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Arizona_Mike
Guest
That’s a simplistic view of a complex political situation. There were two camps in the Japanese junta: the war camp maintained that Japan must inflict tremendous damage on the Americans in order to win better terms than the “unconditional surrender” offered by President Franklin Roosevelt at the Yalta Conference in 1945. They urged fighting to the last man if necessary.“The Japanese were ready to surrender and it wasn’t necessary to hit them with that awful thing … I hated to see our country be the first to use such a weapon,” Eisenhower said in 1963.
In his 1965 study, Atomic Diplomacy: Hiroshima and Potsdam (pp. 107, 108), historian Gar Alperovitz writes:
In mid-April [1945] the [US] Joint Intelligence Committee reported that Japanese leaders were looking for a way to modify the surrender terms to end the war. The State Department was convinced the Emperor was actively seeking a way to stop the fighting.
The peace camp contended that ending the war as soon as possible was the best way to achieve both camps’ overriding goal: retaining the emperor system as the only method to retain an authority that a Japanese populace would accept under U.S. authority.
Gen. Korechika Anami, Japan’s minister of war and the man calling the shots in negotiations, called for conditions that the world wouldn’t have recognized as surrender.
Anami wanted retention of the emperor, self-disarmament, no foreign occupation, and trial of any Japanese war criminals by Japan itself, according to “The Rising Sun,” John Toland’s 1971 Pulitzer Prize-winning history of Japan’s war empire. He was willing to inflict tremendous casualties on the U.S. invaders to achieve this goal.