Does morality exist?

[Syntax]

Why is 5>4 one of those relations and 5<4 not? Your answer seems to be that 4 and 5 are related that way because that is one of the ways they are related. Does that satisfy you?

Precisely. I explained to Leela that it is epistemically circular in my last post.

 

[Syntax]

I don’t think that all that exists are particulars. There also exist relations between particulars. Where we disagree I think is in whether or not such relations as redness exist prior to a human being relating such things as firetrucks and apples.

Redness is not a relation, it’s a property.

“The red firetruck resembles the red apple in color” is a relational statement. But the relation is “resembles” not “redness.”

Nor is “a and b are both red” a relational statement. It is a linguistic transformation of
“a is red and b is red.”
The problem is going from tokens to types in the transformation if types don’t exist.

So do you think types don’t exist?

 

[Syntax]

Here’s a cute little video on Putnam and Rorty to watch. I don’t know if anyone has read Putnam’s stuff on semantic externalism which turned this old philosophical bias of “private meanings” on its head. I don’t agree with everything he says, and he went through a couple big transitions in his own philosophy, but the guy was definitely a bigger genius than Rorty!

youtube.com/watch?v=GlrEbffVVjM&feature=related

Even better. Here’s one with Davidson, a lover of semantics who worked on theories of meaning, and Rorty’s ridiculous post-modern semantic nihilism. There’s so much great work going on in the philosophy of language right now. I love this stuff. This aspect of philosophy is truly carving new ground and it has been quite successful the last couple decades, and I’m a believer that it can solve alot of old philsophical problems we’ve wrestled with for centuries. But I’m certainly not a fan of Rorty’s semantic pessimism. I always have hope.

Tarski, Davidson, Putnam, Strawson, Quine, and Frege (my favorite), etc, etc. Strawson himself is coming to our campus department in Bouler the next couple months for our conference, too…can’t wait!
youtube.com/watch?v=EjWTuF35GtY&feature=related

 

[Ender]

But why not just say that beauty is complex and that different people are sensitive to and/or blind to different aspects of it??? That doesn’t make it a matter of purely personal preference!

None of this addresses the point I raised. If two people viewing the same thing reach opposite positions as to its beauty, is one of them mistaken? Can ones personal perspective on beauty be considered “wrong” and if it cannot be wrong then can it be said that beauty has an objective meaning? The same question pertains to morality: if you and I disagree as to whether an act is moral or immoral, does one of us of necessity have to be wrong? If neither of us is necessarily mistaken then morality has no objective meaning but if you accept that one of us is in error how do you determine which of us got it wrong?

Ender

 

[Betterave]

None of this addresses the point I raised. If two people viewing the same thing reach opposite positions as to its beauty, is one of them mistaken? [Maybe.] Can ones personal perspective on beauty be considered “wrong” **[yes - there is a cognitive element in the apprehension of beauty, we can learn to appreciate beauty, or realize (RE-COGNIZE) that something is beautiful, as I have already pointed out]**and if it cannot be wrong **[it can]**then can it be said that beauty has an objective meaning? The same question pertains to morality: if you and I disagree as to whether an act is moral or immoral, does one of us of necessity have to be wrong? [Not necessarily, depends on the case in question - difficult cases do not destroy the objectivity of a whole field (think of how this applies in medicine, for example - please tell me if you need this explained).] If neither of us is necessarily mistaken then morality has no objective meaning *[false - this is a non sequitur - see above: “not knowing one thing” does not imply “knowing nothing”]

but if you accept that one of us is in error how do you determine which of us got it wrong?

There is no universal a priori criterion which we can simply invoke so as to resolve such disagreements. That’s not how the rational, human apprehension of ‘objective reality’ works. That’s why Anti’s asking us to decide whether some abstract claim is true (“is it better to give $30 to homeless guy than to take wife out to dinner?”) is based on a radical misunderstanding of how ‘objective’ reasoning works. Due consideration of the salient details involved in a case of disagreement is an *intrinsic *part of understanding who is right or wrong (or neither) in such cases. When these details are artificially abstracted away, it is silly to pretend that we should still be able to give a simple ‘objective’ answer that we can apply willy-nilly (i.e., without a need to understand the details) to any possible situation that might come up.

