Duress and culpability

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Objectively, a knowingly chosen act is either moral or immoral, and if it is immoral, it is objectively either a venial sin, or a mortal sin. Also, both venial sins and mortal sins admit of degrees of gravity. A venial sin can be more or less serious and still be venial. A mortal sin can be more or less serious and still be mortal. All of this applies to the objective degree of sinfulness of the knowingly chosen act.

There are three fonts (sources) of morality (intention, moral object, circumstances) and these three together determine the objective morality, or immorality of the chosen act. If any one font is gravely immoral, then nothing in the other two fonts can cause the act to be less than an objective mortal sin. For when any font is gravely immoral it is gravely contrary to the love of God and neighbor, causing the act as a whole to have that same character. But if one font would cause the act to be a venial sin, grave matter in another font makes the act an objective mortal sin.

Culpability also admits of degrees; culpability is the responsibility of the subject (the person who chooses the act). Culpability refers to guilt for sin. It is possible for someone to commit an objective mortal sin, but without sufficient knowledge or freedom of will for the act to be also an actual mortal sin. A substantial reduction in knowledge or freedom in a knowingly chosen act will reduce the culpability substantially, so that the act may be only an actual venial sin, even though it is also an objective mortal sin. Full knowledge and full deliberate are required for an objective mortal sin to be also an actual mortal sin. However, minor reductions in culpability would not be sufficient to cause an objective mortal sin to be less than an actual mortal sin.

Duress refers to the circumstance (in the third font of morality) whereby a person is pressured to commit a particular sin. Duress can change the morality of the third font, since that font is evaluated by weighing the good and bad consequences of one’s act. If the good outweighs the bad, then the act is moral. An act of material cooperation might become moral with some degree of duress, but not necessarily so.

However, duress cannot change the other two fonts. An intrinsically evil act is still objectively immoral, regardless of the degree of duress. An act of formal cooperation with evil also remains objectively immoral regardless of duress. And an immoral intention remains objectively immoral, despite duress. All this refers to the objective morality or immorality of the act and to duress.

Duress can also affect the degree of culpability. A person under duress might judge the objective morality of an act less well, so that he thinks an act is moral when it is not; this would reduce culpabililty, perhaps even substantially. Also, severe fear due to duress might cause the choice of an act to be less than fully free, making the act not an actual mortal sin.

However, the mere fact that a person is under some degree of duress does not necessarily reduce culpability substantially. If you know that an act is intrinsically evil and gravely immoral, and if you freely choose to commit that act in order to avoid the bad consequences threatened by the duress, you have committed an actual mortal sin. The third font of circumstances cannot change either of the other two fonts. If your knowledge that the act was gravely immoral was full, and if you chose that act will full deliberation (full freedom of will), then the act is an actual mortal sin, despite the duress.
 
Duress refers to the circumstance (in the third font of morality) whereby a person is pressured to commit a particular sin. Duress can change the morality of the third font, since that font is evaluated by weighing the good and bad consequences of one’s act. If the good outweighs the bad, then the act is moral. An act of material cooperation might become moral with some degree of duress, but not necessarily so.

However, duress cannot change the other two fonts. An intrinsically evil act is still objectively immoral, regardless of the degree of duress. An act of formal cooperation with evil also remains objectively immoral regardless of duress. And an immoral intention remains objectively immoral, despite duress. All this refers to the objective morality or immorality of the act and to duress.

Duress can also affect the degree of culpability. A person under duress might judge the objective morality of an act less well, so that he thinks an act is moral when it is not; this would reduce culpabililty, perhaps even substantially. Also, severe fear due to duress might cause the choice of an act to be less than fully free, making the act not an actual mortal sin.

