Is it not true that any successor of Peter also bound by Scriptures, Tradition, the Magisterium and the teachings of the successors of Peter before him? Is it not also true that a key responsibility of any cardinal is to assist the pope in matters of Church governance which includes clarifying confusions in Church teachings? Hypothetically, can any successor of Peter break loose from the responsibility of his office?
Agree to what? My own question? One generally agrees or disagrees with answers, not questions. And a question is what I offered.
What you seem to be proposing is that an ignorant conscience be considered to be a ‘good’ one. Or that one that has been attempted to be formed, but remains in ignorance is a good one.
I don’t think a previous pope can bind a current pope on issues of discipline. Even a long-standing discipline. It remains a discipline, not a sacred cow. AL does not change doctrine, as even a quick reading will show.
We are talking about the sacraments and mortal sin here. Jesus made things very clear. People don’t have the right to mess with that.
I agree, but the question that remains: The Church has traditionally required a penitent to recognize that a penitent have a resolve to not commit sin again as a required part of a valid absolution.
Evangelism is ongoing. Is it possible that those who are agonizing over these things on the internet are stuck in a bubble? The rest of the Church might be going about it’s business.
No, we are talking about the sacraments and grave matter. That is the nuance. In AL, the Holy Father states that there may be circumstances where due to lack of knowledge, or freedom of the will, the penitent is not culpable of mortal sin. That is a doctrine of the Church. Why would you think it wouldn’t apply to “adultery” in the situation of a long-standing second union? Would you equate such a union (say by an abandoned spouse with children) with that of a man or woman having an adulterous affair with a co-worker?
Doctrine. But see above. The three conditions for mortal sin are also doctrine. This surely also applies to adultery. Again, we are not talking about someone actively cheating on a spouse they continue to be married to and live with.
s always, an excellent assessment.
How is it that a Catholic in an irregular second marriage lacked either “knowledge” or “freedom of will” when they began the relationship?
Given the nature of the five questions the cardinals presented to the pope, the issue is clearly doctrinal; it is not merely a question of discipline. Discipline may be the application of doctrine in individual circumstances, but if the doctrines are not understood how can they be applied?
They might not have been practicing Catholics at the time, and wish to now return to the Church. They could have been baptized as an infant but their parents did not go through with their Catholic education. They are still, in such a case, Catholic even though they would have received very little instruction in the faith. The possibilities are nearly endless, which is why a “one size fits all” solution is not the answer.
I cannot see how any interpretation that says that “adultery” in cases of the D&R is always “mortal sin”.
They seem to think it is.
There is this from AL:
Is adultery then only sometimes a mortal sin? How is it that this interpretation does not conflict with Church doctrine?
The church has called any number of sins intrinsically evil. Your question is whether there are situations where a person may intentionally commit a grave, intrinsically evil act, and it not be accounted as a grave sin.*…some authors have proposed a kind of double status of moral truth. Beyond the doctrinal and abstract level, one would have to acknowledge the priority of a certain more concrete existential consideration. The latter, by taking account of circumstances and the situation, could legitimately be the basis of certain exceptions to the general rule and thus permit one to do in practice and in good conscience what is qualified as intrinsically evil by the moral law. A separation, or even an opposition, is thus established in some cases between the teaching of the precept, which is valid in general, and the norm of the individual conscience, which would in fact make the final decision about what is good and what is evil. On this basis, an attempt is made to legitimize so-called “pastoral” solutions contrary to the teaching of the Magisterium, and to justify a “creative” hermeneutic according to which the moral conscience is in no way obliged, in every case, by a particular negative precept. (JPII, Veritatis Splendor)