Does fatalism follow from Divine simplicity?

[Linusthe2nd]

I’m sure being contrary to Catholic Doctrine isn’t a problem but being contrary to the legal principle of responsibility may well be in the future…

Right, we can always tell the judge it was " fate " and it wasn’t our fault at all.

Linus2nd

 

[tonyrey]

Right, we can always tell the judge it was " fate " and it wasn’t our fault at all.

Linus2nd

A few days in prison would dispel that illusion!:blackeye:

 

[tonyrey]

“For in Him we live, move and have our being.” Acts 17:28

Fatalism is the antitheistic antithesis of divine creativity!

 

[DanAl]

I’ve been looking a lot into the issue of free will recently, and I’m not sure how to answer this problem: basically (correct me if I’m wrong), Divine simplicity says that God’s essence is the same as His existence. And part of God’s essence is His knowledge. And since God’s existence is necessary, that would mean that God’s knowledge is also necessary. But doesn’t that mean fatalism? If any of God’s knowledge could have been different, that would mean that part of His essence, and thus His existence, isn’t necessary, and He isn’t a perfect being.

You’re forgetting God’s will. God’s will is necessary in the sense that it is an essential part of God, but its operation is contingent. God contingently wills creation and the providence of the world, and it is not bound or constrained or necessitated by his reason in any particular way. Of course, not constrained by his will does not mean that he acts randomly, he has reasons for what he does, but he can will otherwise.

 

[Linusthe2nd]

Omniscience requires: Necessarily, if God knows that I do x, then I do x.

The fatalist would like to argue that my doing x is necessary, ie. I could not have done otherwise than x.

So he cites the fact that since I at least do x contingently, God knows that I do x. He tries to offer the following argument:

1. Necessarily, if God knows that I do x, then I do x.
2. God knows that I do x.
3. Therefore, necessarily, I do x.

But that is invalid.

Yes, that is clear.

The second premise would have to be 2*. Necessarily, God knows that I do x. But every analysis of omniscience denies that that is true. So substituting 2. for 2*. would beg the question.

I don’t intend to be obtuse, but I guess I am. Would you just put this in a syllogism, leaving out " substituting " this " for " that." It just confuses me

Linus2nd.

 

[Linusthe2nd]

You’re forgetting God’s will. God’s will is necessary in the sense that it is an essential part of God, but its operation is contingent. God contingently wills creation and the providence of the world, and it is not bound or constrained or necessitated by his reason in any particular way. Of course, not constrained by his will does not mean that he acts randomly, he has reasons for what he does, but he can will otherwise.

God’s will is not contingent, either in itself or on anything else. He has willed to create a contingent universe, a universe dependent for its existence on his will.

Linus2nd

 

[belorg]

Yes, that is clear.

I don’t intend to be obtuse, but I guess I am. Would you just put this in a syllogism, leaving out " substituting " this " for " that." It just confuses me

Linus2nd.

Linus,

Polytropos means that the fatalist’s argument boils down to

1*. Necessarily, if God necessarily knows that I do x, then I do x.
2*. Necessarily, God knows that I do x
3. Therefore, necessarily, I do x.

This is a valid argument, but Polytropos thinks it is unsound because 2* is unsupported.

 

[tonyrey]

Linus,

Polytropos means that the fatalist’s argument boils down to

1*. Necessarily, if God necessarily knows that I do x, then I do x.
2*. Necessarily, God knows that I do x
3. Therefore, necessarily, I do x.

This is a valid argument, but Polytropos thinks it is unsound because 2* is unsupported.

The argument is invalid for two reasons:

1. Knowledge does not necessarily entail causation.
2. Choices that don’t exist are necesarily unknowable.

 

[Bahman]

I’ve been looking a lot into the issue of free will recently, and I’m not sure how to answer this problem: basically (correct me if I’m wrong), Divine simplicity says that God’s essence is the same as His existence. And part of God’s essence is His knowledge. And since God’s existence is necessary, that would mean that God’s knowledge is also necessary. But doesn’t that mean fatalism? If any of God’s knowledge could have been different, that would mean that part of His essence, and thus His existence, isn’t necessary, and He isn’t a perfect being.

Add one extra sentence to it and you will find that God has no free will, namely what God knows has to come to existence.

 

[Linusthe2nd]

Add one extra sentence to it and you will find that God has no free will, namely what God knows has to come to existence.

Nonesence, it comes into existence because he willed it. God doesn’t have to do anything. It is Dogmatic teaching that God does what he does freely. You may reject that of course, but that will not change Catholic teaching which is based upon Divine Revelation.

