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IWantGod
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Its self evident. Absolutely nothing is nothing at all, so it cannot “be” the cause of anything . It would have to exist first in-order to be considered the cause of anything.
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tony12356
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I’m sorry. I didn’t fully realize what you meant until after a posted that reply. I honestly wish to retract that statement. Would you be willing to look at the new comment I made above.
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tony12356
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But why are you assuming its a being? Why not a something? A being fits into the category of something. So if a being can exist then something can exist.
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MPat
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You asked for evidence, not for belief.Well, if you believe that Caesar was a God, then congrats.It’s interesting that you would believe that he was a God just because others did. I will be happy to look at the evidence.
No, I do not believe that Caesar was God. But once again - “God” and “god” have little in common. The word “god” means a powerful being - for example, Psalm 82:6 calls judges by that name ( “I have said: You are gods and all of you the sons of the most High.”).
And that leaves us with two premises:
- Caesar was a Roman god.
- Caesar did exist.
And once again, “God” is not “god that exists”.
If you like dictionaries so much, have a look at merriam-webster.com/dictionary/god:
“1. capitalized : the supreme or ultimate reality” (there is further part starting with “the Being perfect in power, wisdom, and goodness”)
“2. a being or object believed to have more than natural attributes and powers and to require human worship”
Is that clear?
:yawn:
Do you prefer to exchange several posts to get to that point?
So, by “outside” you meant “outside”… And that is supposed to be clear…
OK, let’s look at the example:
Looking at en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Splitting_of_the_moon I see that there are traditions outside Quran that say that it happened. So, will you suddenly become a Muslim, or will you suddenly discover that yes, you do want confirmation of X in the source that does not believe X, but find that formulation, um, a bit uncomfortable?
I am not sure if “amount” is the right word, but it is true that it is reasonable to expect different propositions to be supported by different evidence.
Should I lie that I have a dog? Nah…
Actually, coins alone are taken as evidence of existence and having power over land. For example, en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Theophilos_(king)&oldid=780805694 is an article about king named Theophilos who is only known from coins. There are more - en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Attambelos_III&oldid=677479074, en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Attambelos_IV&oldid=666241292…
I’m afraid that your ability to judge the evidence might have been overestimated…
So, the principle seems to be confirmation bias - you accept the claims you like and demand unreasonable amounts of evidence for the claims you don’t like.
Yes, I know - it is hard to see your own confirmation bias, and still harder to avoid it.
But we can try to find out what evidence could be reasonably found (see also dhspriory.org/thomas/Ethics1.htm#3 - “Therefore, the educated man ought not to look for greater, nor be satisfied with less, certitude than is appropriate to the subject under discussion. It seems an equal fault to allow a mathematician to use rhetorical arguments and to demand from a rhetorician conclusive demonstrations such as a mathematician should give.”).
Then I guess that in case of Bigfoot it might be reasonable to expect to find a living animal in a cage or a body of dead animal.
But in case of Jesus, I do not see how it would be reasonable to expect to find originals of more than 4 eyewitness accounts. If you want to make that case, make it. But no, mere “I want more! I refuse to believe unless I get more!” (even given in other words) does not count as a case.
Oh, and I see that you did not want to discuss your stated reasons for leaving the faith here? Maybe you would prefer to start another thread about them?
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tony12356
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I don’t understand the point in this question? I mean Just because they thought he was a god doesn’t mean he is a god.
The further part, was referring to specifically the christian God. Not every God.
I’m sorry if you can’t understand what outside the bible means.
Tradition isn’t the same as an eyewitness accounts. I’m surprised you don’t understand the difference.
Originals? We don’t even have original works from 4 eyewitness accounts. None of the original works of the four gospels exist. All we have are copies. Even copies of eyewitness accounts outside of the bible would be somewhat impressive. How about this, can you give me any evidence at all that will prove that Jesus was the son of God?
That had nothing to do with the question. If you want to go over it then send me a private message.
