Does fatalism follow from Divine simplicity?

[Linusthe2nd]

Maybe not, but since His knowledge is immutable, our ‘choices’ must also be immutable. Which means they are not real choices.

That is also untrue. Again, you have proved neither a causal connection nor that our choices are not " real " choices, or free.

You’re slipping Belorg.

Linus2nd

 

[Linusthe2nd]

Immutable does not mean necessary, but I am working under the assumption that what you say is correct, and from what you say here:

It definitely follows that God’s knwoledge is both immutable and necessary.
So, maybe there are arguments for fatalism that commit a modal fallacy, but mine doesn’t.
It should also be noted that WL Craig does not believe in Divine Simplicity.

Who cares what Craig thinks about anything. I think he is a pretty poor philosopher. One thing is certain, your logic here is faulty.

Linus2nd.

 

[Linusthe2nd]

Not sure if it matters much, and I’m certainly no expert, but are we working under a contemporary or Scholastic form of modality?

Depeds on who is posting. I always endeavor to give a Scholastic or Aristotelian explanation, or that of the Catholic Church when necessary and when possible. I can’t speak for the others.

Linus2nd

 

[Linusthe2nd]

That’s exactly why this entails fatalism.

Nonesense. I thought you had a logical mind. At least you always have intimated that you did. But your position here removes that possibility.

Linus2nd

 

[Linusthe2nd]

God’s knowledge is not necessary unless God is the same in all possible worlds. But that is not required for divine simplicity and noncomposition. (And since God’s differing across possible worlds is consistent with noncomposition, it can’t be asked what the sufficient reason for the difference is, for the scholastic principle of sufficient reason would require a potentiality if it were to demand application.)

L = necessarily
K = God knows that

So we have: L(Kp → p). Necessarily, if God knows that p, then p. From this it does not follow that Lp except by an invalid modal operator shift.

Shop talk, " except by an invalid modal operator shift. " For those of us not introduced to formal logic would you explain what that is?

Linus2nd

 

[CatholicSoxFan]

Yes, William Lane Craig does not believe in Divine simplicity, but when somebody asks him about it, he is quite open that the only reason why he doesn’t believe in Divine simplicity is because of his belief in sola scriptura.

 

[CatholicSoxFan]

Shop talk, " except by an invalid modal operator shift. " For those of us not introduced to formal logic would you explain what that is?

Linus2nd

I’m not trained in formal logic, so I might be wrong about this, but from what I understand, an invalid modal operator shift is transferring a modal operator (possibly or necessarilly) from a premise to a conclusion fallaciously.

 

[Linusthe2nd]

Sure he can. Divine simplicity states that there is no composition or potentiality in God. God’s essence does not have to be the same in two possible worlds as long as he does not have a potentiality in world A to be of the essence that he is in world B. But that requirement is met so long as it is not possible that he change.

God does not have knowledge (besides knowledge of himself) “prior to creation.”* His knowledge of particulars is based on his act of creation (for he creates his objects of knowledge). But God’s relation to creation is not a real relation; it is a Cambridge relation. It can thus differ across possible worlds without him having either an active or a passive potency to create or know.

*One could perhaps speak of what knowledge God has in all possible worlds, namely knowledge of himself. But the distinction there drawn is only a virtual, and not a real, distinction. It is like distinguishing between God’s antecedent and consequent will. God does not actually have an antecedent will.

Sorry Poly, you are getting confused. God’s Essence is always One and the Same. The " worlds " he creates or doesn’t create do not impact his Essence. In the same way His Knowlege is unchanged and the same with His Essence. Further He knows all things actual and possible and his Providence provides that His Will will always be done.

From all eternity he has known what things He has created and what He has done ( or will do from our perspective ) to accomplish His Eternal Will. " …Thy eyes beheld my deeds, and all were written in they book; days were decreed, while yet there was not one of them." ( Psalm 138 )

Linus2nd

 

[Linusthe2nd]

God’s differing in essence (as you said was possible) does by definition, imply that He is a different God in every possibile world in which His essence differ.

