Free agent is not contingent

[STT]

Okay… hold on one moment… is this perhaps what you are saying:
P1) Being is either scripted (behaviorally determined) or not (free)
P2) To be wholly designed is to be wholly determined
C1) Therefore a free being cannot be wholly designed
P3) Creation requires the created to be wholly designed
C2) Therefore a free being cannot be a created one

I think this together with the argument A in OP complete the discussion since knowledge is either refer to something composite/reducible or non-composite/irreducible. The A argument in OP deals with composite thing whereas your argument deals with non-composite one. We just need to make a link between design and knowledge and the first part of argument is then complete.

Thanks for your collaboration.

 

[quaestio45]

I think this together with the argument A in OP complete the discussion since knowledge is either refer to something composite/reducible or non-composite/irreducible. The A argument in OP deals with composite thing whereas your argument deals with non-composite one.

I’m quite curious as to what you mean by this. How is the argument I presented in relation specifically to that which is noncomposite? And how is yours in relation to the composite? In the sense that yours argue on the basis of composition and this argues on the basis of description or determination?

We just need to make a link between design and knowledge and the first part of argument is then complete.

Well, to design something requires that you know what it is you are designing; and to design wholly might demand that you know wholly every aspect of the design. For to describe a design is to express your knowledge of its nature, yes?

 

[STT]

I’m quite curious as to what you mean by this. How is the argument I presented in relation specifically to that which is noncomposite? And how is yours in relation to the composite?

Basically, knowledge refers to either something composite or non-composite. The main problem of my argument (A in OP) was that we could not derive (3) from (1) and (2) since there are non-composite entity. So to say that knowledge is structured when it refers to something composite it means that the thing is made of other things. We then exclude free agent from being composite using (4), hence it follows that free agent cannot be created. On the other hand, your argument, refers to something which is non-composite but it is designed since structure in knowledge in here does not refer to the fact that the thing is made of other things but it refers to the fact that the thing is scripted.

I hope it is clear. Let me know otherwise so I can expound more.

In the sense that yours argue on the basis of composition and this argues on the basis of description or determination?

Yes, my argument is based on composition of the agent whereas yours is based of determination.

Well, to design something requires that you know what it is you are designing; and to design wholly might demand that you know wholly every aspect of the design. For to describe a design is to express your knowledge of its nature, yes?

Yes.

 

[quaestio45]

Basically, knowledge refers to either something composite or non-composite.

I agree…

The main problem of my argument (A in OP) was that we could not derive (3) from (1) and (2)…

If you cannot derive (3), which is a conclusion (as it says “Therefore…”), from (2) and (1) then the argument is unsound. Perhaps you meant to say something else

…since there are non-composite entity.

Okay, so if I’m not mistaken you’re saying that the first conclusion - (3) - shows that creation from knowledge cannot be universal because there are noncompsite entities, yes? Well, forgive me STT, but I already agree that if creation must necessarily result in a composite substance then the free agent cannot be created. What my… lets say confusion stems from is how we can make that jump to assertion that what is composite, such as knowledge, must result in something composite, especially if the composition is different from the type we are trying to avoid. I feel as if I am very close to agreeing with what you are saying, I just think that an extra premise between (2) and (3) should be added that follows to (3) and can, of course, be justified.

So to say that knowledge is structured when it refers to something composite it means that the thing is made of other things.

If knowledge can refer to that which is uncomposite, however, could we say that knowledge is not structured in that instance, or am I misinterpreting you?

We then exclude free agent from being composite using (4), hence it follows that free agent cannot be created.

Necessarily so if we can find a proper premise which justifies (3).

I hope it is clear.

I think things are getting closer to clear, which is of course a good thing.

 

[STT]

I agree…

Cool.

If you cannot derive (3), which is a conclusion (as it says “Therefore…”), from (2) and (1) then the argument is unsound. Perhaps you meant to say something else

I mean that (3) cannot be derived from (1) and (2) if knowledge refers to non-composite thing otherwise it is obvious that (3) is correct since knowledge refers to something composite.

Okay, so if I’m not mistaken you’re saying that the first conclusion - (3) - shows that creation from knowledge cannot be universal because there are noncompsite entities, yes?

Yes, I am saying that (3) cannot be universally true since we have non-composite thing too.

Well, forgive me STT, but I already agree that if creation must necessarily result in a composite substance then the free agent cannot be created. What my… lets say confusion stems from is how we can make that jump to assertion that what is composite, such as knowledge, must result in something composite, especially if the composition is different from the type we are trying to avoid. I feel as if I am very close to agreeing with what you are saying, I just think that an extra premise between (2) and (3) should be added that follows to (3) and can, of course, be justified.

If knowledge refers to something composite then (3) is obviously true.

If knowledge can refer to that which is uncomposite, however, could we say that knowledge is not structured in that instance, or am I misinterpreting you?

