Does fatalism follow from Divine simplicity?

[polytropos]

So, which god is necessary? Not the god in w1 since he doesn’t exist in w2. In your scenario, God is not a necessary being.

God’s differing across possible worlds does not imply that he is a different God in each possible world anymore than your acting differently in different possible worlds implies that you only exist in one possible world. (Further, classical theists tend to reject modalities that rely too much on possible worlds semantics. Possible worlds are at best a metric for stating external modalities, ie. modalities that do not attribute de re potentialities to God.)

No, it is not a “Cambridge relation”. What God decides to create is based on His knowledge ontically prior to the actual act of creatio, which, due to His simplicity cannot differ from His knowledge posterior to the act of creation. Hence, the problem remains.

The bolded portion begs the question, since God’s knowledge of creatures would only have to be identical of that which he knows necessarily (ie. himself) if his knowledge of creatures is not a Cambridge relation. But that was what you were trying to dispute.

But all of God’s relations to creatures are Cambridge relations.

 

[Mumbles140]

If a time traveler returns from July 31st and it is a fact on May 31st that, say Spain, will win the World Cup, then Spain’s winning the World Cup is determined. I don’t care by whom.

How is it determined? Assume the Time Traveler returns on the 31st, writes the name on a piece of paper, and puts it in an impenetrable, time-lock safe to open after the World Cup Final. Then, the Time Traveler dies. No one has knowledge about the safe, and the Time Traveler has zero effect on any event - no butterfly effect whatsoever. How does his knowledge make it predetermined?

It doesn’t, and this is why. He has experienced the events (personally) in his reality. However, the rest of us, bound by time, have not yet experienced it. We were all free to make our decisions - he simply saw what our decisions were and made note of them as they occurred. The fact that he can travel to a time before we make the decisions doesn’t change the fact that it was still us who made them.

Now, if he were to reveal to us what we would do, that breaks the cycle, which, coincidentally, would break free will. Fortunately, this is not the case, our future is not revealed, and we maintain Free Will by the grace of God.

 

[belorg]

God’s differing across possible worlds does not imply that he is a different God in each possible world anymore than your acting differently in different possible worlds implies that you only exist in one possible world. (Further, classical theists tend to reject modalities that rely too much on possible worlds semantics. Possible worlds are at best a metric for stating external modalities, ie. modalities that do not attribute de re potentialities to God.)

God’s differing in essence (as you said was possible) does by definition, imply that He is a different God in every possibile world in which His essence differ.

The bolded portion begs the question, since God’s knowledge of creatures would only have to be identical of that which he knows necessarily (ie. himself) if his knowledge of creatures is not a Cambridge relation. But that was what you were trying to dispute.

It’s not about relations , it’s about knowledge. Prior to creation either god knows everything he knows posterior to creation, which entails fatalism, or his knowledge changes after creation, because he now knows that “polytropos exists” is true, which he didn’t know prior to creation. But that contradics Divine Simplicity or Actus Purus.

 

[GaryTaylor]

This is the missed point on post #10

“This question is as simple as: is to know the same as to do? Any college professor or CNA trainer can easily tell you “no”. I can “know” how to make an occupied bed. But unless I demonstrate it, unless I do it, I only “know” it, and have not done it.”

To know is not to think, knowing occurs when thinking is ceased and demonstrated by fact, known’s exist outside of us and are “universal” . we just don’t “know” them yet.

The flaw of the argument is to reduce these known-unknowns to the admitted randomness and chance, which undermines determinism by admitting an existing exemplar…

Note the word “choice” is replaced above in restrictive thinking.

However, in terms of genetics, studies do not show that we lack free will choices. When questioned about whether we are at the mercy of our genes, Francis Collins (former head of the Human Genome Project) had this to say:

“You’re talking about genetic determinism, which implies that we are helpless marionettes being controlled by strings made of double helices. That is so far away from what we know scientifically! Heredity does have an influence not only over medical risks but also over certain behaviors and personality traits. But look at identical twins, who have exactly the same DNA but often don’t behave alike or think alike. They show the importance of learning and experience - and free will. I think we all, whether we are religious or not, recognize that free will is a reality.”