If you want, try to give us a specific case study and we can spell out some of the required elements for its ‘objective’ analysis.

 

[Leela]

Redness is not a relation, it’s a property.

What do you mean by a property as opposed to a relation. I see no difference unless your notion of properties includes the supposition that universe was waiting there with its demand to be sorted according wavelengths in the visible spectrum before there were any human beings who have found it useful for their particular purposes to do so.

“The red firetruck resembles the red apple in color” is a relational statement. But the relation is “resembles” not “redness.”

There are many ways that something can resemble something else. Redness is one of those ways.

Nor is “a and b are both red” a relational statement. It is a linguistic transformation of
“a is red and b is red.”
The problem is going from tokens to types in the transformation if types don’t exist.

So do you think types don’t exist?

Sure they exist. Types are sorts of relations between tokens, and tokens are sets of relations with other tokens. There is no “thing in itself” if that is supposed to mean that there is anything to know about something other than how to use that thing or put it in relation to some other thing.

Best,
Leela

 

[Syntax]

What do you mean by a property as opposed to a relation. I see no difference unless your notion of properties includes the supposition that universe was waiting there with its demand to be sorted according wavelengths in the visible spectrum before there were any human beings who have found it useful for their particular purposes to do so

That you don’t see a difference between properties and relations is precisely the source of all this confusion. You need to at least get the syntactical structure distinguished between monadic and multi-place predicates used to give them expression.

A relation relates 2 or more objects as in “A is above B” or “A is between B and C,” and is expressed with relational multi-placed predicates like xRy and Rxyz. Properties are monadic features of objects as in “a is red,” and are expressed with 1-place predicates like Rx. Relations can be intrinsic or extrinsic to the object. Properties can only be intrinsic.

The **metaphysical **question of whether or not properties and relations actually exist is a separate issue. I’ve already said “red” is still an objective property of qualititative ***mental states ***that represent the world, not of the “outiside” world itself. But there are still other other objective properties in the world like having-mass, having-charge, having-virtue, having-goodness. But can we please stay on the topic of numbers? I suspect you are avoiding this issue and will assert that everything is “composed of relations all the way down”–which I see no evidence for yet. You just stipulate it.

There are many ways that something can resemble something else. Redness is one of those ways.

Sure, but “resembles” is a 2-place predicate. “Red” is a 1-place predicate. And the resembling relation with respect to redness would not hold for two things unless both things were already red. This should be obvious.

Sure they exist. Types are sorts of relations between tokens, and tokens are sets of relations with other tokens.

I’ve already extensively refuted this view in posts #107, #125, #131 in your “Demanding Evidence” thread. If types are related to sets of tokens, then either a type’s relation to the set of tokens is one of identity or non-identity. The first is an absurdity, so the second must be true. And if the second is true, then types are something other than their token instantiatons of them. So the relation between type and token is an instantiation relation, just like Plato and other moderns say, not an identity relation. So types exist independently of their tokens.

 

[Leela]

That you don’t see a difference between properties and relations is precisely the source of all this confusion. You need to at least get the syntactical structure distinguished between monadic and multi-place predicates used to give them expression.

You tend to argue as though your interlocuters have a duty to use the distinctions that you want to draw and to use terms in the way that you prefer to use them. Assuming it is your desire to have a conversation with me, and assuming that you would like me to distinguish between monadic and multi-place predicates, then it is you who has the obligation to convince me that such a distinction is worth making.

