R
Ron_Conte
Guest
Objectively, a knowingly chosen act is either moral or immoral, and if it is immoral, it is objectively either a venial sin, or a mortal sin. Also, both venial sins and mortal sins admit of degrees of gravity. A venial sin can be more or less serious and still be venial. A mortal sin can be more or less serious and still be mortal. All of this applies to the objective degree of sinfulness of the knowingly chosen act.
There are three fonts (sources) of morality (intention, moral object, circumstances) and these three together determine the objective morality, or immorality of the chosen act. If any one font is gravely immoral, then nothing in the other two fonts can cause the act to be less than an objective mortal sin. For when any font is gravely immoral it is gravely contrary to the love of God and neighbor, causing the act as a whole to have that same character. But if one font would cause the act to be a venial sin, grave matter in another font makes the act an objective mortal sin.
Culpability also admits of degrees; culpability is the responsibility of the subject (the person who chooses the act). Culpability refers to guilt for sin. It is possible for someone to commit an objective mortal sin, but without sufficient knowledge or freedom of will for the act to be also an actual mortal sin. A substantial reduction in knowledge or freedom in a knowingly chosen act will reduce the culpability substantially, so that the act may be only an actual venial sin, even though it is also an objective mortal sin. Full knowledge and full deliberate are required for an objective mortal sin to be also an actual mortal sin. However, minor reductions in culpability would not be sufficient to cause an objective mortal sin to be less than an actual mortal sin.
Duress refers to the circumstance (in the third font of morality) whereby a person is pressured to commit a particular sin. Duress can change the morality of the third font, since that font is evaluated by weighing the good and bad consequences of one’s act. If the good outweighs the bad, then the act is moral. An act of material cooperation might become moral with some degree of duress, but not necessarily so.
However, duress cannot change the other two fonts. An intrinsically evil act is still objectively immoral, regardless of the degree of duress. An act of formal cooperation with evil also remains objectively immoral regardless of duress. And an immoral intention remains objectively immoral, despite duress. All this refers to the objective morality or immorality of the act and to duress.
Duress can also affect the degree of culpability. A person under duress might judge the objective morality of an act less well, so that he thinks an act is moral when it is not; this would reduce culpabililty, perhaps even substantially. Also, severe fear due to duress might cause the choice of an act to be less than fully free, making the act not an actual mortal sin.
However, the mere fact that a person is under some degree of duress does not necessarily reduce culpability substantially. If you know that an act is intrinsically evil and gravely immoral, and if you freely choose to commit that act in order to avoid the bad consequences threatened by the duress, you have committed an actual mortal sin. The third font of circumstances cannot change either of the other two fonts. If your knowledge that the act was gravely immoral was full, and if you chose that act will full deliberation (full freedom of will), then the act is an actual mortal sin, despite the duress.
There are three fonts (sources) of morality (intention, moral object, circumstances) and these three together determine the objective morality, or immorality of the chosen act. If any one font is gravely immoral, then nothing in the other two fonts can cause the act to be less than an objective mortal sin. For when any font is gravely immoral it is gravely contrary to the love of God and neighbor, causing the act as a whole to have that same character. But if one font would cause the act to be a venial sin, grave matter in another font makes the act an objective mortal sin.
Culpability also admits of degrees; culpability is the responsibility of the subject (the person who chooses the act). Culpability refers to guilt for sin. It is possible for someone to commit an objective mortal sin, but without sufficient knowledge or freedom of will for the act to be also an actual mortal sin. A substantial reduction in knowledge or freedom in a knowingly chosen act will reduce the culpability substantially, so that the act may be only an actual venial sin, even though it is also an objective mortal sin. Full knowledge and full deliberate are required for an objective mortal sin to be also an actual mortal sin. However, minor reductions in culpability would not be sufficient to cause an objective mortal sin to be less than an actual mortal sin.
Duress refers to the circumstance (in the third font of morality) whereby a person is pressured to commit a particular sin. Duress can change the morality of the third font, since that font is evaluated by weighing the good and bad consequences of one’s act. If the good outweighs the bad, then the act is moral. An act of material cooperation might become moral with some degree of duress, but not necessarily so.
However, duress cannot change the other two fonts. An intrinsically evil act is still objectively immoral, regardless of the degree of duress. An act of formal cooperation with evil also remains objectively immoral regardless of duress. And an immoral intention remains objectively immoral, despite duress. All this refers to the objective morality or immorality of the act and to duress.
Duress can also affect the degree of culpability. A person under duress might judge the objective morality of an act less well, so that he thinks an act is moral when it is not; this would reduce culpabililty, perhaps even substantially. Also, severe fear due to duress might cause the choice of an act to be less than fully free, making the act not an actual mortal sin.
However, the mere fact that a person is under some degree of duress does not necessarily reduce culpability substantially. If you know that an act is intrinsically evil and gravely immoral, and if you freely choose to commit that act in order to avoid the bad consequences threatened by the duress, you have committed an actual mortal sin. The third font of circumstances cannot change either of the other two fonts. If your knowledge that the act was gravely immoral was full, and if you chose that act will full deliberation (full freedom of will), then the act is an actual mortal sin, despite the duress.