If determinism were true and behavior were solely determined by genes, it would be expected that genetically identical twins would think and behave identically, which they don’t.

 

[CatholicSoxFan]

belorg, my assumption that Divine simplicity = God’s knowledge is the same across possible worlds needs to be seen in light of my asking somebody to correct me if I am wrong, and I was in fact corrected.

 

[polytropos]

It’s not about relations , it’s about knowledge.

If the Thomist analyzes knowledge in terms of relations, then it is about both. (Just about everyone analyzes knowledge in terms of relations.)

Prior to creation either god knows everything he knows posterior to creation, which entails fatalism, or his knowledge changes after creation, because he now knows that “polytropos exists” is true, which he didn’t know prior to creation. But that contradics Divine Simplicity or Actus Purus.

Clarify what you mean by “prior” and “posterior” in this context. The “polytropos exists” example suggests a temporal usage, but that can’t be right.

God knows that “polytropos exists,” with some specification of time (or space-time relation). That knowledge can be had eternally. But furthermore, being a function of God’s creation, and God’s relation to creatures being a Cambridge relation, there is no reason why God’s knowledge that “polytropos exists” cannot be contingent even though God’s essence is necessary.

 

[belorg]

If the Thomist analyzes knowledge in terms of relations, then it is about both. (Just about everyone analyzes knowledge in terms of relations.)

Knowledge is about propositions. God has, in His mind, a collection of true and false propositions (or, on Divine Simplicity, one proposition comprising all others). Whenever a proposition changes from false to true or vice versa, there is a change in God’s mind. But since that is impossible, it is impossible for propositions to change, and that’s where fatalism enters the picture.

Clarify what you mean by “prior” and “posterior” in this context. The “polytropos exists” example suggests a temporal usage, but that can’t be right.

I think that illustrates the problem. A simple and immatble God cannot have prior and posterior knwoledge. I was just talking from your perspective.

God knows that “polytropos exists,” with some specification of time (or space-time relation). That knowledge can be had eternally.

To God, everything is present, so there is no need for a specification of time. “polotropos exists” is enough.

But furthermore, being a function of God’s creation, and God’s relation to creatures being a Cambridge relation, there is no reason why God’s knowledge that “polytropos exists” cannot be contingent even though God’s essence is necessary.

God’s knowledge = God’s essence. Simple things cannot have parts.

 

[polytropos]

Knowledge is about propositions. God has, in His mind, a collection of true and false propositions (or, on Divine Simplicity, one proposition comprising all others).

“Knowledge is about propositions” is rather simplistic way to put it. It might be said that knowledge is propositional (ie. that it in a sense consists of subject-predicate judgments that refer to some objective reality), but any account of knowledge (such as the Thomist one) has to account for propositional content with some ontological correlate. Thomists are not platonists; propositions on Aquinas’s account of knowledge are entia rationis whose truth or falsity are rooted in virtually possessed forms.

The “false” propositions that God knows would be counterfactual knowledge that God knows based on the potencies of contingent entities that he knows are not actualized. But again, like the true propositions they would have to be analyzed in some way.

Whenever a proposition changes from false to true or vice versa, there is a change in God’s mind. But since that is impossible, it is impossible for propositions to change, and that’s where fatalism enters the picture.

There is no need to view God’s knowledge as changing. When I go out of existence it is not a case of the proposition “polytropos exists” changing and becoming false. At the time at which it was true, it was true. At the time at which it will be false, it will be false. It is not true and false in the same respect, so there is no contradiction. From the perspective of eternality, there is no need for it to “change.”

To God, everything is present, so there is no need for a specification of time. “polotropos exists” is enough.