So on this and other issues you have raised we and you will have to agree to disagreee.

Linus2nd

 

[Bahman]

Nonesence, it comes into existence because he willed it. God doesn’t have to do anything. It is Dogmatic teaching that God does what he does freely. You may reject that of course, but that will not change Catholic teaching which is based upon Divine Revelation.

So on this and other issues you have raised we and you will have to agree to disagreee.

Linus2nd

Of course it make sense unless you subject God to changes.

 

[davidv]

Of course it make sense unless you subject God to changes.

The necessity that God is immutable means God is not subject to changes.

 

[CatholicSoxFan]

Yes, that is clear.

I don’t intend to be obtuse, but I guess I am. Would you just put this in a syllogism, leaving out " substituting " this " for " that." It just confuses me

Linus2nd.

Yes. So it’d be:

1. Necessarily, if God knows that I do x, then I do x.
2. Necessarily, God knows that I do x.
3. Therefore, necessarily, I do x.

 

[Bahman]

The necessity that God is immutable means God is not subject to changes.

I do agree with you. But that means that the beings in all forms are as eternal as God since any imaginably being should manifest itself into existence which has no beginning. In another world the concept creation namely, something was not exist and then come to existence is a false concept. Big lie.

 

[davidv]

I do agree with you. But that means that the beings in all forms are as eternal as God since any imaginably being should manifest itself into existence which has no beginning.

No it does not mean that. Nor has any evidence or logic been presented that supports this statement.

In another world the concept creation namely, something was not exist and then come to existence is a false concept. Big lie.

What other world would that be? I have seen no evidence of other worlds.

 

[Linusthe2nd]

Yes. So it’d be:

1. Necessarily, if God knows that I do x, then I do x.
2. Necessarily, God knows that I do x.
3. Therefore, necessarily, I do x.

O.K. This is what I would say in " bullet " format…

1. God created be with a free will.
2. God knows all that I do or have done or will do.
3. He knows that I freely choose to do x.
4. Since I freely do x, God does not cause me to do x.
5. God’s knowledge of all that I do is necessary, he cannot not know what he knows.
6. His necessary knowledge does not cause me to do anything against my will.
7. There is no fatalism involved either in God’s knowledge or in my free acts.

• There are other aspects of God’s causality which are similar to determinism. He creates all the natures of individual substances, even my soul, to function in such a manner as to carry out his will in regard to his Plan for creation. But this aspect does not touch the free acts of my will.

Linus2nd

 

[Bahman]

No it does not mean that. Nor has any evidence or logic been presented that supports this statement.
What other world would that be? I have seen no evidence of other worlds.

It does follow since anything should be either eternal or has a beginning. Could we agree on this? I then have two questions: 1) Do we exist? 2) Did we have any beginning? If the answer to both question is yes then we were in thought of God because of (1) and we had a beginning because of (2). Having a beginning however implements that God has to change his mind over time which is contradictory with the fact that God does not change. The last part is very hard to grasp but we can discuss it further if you wish?

 

[Bahman]

O.K. This is what I would say in " bullet " format…

1. God created be with a free will.
2. God knows all that I do or have done or will do.
3. He knows that I freely choose to do x.
4. Since I freely do x, God does not cause me to do x.
5. God’s knowledge of all that I do is necessary, he cannot not know what he knows.
6. His necessary knowledge does not cause me to do anything against my will.
7. There is no fatalism involved either in God’s knowledge or in my free acts.

• There are other aspects of God’s causality which are similar to determinism. He creates all the natures of individual substances, even my soul, to function in such a manner as to carry out his will in regard to his Plan for creation. But this aspect does not touch the free acts of my will.

Linus2nd

You forget to mention that there is an issue with free will and God being good. Because a good God can only create good. The problem is that free will is not good since it can lead to evil. Evil however does not exist in God hence the agent with free will has to be able to be something that God could not be, namely devil.

 

[belorg]

The argument is invalid for two reasons:

1. Knowledge does not necessarily entail causation.
2. Choices that don’t exist are necesarily unknowable.

That would make the argument** unsound**, not invalid.

 

[Linusthe2nd]

You forget to mention that there is an issue with free will and God being good. Because a good God can only create good. The problem is that free will is not good since it can lead to evil. Evil however does not exist in God hence the agent with free will has to be able to be something that God could not be, namely devil.

You can think whatever you want, no skin off our noses.

Linus2nd