A relation relates 2 or more objects as in “A is above B” or “A is between B and C,” and is expressed with relational multi-placed predicates like xRy and Rxyz. Properties are monadic features of objects as in “a is red,” and are expressed with 1-place predicates like Rx. Relations can be intrinsic or extrinsic to the object. Properties can only be intrinsic.

I don’t see the possibility for redness (or anything else) as a monadic feature. If all that existed was one one thing, what could it mean to say that that thing is red? Red only becomes of issue when there are other things to relate this one thing to.

The **metaphysical **question of whether or not properties and relations actually exist is a separate issue. I’ve already said “red” is still an objective property of qualititative ***mental states ***that represent the world, not of the “outiside” world itself. But there are still other other objective properties in the world like having-mass, having-charge, having-virtue, having-goodness. But can we please stay on the topic of numbers? I suspect you are avoiding this issue and will assert that everything is “composed of relations all the way down”–which I see no evidence for yet. You just stipulate it.

I am happy to stay with numbers, and I still say that there is nothing to say about a number that is not to express a relation between 4 and something else. You can argue that I am wrong if you can think of an assertion about 4 that is not such a relation.

Sure, but “resembles” is a 2-place predicate. “Red” is a 1-place predicate. And the resembling relation with respect to redness would not hold for two things unless both things were already red.

I disagree since it could not hold for one thing unless something else either were or were not red. But to stick to numbers, can you supply a monadic property of 4?

I’ve already extensively refuted this view in posts #107, #125, #131 in your “Demanding Evidence” thread.

Ok. You have apparently convinced yourself of your view several times already. Is that what “refute” means?

If types are related to sets of tokens, then either a type’s relation to the set of tokens is one of identity or non-identity. The first is an absurdity, so the second must be true. And if the second is true, then types are something other than their token instantiatons of them. So the relation between type and token is an instantiation relation, just like Plato and other moderns say, not an identity relation. So types exist independently of their tokens.

You have presupposed that the only sort of relation that could describe a type is either an identity or a nonidentity to a set of tokens. Why are these the only sorts of relations possible? Why is the first an absurdity.

If we are to stick to numbers, I suppose we are to regard 4-ness as a type and 1+3, 2*2, etc as tokens? What can be said of such types that is not to put them in relation to some other types or tokens?

Best,
Leela

 

[Leela]

I was referring you to a well-known article that situates this debate, not calling you names!

If you can provide the article I’ll be glad to have a look at it if you think it will move the conversation forward.

“I don’t have to think that 4 and 5 have intrinsic properties to say that 4 and 5 are not the same number. “4” and “5” stand for an innumerable set of relations between numbers, but that does not mean that any sort of relation such as 5<4 is one of those relations. It is not. But 5>4 is one of those relations.”

Why is 5>4 one of those relations and 5<4 not? Your answer seems to be that 4 and 5 are related that way because that is one of the ways they are related. Does that satisfy you?

5>4 and 4>5 both have inferential relationships with other relations. We could only say 4>5 if we were willing to give up our beliefs about these other relations such as 4=2+2 and 4=3+2 and 3>2, but neither of us are willing to do so.

But you also seem to (have to) say that the number 4 itself really is related to all sorts of other numbers - it is greater than 3, for instance. But that is not because of what 4 and 3 are intrinsically are…? But isn’t 4 intrinsically the number that is 1 greater than 3? If you don’t understand this about the number 4 itself, isn’t it possible that you simply don’t understand ‘the number 4’?

I don’t think there is anything to know about the number 4 other than to be able to use 4 in such ways as putting it in relation to other numbers. If you think I am wrong, then please tell me what else it is that I need to know in order to be able to say that I understand 4.

Best,
Leela

 

[Syntax]

You tend to argue as though your interlocuters have a duty to use the distinctions that you want to draw and to use terms in the way that you prefer to use them. Assuming it is your desire to have a conversation with me, and assuming that you would like me to distinguish between monadic and multi-place predicates, then it is you who has the obligation to convince me that such a distinction is worth making.

