Does fatalism follow from Divine simplicity?

[polytropos]

Shop talk, " except by an invalid modal operator shift. " For those of us not introduced to formal logic would you explain what that is?

Very often in philosophy, we claim that certain conditionals are necessary. Denote that by “L(p → q)”, or “Necessarily, if p, then q”.

Very often, we also desire to have a necessary conclusion, like “Lq”.

But it is invalid to infer “Lq” from “L(p → q) & p”. If the antecedent is true, and the conditional is necessary, then it is not necessarily the case that the consequent is necessary. All we can infer is “q”, that the consequent is true in whatever world in which the antecedent is true.

What would be needed is “Lp” to infer “Lq”. But in the case of divine omniscience, we do not that “Lp” (ie. “necessarily, God knows that I do x”, or what have you). This error is behind most charges of incompatibility between freedom and immutability.

 

[polytropos]

Sorry Poly, you are getting confused. God’s Essence is always One and the Same. The " worlds " he creates or doesn’t create do not impact his Essence. In the same way His Knowlege is unchanged and the same with His Essence. Further He knows all things actual and possible and his Providence provides that His Will will always be done.

From all eternity he has known what things He has created and what He has done ( or will do from our perspective ) to accomplish His Eternal Will. " …Thy eyes beheld my deeds, and all were written in they book; days were decreed, while yet there was not one of them." ( Psalm 138 )

Linus2nd

I was confused. The distinction I should have been making is that in all possible worlds, God’s single intellective act (an act of self-cognition) is the same, but it does not follow that the extension of his objects of knowledge is the same.

 

[belorg]

You will have to start flagging your modalities, because the statement “I can’t change that fact in any way” is ambiguous.

No, it is not ambiguous. It is very clear.

In the present, the fact that you will act a given way in the future is indeterminate. Either option is open to you.

The future is epistemically open to me, it is not ontologically open to me.

God knows what you do. But the proposition disclosing what you will do could only be true in the present if simultaneity with God were transitive, which it is not. There is no future fact for you to “change.”

If I were to ask God what you will do on 30 May, would he be able to tell me that?.

God knows about me eternally because he exists eternally (and his knowledge doesn’t change).

Then He also knows eternally what/who exactly He is going to create and what every single of those creatures will do at every single moment of time. That’s even worse. Not only does this entail that every single act of every single creature is determined, it also entails that God’s creative act is necessary, hence it entails not only creaturely fatalism, but even divine fatalism.

But for God to refer to “an entity that does not yet exist” (me), he would have to be instantiated in some moment of time before I existed. But that is absurd; God is eternal.

Hence all reports of divine revelation are nonsense/

Of course, we could draw a logical distinction between God’s knowledge of the world before I existed and after I existed. I am not something of which God knows prior to my existing.

God is simple, so we can’t draw any logical distinction.

The fate of this world is not determined, given incompatibilism and the intransitivity of simultaneity. God’s knowing the future eternally does not imply that the future is true now.

It means that the future is immutable, just as God’s knowledge.

God’s knowing creation is causative of creation, however. His creating is a single, eternal act,

That’s exactly what I claim.

God wills himself and he wills creatures.

God doesn’t “will himself”

By divine simplicity, he also knows himself and he knows creatures.

Buy divine simplicity, God’s knowing himslef and God’s knowing his creatures are the same.

(The willing and knowing of himself is what is the case in all possible worlds; the willing and knowing of creatures may vary from possible world to possible world because, as Cambridge relations, they do not impute potentiality to God.)

So, those creatures are coincidental? Either God wills polytropos and then God’s willing and knowing of polytropos is part of his necessary knowledge, or , in the case of Cambridge knowledge,polytropos happens to exist.

This is correct, but it is not a counterexample to the special case where God’s will and knowledge are identical. (Your will and knowledge are not identical.)

It is because my will and knowledge are not identical that I can have Cambridge knowledge.

This would require the additional premise that if the objects of God’s knowledge differ, then God’s single act of cognition differs. But I do not accept that principle; only God’s knowledge of himself is necessary, and his knowing of creation, as a Cambridge relation, can be known through his essence in the same intellective act.

So God’s intellective act is always the same. hence divine fatalism.