All times are simultaneous with God’s existence, yes. But simultaneity is not transitive. So to God both “polytropos exists” and “polytropos does not exist” are true in different respects; the difference is with respect to time.

Obviously that does not require that God change over time; he can know both propositions eternally.

God’s knowledge = God’s essence. Simple things cannot have parts.

If God’s knowledge of created things consists of a (contingent) Cambridge relation, then it is not identical to his essence (or to his self-knowledge). So it does not impute parts to God.

 

[Charlemagne_III]

Short answer: yes.
It’s even worse: God’s knowledge is necssary and therefore unchnaging and immutable, which means every proposition that God knows is necessarily true. If God knows that I will have corn flakes for breakfast, it is necessarily the case that I will have corn flakes for breakfast.
Since I cannot change a necessary fact, fatalism is the only possibility.
It also entails divine fatalism by the way: it reduces God to an automaton.

But since you are an atheist, it’s understandable that you are also a determinist. You cannot imagine a God, and therefore you cannot imagine a God who endows us with free will, even though God necessarily knows from outside of time what we will do freely inside time.

 

[belorg]

“Knowledge is about propositions” is rather simplistic way to put it. It might be said that knowledge is propositional (ie. that it in a sense consists of subject-predicate judgments that refer to some objective reality), but any account of knowledge (such as the Thomist one) has to account for propositional content with some ontological correlate. Thomists are not platonists; propositions on Aquinas’s account of knowledge are entia rationis whose truth or falsity are rooted in virtually possessed forms.

The “false” propositions that God knows would be counterfactual knowledge that God knows based on the potencies of contingent entities that he knows are not actualized. But again, like the true propositions they would have to be analyzed in some way.

There is no need to view God’s knowledge as changing. When I go out of existence it is not a case of the proposition “polytropos exists” changing and becoming false. At the time at which it was true, it was true. At the time at which it will be false, it will be false. It is not true and false in the same respect, so there is no contradiction. From the perspective of eternality, there is no need for it to “change.”

But, the proposition “polytopos eats corn flakes on 21 May” is true in God’s mind, so, it is impossible for you to eat anything else instead. That’s fatalism. The proposition was true even before you were born.

All times are simultaneous with God’s existence, yes. But simultaneity is not transitive. So to God both “polytropos exists” and “polytropos does not exist” are true in different respects; the difference is with respect to time.

Sure, but that, as i said above, means fatalism.

Obviously that does not require that God change over time; he can know both propositions eternally.

Because they are eternally true. And that’s where fatalism comes into play.

If God’s knowledge of created things consists of a (contingent) Cambridge relation, then it is not identical to his essence (or to his self-knowledge). So it does not impute parts to God.

Then God is not simple.

 

[belorg]

But since you are an atheist, it’s understandable that you are also a determinist

.

No, I am not a determinist.

You cannot imagine a God, and therefore you cannot imagine a God who endows us with free will, even though God necessarily knows from outside of time what we will do freely inside time.

I can imagine a God and I can work from properties this God has according to some people and I can conclude that some of those properties are contradictory and that the particular God that they believe in cannot possibly exist.

 

[Charlemagne_III]

But, the proposition “polytopos eats corn flakes on 21 May” is true in God’s mind, so, it is impossible for you to eat anything else instead. That’s fatalism. The proposition was true even before you were born.

God does not exist in time, so there is no “before” in God’s mind.

Nor have you demonstrated that God can know things without having necessarily caused them.

Do you believe in free will? If not, you are a psychological determinist, no?

 

[polytropos]

But, the proposition “polytopos eats corn flakes on 21 May” is true in God’s mind, so, it is impossible for you to eat anything else instead. That’s fatalism. The proposition was true even before you were born.

It’s true to God timelessly, because God’s timeless existence is simultaneous to (and causative of) my eating cornflakes on 21 May.

