts, God is free of matter/form composition, potency/act composition, and existence/essence composition. There is also no real distinction between God as subject of his attributes and his attributes. God is thus in a sense requiring clarification identical to each of his attributes, which implies that each attribute is identical to every other one. God is omniscient, then, not in virtue of instantiating or exemplifying omniscience — which would imply a real distinction between God and the property of omniscience — but by being omniscience… (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)

Your conclusion does not follow. Since God’s knowledge is not separate from Himself and He is immutable, His knowledge does not change. However, His knowledge of our choices is not the cause of our choices.

 

[belorg]

I’ve been looking a lot into the issue of free will recently, and I’m not sure how to answer this problem: basically (correct me if I’m wrong), Divine simplicity says that God’s essence is the same as His existence. And part of God’s essence is His knowledge. And since God’s existence is necessary, that would mean that God’s knowledge is also necessary. But doesn’t that mean fatalism? If any of God’s knowledge could have been different, that would mean that part of His essence, and thus His existence, isn’t necessary, and He isn’t a perfect being.

Short answer: yes.
It’s even worse: God’s knowledge is necssary and therefore unchnaging and immutable, which means every proposition that God knows is necessarily true. If God knows that I will have corn flakes for breakfast, it is necessarily the case that I will have corn flakes for breakfast.
Since I cannot change a necessary fact, fatalism is the only possibility.
It also entails divine fatalism by the way: it reduces God to an automaton.

 

[belorg]

Given this:Your conclusion does not follow. Since God’s knowledge is not separate from Himself and He is immutable, His knowledge does not change. However, His knowledge of our choices is not the cause of our choices.

Maybe not, but since His knowledge is immutable, our ‘choices’ must also be immutable. Which means they are not real choices.

 

[davidv]

Maybe not, but since His knowledge is immutable, our ‘choices’ must also be immutable.

I agree our choices are immutable, as we cannot unmake them. However this does imply that we weren’t free to make a different choice.

Which means they are not real choices.

Non sequiteur.

 

[CatholicSoxFan]

Maybe not, but since His knowledge is immutable, our ‘choices’ must also be immutable. Which means they are not real choices.

Well no. Unless immutable means necessarry, that doesn’t follow at all. If we did differently then what we did, God would just foreknow that we did differently. As Craig points out, the argument for fatalism commits a fallacy in modal logic.

 

[belorg]

Well no. Unless immutable means necessarry, that doesn’t follow at all. If we did differently then what we did, God would just foreknow that we did differently. As Craig points out, the argument for fatalism commits a fallacy in modal logic.

Immutable does not mean necessary, but I am working under the assumption that what you say is correct, and from what you say here:

CatholicSoxFan:

And since God’s existence is necessary, that would mean that God’s knowledge is also necessary.

It definitely follows that God’s knwoledge is both immutable and necessary.
So, maybe there are arguments for fatalism that commit a modal fallacy, but mine doesn’t.
It should also be noted that WL Craig does not believe in Divine Simplicity.

 

[belorg]

I agree our choices are immutable, as we cannot unmake them. However this does imply that we weren’t free to make a different choice.

Then God’s knowledge would be different, which is impossible on CatholicSoxFan’s scenario.

Non sequiteur.

On CatholicSoxFan’s scenario, this is not a non-sequitur.

 

[TarkanAttila]

We do not know what we are going to do. We make choices. And once those choices have been made, we cannot change them.

Is there a difference between that, and knowing a choice is going to be made?

This question is as simple as: is to know the same as to do? Any college professor or CNA trainer can easily tell you “no”. I can “know” how to make an occupied bed. But unless I demonstrate it, unless I do it, I only “know” it, and have not done it.

 

[Mumbles140]

Then God’s knowledge would be different, which is impossible on CatholicSoxFan’s scenario.

On CatholicSoxFan’s scenario, this is not a non-sequitur.