However, the mere fact that a person is under some degree of duress does not necessarily reduce culpability substantially. If you know that an act is intrinsically evil and gravely immoral, and if you freely choose to commit that act in order to avoid the bad consequences threatened by the duress, you have committed an actual mortal sin. The third font of circumstances cannot change either of the other two fonts. If your knowledge that the act was gravely immoral was full, and if you chose that act will full deliberation (full freedom of will), then the act is an actual mortal sin, despite the duress.
Let me ask you this:
If a woman is about to be date raped and she asks the creep to use a condom, is she committing a sin? If so, is it a mortal sin or a venial sin?
 
Let me ask you this:
If a woman is about to be date raped and she asks the creep to use a condom, is she committing a sin? If so, is it a mortal sin or a venial sin?
Ouch! Tough question. If this was ‘Jeoprady’, I think that this would be worth, like, $5,000… 🙂
 
Ouch! Tough question. If this was ‘Jeoprady’, I think that this would be worth, like, $5,000… 🙂
Truly, I would love to hear Ron’s answer on that because he seems to have a very good grasp of official church teaching. If I am not mistaken, condoms are forbidden even under these terrible circumstances since they interfere with the potential creation of new life.
 
Contraception is intrinsically evil, and always gravely immoral. No good intention, and no dire circumstance, can cause an intrinsically evil act to become moral. That is all that I will say about that question.

Returning to the original topic that I raised…

There are three fonts of morality.
  1. intention - duress does not affect the morality of the intention. If a person has an immoral intention, then duress does not make the intention moral. Duress can indirectly affect intention, in that, if a person is under duress, he might make a choice related to the duress, intending to free himself from it.
  2. moral object - if an act is intrinsically evil, duress cannot change the moral object. Duress is a circumstance in the third font. The first and second fonts cannot change the moral object in the second font. Intrinsically evil acts are irreformable.
Intentions are reformable; you can change your own intention.
Circumstances are somewhat reformable; sometimes you can change the circumstances so that the good consequences will now outweigh the bad.
Moral objects are irreformable; your only option is to choose a type of act with a good moral object instead of a type of act with a bad moral object.
  1. Duress affects the consequences of your act. So if you are a store manager forced to open a safe at gunpoint, you can do so without sin, because the circumstance of duress results in the good consequences of complying outweighing the bad consequences.
 
Contraception is intrinsically evil, and always gravely immoral. No good intention, and no dire circumstance, can cause an intrinsically evil act to become moral. That is all that I will say about that question.

Returning to the original topic that I raised…

There are three fonts of morality.
  1. intention - duress does not affect the morality of the intention. If a person has an immoral intention, then duress does not make the intention moral. Duress can indirectly affect intention, in that, if a person is under duress, he might make a choice related to the duress, intending to free himself from it.
  2. moral object - if an act is intrinsically evil, duress cannot change the moral object. Duress is a circumstance in the third font. The first and second fonts cannot change the moral object in the second font. Intrinsically evil acts are irreformable.
Intentions are reformable; you can change your own intention.
Circumstances are somewhat reformable; sometimes you can change the circumstances so that the good consequences will now outweigh the bad.
Moral objects are irreformable; your only option is to choose a type of act with a good moral object instead of a type of act with a bad moral object.
  1. Duress affects the consequences of your act. So if you are a store manager forced to open a safe at gunpoint, you can do so without sin, because the circumstance of duress results in the good consequences of complying outweighing the bad consequences.
So just to be clear:
Your two opening sentences of the above quote would suggest that a woman who is the victim of date rape is committing an intrinsically evil and gravely immoral act by asking her attacker to use a condom. Is this correct?

Since she is asking (even begging) him to contracept which is grave matter, with absolute full consent of her will, and sufficient reflection, is she guilty of mortal sin using the guidelines under the three fonts of morality?

Would the woman need to confess her sin and obtain absolution from a priest before receiving the sacraments because of this?

*unlike contraception, opening a safe is never an intrinsically evil or gravely immoral act.
 
So just to be clear:
Your two opening sentences of the above quote would suggest that a woman who is the victim of date rape is committing an intrinsically evil and gravely immoral act by asking her attacker to use a condom. Is this correct?