 

[Linusthe2nd]

I was confused. The distinction I should have been making is that in all possible worlds, God’s single intellective act (an act of self-cognition) is the same, but it does not follow that the extension of his objects of knowledge is the same.

That’s better.

Linus2nd

 

[Linusthe2nd]

Very often in philosophy, we claim that certain conditionals are necessary. Denote that by “L(p → q)”, or “Necessarily, if p, then q”.

Very often, we also desire to have a necessary conclusion, like “Lq”.

But it is invalid to infer “Lq” from “L(p → q) & p”. If the antecedent is true, and the conditional is necessary, then it is not necessarily the case that the consequent is necessary. All we can infer is “q”, that the consequent is true in whatever world in which the antecedent is true.

What would be needed is “Lp” to infer “Lq”. But in the case of divine omniscience, we do not that “Lp” (ie. “necessarily, God knows that I do x”, or what have you). This error is behind most charges of incompatibility between freedom and immutability.

Not helpful. If you would just explain what you mean in declaritive sentences, I might understand what you are saying. And so would those not trained in " modern " logical symbolism.

Linus2nd

 

[polytropos]

The future is epistemically open to me, it is not ontologically open to me.

The indeterminacy here is ontological.

If I were to ask God what you will do on 30 May, would he be able to tell me that?.

Maybe, if his disclosing the future is consistent with my acting in accordance with what he says. But if his disclosing the future is not so consistent (ie. if you would tell me, and I would be determined to act against his word), then we would have a contradiction on our hands, so there would be no possible world in which God tells you what I do on 30 May. (The case in point being Peter’s three denials of Jesus. Jesus’s disclosing the future was consistent with Peter’s acting freely in accordance with what he said.)

Then He also knows eternally what/who exactly He is going to create and what every single of those creatures will do at every single moment of time. That’s even worse. Not only does this entail that every single act of every single creature is determined, it also entails that God’s creative act is necessary, hence it entails not only creaturely fatalism, but even divine fatalism.

Again, one has to clarify modalities. Aquinas admits that God’s creation is necessary “by supposition” (ie. given that he has done it eternally). But that is not sufficient for fatalism, for God’s willing of creation is not necessary “absolutely,” owing to the fact that only God’s willing of his own goodness is absolutely necessarily, and the willing of creation (because God is purely actual) cannot serve as a necessary means to that end. (It is a good which cannot be necessarily absolutely.)

There is no divine fatalism here. And as a consequence, there is also no creaturely fatalism, for your doing what God knows you will do is only necessary by supposition, ie. because you do it. (God’s knowledge causing you to do it is also consistent with your doing it freely, given the concurrence of primary and secondary causation.)

Hence all reports of divine revelation are nonsense/

Not following. For God to refer to an entity that does not exist to him, but will exist later, he would have to exist before the entity exists and not after. But that is false.

God is simple, so we can’t draw any logical distinction.

Yes we can. We can draw a logical distinction between God’s essence and his existence. What cannot be admitted given simplicity is a real distinction.

It means that the future is immutable, just as God’s knowledge.

The future cannot be immutable if it does not exist now.

God doesn’t “will himself”

God wills his own goodness, which is identical to himself. “For the divine will has a necessary relation to the divine goodness, since that is its proper object. Hence God wills His own goodness necessarily, even as we will our own happiness necessarily, and as any other faculty has necessary relation to its proper and principal object, for instance the sight to color, since it tends to it by its own nature.” That of course does not mean that God is self-caused.

Buy divine simplicity, God’s knowing himslef and God’s knowing his creatures are the same.

God knows himself and his creatures in the same intellective act. It doesn’t follow that the extension of his objects of knowledge is the same in possible worlds in which he does not know creatures (ie. because he did not create creatures).

So, those creatures are coincidental? Either God wills polytropos and then God’s willing and knowing of polytropos is part of his necessary knowledge, or , in the case of Cambridge knowledge,polytropos happens to exist.

My “happening” to exist is a consequence of God’s willing me to exist. It’s a Cambridge relation only because God does not have a real relation to his creatures, but that does not suffice for calling it “coincidental.”

It is because my will and knowledge are not identical that I can have Cambridge knowledge.

