Evidence for god or gods?

[Perplexity]

Hold on a second, though. Your argument isn’t about ‘genus’ or ‘species’, per se, it’s that transcendence and simplicity cannot exist. All you’re doing is trying to recast these as categories; we can simply enough sidestep your objections by saying that these aren’t categories, but rather, are God’s essence.

I guess I’m confused Gorgias because I’m not saying anything like that transcendence or simplicity cannot exist, nor am I trying to recast either as a category. All I’ve argued is that when we say there can be only one divinely simple being or only one transcendent being, we unwittingly turn divine simplicity into a part and transcendent into a category. The idea is that monotheism cannot countenance the divine attributes, not that we ought to reject the divine attributes.

 

[mkoopman]

I guess I’m confused Gorgias because I’m not saying anything like that transcendence or simplicity cannot exist, nor am I trying to recast either as a category. All I’ve argued is that when we say there can be only one divinely simple being or only one transcendent being, we unwittingly turn divine simplicity into a part and transcendent into a category. The idea is that monotheism cannot countenance the divine attributes, not that we ought to reject the divine attributes.

Does this mean you are taxing us with a poll on God’s face. There are no hanging chads in comic books where Veronica is a character. We just move along to the next pane like icons behind an altar while God remains unchanged.

 

[Gorgias]

when we say there can be only one divinely simple being or only one transcendent being, we unwittingly turn divine simplicity into a part and transcendent into a category.

Right; I got that assertion – I’m just not seeing how you justify it. Aquinas gets around it by asserting that it isn’t a part or category, but rather, is the essence of God. You seem to be saying that Aquinas gets it wrong, but without substantiating your claim.

I think I’d reply that if there is a God and his essence entails transcendence, then by definition there can be only one such God. Necessarily, God cannot transcend some but not all.

Neither is divine simplicity – particularly in the way that Aquinas describes it in ST I.3 – a ‘part’ of God; it is, perhaps shorthand for saying “God is not composite, whether considered from the perspective of form/matter, essence/existence, genus/difference, or subject/accident”, but it does not create a ‘part’ in which God participates.

The idea is that monotheism cannot countenance the divine attributes.

If you’re saying that they are not attributes per se, I’d agree. However, your claim – it seemed – is that we can’t use terms like ‘transcendence’ or ‘divine simplicity’ in a description of God, since that would imply that there must be the possibility of multiple gods. That seems untenable. One could, if he wished, use those terms in that way, creating categories, but it does not imply that this is the only way to use those terms.

 

[reggieM]

I guess I’m confused Gorgias because I’m not saying anything like that transcendence or simplicity cannot exist, nor am I trying to recast either as a category. All I’ve argued is that when we say there can be only one divinely simple being or only one transcendent being, we unwittingly turn divine simplicity into a part and transcendent into a category. The idea is that monotheism cannot countenance the divine attributes, not that we ought to reject the divine attributes.

Right, we’re limited to what human reason can describe or define. A scientific approach, as with Aristotle, is reductionist. It breaks reality apart into categories and labels each.
For the sake of some understanding, we attempt to do the same with God.
So, it appears contradictory - God is pure being, non-composite, without parts, pure simplicity. Then, however, we talk about attributes. But those attributes, in reality, are non-separable. They’re not distinct. Justice and mercy “have kissed” as the psalm says. They’re united.

Yes, a much bigger problem is explaining the unique and distinct Three Divine Persons, in one, pure simple, being of God. But philosophically (using reason alone), God is One, undivided. Theologically, which transcends reason but is compatible with it, God is One with Three persons, Distinct but Undivided.

Some would call this “illogical” or “irrational” but it is not a teaching that is reducible to logic or human reason alone. We learn it from the Revelation of Christ - so it comes from heaven, not from human thought.

Aristotle didn’t have arguments for the Trinity, obviously, because he didn’t know the revelation.

 

[AgnosticBoy]

Can anyone provide clear evidence for the existence of a god or gods?

To me, the probability of a god existing is just as high as the probability of intelligent life, one more advanced than us, existing on another planet. Do you rule out intelligent life on other planets, as well?