It’s not about relations , it’s about knowledge. Prior to creation either god knows everything he knows posterior to creation, which entails fatalism, or his knowledge changes after creation, because he now knows that “polytropos exists” is true, which he didn’t know prior to creation. But that contradics Divine Simplicity or Actus Purus.

Indeed He does know it, but that is not fatalism. Part of God’s creation was man’s free will, therefore there is no " fatalism. "

And you are correct. God’s Essence does not and cannot, even in principle, change. He is the Same in all possible worlds.

Linus2nd
Linus2nd

 

[Linusthe2nd]

God’s differing across possible worlds does not imply that he is a different God in each possible world anymore than your acting differently in different possible worlds implies that you only exist in one possible world. (Further, classical theists tend to reject modalities that rely too much on possible worlds semantics. Possible worlds are at best a metric for stating external modalities, ie. modalities that do not attribute de re potentialities to God.)

The bolded portion begs the question, since God’s knowledge of creatures would only have to be identical of that which he knows necessarily (ie. himself) if his knowledge of creatures is not a Cambridge relation. But that was what you were trying to dispute.

But all of God’s relations to creatures are Cambridge relations.

O.K. guys, please explain what a " Cambridge relation " is. I’m just a poor Thomist.

Linus2nd

 

[Linusthe2nd]

belorg, my assumption that Divine simplicity = God’s knowledge is the same across possible worlds needs to be seen in light of my asking somebody to correct me if I am wrong, and I was in fact corrected.

But you were correct. God’s knowledge is the same across all possible worlds. He " knows all that does and will happen " in each world. He can create an infinite number of worlds. He knowledge of each would be unique for that world. That has nothing to do with his knowledge with the unique facts and events in other worlds.

Linus2nd

 

[Linusthe2nd]

If the Thomist analyzes knowledge in terms of relations, then it is about both. (Just about everyone analyzes knowledge in terms of relations.)

Clarify what you mean by “prior” and “posterior” in this context. The “polytropos exists” example suggests a temporal usage, but that can’t be right.

God knows that “polytropos exists,” with some specification of time (or space-time relation). That knowledge can be had eternally. But furthermore, being a function of God’s creation, and God’s relation to creatures being a Cambridge relation, there is no reason why God’s knowledge that “polytropos exists” cannot be contingent even though God’s essence is necessary.

I think that would be incorrect. We are contingent, God’s knowledge of us is not contingent.

Linus2nd

 

[Linusthe2nd]

But since you are an atheist, it’s understandable that you are also a determinist. You cannot imagine a God, and therefore you cannot imagine a God who endows us with free will, even though God necessarily knows from outside of time what we will do freely inside time.

Well put.

Linus2nd

 

[Linusthe2nd]

I disagree. God does not differ across possible worlds. As a necessary and unchangeable being, there is no possible world in which God is different.

Divine Simplicity is negative theology. It says that God is not composed in any way. See ST I, 3. Supposing that essence and existence are distinct, as Thomas did, God would not be a composition of essence and existence.

Some theologians would say that necessary truths are part of God’s essence, but no theologians would say that contingent truths are part of God’s essence. This is your main error.

If all of God’s knowledge were part of his essence (or was an intrinsic “property” he bears) then it would lead to fatalism.

God’s Knowledge and Essence are the same. He know all things, even the contingent things of all possible worlds. But he knows them as unique to each particular world. But it is not his knowledge which is contingent, it is the events of all possible worlds which are contingent. His knowledge is Necessary, as is His Being, they are one and the same. That does not lead to fatalism, because he has created free will in man and all possible real men. All other things however are determined by His Will working through the natures of each substance and each living creature other than man.

Linus2nd

Linus2nd

 

[Linusthe2nd]

It was in God’s knowledge from all eternity that at some point He was going to create rational creatures possessed of an intellect and free will. Now the creation of creatures possessed of a free will is opposed to fatalism.