God’s will and knowledge are identical. But the extension of God’s objects of knowledge may differ across possible worlds, which is why it is possible that God have Cambridge knowledge.

So God’s intellective act is always the same. hence divine fatalism.

I’ve already spelled out why this is not the case. The sameness of God’s intellective act does not imply the sameness of the extension of his objects of knowledge.

 

[polytropos]

Not helpful. If you would just explain what you mean in declaritive sentences, I might understand what you are saying. And so would those not trained in " modern " logical symbolism.

Omniscience requires: Necessarily, if God knows that I do x, then I do x.

The fatalist would like to argue that my doing x is necessary, ie. I could not have done otherwise than x.

So he cites the fact that since I at least do x contingently, God knows that I do x. He tries to offer the following argument:

1. Necessarily, if God knows that I do x, then I do x.
2. God knows that I do x.
3. Therefore, necessarily, I do x.

But that is invalid. The second premise would have to be 2*. Necessarily, God knows that I do x. But every analysis of omniscience denies that that is true. So substituting 2. for 2*. would beg the question.

 

[belorg]

The indeterminacy here is ontological.

If God knows only one future, there is only one future. There is no ontological determinacy anywhere.

Maybe, if his disclosing the future is consistent with my acting in accordance with what he says. But if his disclosing the future is not so consistent (ie. if you would tell me, and I would be determined to act against his word), then we would have a contradiction on our hands, so there would be no possible world in which God tells you what I do on 30 May. (The case in point being Peter’s three denials of Jesus. Jesus’s disclosing the future was consistent with Peter’s acting freely in accordance with what he said.)

Either he can, or He can’t.

Again, one has to clarify modalities. Aquinas admits that God’s creation is necessary “by supposition” (ie. given that he has done it eternally). But that is not sufficient for fatalism, for God’s willing of creation is not necessary “absolutely,” owing to the fact that only God’s willing of his own goodness is absolutely necessarily, and the willing of creation (because God is purely actual) cannot serve as a necessary means to that end. (It is a good which cannot be necessarily absolutely.)

I really don’t care for assertions, I care for arguments.

There is no divine fatalism here. And as a consequence, there is also no creaturely fatalism, for your doing what God knows you will do is only necessary by supposition, ie. because you do it. (God’s knowledge causing you to do it is also consistent with your doing it freely, given the concurrence of primary and secondary causation.)

If God causes me to do it, I can still not do it? Strange definition of omnipotence.

Not following. For God to refer to an entity that does not exist to him, but will exist later, he would have to exist before the entity exists and not after. But that is false.

Then God cannot refer to any entity.

Yes we can. We can draw a logical distinction between God’s essence and his existence. What cannot be admitted given simplicity is a real distinction.

So God’s essence IS God’s existence, but not really.

The future cannot be immutable if it does not exist now.

Does God knwo what I will do on 30 May or doesn’t He know it?

God wills his own goodness, which is identical to himself. “For the divine will has a necessary relation to the divine goodness, since that is its proper object. Hence God wills His own goodness necessarily, even as we will our own happiness necessarily, and as any other faculty has necessary relation to its proper and principal object, for instance the sight to color, since it tends to it by its own nature.” That of course does not mean that God is self-caused.

I am glad you say this.

God knows himself and his creatures in the same intellective act. It doesn’t follow that the extension of his objects of knowledge is the same in possible worlds in which he does not know creatures (ie. because he did not create creatures).

Yes, i undertsand, God1 end God2.

My “happening” to exist is a consequence of God’s willing me to exist. It’s a Cambridge relation only because God does not have a real relation to his creatures, but that does not suffice for calling it “coincidental.”

God’s will for me to exist is the same as God’s will for me to not exist?

God’s will and knowledge are identical.

So, if God will my existence He knows he wills my existence and if He doesn’t will my existence He knows exactly the same, namely that He doesn’t will my existence. Makes a lot of sense.

I’ve already spelled out why this is not the case. The sameness of God’s intellective act does not imply the sameness of the extension of his objects of knowledge.

As µI ahev argued above, It is not confined to the extensions of his objects of knowledge, it is about the content of His will.

 

[polytropos]

If God knows only one future, there is only one future. There is no ontological determinacy anywhere.