 

[Perplexity]

Gorgias: I’m saying Aquinas is right that, when he uses “simplicity” and “transcendence”, these terms just refer to YHWH albeit considered in different respects; as without any composition and prior to and beyond all categories, respectively. But, it is precisely because he relativizes the attributes he talks about to YHWH that it’s a platitude to say nothing else can have these attributes: that is, of course nothing else can be YHWH qua without composition, or YHWH qua prior to and beyond all categories, because nothing else is YHWH at all, let alone YHWH in these respects. So, his claim that there can only be one God is trivial: it just means there can only be one YHWH. Polytheists will happily agree. The same thing is true for all the other Gods: that is, it is true of each God that he or she can be considered qua without composition or qua prior to and beyond all categories. Aquinas understood how radically relativized the divine attributes are, but still thought his form of monotheism negated polytheism. It doesn’t though.

 

[reggieM]

Gorgias: I’m saying Aquinas is right that, when he uses “simplicity” and “transcendence”, these terms just refer to YHWH albeit considered in different respects; as without any composition and prior to and beyond all categories, respectively. But, it is precisely because he relativizes the attributes he talks about to YHWH that it’s a platitude to say nothing else can have these attributes: that is, of course nothing else can be YHWH qua without composition, or YHWH qua prior to and beyond all categories, because nothing else is YHWH at all, let alone YHWH in these respects. So, his claim that there can only be one God is trivial: it just means there can only be one YHWH. Polytheists will happily agree. The same thing is true for all the other Gods: that is, it is true of each God that he or she can be considered qua without composition or qua prior to and beyond all categories. Aquinas understood how radically relativized the divine attributes are, but still thought his form of monotheism negated polytheism. It doesn’t though.

In what way does this not negate polytheism?

Secondly, this is proved from the infinity of His perfection. For it was shown above (I:4:2) that God comprehends in Himself the whole perfection of being. If then many gods existed, they would necessarily differ from each other. Something therefore would belong to one which did not belong to another. And if this were a privation, one of them would not be absolutely perfect; but if a perfection, one of them would be without it. So it is impossible for many gods to exist. Hence also the ancient philosophers, constrained as it were by truth, when they asserted an infinite principle, asserted likewise that there was only one such principle.

 

[Perplexity]

In what way does this not negate polytheism?

Secondly, this is proved from the infinity of His perfection. For it was shown above (I:4:2) that God comprehends in Himself the whole perfection of being. If then many gods existed, they would necessarily differ from each other. Something therefore would belong to one which did not belong to another. And if this were a privation, one of them would not be absolutely perfect; but if a perfection, one of them would be without it. So it is impossible for many gods to exist. Hence also the ancient philosophers, constrained as it were by truth, when they asserted an infinite principle, asserted likewise that there was only one such principle.

Aquinas never really interacts with polytheism as such. What I mean is that in every case he objects to “polytheism”, he does so by holding “Gods” to a standard that only applies to creatures, thereby failing to treat of those who would truly be Gods, and thus of polytheism as such. This was hard for me to swallow when I was a Thomist, but once you see it, it’s as clear as day.

The objection you cite, which has been given by many Christian authors throughout Church history, provides a particularly good illustration of what I’m talking about.

There’s a difference between individuation and differentiation: individuation precedes differentiation, as differentiation is just the contrasting of one thing which is already individuated from another. To put things linguistically to illustrate: to be individuated is to be the subject without any predicates, whereas to be differentiated is for the predicates of one subject to be contrasted with those of another. Strictly speaking, individuality is ineffable, since a subject without any predicates has no predicates by which to be described.

So, creatures have “predicates”, as it were, and we differentiate one creature from another by contrasting their “predicates.” But, that which is God is utterly simple, and so has no “predicates” whatsoever, let alone any to be contrasted with from others. As such, to demand that one God be differentiated from another by virtue of contrasting “predicates” is not to treat them like they’re really “Gods”, but rather to hold them to a standard that only applies to creatures: it is to fundamentally misunderstand what polytheism would involve, and so to straw-man it. If we are to genuinely treat of a plurality of “Gods”, then we’ll take seriously the fact that each would be utterly simple. Since Gods would not have any “predicates” by which to differ from one another, each would have to differ from another simply by virtue of his or her peculiar and ineffable individuality: they would each be non-identical subjects.

