Free agent is not contingent

[IWantGod]

Free agent is not contingent

A free agent (a human being) moves from potentiality to actuality. His or her thoughts is a mixture of potential and act. Our choices change and proceed from states that were once only potentially real. The activity of our minds proceed from potential. We grow in our knowledge potentially. So as far as our existence is concerned we cannot be considered to be necessary beings because existence is not identical with our nature in so much as it is only something we are receiving potentially. If we were by our very nature existence our minds would be pure actuality and would not have any potential states because our minds would lack no reality. We are therefore contingent.

 

[STT]

I fail to see whats unfair about what I said. Highest truth is argued for by the format:

quaestio45:

P1) All particular truths are reducible to their higher truths

P2) Connected particular truths must share a particular higher truth
P3) All particular truths are connected
C1) Therefore, all particular truths are reducible to a shared highest truth

Me not knowing exactly what the highest truth is does not in any way take away from its existence, but instead shows my ignorance. And to say that because some truth is uncomposite that therefore there can be knowledge which is uncomposite (highest knowledge; not collective knowledge) only follows from definitions. But perhaps there is something to which I neglect or do not understand which, without my awareness, makes my argument either invalid or unsound. If such be the case, let my eyes be opened to this fallaciousness I have taken. If not, then what more have we here?

We have been through this argument. I refuted it in post #106. (P1) is false, (P2) might be correct (could you please give an example). At the end, highest knowledge if there is any is a proposition, therefore it is structured.

 

[STT]

A free agent (a human being) moves from potentiality to actuality. His or her thoughts is a mixture of potential and act. Our choices change and proceed from states that were once only potentially real. The activity of our minds proceed from potential. We grow in our knowledge potentially. So as far as our existence is concerned we cannot be considered to be necessary beings because existence is not identical with our nature in so much as it is only something we are receiving potentially. If we were by our very nature existence our minds would be pure actuality and would not have any potential states because our minds would lack no reality. We are therefore contingent.

As you said that is your thoughts, choices, etc which are subject to change rather than your existence. You are the same person as yesterday, aren’t you?

 

[quaestio45]

We have been through this argument. I refuted it in post #106.

I would use the word refutation quite lightly.

(P1) is false

I disagree for I don’t think the arguments against it were rather that powerful, but for the sake of argument I’ll assume its falsity. That be so, its opposite is true, correct? That particular truths are irreducible?

(P2) might be correct (could you please give an example)

There is an apple on my desk, and there is a soda on my desk. Both truths are connected via the higher truths of me having placed them there (the cause), their purpose (to be consumed), and their time and place (here on my desk and now). All of these are further explanations of what that particular truth and thus a higher truth.

At the end, highest knowledge if there is any is a proposition, therefore it is structured.

I fail to see how that follows.

 

[STT]

I disagree for I don’t think the arguments against it were rather that powerful, but for the sake of argument I’ll assume its falsity. That be so, its opposite is true, correct? That particular truths are irreducible?

What I am stressing is that particular truths are not reducible to higher truth since they are different truth categories. Like, there is an apple on your table. From this it doesn’t follow necessary that you put it there to consume it. Perhaps someone else put it there. etc. We in fact derive higher truth from particular truth, like law of gravity, by excluding all possible higher truth.

I fail to see how that follows.

If the highest truth is not a proposition then it is a word or letter, at best it is ambiguous. Like existence. Existence what? Existence is possible or impossible, etc. are meaningful. Existence if it refers to something which exist is a particular truth. Existence in this case doesn’t refer to any higher or highest truth.

 

[lelinator]

We are therefore contingent.

So what? Maybe all that exists are contingent things.

Aquinas’ argument is that it’s possible for contingent things not to exist. Thus if everything is contingent it’s possible that there was a point where nothing existed. And since nothing cannot give rise to something…there would still be nothing.