But “there is only one future” is insufficient for fatalism. What will happen will happen. That is a tautology. There is nothing deep in what you are saying. From that it doesn’t follow that what will happen must happen.

Either he can, or He can’t.

What I said was that it would depend on the case. In any given case, he can or cannot, but it goes without saying that from the biblical cases one cannot universally generalize to every other case.

I really don’t care for assertions, I care for arguments.

Strange, considering you asserted something, which dissolves upon the clarification of modalities, which you asserted was unnecessary.

If God causes me to do it, I can still not do it? Strange definition of omnipotence.

God’s causality is generally concurrent. This is true even in cases that do not involve a free agent. If a leaf falls from a tree, then it is true that, “God causes it to be that [the leaf fell from the tree].” The falling of the leaf from the tree also has a natural secondary cause. God’s causation is primary.

If God causes you to do it, then obviously you do it. That is because “God causes that [you do x]” just in case “you do x”. But that does not mean that you could not have done otherwise; it is just the case that, if you had done otherwise, then it would have been the case that “God causes that [you do y]”.

Then God cannot refer to any entity.

I said: “For God to refer to an entity that does not exist to him, but will exist later, he would have to exist before the entity exists and not after. But that is false.” If God exists eternally, then it is not the case that God “exist before the entity exists and not after.” So it does not follow that “God cannot refer to any entity.”

So God’s essence IS God’s existence, but not really.

?? I said there is not a real distinction between God’s essence and his existence, but you take me to be implicitly conceding that God’s essence is “not really” his existence?

There is a logical distinction between being and goodness, but not a real distinction. They differ in sense but not in reference. To admit a logical distinction is not to admit a real distinction.

Does God knwo what I will do on 30 May or doesn’t He know it?

He knows everything that he knows eternally.

God’s will for me to exist is the same as God’s will for me to not exist?

Not following again. The one-liners may not be conveying as much information as you think they are conveying…

So, if God will my existence He knows he wills my existence and if He doesn’t will my existence He knows exactly the same, namely that He doesn’t will my existence. Makes a lot of sense.

I can’t tell what you’re getting at here, but I mean that God’s will and his single intellective act are the same. (But, again, it does not follow that either are identical to the extension of his objects of knowledge.)

As µI ahev argued above, It is not confined to the extensions of his objects of knowledge, it is about the content of His will.

God’s wills his own goodness. What else he wills (ie. creation) he does not bear a real relation to, for he does not will creation essentially. But this implies that the content of his will (ie. his own goodness + creation) need not be identical to his will, just as the extension of his knowledge (ie. his self-knowledge + his knowledge of creation) need not be identical to his single intellective act. This is consistent, of course, with his will and his single intellective act being identical, and being identical across possible worlds.

 

[belorg]

[SIGN][/SIGN]

But “there is only one future” is insufficient for fatalism. What will happen will happen. That is a tautology. There is nothing deep in what you are saying. From that it doesn’t follow that what will happen must happen

In order for indetermincay to be true, at this moment, there has to be more than one possible future. But for God to eternally know X, X must be eternally true.
What you are claiming only makes sense if every fact about creation is ontologically prior to God’s knowledge of it. But if that’s the case, God has prior knwoledge and posterior knowledge, which is impossible for a simple Pure Act.

What I said was that it would depend on the case. In any given case, he can or cannot, but it goes without saying that from the biblical cases one cannot universally generalize to every other case.

You claims entail that He cannot possibly reveal anything about the future to anyone, because in doing so, He must enter time, which is impossible given God’s immutability, but even if this were possible, since the facts haven’t happened yet, He cannot have knowledge of them.

Strange, considering you asserted something, which dissolves upon the clarification of modalities, which you asserted was unnecessary.

I argued for that. That you don’t understand the argument does not make it an assertion.

God’s causality is generally concurrent. This is true even in cases that do not involve a free agent. If a leaf falls from a tree, then it is true that, “God causes it to be that [the leaf fell from the tree].” The falling of the leaf from the tree also has a natural secondary cause. God’s causation is primary.

The natural secondary cause is also determined by God. It’s not because you try to hide this behind a whole bunch of secondary causes that somehow you have magically removed determinacy. If I design an infallible system in which a signal from my cell phone makes a robot arm press a button that switces a light on, which is picked up by a sensor, which on its turn detonates a bomb, then the detonation of the bomb was determined by me.