But the proposition is not true before I was born. That would only be the case if simultaneity were transitive, since what you’d need is for everything that is true at some time to be true at all times. (And you would be using God’s timelessness to derive this). But the simultaneity relation is not transitive. (It’s not transitive given relativity, nor is there any reason to regard it as transitive with respect to God/creatures.)

And it is obviously consistent to say that the proposition can be true timelessly without being true at a particular time, since we are saying that it is true and false in different respects. To say that all propositions are only timelessly true would beg the question, as we are acting under a Thomist ontology of propositions, on which they are mind-dependent entia rationis.

I’d actually maintain that it is impossible to refer to an entity that does not yet exist, though I don’t have time to give an argument for it at the moment. (The gist of it is that prior to my existing, the name “polytropos” had no referent, so the proposition “polytropos will eat cornflakes on 21 May (2014)” was senseless.)

Sure, but that, as i said above, means fatalism.

Because they are eternally true. And that’s where fatalism comes into play.

Not at all. Their being eternally true is consistent with their being contingent. This is the same issue with getting from “L(Kp → p) & Kp” to “Lp”. We only have fatalism if “Lp”. But that inference is invalid.

(Note here “eternally true” means true to an eternal/timeless being. From that it cannot be inferred that they are true at all times.)

Then God is not simple.

Yes he is. A Cambridge relation is not a part of God.

 

[zippy2006]

God’s knowledge is not necessary unless God is the same in all possible worlds. But that is not required for divine simplicity and noncomposition.

I disagree. God does not differ across possible worlds. As a necessary and unchangeable being, there is no possible world in which God is different.

I’ve been looking a lot into the issue of free will recently, and I’m not sure how to answer this problem: basically (correct me if I’m wrong), Divine simplicity says that God’s essence is the same as His existence.

Divine Simplicity is negative theology. It says that God is not composed in any way. See ST I, 3. Supposing that essence and existence are distinct, as Thomas did, God would not be a composition of essence and existence.

And part of God’s essence is His knowledge.

Some theologians would say that necessary truths are part of God’s essence, but no theologians would say that contingent truths are part of God’s essence. This is your main error.

And since God’s existence is necessary, that would mean that God’s knowledge is also necessary. But doesn’t that mean fatalism?

If all of God’s knowledge were part of his essence (or was an intrinsic “property” he bears) then it would lead to fatalism.

 

[belorg]

It’s true to God timelessly, because God’s timeless existence is simultaneous to (and causative of) my eating cornflakes on 21 May.

But the proposition is not true before I was born.

So, prophesy is impossible?

That would only be the case if simultaneity were transitive, since what you’d need is for everything that is true at some time to be true at all times. (And you would be using God’s timelessness to derive this). But the simultaneity relation is not transitive. (It’s not transitive given relativity, nor is there any reason to regard it as transitive with respect to God/creatures.)
And it is obviously consistent to say that the proposition can be true timelessly without being true at a particular time, since we are saying that it is true and false in different respects. To say that all propositions are only timelessly true would beg the question, as we are acting under a Thomist ontology of propositions, on which they are mind-dependent entia rationis.

For God to have timeless knowledge of all things that have happened and will happen, it has to be true that those things have happened and will happen, and not some alternative scenario. For God to know timlessly that you will eat corn flakes on 21st of May, it must be true that you will eat corn flakes on 21st May.

I’d actually maintain that it is impossible to refer to an entity that does not yet exist, though I don’t have time to give an argument for it at the moment. (The gist of it is that prior to my existing, the name “polytropos” had no referent, so the proposition “polytropos will eat cornflakes on 21 May (2014)” was senseless.)

That means that, in order for God to have the knowledge that polytropos will eat corn flakes on 21 May, from one point of view , polytropos eternally exists

Not at all. Their being eternally true is consistent with their being contingent. This is the same issue with getting from “L(Kp → p) & Kp” to “Lp”. We only have fatalism if “Lp”. But that inference is invalid.