No. I think we conclude that knowledge is always structured since it is a set of coherent propositions.

Necessarily so if we can find a proper premise which justifies (3).

I think that (3) is justified now since knowledge in my argument refers to something composite.

I think things are getting closer to clear, which is of course a good thing.

Cool. I think we are getting close to agree that your argument with my argument in A in OP complete the discussion related to the fact that free agent cannot be created. We then can move to argument B and C.

 

[quaestio45]

If knowledge refers to something composite then (3) is obviously true.

Well two things; one, can it ever be that knowledge can be in reference to what is noncomposite, or no? Two - and this is my grandest objection- the composition of something like knowledge is categorically different from the composition of something like a substance; as such, it doesn’t seem to necessarily follow that from one we can go to the other without an extra premise added to the argument which takes such into account. But I’m sure the latter can clarify the former

 

[STT]

Well two things; one, can it ever be that knowledge can be in reference to what is noncomposite, or no?

Knowledge is structured but it can be in reference what is non-composite. Like apple is sweet.

Two - and this is my grandest objection- the composition of something like knowledge is categorically different from the composition of something like a substance; as such, it doesn’t seem to necessarily follow that from one we can go to the other without an extra premise added to the argument which takes such into account. But I’m sure the latter can clarify the former

I think we need to divide knowledge to composite and non-composite which former is a reference to something composite like apple on the table and later is a reference to something non-composite like apple is sweet. I think that (3) then become evident to reader since the knowledge what are talking about in A is a reference to composite thing.

 

[Gorgias]

Knowledge is structured but it can be in reference what is non-composite. Like apple is sweet.

Hang on, though: “sweet” is merely an attribute, not a component, of an apple. You seem to be conflating the two notion. (“Apples and oranges”, as it were! )

I think we need to divide knowledge to composite and non-composite which former is a reference to something composite like apple on the table and later is a reference to something non-composite like apple is sweet.

You’re still using your terms in non-standard ways. (And, my intuition is that it’s a sloppy usage, as well…)
“Composite” and “non-composite” are distinct from the examples you provided: the former is a reference to the existence of a distinct member of the class ‘apple’, and the latter is an abstract attribute of apples in general.

 

[STT]

Hang on, though: “sweet” is merely an attribute, not a component, of an apple. You seem to be conflating the two notion. (“Apples and oranges”, as it were! )

Yes, sweet is merely and attribute. Knowledge however is structured regardless.

You’re still using your terms in non-standard ways. (And, my intuition is that it’s a sloppy usage, as well…)
“Composite” and “non-composite” are distinct from the examples you provided: the former is a reference to the existence of a distinct member of the class ‘apple’, and the latter is an abstract attribute of apples in general.

No. You need to reread what I wrote.

 

[Gorgias]

No. You need to reread what I wrote.

I read it – you’re conflating “composite” with “distinct instance of an existing object” and you’re conflating “non-composite” with “attribute of a class of objects”. It doesn’t hold up.

 

[STT]

I read it – you’re conflating “composite” with “distinct instance of an existing object” and you’re conflating “non-composite” with “attribute of a class of objects”. It doesn’t hold up.

Composite means: made up of several parts or elements. That is what I mean when I say knowledge refers to something composite or non-composite.

 

[Gorgias]

That is what I mean when I say knowledge refers to something composite or non-composite.

So… a tautology? “Either knowledge has parts or it doesn’t have parts”? That’s hardly helpful…

 

[STT]

So… a tautology? “Either knowledge has parts or it doesn’t have parts”? That’s hardly helpful…

Is knowledge a set of coherent propositions? Yes. Therefore it is structured. Knowledge however can refer to something in reality which that thing could be composite or non-composite.

 

[quaestio45]

Knowledge is structured but it can be in reference what is non-composite. Like apple is sweet.

I’m a little confused, for it seems to me that to say “an apple is sweet” is to point to the composition of attributes in an apple (unless you mean to say the apple is sweetness itself, but I strongly doubt that). So how could we call this an example of noncomposition? Or are you calling what is a description of an entities attributes “noncomposite”? In which case, we may say that some equivocation is occuring here, yes?

I think we need to divide knowledge to composite and non-composite which former is a reference to something composite like apple on the table and later is a reference to something non-composite like apple is sweet.

Once my confusion stated above is cleared, I will agree to this.

 

[STT]

I’m a little confused, for it seems to me that to say “an apple is sweet” is to point to the composition of attributes in an apple (unless you mean to say the apple is sweetness itself, but I strongly doubt that).

Apple has attributes. It is of course reducible to electron and quark. Perhaps I should use the example of electron which has charge but it is not made of anything else.

So how could we call this an example of noncomposition?

By composition I mean the subject that knowledge points to has parts. Like atom.