If God causes you to do it, then obviously you do it. That is because “God causes that [you do x]” just in case “you do x”. But that does not mean that you could not have done otherwise; it is just the case that, if you had done otherwise, then it would have been the case that “God causes that [you do y]”.

A free choice is not cause by an external agent.

I said: “For God to refer to an entity that does not exist to him, but will exist later, he would have to exist before the entity exists and not after. But that is false.” If God exists eternally, then it is not the case that God “exist before the entity exists and not after.” So it does not follow that “God cannot refer to any entity.”

See my comment above.

?? I said there is not a real distinction between God’s essence and his existence, but you take me to be implicitly conceding that God’s essence is “not really” his existence?

There is a logical distinction between being and goodness, but not a real distinction. They differ in sense but not in reference. To admit a logical distinction is not to admit a real distinction.

A logical distinction IS a real distinction. What you are describing is not a logical distinction, but a matter of speech.

He knows everything that he knows eternally.

SQe my comment above.

Not following again. The one-liners may not be conveying as much information as you think they are conveying…

This one-liner is clear enough. You should be able to address it.

I can’t tell what you’re getting at here, but I mean that God’s will and his single intellective act are the same. (But, again, it does not follow that either are identical to the extension of his objects of knowledge.)

If you want to believe that God’s will to create X is the same as God’s will to not create X, then that’s fine with me, polytropos.

God’s wills his own goodness. What else he wills (ie. creation) he does not bear a real relation to, for he does not will creation essentially. But this implies that the content of his will (ie. his own goodness + creation) need not be identical to his will, just as the extension of his knowledge (ie. his self-knowledge + his knowledge of creation) need not be identical to his single intellective act. This is consistent, of course, with his will and his single intellective act being identical, and being identical across possible worlds.

Simple beings have no “else”, polytropos.

 

[tonyrey]

Short answer: yes.
It’s even worse: God’s knowledge is necssary and therefore unchnaging and immutable, which means every proposition that God knows is necessarily true. If God knows that I will have corn flakes for breakfast, it is necessarily the case that I will have corn flakes for breakfast.
Since I cannot change a necessary fact, fatalism is the only possibility.
It also entails divine fatalism by the way: it reduces God to an automaton.

Knowledge does **not **entail causation nor are facts static.

 

[belorg]

Knowledge does **not **entail causation nor are facts static.

Since I haven’t claimed these things, I fail to see how this response is relevant.

 

[tonyrey]

Since I haven’t claimed these things, I fail to see how this response is relevant.

Your claim is implied by your assertions “God’s knowledge is necssary and therefore unchnaging and immutable” and “It also entails divine fatalism by the way: it reduces God to an automaton.”…

 

[belorg]

Your claim is implied by your assertions “God’s knowledge is necessary and therefore unchanging and immutable” and “It also entails divine fatalism by the way: it reduces God to an automaton.”…

First of all, they’re not “assertions”. The fact that you apparently do not understand my arguments does not make them assertions. But even if they were assertions, there is nothing in the things you quote that says anything about causation, nor about static facts. So, this entailment seems to exist solely in your mind.

 

[polytropos]

In order for indetermincay to be true, at this moment, there has to be more than one possible future.

There is more than one possible future in a contemporary modality, and which future it is (insofar as it is caused by you) is determined by your choices. That is sufficient for fatalism to fail. There is one future in the respect that the actual world is all that there is.

But for God to eternally know X, X must be eternally true.

From “X is eternally true” (where X discloses some future fact that has not obtained), it does not follow that X is true now.

You claims entail that He cannot possibly reveal anything about the future to anyone, because in doing so, He must enter time, which is impossible given God’s immutability, but even if this were possible, since the facts haven’t happened yet, He cannot have knowledge of them.

That does not follow from what I have claimed. God’s effects can be in time without God being in time. It would only follow that what he discloses either has to have indeterminate referent (ie. “some man will do such and such”) or refer to something eternal (ie. God himself).

I argued for that. That you don’t understand the argument does not make it an assertion.

I clarified the modalities. It dissolved the point you were making. Your only response was that you care for arguments and not assertions. But I gave an argument, not an assertion.