Since she is asking (even begging) him to contracept which is grave matter, with absolute full consent of her will, and sufficient reflection, is she guilty of mortal sin using the guidelines under the three fonts of morality?

Would the woman need to confess her sin and obtain absolution from a priest before receiving the sacraments because of this?

*unlike contraception, opening a safe is never an intrinsically evil or gravely immoral act.
What was the intent of using the condom: preventing impregnation, or preventing a sexually-transmitted disease, one of which, HIV infection, is invariably fatal?

It makes a world of difference.

Also I would say that duress here, expressed probably as strong fear, would greatly limit culpability.

Moreover I don’t think that the circumstances lend themselves to examining one’s conscience and exercising a truly free will prior to the request.

So were I a confessor, I would err on the side of leniency towards the victim.
 
What was the intent of using the condom: preventing impregnation, or preventing a sexually-transmitted disease, one of which, HIV infection, is invariably fatal?
It is a serious doctrinal error to claim that an intrinscially evil act, i.e. an act with an evil moral object, becomes moral with a good intention. It is a serious doctrinal error to claim that the intended purpose determines the moral object. It is a serious doctrinal error to claim that any circumstance, even one with dire consequences, changes the moral object or makes an intrinsically evil act moral.

Intention is the first font. Moral object is in the second font. Circumstances is the third font. One bad font makes any act a sin.
 
It is a serious doctrinal error to claim that an intrinscially evil act, i.e. an act with an evil moral object, becomes moral with a good intention. It is a serious doctrinal error to claim that the intended purpose determines the moral object. It is a serious doctrinal error to claim that any circumstance, even one with dire consequences, changes the moral object or makes an intrinsically evil act moral.

Intention is the first font. Moral object is in the second font. Circumstances is the third font. One bad font makes any act a sin.
I wasn’t talking about the morality of the act.

I was talking about the level of culpability of the rape victim, which I clearly stated in my post above: “Also I would say that duress here, expressed probably as strong fear, would greatly limit culpability.”
 
Your two opening sentences of the above quote would suggest that a woman who is the victim of date rape is committing an intrinsically evil and gravely immoral act by asking her attacker to use a condom. Is this correct?
I object to the tendency for every thread on ethics to become a discussion of sexual ethics. I’m trying to discuss basic principles of ethics in general.

It would be absurd to take the theological position that a rapist could use contraception, and everyone else could not. There is nothing in the gravely immoral act of rape that would somehow change the moral object of contraception to make it moral. Rape is gravely immoral for several reasons. But adding contraception does not make the act any less evil. The victim may use violence, even deadly force, to defend herself. She may not request the use of contraception, nor make any request that would cause the act to be more sinful.
 
Speaking in general:

Whenever any one font of morality is gravely immoral, nothing in the other two fonts can cause the act to be less than an objective mortal sin. And if the objective mortal sin were committed with full knowledge that the act is intrinsically evil, and with full consent, then the act has the full culpability of an actual mortal sin.

So a good intention does not cause an intrinsically evil act done with full knowledge and full consent to become anything less than a fully culpable actual mortal sin.

Duress might affect knowledge, in that a person **might **judge less well which acts are immoral and whether they are gravely immoral when under duress. Duress might affect free choice, in that a person **might **make a decision without full deliberation when under duress. But not necessarily so.
 
The victim may use violence, even deadly force, to defend herself. She may not request the use of contraception, nor make any request that would cause the act to be more sinful.
The woman is not engaging willingly in the act. And anyway, it’s an act of violence, not sex, per se. If you think that she would be engaging in an act of contracepted sex with the rapist, you need to reevaluate your understanding of, well, everything.
 
I object to the tendency for every thread on ethics to become a discussion of sexual ethics. I’m trying to discuss basic principles of ethics in general.