Oh please. Just flat-out denying there exists a distinction between 1-place and multi-place predicates is tantamount to denying that the term “relation” even makes any sense. So why are you even using it if there is no distinction? This is post-modern nonsense.

The distinction provides the foundation for linguistic and logical structure. If you don’t think these distinctions should be made, then you’re going to have a hell of a time explaining why you think the syntax of logic and language is fundamentally error-prone.

I don’t see the possibility for redness (or anything else) as a monadic feature. If all that existed was one one thing, what could it mean to say that that thing is red? Red only becomes of issue when there are other things to relate this one thing to.

If there was just one thing, then that **one thing **would be red. No problem.

I am happy to stay with numbers, and I still say that there is nothing to say about a number that is not to express a relation between 4 and something else. You can argue that I am wrong if you can think of an assertion about 4 that is not such a relation.

I’ve given you several argments already. You are just re-stating your view without telling me where my arguments went wrong. Obviously, you seem to think the norms of intelligible discourse don’t apply to you.

But to stick to numbers, can you supply a monadic property of 4?.

Yes. being divisible by two, and being a factor of 16. If you think these are relations show me the relation!!! It will have this relational structure.

x (divisible by 2) y.

Ok. You have apparently convinced yourself of your view several times already. Is that what “refute” means?

No. But if you don’t think I have refuted it, the norms of intelligible discourse require an explanation **why you **think I haven’t.

You have presupposed that the only sort of relation that could describe a type is either an identity or a nonidentity to a set of tokens.

lol…What’s wrong with that? (P or not P) is always true, right? If P is false, then not-P is necessarily true. So at least we know the relation is not an identity relation, right?

This is why I think the relation is something different than identity, namely, instantiation. If you think there’s another relation, then you need to provide it.
Leela;6265879:

Why are these the only sorts of relations possible? Why is the first an absurdity.

I explain the reason why identity is a relation of absurdity in those posts. You can read them.

 

[Syntax]

I’ve just realized I’m up against post-modern nonsense. This is wasting my time.

Leela, check out

elsewhere.org/pomo/

This is so funny!!

 

[Ender]

Due consideration of the salient details involved in a case of disagreement is an *intrinsic *part of understanding who is right or wrong (or neither) in such cases. When these details are artificially abstracted away, it is silly to pretend that we should still be able to give a simple ‘objective’ answer that we can apply willy-nilly (i.e., without a need to understand the details) to any possible situation that might come up.

Once again you have not addressed (not understood?) the point I raised so let me try again. If I say “X is true” and you say “X is false” one of us must be wrong if what is meant is “X is universally true” as opposed to “X is true for me”. We may both be correct if I say “the apple appears to be yellow” and you say “the apple appears to be red” but we cannot both be correct if I say it *is *yellow and you say it *is *red.

If values (opinions, preferences, beliefs, whatever…) are relative to the individual then we have no basis for saying that someones values are wrong, only that they are different. If morality is relative then, like beauty, it can never be right or wrong … only different. I’ll make this as simple and concrete as I can: why is murder immoral?

If neither of us is necessarily mistaken then morality has no objective meaning *[false - this is a non sequitur - see above: “not knowing one thing” does not imply “knowing nothing”]

It is not a non sequitur nor does my comment imply the conclusion you reached. It is obvious that if two people say things that are mutually exclusive then one of them has to be wrong if what they are talking about has a specific - as opposed to a relative - meaning. If we face each other and I say the car is to the right and you say it is to the left our observations can both be correct because left and right are relative terms, but if I say it is north of us and you say it is south of us then one of us is wrong. I know with certainty that at least one of us is wrong even if I don’t know that either of us is right - and this is true for all statements with objective (as opposed to relative) meanings.

Ender

 

[Syntax]

Once again you have not addressed (not understood?) the point I raised so let me try again. If I say “X is true” and you say “X is false” one of us must be wrong if what is meant is “X is universally true” as opposed to “X is true for me”. We may both be correct if I say “the apple appears to be yellow” and you say “the apple appears to be red” but we cannot both be correct if I say it *is *yellow and you say it *is *red.

