Why additional elaboration would constitute a significant difference between the two scenarios is anybody’s guess, but as it turns out no additional elaboration is necessary. That one logically impossible state of affairs includes contradictory physical characteristics and the other does not is certainly a difference, but not one that matters. Both scenarios set forth a logically impossible state of affairs; or do you disagree?
And this is why in my earlier post to you I made the oblique reference to Asimov’s work not providing insight into the ontological probabilities of competing theories of time. McTaggart concludes that there is no such thing as time, as he finds the A series to be internally inconsistent. A theorists disagree, and B theorists also disagree in that time does exist but only as relations to events on the timeline, ie. time only appears to pass to us but does not in reality. Then among B theorists you have Eternalists who claim that all objects past and future exist as a four-dimensional block, but we cannot view them because of the spacetime position in which we find ourselves.
First we would all have to accept a Presentism A-theory of time, which no one here has obliged themselves to do. Even then, to realize this logically impossible event is dependent upon God providing the questioner (Tyrion) with the information about what Tyrion would have chosen. It is only with this information that Tyrion can now “change the future.” But to do so Tyrion must choose an answer inconsistent with God’s. We have the following conditional proposition: If God presents Tyrion with an answer and if Tyrion chooses to give an inconsistent answer, then God cannot answer the question correctly. In that instance, it is logically impossible for God to correctly answer the question - made impossible by the very fact that God gave Tyrion the information in the first instance.
That is exactly what B-theory Eternalists hypothesize - that there is no future or past, just a four-dimensional spacetime manifold block where all objects exist. If they are correct, then there may be a book that exists at some point in spacetime with an author’s name on it, although we may not have present knowledge of it. In any case, omniscience can still exist under a Presentism A-theory.
Now I get to use an example from Asimov’s first Foundation book that actually has some applicability. There the “psychohistorians” create a very complex algorithm that can accurately p(name removed by moderator)oint the unfolding of human events. God being the creator of the universe and everything in it, as well as having an infinite intellect, can accurately predict all events that occur in the cosmos, whether the event has “happened yet” or not - well, unless it is logically impossible for him to do so.
This is very bizarre reasoning: using a possible worlds thought experiment that results in a logical paradox to prove the ontological status of of future events. The only conclusion that can be reached is that God is not able to give Tyrion the accurate answer under the conditions specified. But, as you put it in a recent post, let’s get down to business.
The only way that the thought experiment works is if God agrees to give an answer about what Tyrion will do. Let’s assume that if God gives an answer it allows Tyrion to “change the future” such that God couldn’t foresee it - making God not omniscient. Could God do this? No, because God can’t do anything that would compromise his omniscience. It’s akin to asking if God can lie or if God can be unjust. So while I think you’ve made a number of questionable assumptions about the nature of time, even if your conclusion is true, you still haven’t proven what you set out to prove.