It would be absurd to take the theological position that a rapist could use contraception, and everyone else could not. There is nothing in the gravely immoral act of rape that would somehow change the moral object of contraception to make it moral. Rape is gravely immoral for several reasons. But adding contraception does not make the act any less evil. The victim may use violence, even deadly force, to defend herself. She may not request the use of contraception, nor make any request that would cause the act to be more sinful.
Please don’t twist my question Ron. I am not asking if rapists are “allowed” to use condoms!
If you object to the question, I’m sorry but I feel that it is a legitimate question and the scenario is not rare. If you are unable or unwilling to answer it, I can handle that too.

So in this case, if the victim is able to pull a .357 magnum out of her purse and blow a hole the size of Texas through the chest of her attacker, that is a morally acceptable act, but asking him to use a condom is intrinsically evil and gravely immoral.

Is this your position and is it consistent with Church teaching?
 
She may not request the use of contraception, nor make any request that would cause the act to be more sinful.
Ron:
That doesn’t even sound sane let alone reasonable. Would you give this advice to your daughter, sister, or mother?

🤷
 
But adding contraception does not make the act any less evil. The victim may use violence, even deadly force, to defend herself. She may not request the use of contraception, nor make any request that would cause the act to be more sinful.
I replied before FiberZilla, but deleted it because it wasn’t charitable.

But, I have to ask - Sinful for whom? The victim? There is no sin for the victim at all.

This is an act of violence, not extra-marital sex.
 
I replied before FiberZilla, but deleted it because it wasn’t charitable.

But, I have to ask - Sinful for whom? The victim? There is no sin for the victim at all.

This is an act of violence, not extra-marital sex.
PaulinVA:
That’s totally alright. I’m not perfect at being charitable myself sometimes! This is a very difficult subject that requires tough answers. You are asking the same question that I am. Ron seems to be suggesting that the rape victim cannot request that her attacker use a condom.

I must wonder if the victim is obligated to ask the creep to “not use it” if she sees him unwrapping one. Again, this is date rape which is not rare these days. What is a catholic woman required to do if she is about to be violated?
 
I must wonder if the victim is obligated to ask the creep to “not use it” if she sees him unwrapping one. Again, this is date rape which is not rare these days. What is a catholic woman required to do if she is about to be violated?
Well? Interesting question -

“Please do not use a condom as that would render this act of violence against me contraceptive in nature and that would be wrong.”

I don’t know what to say. A woman can kill the person but can’t protect herself from him by having him use a condom?

Sounds misogynistic to me.
 
Well? Interesting question -

“Please do not use a condom as that would render this act of violence against me contraceptive in nature and that would be wrong.”

I don’t know what to say. A woman can kill the person but can’t protect herself from him by having him use a condom?

Sounds misogynistic to me.
I agree totally. Moreover the most likely thing the person is trying to protect herself from is potentially contracting a fatal disease, which is nothing other than self-defense. Mr. Conte agrees that the victim would even be entitled to use mortal force to overcome her assailant. In most cases that option is not open to her (for example due to disparity of size and no available weapon). It would seem that getting the creep to use a condom is perhaps her last line of defense.

Personally I also agree that it is her right to avoid impregnation in the circumstances. Since the condom is not an abortifacient, she shouldn’t feel constrained from considering it.
 
A person cannot lie in order to defend against assault of any kind, or even murder.
Lying is intrinsically evil.
Intrinsically evil acts are always immoral.
Intrinsically evil acts are never justified by intention or circumstances.
 
A person cannot lie in order to defend against assault of any kind, or even murder.
Lying is intrinsically evil.
Intrinsically evil acts are always immoral.
Intrinsically evil acts are never justified by intention or circumstances.
See, this is where identification of the moral object (or whatever it is) is important,

If I say something that is not true to defend myself against an unjust aggressor, is it lying?

If I take a life, it’s not always murder. Sometimes it is justified. How can telling an untruth be any different? 🤷

If a killer asks me, “Where are the children?”, and I have previously hidden them in a closet, and I respond “Gee, I don’t know”, are you telling me that protecting those children with an untruth is intrinsically evil?
 
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