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MPat
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I don’t think you get to declare who cannot be a Roman god without an argument, just because otherwise you would have to accept an inconvenient conclusion that there actually was one.
You thought I won’t look or what? No, it does not say so. It says:
“a : the Being perfect in power, wisdom, and goodness who is worshipped as creator and ruler of the universe”
Part “b” specifically mentioned Christian Science, so it’s not like they wouldn’t have mentioned Christianity in part “a”, if it referred to Christianity alone.
And anyway, you haven’t confirmed that you understood the difference between “God” and “god”, given in that dictionary. Which is kinda important.
OK, let’s say there was one. Then what? Would you instantly become a Muslim?
So, now you want “just” one original of a gospel and one copy of eyewitness account rejected from the Bible?
Once again, I do not see why you think it is reasonable to expect that evidence.
To you? No, no evidence will prove that to you. After all, your problem has nothing to do with evidence. Just look at your own account:
Please note that you are not saying that you lost your faith when you found out that we do not have originals of gospels.
If you refuse to believe because you are angry at some people, or because you find some teachings (or the whole faith) ridiculous, or because you do not like some teachings, why would that change after seeing some evidence?
Especially if its evidence that is so unimpressive, as an original of the gospel or, let’s say, something that is presented as a letter from Pontius Pilate to the emperor. Why on Earth would you change your opinion after seeing them? If you don’t believe me, look at newadvent.org/fathers/0809.htm - “Report of Pontius Pilate”. You won’t change your mind.
If you want a discussion that has a higher chance of addressing the actual problems, state them.
No, I’d prefer the discussions to stay public.
Anyway, if you do not want to discuss those reasons here, don’t introduce them into discussion and don’t spend a couple of posts writing about them.
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Wesrock
Guest
Being in this case is a boad category that includes anything. A rosebush is a being. An atom is a being. If a quantum field exists, that’s a being.
That the Being Beyond Being is personal, One, an Intellect, a Will, etc… follows from other arguments after first establishing that a first cause is needed. It’s not assumed.
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Wesrock
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It’s interesting that you assume we just assume that God is good and never lies.
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mkoopman
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I have the ultimate entitlement worldview as worldly goods are just given to me for living. I believe worship is strictly for my entertainment and has no element of community. In my way I blaspheme God in lavishing praise upon myself for my abundantly evident righteousness.
Care to join me? What afraid of the bogeyman?
God is dead. Who wants God?
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tony12356
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Really, are we going to play that game? Yes, you would have to assume that to be true if you didn’t know anything about that God. Also please don’t rely with “we do know…”. You would first need to prove a God exists.
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tony12356
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Alright let’s here the entire argument in full.
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reggieM
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Perhaps it’s best to hear your objection to the first cause argument. Then we can move on from there. If you get stuck at that point, there’s no sense in building further.
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Perplexity
Guest
Part of the problem with these arguments for “God”, I think, is that they don’t go deep enough into what the divine attributes mean, such as simplicity or transcendence. Let’s take these for illustration:
Divine Simplicity:
To be divinely simple requires that one has no parts of any sort – physical, metaphysical, temporal, etc. This is all well and good to acknowledge, and some even go on to recognize that in having no parts of any sort, one must – in a radical sense – have no “nature”, “species” or “form of being.” But, it is never realized that this entails that one who is divinely simple cannot be the only one who is divinely simple: such a statement makes no sense, as “divine simplicity” cannot be a ‘property’ or ‘feature’ at all, let alone one which only one has.
Transcendence:
To be transcendent is to be prior to every category of being – object, property, event, state of affairs, etc. This is all well and good to acknowledge, and some even go on to recognize that in transcending every category of being, one must – in a radical sense – be unclassifiable. But, it is never realized that this entails that one who is transcendent cannot be the only one who is transcendent: such a statement makes no sense, as “transcendent” cannot be a ‘category’ at all, let alone one that has only one member or instance.
There can be no arguments for “God”, only arguments for this God, that God, a God, or Gods etc. This isn’t to derail the current conversations, but to critique the arguments for “God” that have been offered from another perspective. If you’re interested in a little more details, I’ve touched on the matter here recently.