Presuming that God’s knowledge would change based on when you made your choice, which is confining God to time and space as we understand and experience it. But the Church does not hold God to our time and space. Therefore, He sees the choice after it has been made. While not affecting it, He knows it.

To clarify the issue of changing of one’s mind, God also knows that the person debated between Cornflakes and Cheerios at that particular instant and which one they chose. It’s not like God made billions of predictions for the entire world when He created it and then watched to make sure they came true - that is a constraint upon God to follow the time that He created. But by being outside of time, He sees all, and thus knows all things at all times for all eternity.

 

[ccmnxc]

Not sure if it matters much, and I’m certainly no expert, but are we working under a contemporary or Scholastic form of modality?

 

[belorg]

Presuming that God’s knowledge would change based on when you made your choice, which is confining God to time and space as we understand and experience it. But the Church does not hold God to our time and space. Therefore, He sees the choice after it has been made. While not affecting it, He knows it.

To clarify the issue of changing of one’s mind, God also knows that the person debated between Cornflakes and Cheerios at that particular instant and which one they chose. It’s not like God made billions of predictions for the entire world when He created it and then watched to make sure they came true - that is a constraint upon God to follow the time that He created. But by being outside of time, He sees all, and thus knows all things at all times for all eternity.

That’s exactly why this entails fatalism.

 

[polytropos]

God’s knowledge is necssary and therefore unchnaging and immutable, which means every proposition that God knows is necessarily true. If God knows that I will have corn flakes for breakfast, it is necessarily the case that I will have corn flakes for breakfast.

God’s knowledge is not necessary unless God is the same in all possible worlds. But that is not required for divine simplicity and noncomposition. (And since God’s differing across possible worlds is consistent with noncomposition, it can’t be asked what the sufficient reason for the difference is, for the scholastic principle of sufficient reason would require a potentiality if it were to demand application.)

L = necessarily
K = God knows that

So we have: L(Kp → p). Necessarily, if God knows that p, then p. From this it does not follow that Lp except by an invalid modal operator shift.

 

[polytropos]

Divine simplicity says that God’s essence is the same as His existence. And part of God’s essence is His knowledge. And since God’s existence is necessary, that would mean that God’s knowledge is also necessary.

God’s essence = God’s existence = God’s intellect.

God’s objects of knowledge (for example, “in the actual world, it is true that p”), however, need not be identical to God given divine simplicity. On Aquinas’s formulation, for instance, even though creatures have a real relation to God as a consequence of being created, God does not have a real relation to creatures. God’s knowledge of particulars being a function of what God creates, what God knows need not be identical to his existence.

 

[Mumbles140]

That’s exactly why this entails fatalism.

I disagree. God’s knowledge of what will transpire does not predetermine those specific events to transpire. You are only looking historically, whereas God is outside of time. He is not ahead of the event, at the event, or after the event because He is not even on the curve. He created the curve, He is not a part of it.

Currently, World Cup is approaching. Right now, we do not have knowledge of who will win. In about two months, everyone will know who won. Now if someone were to time travel from July 31st to May 31st and tell us who wins the World Cup, that outcome may be ‘inevitable’ in the sense that it has already occurred (to our Time Traveler), but I would hardly call it predetermined because our Time Traveler was an observer - he had no participation which in any way affected the matter. The games were still played, the best team won, and that was that.

 

[belorg]

God’s knowledge is not necessary unless God is the same in all possible worlds. But that is not required for divine simplicity and noncomposition. (And since God’s differing across possible worlds is consistent with noncomposition, it can’t be asked what the sufficient reason for the difference is, for the scholastic principle of sufficient reason would require a potentiality if it were to demand application.)

L = necessarily
K = God knows that

So we have: L(Kp → p). Necessarily, if God knows that p, then p. From this it does not follow that Lp except by an invalid modal operator shift.

Firstly, I am working from CatholicSoxFan’s observation that “…since God’s existence is necessary, that would mean that God’s knowledge is also necessary.”
That leads to fatalism, there is no doubt about that.