Exactly.

Linus2nd

 

[Linusthe2nd]

…

There is a possible world in which God knows only himself and there is a possible world in which, through his own essence God knows himself + creation. So, his essence does differ between world 1 and world 2.

He knows both of these worlds eternally. There is no division in His Essence implied.

God knows the entities of all possible worlds, whether or not they exist.

Linus2nd

 

[Linusthe2nd]

I’m not trained in formal logic, so I might be wrong about this, but from what I understand, an invalid modal operator shift is transferring a modal operator (possibly or necessarilly) from a premise to a conclusion fallaciously.

I have no idea of what a " modal operator " is. I wish the boys would drop the shop talk.

Linus2nd

 

[CatholicSoxFan]

I have no idea of what a " modal operator " is. I wish the boys would drop the shop talk.

Linus2nd

A modal opator is “possibly” or “necesarrilly” AFAIK.

 

[Linusthe2nd]

A modal opator is “possibly” or “necesarrilly” AFAIK.

That is as clear as mud.

Linus2nd

 

[polytropos]

There is, in God’s mind, only one truth about 21th May. And therev is, in God’s mind, only one truth about what I will do 5 April 2042 at 2.30 p.m. I can’t change that fact in any way. That’s fatalism. Fatalsim does not entail that an action occurs in every possible world it entails that, given the initial conditions of a certain world, there is only one future in that world.

Fatalism has to do with the possibility to do otherwise in the actual world. I cannot shift between possible worlds, so I can’t do otherwise.

You will have to start flagging your modalities, because the statement “I can’t change that fact in any way” is ambiguous.

In the present, the fact that you will act a given way in the future is indeterminate. Either option is open to you.

God knows what you do. But the proposition disclosing what you will do could only be true in the present if simultaneity with God were transitive, which it is not. There is no future fact for you to “change.”

Then God refers to an entity that does not yet exist, which, according to you is impossible.

God knows about me eternally because he exists eternally (and his knowledge doesn’t change).

But for God to refer to “an entity that does not yet exist” (me), he would have to be instantiated in some moment of time before I existed. But that is absurd; God is eternal.

Of course, we could draw a logical distinction between God’s knowledge of the world before I existed and after I existed. I am not something of which God knows prior to my existing.

Yes it does. The fate of this world is determined. Other possible world have nothing to do with it.

The fate of this world is not determined, given incompatibilism and the intransitivity of simultaneity. God’s knowing the future eternally does not imply that the future is true now.

The relations may be Cambridge relations, but the knowledge of those relations is not a Cambridge relation.

God’s knowing creation is causative of creation, however. His creating is a single, eternal act, and his relation to creatures is a Cambridge relation.

God wills himself and he wills creatures. By divine simplicity, he also knows himself and he knows creatures. (The willing and knowing of himself is what is the case in all possible worlds; the willing and knowing of creatures may vary from possible world to possible world because, as Cambridge relations, they do not impute potentiality to God.)

Suppose I had a short relationship with a woman 20 years ago when I was on holiday in a another country, and, without me knowing it, this woman gave birth to my daughter.
I don’t have knowledge of this fact, so, as far as my knowledge is concerned, I am not a father. Yet, the Cambridge change in me happened almost 20 years ago. But, suppose that tomorrow I get a letter form this woman. Then at that time, my knowledge changes, although the Cambridge fact that I am a father has been true for 20 years.

This is correct, but it is not a counterexample to the special case where God’s will and knowledge are identical. (Your will and knowledge are not identical.)

There is a possible world in which God knows only himself and there is a possible world in which, through his own essence God knows himself + creation. So, his essence does differ between world 1 and world 2.

This would require the additional premise that if the objects of God’s knowledge differ, then God’s single act of cognition differs. But I do not accept that principle; only God’s knowledge of himself is necessary, and his knowing of creation, as a Cambridge relation, can be known through his essence in the same intellective act.