They are eternally true, so, their alternatives are not eternally true. That’s all that’s needed for fatalism.

(Note here “eternally true” means true to an eternal/timeless being. From that it cannot be inferred that they are true at all times.)

It follows that they cannot be false at the times the knoledge refers to.

Yes he is. A Cambridge relation is not a part of God.

Knowledge is a part of God. Cambridge relations have nothing to do with it.
A Cambridge relation refers to the relation alone. e.g. if my daughert has a child then I will be a grandfather. That is a Cambridge change, because nothing has actually changed to my person. But at the time my duaghter gives birth, I get to knwo that my grandchild is born, and my knwoledge changes. That is not a Cambridge change.
So, either God’s knowledge is eternal and immutable, in which case, there is, for each situation only one possibility, hence fatalism, or God’s knowledge changes according to decisions made by individuals, in which case God cannot be simple.

 

[belorg]

God does not exist in time, so there is no “before” in God’s mind.

Nor have you demonstrated that God can know things without having necessarily caused them.

Do you believe in free will? If not, you are a psychological determinist, no?

There is no before in God’s mind, but there is a before in your mind. And it’s that ‘before’ I am talking about.

I must say I have no idea what you mean by “Nor have you demonstrated that God can know things without having necessarily caused them.”
Why would I have to demonstrate something that?

As to whether I believe in free will, I don’t believe in libertarian free will. I am not sure what you mean by “psychological determinist”, though.

 

[polytropos]

So, prophesy is impossible?

No. Prophecies can be made with indeterminate referent. Prophecies about Jesus also would have an eternal referent.

For God to have timeless knowledge of all things that have happened and will happen, it has to be true that those things have happened and will happen, and not some alternative scenario. For God to know timlessly that you will eat corn flakes on 21st of May, it must be true that you will eat corn flakes on 21st May.

But this is not strong enough for fatalism. L(If God knows that p, then p). OK. One still can’t validly get to L(p) from here, since this principle is consistent with ~p.

That means that, in order for God to have the knowledge that polytropos will eat corn flakes on 21 May, from one point of view , polytropos eternally exists

God knows about me eternally because God exists eternally and doesn’t change. It does not at all follow that I eternally exist.

They are eternally true, so, their alternatives are not eternally true. That’s all that’s needed for fatalism.

No, this is mixing up the modalities. Fatalism has to do with the possibility of doing otherwise. As long as in some possible world, “Kp & p”, and in some other possible world, “K~p & ~p”, then there is not fatalism. But those are both consistent with “L(Kp <-> p)”, which is all that the formulation of omniscience states.

It follows that they cannot be false at the times the knoledge refers to.

Again, the modalities have to be disambiguated, but they could be false in another possible world. They cannot be false in the actual world, but that does not imply fatalism.

Knowledge is a part of God. Cambridge relations have nothing to do with it.
A Cambridge relation refers to the relation alone. e.g. if my daughert has a child then I will be a grandfather. That is a Cambridge change, because nothing has actually changed to my person. But at the time my duaghter gives birth, I get to knwo that my grandchild is born, and my knwoledge changes. That is not a Cambridge change.
So, either God’s knowledge is eternal and immutable, in which case, there is, for each situation only one possibility, hence fatalism, or God’s knowledge changes according to decisions made by individuals, in which case God cannot be simple.

God’s self-knowledge (which is his single act of knowing) is immutable and is the same in all possible worlds. But because his relation to creatures is a Cambridge relation (and therefore can differ across possible worlds without imputing any potentiality or difference to God), his knowledge of creatures is both a Cambridge relation and a function of his self-knowledge.

In the possible world in which God does not create, God knows himself alone. In the actual world, God knows himself as well as his creation. But his knowledge of creation is a knowledge of his own causality through his own essence; but his knowledge of his effects is a Cambridge relation (so Aquinas argues), so his essence does not differ or change between the two worlds. There is a single intellective act.