Or are you calling what is a description of an entities attributes “noncomposite”?

Non-composite things have attributes but each is a irreducible entity, like electron.

In which case, we may say that some equivocation is occuring here, yes?

I hope things is clear now.

Once my confusion stated above is cleared, I will agree to this.

Cool. Let me know what you think about my comments.

 

[quaestio45]

By composition I mean the subject that knowledge points to has parts. Like atom.

Physical, metaphisical, spiritual? Or all of the above at the same time?

Non-composite things have attributes but each is a irreducible entity, like electron.

So as in physical substance, correct?

 

[STT]

Physical, metaphisical, spiritual? Or all of the above at the same time?

All of them.

So as in physical substance, correct?

Yes, in this example.

 

[quaestio45]

quaestio45:

Physical, metaphisical, spiritual? Or all of the above at the same time?

All of them.

So as in physical substance, correct?

Yes, in this example.

Okay then, hopefully I understand that what you mean by composition is simply to have multiple components in your being. This can be divided into the phsical, metaphysical, spiritual, and perhaps more. Now, knowledge as a collective is composed of numerous ideas, which is different from a composition of physical entities. Now, we both agree that the will in substance must be noncomposite necessarily (stemming from your argument); I’m hesitant to call this physical composition, so instead lets call it spiritual.

Now, one could make the case that the will is still composed in a metaphysical way if there isn’t a union between essence and existence (this is, of course, contingent upon the idea that the will is created, however). Furthermore, the will can hold multiple mental attributes at once (thoughts, imagination, and ideas), so it must be composed in a way different then physical or spiritual composition. Further, this composition seems similar to the composition of knowledge, which had the compenents of multiple ideas. As such, two things might be said; one, that the composition of the will is plausible outside of spiritual substance, and two, that the composition of the mind might be the same as the composition of knowledge.

That be so, we must ask the question of if it were true that composition must begat composition, then why must the composition begotten need be in any other category other than the one that the causing composition finds itself in? We must have an extra premise to explain such a phenomena if it were true.

 

[STT]

Okay then, hopefully I understand that what you mean by composition is simply to have multiple components in your being. This can be divided into the phsical, metaphysical, spiritual, and perhaps more. Now, knowledge as a collective is composed of numerous ideas, which is different from a composition of physical entities.

Great.

Now, we both agree that the will in substance must be noncomposite necessarily (stemming from your argument); I’m hesitant to call this physical composition, so instead lets call it spiritual.

What do you mean with will in here? Do you mean mind?

Now, one could make the case that the will is still composed in a metaphysical way if there isn’t a union between essence and existence (this is, of course, contingent upon the idea that the will is created, however).

Essence is an idea. I don’t understand how that could be existence. Could you please elaborate?

Furthermore, the will can hold multiple mental attributes at once (thoughts, imagination, and ideas), so it must be composed in a way different then physical or spiritual composition.

If by will you mean mind then mind doesn’t hold stuff. Mind just experiences, decides and causes. The stuff is hold in physical as memory.

Further, this composition seems similar to the composition of knowledge, which had the compenents of multiple ideas. As such, two things might be said; one, that the composition of the will is plausible outside of spiritual substance, and two, that the composition of the mind might be the same as the composition of knowledge.

Mind is in fact the free agent. It decides so it doesn’t have any composition.

That be so, we must ask the question of if it were true that composition must begat composition, then why must the composition begotten need be in any other category other than the one that the causing composition finds itself in? We must have an extra premise to explain such a phenomena if it were true.

I cannot follow you in here. Let’s clear the former comments and leave this for the last.

 

[quaestio45]

What do you mean with will in here? Do you mean mind?

A free agent is what I mean, which of course necessitates a mind; so yes.

Essence is an idea. I don’t understand how that could be existence. Could you please elaborate?

I simply mean that the essence of the free agent isn’t in complete explanation of its existence because essence is constant whilst a free agent isn’t, along with the fact that if a free agent is created, then the explanation for their existence lies in something else. All this to say is that there are metaphysical compositions to which a limited or finite free agent must have, unless they are supremely simple, to which only a being of pure actuality can be (God, of course).

If by will you mean mind then mind doesn’t hold stuff. Mind just experiences, decides and causes.

So a mind does not hold a thought? It simply is a thought or experiences a thought? But, I hope you understand that to experience something is to have some form of possesion. As such, if the free agent can posess multiple thoughts, and such thoughts can only be caused by a single entity, then thus the entity is either composed in substance or, alternatively, is simply composed in thought.

The stuff is hold in physical as memory.

So the free agent holds nothing? It does not store anything or posess anything?

It decides so it doesn’t have any composition.

In which way is the free agent not composed fundamentally? Every way? Or just the substance based way?

I cannot follow you in here. Let’s clear the former comments and leave this for the last.

Fair enough.