Aquinas demands that “Gods” differ from one another by virtue of something other than their individuality – namely, by having this perfection, or that one. In so doing, he attacks a straw-man, and leaves polytheism as such untouched.

 

[reggieM]

Since Gods would not have any “predicates” by which to differ from one another, each would have to differ from another simply by virtue of his or her peculiar and ineffable individuality: they would each be non-identical subjects.

Aquinas demands that “Gods” differ from one another by virtue of something other than their individuality – namely, by having this perfection, or that one. In so doing, he attacks a straw-man, and leaves polytheism as such untouched.

If the only difference between Gods is their individuality, then what more can be said about each one? Why are they necessary? Why would they have a reason to exist?

 

[Perplexity]

If the only difference between Gods is their individuality, then what more can be said about each one? Why are they necessary? Why would they have a reason to exist?

There’s a difference between knowing the Gods philosophically, and knowing them experientially. Philosophy affords a number of arguments for polytheism – such as through the incoherence of monotheism, the pure negativity of The One, the fact that polytheism is possible etc. – but it is ultimately through religious experiences of and our devotions to the Gods that we know they are many.

 

[reggieM]

There’s a difference between knowing the Gods philosophically, and knowing them experientially. Philosophy affords a number of arguments for polytheism – such as through the incoherence of monotheism, the pure negativity of The One, the fact that polytheism is possible etc. – but it is ultimately through religious experiences of and our devotions to the Gods that we know they are many.

Yes, but we have to communicate that knowledge in some way, I would think.
It seems you are saying that you experienced the individuality of a multitude of gods, but nothing other than that? It may be that you cannot express anything further, or perhaps this is a paradox - the gods you experienced are unique and individual but they are also exactly the same in every other way you could discuss. That is a non-rational explanation. You somehow experienced uniqueness but you can say nothing about the difference between one and another. They are unique and individual, but you cannot explain one thing that would distinguish one from the other.
It doesn’t mean what you experienced is false, necessarily. But I’m just looking for your thoughts on this.

 

[Perplexity]

Yes, but we have to communicate that knowledge in some way, I would think.
It seems you are saying that you experienced the individuality of a multitude of gods, but nothing other than that? It may be that you cannot express anything further, or perhaps this is a paradox - the gods you experienced are unique and individual but they are also exactly the same in every other way you could discuss. That is a non-rational explanation. You somehow experienced uniqueness but you can say nothing about the difference between one and another. They are unique and individual, but you cannot explain one thing that would distinguish one from the other.
It doesn’t mean what you experienced is false, necessarily. But I’m just looking for your thoughts on this.

Oh, I see what you’re saying. Yes, I would say that in and of themselves, the Gods are ineffable and that we can know there are a finite amount of them through philosophy. But, we come to know these ineffables through their effects: not only through the causal series’ that each God uniquely heads, but through their self-disclosures in myths and direct experience. So, for example, I would say that I know through philosophy that all things insofar as they come to be or change are the effect of a particular deity, and through inspired myth that this God is Poseidon. Through a devotional relationship with Poseidon, I can experience his individuality and come to embody it myself through imitation. In so doing, I can relate to others what Poseidon has revealed through myth and experience, and invite them to experience him for themselves.

 

[reggieM]

So, for example, I would say that I know through philosophy that all things insofar as they come to be or change are the effect of a particular deity, and through inspired myth that this God is Poseidon.

In this, you’ve assigned certain powers to Poseidon. You could learn this from myth, but not from philosophy. Additionally, this would seem to run into the problem that St. Thomas described:

Something therefore would belong to one which did not belong to another. And if this were a privation, one of them would not be absolutely perfect; but if a perfection, one of them would be without it.

Something belongs to Poseidon that does not belong to another god.

 

[Perplexity]

In this, you’ve assigned certain powers to Poseidon. You could learn this from myth, but not from philosophy. Additionally, this would seem to run into the problem that St. Thomas described:

Something therefore would belong to one which did not belong to another. And if this were a privation, one of them would not be absolutely perfect; but if a perfection, one of them would be without it.