Secondly, God cannot differ across possible worlds in His essence, so it has to be in His accidents. But God, being simple and being “existence itself” and “Pure Act” has no accidents. So, it does follow from Divine Simplicity, together with the Thomistic notion of Pure Act and the notion of God’s necessity that God is the same in all possible worlds. So, unless you deny either Divine Simplicity oo Divine Necessity or God as Pure Act, there’s simply no escape from that fact.

God’s objects of knowledge (for example, “in the actual world, it is true that p”), however, need not be identical to God given divine simplicity. On Aquinas’s formulation, for instance, even though creatures have a real relation to God as a consequence of being created, God does not have a real relation to creatures. God’s knowledge of particulars being a function of what God creates, what God knows need not be identical to his existence.

God’s knowledge prior to creation is a result of God’s intellect, which you admit = His essence. God’s essence is the same in every possible world. Therefore, God’s knowledge prior to creation is the same in every possible world too. And since what God creates is a result of His prior knowledge, what god creates is also the same in every possible world.

 

[belorg]

I disagree. God’s knowledge of what will transpire does not predetermine those specific events to transpire. You are only looking historically, whereas God is outside of time. He is not ahead of the event, at the event, or after the event because He is not even on the curve. He created the curve, He is not a part of it.

Is the “curve” unchangable or not? If it is unchangable, then God does predetermine those specific events.

Currently, World Cup is approaching. Right now, we do not have knowledge of who will win. In about two months, everyone will know who won. Now if someone were to time travel from July 31st to May 31st and tell us who wins the World Cup, that outcome may be ‘inevitable’ in the sense that it has already occurred (to our Time Traveler), but I would hardly call it predetermined because our Time Traveler was an observer - he had no participation which in any way affected the matter. The games were still played, the best team won, and that was that.

If a time traveler returns from July 31st and it is a fact on May 31st that, say Spain, will win the World Cup, then Spain’s winning the World Cup is determined. I don’t care by whom.

 

[polytropos]

Secondly, God cannot differ across possible worlds in His essence, so it has to be in His accidents.

Sure he can. Divine simplicity states that there is no composition or potentiality in God. God’s essence does not have to be the same in two possible worlds as long as he does not have a potentiality in world A to be of the essence that he is in world B. But that requirement is met so long as it is not possible that he change.

God’s knowledge prior to creation is a result of God’s intellect, which you admit = His essence. God’s essence is the same in every possible world. Therefore, God’s knowledge prior to creation is the same in every possible world too. And since what God creates is a result of His prior knowledge, what god creates is also the same in every possible world.

God does not have knowledge (besides knowledge of himself) “prior to creation.”* His knowledge of particulars is based on his act of creation (for he creates his objects of knowledge). But God’s relation to creation is not a real relation; it is a Cambridge relation. It can thus differ across possible worlds without him having either an active or a passive potency to create or know.

*One could perhaps speak of what knowledge God has in all possible worlds, namely knowledge of himself. But the distinction there drawn is only a virtual, and not a real, distinction. It is like distinguishing between God’s antecedent and consequent will. God does not actually have an antecedent will.

 

[belorg]

Sure he can. Divine simplicity states that there is no composition or potentiality in God. God’s essence does not have to be the same in two possible worlds as long as he does not have a potentiality in world A to be of the essence that he is in world B. But that requirement is met so long as it is not possible that he change.

So, which god is necessary? Not the god in w1 since he doesn’t exist in w2. In your scenario, God is not a necessary being.

God does not have knowledge (besides knowledge of himself) “prior to creation.”* His knowledge of particulars is based on his act of creation (for he creates his objects of knowledge). But God’s relation to creation is not a real relation; it is a Cambridge relation. It can thus differ across possible worlds without him having either an active or a passive potency to create or know.

No, it is not a “Cambridge relation”. What God decides to create is based on His knowledge ontically prior to the actual act of creatio, which, due to His simplicity cannot differ from His knowledge posterior to the act of creation. Hence, the problem remains.