The natural secondary cause is also determined by God. It’s not because you try to hide this behind a whole bunch of secondary causes that somehow you have magically removed determinacy. If I design an infallible system in which a signal from my cell phone makes a robot arm press a button that switces a light on, which is picked up by a sensor, which on its turn detonates a bomb, then the detonation of the bomb was determined by me.

The distinction between primary and secondary causation is not a distinction between the first cause in a queue and all subsequent causes in a queue. A primary cause (ie. God) is that which makes possible the action of the elements of a series by creating them concurrently (and so is actually consistent with causal loops or infinite regresses).

Strictly speaking it is not correct to analyze “the leaf falls from the tree” as “God moves a, which moves b, which moves c, …, which moves the leaf”. The issue is that such an analysis falsely situates God as “a” being in the world, which he is not. The sort of causation that God does is on a distinct tier; his concurrent activity in a natural event “the leaf falls from the tree” is to cause the event by actualizing the existence of its members, which is why I rendered it: “God causes it to be that [the leaf falls from the tree]”, where “the leaf falls from the tree” is a secondary-causal explanation, and the “God causes it to be that [____]” operator denotes primary causation. (Aquinas’s cosmological arguments on a proper reading, in my view, yield this analysis of causation, but that is a separate issue.)

“polytropos walks” is a secondary-causal explanation. It entails “God causes it to be that [polytropos walks]”. But to get determinism here, one would have to equivocate on “cause,” since “cause” is not being used univocally between God’s causation and my causation. (A further issue is that the Thomist’s analysis of “polytropos walks” is going to implicate formal causality; I have reasons why I walk. Those reasons are my own. They most certainly do not inhere in God. So God’s actualizing me qua walking is not determinative of my walking, which is formally caused by my desire to walk.)

A free choice is not cause by an external agent.

Right, but that isn’t implied by this analysis.

A logical distinction IS a real distinction. What you are describing is not a logical distinction, but a matter of speech.

“Logical distinction” and “real distinction” are technical terms in Thomism. They do not mean the same thing.

If you want to believe that God’s will to create X is the same as God’s will to not create X, then that’s fine with me, polytropos.

God’s act of willing is the same in both cases. But since what God wills (ie. what the objects of his will are) need not be identical to God’s will, then this doesn’t follow.

Simple beings have no “else”, polytropos.

Didn’t say they do. God has one will and one intellective act (which are identical, and identical with him). The “else” are not identical to God; the “else” are his creatures and his knowledge of his creatures.

 

[tonyrey]

First of all, they’re not “assertions”. The fact that you apparently do not understand my arguments does not make them assertions.

What do arguments consist of?

But even if they were assertions, there is nothing in the things you quote that says anything about causation, nor about static facts. So, this entailment seems to exist solely in your mind.

If “divine fatalism” has nothing to do with causation why do you regard God as an “automaton”?

 

[Linusthe2nd]

First of all, they’re not “assertions”. The fact that you apparently do not understand my arguments does not make them assertions. But even if they were assertions, there is nothing in the things you quote that says anything about causation, nor about static facts. So, this entailment seems to exist solely in your mind.

Hey, Belorg. You can call Catholic Answers Live in the next two hours at 888=318-3884 Atheists only tonight.

Linus2nd

 

[Linusthe2nd]

First of all, they’re not “assertions”. The fact that you apparently do not understand my arguments does not make them assertions. But even if they were assertions, there is nothing in the things you quote that says anything about causation, nor about static facts. So, this entailment seems to exist solely in your mind.

Did you call? Well, someone did who raised the exact question we have been discussing. He also raised the issue of " Russells’ Teapot. "

Linus2nd

 

[Linusthe2nd]

Well guys, Trent Horn talked to atheists for two hours tonight on CA Radio. One of them raised the question we have been discussing and Trent agreed with us. The knowledge God has of all possible events does not mean that man’s free will determined. We all knew that but it is good to have an " outsider " agree with us. Belorg is dead wrong, his argument is illogical.

Linus2nd

 

[belorg]

What do arguments consist of?

Premises, evidence for those premises and conclusions.

If “divine fatalism” has nothing to do with causation why do you regard God as an “automaton”?

I have explained that. You’ll have to read it.