Divine Simplicity:
To be divinely simple requires that one has no parts of any sort – physical, metaphysical, temporal, etc. This is all well and good to acknowledge, and some even go on to recognize that in having no parts of any sort, one must – in a radical sense – have no “nature”, “species” or “form of being.” But, it is never realized that this entails that one who is divinely simple cannot be the only one who is divinely simple: such a statement makes no sense, as “divine simplicity” cannot be a ‘property’ or ‘feature’ at all, let alone one which only one has.
Transcendence:
To be transcendent is to be prior to every category of being – object, property, event, state of affairs, etc. This is all well and good to acknowledge, and some even go on to recognize that in transcending every category of being, one must – in a radical sense – be unclassifiable. But, it is never realized that this entails that one who is transcendent cannot be the only one who is transcendent: such a statement makes no sense, as “transcendent” cannot be a ‘category’ at all, let alone one that has only one member or instance.
There can be no arguments for “God”, only arguments for this God, that God, a God, or Gods etc. This isn’t to derail the current conversations, but to critique the arguments for “God” that have been offered from another perspective. If you’re interested in a little more details, I’ve touched on the matter here recently.
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Wesrock
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There can only be one without contradicting the Law of Identity. I’m not sure where you get that "it is never realized that this entails that one who is divinely simple cannot be the only one who is divinely simple. This has certainly been framed in more contemporary terms, but Aquinas was sure to make the point in his work Summa Contra Gentiles.
Book 1 - Chapter 42:
[3] Again, it has been shown that God is absolutely perfect, lacking no perfection. If, then, there are many gods, there must be many such perfect beings. But this is impossible. For, if none of these perfect beings lacks some perfection, and does not have any admixture of imperfection, which is demanded for an absolutely perfect being, nothing will be given in which to distinguish the perfect beings from one another. It is impossible, therefore, that there be many gods.
[8] Then, too, if there are two beings of which both are necessary beings, they must agree in the notion of the necessity of being. Hence, they must be distinguished by something added either to one of them only, or to both. This means that one or both of them must be composite. Now, as we have shown, no composite being is through itself a necessary being. It is impossible therefore that there be many beings of which each is a necessary being. Hence, neither can there be many gods.
[9] Furthermore, given two gods that are posited as agreeing in the necessity of being, either that in which they differ is in some way required for the completion of their necessity of being, or it is not. If it is not, then it is something accidental, because that which accrues to a thing without contributing to its being is an accident. Hence, this accident has a cause, which is, consequently, either the essence of the necessary being or something else. If its essence, then, since the necessity itself of being is its essence, as is evident from what was said above, the necessity of being will be the cause of that accident. But the necessity of being is found in both gods. Therefore, both will have that accident, and thus will not be distinguished with reference to it. If, however, the cause of the accident is something else, it follows that, unless that something else existed, this accident would not exist; and unless this accident existed, the aforesaid distinction would not exist. Therefore, unless that something else existed, these two supposed necessary beings would not be two but one. Therefore, the proper being of each depends on the other, and thus neither of them is through itself a necessary being.
[15] Furthermore, either the nature signified by the name God is individuated through itself in this God, or it is individuated through something else. If through something else, composition must result. If through itself, then it cannot possibly belong to another, since the principle of individuation cannot be common to several, It is impossible, therefore, that there be several gods.
[16] If, again, there are several gods, the nature of the godhead cannot be numerically one in two of them. There must, therefore, be something distinguishing the divine nature in this and in that god. But this is impossible, because, as we have shown above, the divine nature receives the addition neither of essential differences nor of accidents. Nor yet is the divine nature the form of any matter, to be capable of being divided according to the division of matter. It is impossible, therefore, that there be two gods.
And there’s 24 paragraphs in this chapter, and this chapter is built on the 41 chapters before it, and this is only intended as a helpful handbook to already educated priests in non-Christian areas, but suffice it to say, much mind has been paid to the topic by both Aquinas and all other proponents of divine simplicity.