But this argument makes an assumption, an assumption which you yourself have previously refuted. It assumes that the existence of nothing is actually possible, but you have argued that the existence of nothing is impossible.

Thus even if everything is contingent, and constantly changes, the one thing that it can’t possibly change into…is nothing. Therefore, even if everything is contingent, there has always been, and always will be, something, and the only necessary truth, is that “nothing” is impossible.

 

[quaestio45]

It assumes that the existence of nothing is actually possible, but you have argued that the existence of nothing is impossible.

Really? @IWantGod, what is this argument he speaks of? I’m rather curious about it.

What I am stressing is that particular truths are not reducible to higher truth since they are different truth categories.

Any particular truth can be reduced to a higher truth because to be a higher truth isn’t a statement of the truth being examined but instead is only a higher truth because it is higher relative to some other truth. Example, apple on my desk is a particular truth, but it is a higher truth to the subsequent particular truth of me seeing the apple. All that to say, I’m not dividing the two categories between reality encompassing truths and those that aren’t. But even then, I don’t understand how we can’t go from a particular truth such as “my apple falls” to some higher explanation like “gravity exists”. If we can do such, we can reduced the first truth to a composition of the latter truth along with causes of the apples placement in a position to fall, its purpose for falling, the apples material, etc.

Like, there is an apple on your table. From this it doesn’t follow necessary that you put it there to consume it.

I agree, but that’s where I say that the picture being presented is incomplete. For then, if I put it there to consume, then there is more to the apple being on my desk then just it being there. Thus there is a purpose, meaning that there is more structure to that truth, meaning composition.

We in fact derive higher truth from particular truth, like law of gravity, by excluding all possible higher truth.

If I understand you correctly, then I agree.

If the highest truth is not a proposition then it is a word or letter, at best it is ambiguous.

Okay, so first, I admit that highest truth must be a proposition as all things and thoughts are to us mental based creatures. I don’t understand how something being held as a proposition in mind makes it composite though.

 

[IWantGod]

the only necessary truth, is that “ nothing ” is impossible.

If nothing is impossible then there must be a necessary existence, a being that cannot not exist. Contingent beings are dependent for there existence on something that is necessary since they are not themselves necessary beings but instead dependent for their existence which is evident.

If only contingent beings existed then it would be possible for absolutely nothing to exist. But since that is not possible, it cannot be true that only contingent beings exist.

 

[IWantGod]

Really? @IWantGod, what is this argument he speaks of? I’m rather curious about it.

It’s from this thread i started a while back.

The Impossibility Of Absolutely-Nothing And the Necessity Of A Fundamental Unchanging Act Of Reality Philosophy

Absolutely-nothing is impossible because it is meaningless. Nothing refers to the possibility of some thing that is absent from reality. There is no possibility in absolutely-nothing since it is by the very nature of it’s meaning the absolute absence of everything including possibilities; for it is nothing at all. Since there are possibilities it cannot be true that there was ever such a thing as absolutely-nothing, or that there could be such a thing in principle, because existence is fundame…

 

[quaestio45]

Ah, so you define nothing as an absence of even potentiality, correct? That be the case, I agree; that type of “nothing” is impossible. For if we call nothing something like nonbeing, and we say that being is by necessity an actuality (for existence and actuality is the same thing), then we must fall to the conclusion that its opposite must be what is contrary to actuality, that being potentiality. As such, nonbeing is pure potentiality (lacking any and all actuality, being, and as such, existence).

 

[STT]

Any particular truth can be reduced to a higher truth because to be a higher truth isn’t a statement of the truth being examined but instead is only a higher truth because it is higher relative to some other truth.

No. Please see the following.

Example, apple on my desk is a particular truth, but it is a higher truth to the subsequent particular truth of me seeing the apple.

There is one particular truth that is independent of any observer, apple is there. You seeing the apple follows from apple being there. That is job of our sensory system.