Something belongs to Poseidon that does not belong to another god.

Aquinas is talking about how the being of one God would differ from another. But, because they would be Gods, they would each be absolutely simple, so that their differentiation from one another could not be through different components like powers or properties etc. They’re like subjects without any predicates to be contrasted by. Each God comprehends within herself the whole perfection of being, but in her own ineffably unique way. This ineffable individuality gets expressed through the being that proceeds from it. So, being qua mutable proceeds from Poseidon, not by virtue of some component power of his (since he’s a “God”), but as an expression of his individuality.

 

[reggieM]

Each God comprehends within herself the whole perfection of being, but in her own ineffably unique way.

I don’t think that follows logically.
The “whole perfection of being” is a question of what being is, and what it could be in its wholeness. If a god possesses only one aspect of being, or a power that is partial - then it cannot be itself the whole perfection of what being is.

 

[mkoopman]

I don’t think that follows logically.
The “whole perfection of being” is a question of what being is, and what it could be in its wholeness. If a god possesses only one aspect of being, or a power that is partial - then it cannot be itself the whole perfection of what being is.

The clear distinction of the monotheist God. Allah be praised! Yes.

 

[Perplexity]

If a god possesses only one aspect of being, or a power that is partial - then it cannot be itself the whole perfection of what being is.

I agree, but that’s why I said each God possess within herself the whole perfection of being. Their doing so in different ways does not mean they possess within themselves different aspects of being, they still possess the whole of it, but it is their own peculiar way of doing so simply by virtue of the fact that it is their possession of the whole of it rather than just “the possession of it” without reference to who is doing so.

 

[mkoopman]

I agree, but that’s why I said each God possess within herself the whole perfection of being. Their doing so in different ways does not mean they possess within themselves different aspects of being, they still possess the whole of it, but it is their own peculiar way of doing so simply by virtue of the fact that it is their possession of the whole of it rather than just “the possession of it” without reference to who is doing so.

God is totality. This separate possession of totality is like equating the fully human nature of Christ with the fully divine, they do not mix.

Creatures of special creation understand a transient individuality. Jesus and The Father are one not separate gods experiencing infinite totality. There can be only one totality and no subdivision or each is part and not the whole being. God is unchanged for eternity.

We will not be God when we are in Heaven. Each will know the infused knowledge of God, yes, we will be of God, within God in total union with pure goodness. This will not attach the attributes of God to our being, we do not become God. God always exists, In the beginning, as is now and as will ever be.

He created each of us and it would need be that God created the others that you believe could encompass every infinite element of the one True God. There is only one totality of being and this is God. There can not exist multiple gods, only false gods.

 

[tony12356]

To me, the probability of a god existing is just as high as the probability of intelligent life, one more advanced than us, existing on another planet. Do you rule out intelligent life on other planets, as well?

First off we know intelligent life exists, since we are an example of intelligent life. However, we don’t have any example of a god. So the probability of a god is unknown, while the probability of intelligent life isn’t zero. Unless we have an example of a god, then the probability of god existing compared to intelligent life won’t be the same.

 

[AgnosticBoy]

First off we know intelligent life exists, since we are an example of intelligent life. However, we don’t have any example of a god. So the probability of a god is unknown, while the probability of intelligent life isn’t zero. Unless we have an example of a god, then the probability of god existing compared to intelligent life won’t be the same.

I thought you were referring to “god” in a generic sense because the thread title says “god” or “gods”. And if you were referring to god in that sense then I’d agree with your approach because there are many different concepts of a God. Outside of Western philosophy (god as necessary being, etc), I don’t see why a god being can’t simply be a highly powerful and advanced being without the superlative baggage of omnipotent or omniscience.

Also, I wasn’t referring to just any intelligent life or us humans but rather I was referring to intelligent life more advanced than us on other planets or elsewhere. I brought up that point because modern day humans would seem like gods to ancient civilizations because we are much more advanced than them, technologically, in terms of knowledge, etc. In the same way, intelligent life on another planet that’s more advanced than us would probably seem like a god to us just as we would be to ancient civilizations.