 

[Richca]

I’ve been looking a lot into the issue of free will recently, and I’m not sure how to answer this problem: basically (correct me if I’m wrong), Divine simplicity says that God’s essence is the same as His existence. And part of God’s essence is His knowledge. And since God’s existence is necessary, that would mean that God’s knowledge is also necessary. But doesn’t that mean fatalism? If any of God’s knowledge could have been different, that would mean that part of His essence, and thus His existence, isn’t necessary, and He isn’t a perfect being.

It was in God’s knowledge from all eternity that at some point He was going to create rational creatures possessed of an intellect and free will. Now the creation of creatures possessed of a free will is opposed to fatalism.

 

[belorg]

But this is not strong enough for fatalism. L(If God knows that p, then p). OK. One still can’t validly get to L(p) from here, since this principle is consistent with ~p.

There is, in God’s mind, only one truth about 21th May. And therev is, in God’s mind, only one truth about what I will do 5 April 2042 at 2.30 p.m. I can’t change that fact in any way. That’s fatalism. Fatalsim does not entail that an action occurs in every possible world it entails that, given the initial conditions of a certain world, there is only one future in that world.

God knows about me eternally because God exists eternally and doesn’t change. It does not at all follow that I eternally exist.

Then God refers to an entity that does not yet exist, which, according to you is impossible.

No, this is mixing up the modalities. Fatalism has to do with the possibility of doing otherwise. As long as in some possible world, “Kp & p”, and in some other possible world, “K~p & ~p”, then there is not fatalism. But those are both consistent with “L(Kp <-> p)”, which is all that the formulation of omniscience states.

Fatalism has to do with the possibility to do otherwise in the actual world. I cannot shift between possible worlds, so I can’t do otherwise.

Again, the modalities have to be disambiguated, but they could be false in another possible world. They cannot be false in the actual world, but that does not imply fatalism.

Yes it does. The fate of this world is determined. Other possible world have nothing to do with it.

God’s self-knowledge (which is his single act of knowing) is immutable and is the same in all possible worlds. But because his relation to creatures is a Cambridge relation (and therefore can differ across possible worlds without imputing any potentiality or difference to God), his knowledge of creatures is both a Cambridge relation and a function of his self-knowledge.

The relations may be Cambridge relations, but the knowledge of those relations is not a Cambridge relation.
Suppose I had a short relationship with a woman 20 years ago when I was on holiday in a another country, and, without me knowing it, this woman gave birth to my daughter.
I don’t have knowledge of this fact, so, as far as my knowledge is concerned, I am not a father. Yet, the Cambridge change in me happened almost 20 years ago. But, suppose that tomorrow I get a letter form this woman. Then at that time, my knowledge changes, although the Cambridge fact that I am a father has been true for 20 years.

In the possible world in which God does not create, God knows himself alone. In the actual world, God knows himself as well as his creation. But his knowledge of creation is a knowledge of his own causality through his own essence; but his knowledge of his effects is a Cambridge relation (so Aquinas argues), so his essence does not differ or change between the two worlds. There is a single intellective act.

There is a possible world in which God knows only himself and there is a possible world in which, through his own essence God knows himself + creation. So, his essence does differ between world 1 and world 2.

 

[Linusthe2nd]

Short answer: yes.
It’s even worse: God’s knowledge is necssary and therefore unchnaging and immutable, which means every proposition that God knows is necessarily true. If God knows that I will have corn flakes for breakfast, it is necessarily the case that I will have corn flakes for breakfast.
Since I cannot change a necessary fact, fatalism is the only possibility.
It also entails divine fatalism by the way: it reduces God to an automaton.

There is no causal relation between what God knows about our decisions and the fact that we make them. We are free in the decisions, God knows, in the Eternal Now, what these will be. Where is the causal connection?

Linus2nd