All that to say, I’m not dividing the two categories between reality encompassing truths and those that aren’t. But even then, I don’t understand how we can’t go from a particular truth such as “my apple falls” to some higher explanation like “gravity exists”.

Welcome, to the world of analytical thinking. Existence of gravity follows from the first law of mechanics.

If we can do such, we can reduced the first truth to a composition of the latter truth along with causes of the apples placement in a position to fall, its purpose for falling, the apples material, etc.

We don’t reduce, we instead deduce.

I agree, but that’s where I say that the picture being presented is incomplete.

Yes. That is why I am saying that you cannot reduce particular truth to higher truth. If I come to your room and see the apple on your table, the particular truth, then I cannot reduce from this particular truth to a higher truth that you put the apple there. I can however deduce, someone put the apple there since apples grow on apple tree and they are originally there.

For then, if I put it there to consume, then there is more to the apple being on my desk then just it being there. Thus there is a purpose, meaning that there is more structure to that truth, meaning composition.

True. Knowledge is structured.

If I understand you correctly, then I agree.

Cool.

Okay, so first, I admit that highest truth must be a proposition as all things and thoughts are to us mental based creatures. I don’t understand how something being held as a proposition in mind makes it composite though.

Because proposition are made of parts, words. To understand the meaning of the proposition you need to understand the meaning of word. But each word is defined in term of other words. This is circular. So language is incomplete. But we understand when we use language. That is because the language is based on higher knowledge.

 

[quaestio45]

Because proposition are made of parts, words. To understand the meaning of the proposition you need to understand the meaning of word. But each word is defined in term of other words. This is circular. So language is incomplete. But we understand when we use language. That is because the language is based on higher knowledge.

Fair enough, but what I took away from that was only that the nature of a proposition must be composite by necessity, not the actual thing the proposition describes. I would say thats the equivalent of building a wooden baracade around a stone structure and saying that because what encapsulates the structure is to an outsider wood, then therefore what is holds inside it must also be wood. It doesn’t follow.

That is why I am saying that you cannot reduce particular truth to higher truth. If I come to your room and see the apple on your table, the particular truth, then I cannot reduce from this particular truth to a higher truth that you put the apple there. I can however deduce, someone put the apple there since apples grow on apple tree and they are originally there.

I think we’ve been stuck on all of this for a while, and if I’m being honest, that there could be a difference between something having its explanation in many things “above it” and being composed (after all, the velocity of a vehicle is derived from the engine and pedals and many things, but that does not mean the velocity is composed of all those things).

As such, we will say that I am wrong on this frong for the time being. That being said, there is still a problem to which, if resolved, may bother me no more and convince me of the argument. And that is that the argument although sound, does not seem valid. It does not appear that from the first two premises:
P1) [A] is dependent upon
P2) holds the attributes [C]

That therefore the conclusion would be:
C1) [A] holds the attributes [C]

So if you could explain to me how it follows necessarily from this formulation that the conclusion would be as such, I will concede your correctness.

 

[STT]

Fair enough, but what I took away from that was only that the nature of a proposition must be composite by necessity, not the actual thing the proposition describes. I would say thats the equivalent of building a wooden baracade around a stone structure and saying that because what encapsulates the structure is to an outsider wood, then therefore what is holds inside it must also be wood. It doesn’t follow.

Sorry, I should have said that language is based on particular knowledge.

I think we’ve been stuck on all of this for a while, and if I’m being honest, that there could be a difference between something having its explanation in many things “above it” and being composed (after all, the velocity of a vehicle is derived from the engine and pedals and many things, but that does not mean the velocity is composed of all those things).

As such, we will say that I am wrong on this frong for the time being. That being said, there is still a problem to which, if resolved, may bother me no more and convince me of the argument. And that is that the argument although sound, does not seem valid. It does not appear that from the first two premises:
P1) [A] is dependent upon
P2) holds the attributes [C]

That therefore the conclusion would be:
C1) [A] holds the attributes [C]

So if you could explain to me how it follows necessarily from this formulation that the conclusion would be as such, I will concede your correctness.