Again, it follows for the same reasons detailed above. “Transcendent” isn’t some arbitrary title or property. We’re not just throwing the word around. We’re referring to an act of existence which has no limit or boundary, which remains unconditioned, of which it is pure act and no potential. It might due to read up on some Thomist materials regarding what is meant by “act of existence” and “essence.”
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Perplexity
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Wesrock: Aquinas’ responses to polytheism are riddled with problems (as are monotheist thinker’s in general, who’ve only ever attack straw men), but that’s aside from my objections which concerned simplicity and transcendence. There’s nothing in what you cited that counts as a response to my objections, although paragraphs 15 and 16 have to do with the subject of divine simplicity and monotheism I suppose. I’m intimately familiar with Aquinas’ arguments against polytheism across his vast corpus, maybe we could discuss them in another thread.
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Wesrock
Guest
You stated: “To be divinely simple requires that one has no parts of any sort – physical, metaphysical, temporal, etc. This is all well and good to acknowledge, and some even go on to recognize that in having no parts of any sort, one must – in a radical sense – have no “nature”, “species” or “form of being.””
We must be using a fundamentally different ontology, because I see in no way how divine simplicity rules out a nature.
You also stated: “But, it is never realized that this entails that one who is divinely simple cannot be the only one who is divinely simple: such a statement makes no sense, as “divine simplicity” cannot be a ‘property’ or ‘feature’ at all, let alone one which only one has.”
(1) As shown, there are multiple arguments given to demonstrate that there can only be one being who is divinely simple. It’s not an unaddressed point. Divine simplicity rules out any possible genus, because if two beings are posited to be divinely simple there can be no distinction between them, because any distinction between them makes them composite, which means they are not divinely simple.
(2) Divine simplicity is not a property or attribute in the way I think you mean it. It’s a term we use make the point that there is no composition in the divine nature.
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Perplexity
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In S.T. I.3.3, Aquinas argues that by virtue of being divinely simple, God is not an individual (suppositum) with a nature: he just is his nature. This is to say that there is no real difference, for Aquinas, between God and his nature.
Aquinas does argue at length in many places that “God” cannot be many because he is divinely simple. But, my concern wasn’t that monotheists haven’t even tried to argue this point: it’s that they haven’t realized that divine attributes such as simplicity and transcendence actually entail polytheism.
If God has a nature, then he is a composite – as Aquinas rightly points out. God’s nature just is God, but considered precisely insofar as he is God, rather than insofar as he causes intellect, will, life, etc.
Aquinas argues in S.T. I.11.3:
When Aquinas says there cannot be many Gods, what he means is “there cannot be many of this one, whom I call Being Itself when considered under this aspect, and First Cause, when considered under that aspect, etc.” Platonists agree: There cannot be many of this one, whom Aquinas called YHWH. Nor can there be many of that one, whom others know as Poseidon. Nor of that one, called Odin. etc. Aquinas didn’t quite understand how radical divine individuality is, and so often conceded that there was no real difference between “God” and his attributes, only to then argue the platitude that nothing else could have these “attributes.” Unfortunately, he had only to work with the form of Platonism he’d received, one that had been whittled beyond impoverishment since its golden age in late antiquity with its doctrines of henadicity and polycentricity.
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Gorgias
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Ok, I’ll bite: I’m not seeing the force of your argument against the possibilitiy of a “set with only one member”.
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Perplexity
Guest
Do you agree that if “God” cannot be a member of any genus or species (Cf. S.T. I.3.5), then, a fortiori, he cannot be the only member of any genus or species?Ok, I’ll bite: I’m not seeing the force of your argument against the possibilitiy of a “set with only one member”.
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Gorgias
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Hold on a second, though. Your argument isn’t about ‘genus’ or ‘species’, per se, it’s that transcendence and simplicity cannot exist. All you’re doing is trying to recast these as categories; we can simply enough sidestep your objections by saying that these aren’t categories, but rather, are God’s essence.
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