That’s correct, Ender. But I suspect Betterave might have had something else in mind. I’m not sure what that was, though.

 

[Betterave]

Once again you have not addressed (not understood?) the point I raised so let me try again. If I say “X is true” and you say “X is false” one of us must be wrong if what is meant is “X is universally true” as opposed to “X is true for me”. We may both be correct if I say “the apple appears to be yellow” and you say “the apple appears to be red” but we cannot both be correct if I say it *is *yellow and you say it *is *red.

Once again *you *have not addressed (not understood?) the point I raised so let me try again.

So let’s talk ‘murder.’ Murder is, by definition, unjustified (immoral) killing. If someone thinks that murder is morally okay, he doesn’t understand the meaning of the term. So why is murder immoral? - not an interesting question.

You propose the following dichotomy: “X is universally true” or “X is true for me.” We’ve already talked about the latter use of the word true and you agreed that it didn’t make sense (I thought) - why are you continuing to use it?

Anyway, what is ‘X’ in your claim? That’s one of the details that makes a difference!

“Murder is wrong”? That’s true by definition.
“Some killings are morally justified, i.e., not all killings are murder”? That’s true.
“This particular killing was justified”? We might not be able to say.

Compare:

Pneumonia is a lung infection. (True by definition)
Some cases of pneumonia are fatal, some are not. (True)
It was pneumonia that was responsible for Bill’s death. (We might not be able to say.)

 

[Syntax]

Once again you have not addressed (not understood?) the point I raised so let me try again. If I say “X is true” and you say “X is false” one of us must be wrong if what is meant is “X is universally true” as opposed to “X is true for me”. We may both be correct if I say “the apple appears to be yellow” and you say “the apple appears to be red” but we cannot both be correct if I say it *is *yellow and you say it *is *red.

This is roughly correct. I just wanted to press your distinction further just for clarification.

Notice the two different sets of claims, here: they are about different things.

“X is yellow” and “X is red” cannot both be true because they are incompatible claims being made about** X.**

“X appears yellow to me” and “X appears red to me” are not claims being made about X at all, but only about me–or how I am **being-appeared-to ** subjectively by the object in front of me. So it is about my appearances of the object, not about the object of my appearances. These claims can also be true or false. If I say “that appears green to me” and you say “No it doesn’t, it appears blue to you,” you would still be making a false statement about my appearances.

If values (opinions, preferences, beliefs, whatever…) are relative to the individual then we have no basis for saying that someones values are wrong, only that they are different.

This would be true, **only **on the antirealist assumption that right and wrong didn’t exist. But why would you think this?

 

[Ender]

This is roughly correct. I just wanted to press your distinction further just for clarification.

I agree with your clarification.

This would be true, **only **on the antirealist assumption that right and wrong didn’t exist. But why would you think this?

I believe the statement is universally true of everything. If something has the property (and let’s not quibble about whether I’m using “property” correctly, you understand my meaning) of redness then regardless of how anyone perceives it, it is still red. If something only gives the perception of being red, can we still say that it is in fact red? If I claim to perceive it as yellow but it really is red then my perception is incorrect, but if we don’t know whether in fact it is red then my perception is as valid as anyone elses. Why would this logic not hold for morality, beauty or any other value judgment?

Ender

 

[Ender]

Murder is, by definition, unjustified (immoral) killing.

No. Murder is defined as: “the crime of unlawfully killing a person.” The definition pertains to the law, not to morality. Look it up in your Funk and Wagnalls.

So why is murder immoral? - not an interesting question.

It is interesting precisely because it makes the question of morality so stark. If you cannot show that murder is immoral then you clearly cannot claim that morality exists.