If we accept that particular knowledge is about the relation between objects (like apple on the table) in reality then (C1) follows from (P1) and (P2) since we have an actor in (P1) (you putting apple on the table), and in (P2) we have particular knowledge which is structured, and in (C1) we have the scene.

 

[quaestio45]

If we accept that particular knowledge is about the relation between objects (like apple on the table) in reality then (C1) follows from (P1) and (P2) since we have an actor in (P1) (you putting apple on the table), and in (P2) we have particular knowledge which is structured, and in (C1) we have the scene.

Why is it that knowledge needed in creation must necessarily be composed knowledge? And, more to the point, why does the thing to which something is dependent upon (like creation is dependent on knowledge) must have its nature replicated on the thing that depends on it (knowledge might have a composed nature, so creation must have a composed nature)?

Further, there is a difference between being composed in substance and in idea; just because knowledge may be composed in that its the relation of ideas, doesn’t mean the substance of that which possesses free will must be composed as well. At minimum, it can be composed in other ways, such as in ideas (the way the mind may hold multiple ideas), but not in the substantial way, right?

Finally, what do you make of the formulations implications if it were valid? For there seems as if absurdities pop up when we hold the formulation to be true. For example:

P1) [Monkeys] are dependent upon [water]
P2) [Water] holds the attribute [wetness]
C1) [Monkeys] hold the attribute [wetness]

P1) [Swords] are dependent upon [craft]
P2) [Craft] holds the attribute of [making]
C1) [Swords] hold the attribute of [making]

P1) [A house dog] is dependent upon [its master]
P2) [A master] holds the attribute of [leadership]
C1) [A house dog] holds the attribute of [leadership]

 

[STT]

Why is it that knowledge needed in creation must necessarily be composed knowledge?

Because creation is structured.

And, more to the point, why does the thing to which something is dependent upon (like creation is dependent on knowledge) must have its nature replicated on the thing that depends on it (knowledge might have a composed nature, so creation must have a composed nature)?

That is sort of obvious. If the reality is structured then the particular knowledge which describe the reality is as well structured and vice versa.

Further, there is a difference between being composed in substance and in idea; just because knowledge may be composed in that its the relation of ideas, doesn’t mean the substance of that which possesses free will must be composed as well. At minimum, it can be composed in other ways, such as in ideas (the way the mind may hold multiple ideas), but not in the substantial way, right?

What the ideas are referring to? You can of course say “I exist” which this is composed of two ideas but that is not sort of particular truth I am referring to. Think of example of table and apple. Table exists and it is not composed. Apple exists as a single object and it is not composed either. But there is a particular truth which is apple is on the table which is composed and it is related to a particular knowledge. Now when comes to an act, you can of course put apple on the table but you cannot create them since there is no particular knowledge, higher knowledge and highest knowledge which allows that to happen (if there is then let me know the proposition).

Finally, what do you make of the formulations implications if it were valid? For there seems as if absurdities pop up when we hold the formulation to be true. For example:

quaestio45:

P1) [Monkeys] are dependent upon [water]
P2) [Water] holds the attribute [wetness]
C1) [Monkeys] hold the attribute [wetness]

P1) [Swords] are dependent upon [craft]
P2) [Craft] holds the attribute of [making]
C1) [Swords] hold the attribute of [making]

P1) [A house dog] is dependent upon [its master]
P2) [A master] holds the attribute of [leadership]
C1) [A house dog] holds the attribute of [leadership]

I agree that that formula does not always work. But it works when there ideas in particular knowledge referring to separate objects, like there is an apple on the table.

 

[quaestio45]

quaestio45:

Why is it that knowledge needed in creation must necessarily be composed knowledge?

Because creation is structured.