Ender

 

[Betterave]

No. Murder is defined as: “the crime of unlawfully killing a person.” The definition pertains to the law, not to morality. Look it up in your Funk and Wagnalls.
It is interesting precisely because it makes the question of morality so stark. If you cannot show that murder is immoral then you clearly cannot claim that morality exists.

Aren’t you being a little obtuse here? Don’t you think that the unlawfulness of murder is grounded in its being wrong? Anyway, *if *murder is merely ‘unlawful’ killing, then murder is *not *inherently immoral (*unless *the laws it contravenes are *moral *laws); therefore, your bolded claim above is incoherent. Do you understand this???

 

[Leela]

Oh please. Just flat-out denying there exists a distinction between 1-place and multi-place predicates is tantamount to denying that the term “relation” even makes any sense. So why are you even using it if there is no distinction? This is post-modern nonsense.

You’ve missed my point. I’m not denying any distinction. I’m trying to help you with your obvious frustration with seeminhgly everyone you converse with. If you come to understand that no one has a duty to accept your premises and to be already educated in the things that you think are important and instead come to realize that it is you who needs to convince others to accept your premises and that they need to understand the things that you think are important, you will do better at making whatever points you want to make and you will annoy everyone else a lot less.

The distinction provides the foundation for linguistic and logical structure. If you don’t think these distinctions should be made, then you’re going to have a hell of a time explaining why you think the syntax of logic and language is fundamentally error-prone.

uh…Ok, I’ll get right on that.

If there was just one thing, then that **one thing **would be red. No problem.

I can’t see how it wold make any sense to say so.

I’ve given you several argments already. You are just re-stating your view without telling me where my arguments went wrong. Obviously, you seem to think the norms of intelligible discourse don’t apply to you.

Apparently you think this sort of talk reflects well on you and the Catholic religion you represent here.

Yes. being divisible by two, and being a factor of 16. If you think these are relations show me the relation!!! It will have this relational structure.

x (divisible by 2) y.

I keep saying that there is nothing to say about a number that is not to express a relation between 4 and something else, and to refute my claim you tell me 4 is divisible by 2???

I don’t speak symbolic logic, but isn’t it obvious that saying that 4 is divisible 2 is relating the number 4 to the number 2? Maybe you’ll want to try again to give me a “property” of 4 that is not just as assertion of a relationship between 4 and something else.

Regards,
Leela

 

[AntiTheist]

I’ve decided simply not to take Anti’s posts seriously anymore.

Feel free to. Watch how much I care.

Anti just takes it as a brute fact that people *can *share meanings but then admits we don’t need any explanation for why this happens.

As I said, the ideas we generate are similar enough – since they come from similar experiences – that we can communicate. Seems like you started ignoring my posts before you even got to the end of the last one, eh?

Ender:

It is interesting precisely because it makes the question of morality so stark. If you cannot show that murder is immoral then you clearly cannot claim that morality exists.

Bravo, Ender, bravo. You are really hitting it out of the park, here.

Yes, let’s hear the reason that murder is immoral. So far, we’ve heard the rather unconvincing argument, “It just is.”

Any answer you come up with is going to have to be grounded in values. You’re going to get to the point that “It’s against my values to take the life of a person in situations X, Y, or Z.” Other people are going to think that situation Y is ok, or they won’t be ok with situation Q or whatever. Think about debates involving capital punishment, abortion, self-defense killings, “just” war, etc. Different people – obviously – apply different criteria for what they think constitutes “just.”

Who gets to decide which set of values is the “objectively correct” one?

Unless you have a Big Brother, whose value judgments are binding on everyone, you can’t say that any of those criteria is “objectively” correct.

What we can say is that almost all of us value not being murdered, the vast majority of us have no desire to commit murder, and almost all of us value living in a society where we can be protected from murder – both our own murder and the social disturbance that results from killings.

Murder doesn’t have to be “objectively wrong” for us to say that in the context of our shared values, we have really good reasons for not permitting it.