And, more to the point, why does the thing to which something is dependent upon (like creation is dependent on knowledge) must have its nature replicated on the thing that depends on it (knowledge might have a composed nature, so creation must have a composed nature)?

That is sort of obvious. If the reality is structured then the particular knowledge which describe the reality is as well structured and vice versa.

Perhaps I miss worded what I meant, for of course if knowledge is something inseparable from the state of reality, then a composed reality necessitates a composed knowledge. What I meant to say then was why does a composed reality which necessitates a composed knowledge mean that there can only be a composed creation (like that which wills, lets say)?

Further, the only knowledge necessary for creation is knowledge of material and knowledge of the form you wish to mold said material. These in fact maybe two things to know, but it produces in the end one thing. As such, you do not need the whole of knowledge to create something, but rather a selective knowledge of “what shall be made here”.

What the ideas are referring to? You can of course say “I exist” which this is composed of two ideas but that is not sort of particular truth I am referring to. Think of example of table and apple. Table exists and it is not composed. Apple exists as a single object and it is not composed either. But there is a particular truth which is apple is on the table which is composed and it is related to a particular knowledge. Now when comes to an act, you can of course put apple on the table but you cannot create them since there is no particular knowledge, higher knowledge and highest knowledge which allows that to happen (if there is then let me know the proposition).

So, we can still agree there is a distinction being made here in terms of composition. The first being the substance of something (in which case, the apple and table are composed, due to themselves being of smaller units of matter), and the truth of something (which requires two or more things to be, both being unequal to each other, like the apple being on the table). Now the problem with a composed will is only brought about in the first type of composition and not the second type of composition (as has been shown by yourself in the argument of both regress and incompatibility), but it seems to me that what is being shown in the argument is that the will must necessarily be in the second type of composition, if I’m not confused. As such, the problems that you describe do not arise.

 

[quaestio45]

I agree that that formula does not always work. But it works when there ideas in particular knowledge referring to separate objects, like there is an apple on the table.

Good, we agree the formula is faulty. My point in showing you this is that you cannot therefore make an argument from deduction or necessity using this formula in the state its in. As such, either more premises must be added, or the whole thing must be tossed out.

 

[STT]

Perhaps I miss worded what I meant, for of course if knowledge is something inseparable from the state of reality, then a composed reality necessitates a composed knowledge. What I meant to say then was why does a composed reality which necessitates a composed knowledge mean that there can only be a composed creation (like that which wills, lets say)?

Because, the creation otherwise contain one irreducible entity. An irreducible thing does not have structure/parts. It has however properties. The universe as we know is reducible.

Further, the only knowledge necessary for creation is knowledge of material and knowledge of the form you wish to mold said material. These in fact maybe two things to know, but it produces in the end one thing. As such, you do not need the whole of knowledge to create something, but rather a selective knowledge of “what shall be made here”.

If we accept that knowledge is structured and free agent is irreducible then it follows that there is no knowledge which can describe its behavior. It if free. You cannot program freedom. Therefore, you cannot create free agent. Different pieces of knowledge are functionally and coherently related.

So, we can still agree there is a distinction being made here in terms of composition. The first being the substance of something (in which case, the apple and table are composed, due to themselves being of smaller units of matter), and the truth of something (which requires two or more things to be, both being unequal to each other, like the apple being on the table). Now the problem with a composed will is only brought about in the first type of composition and not the second type of composition (as has been shown by yourself in the argument of both regress and incompatibility), but it seems to me that what is being shown in the argument is that the will must necessarily be in the second type of composition, if I’m not confused. As such, the problems that you describe do not arise.

Yes. But even if the act of creation was about one irreducible being, free agent, then there is no knowledge which can describe it. You cannot describe functionally something which doesn’t obey any functioning.

 

[STT]

Good, we agree the formula is faulty. My point in showing you this is that you cannot therefore make an argument from deduction or necessity using this formula in the state its in. As such, either more premises must be added, or the whole thing must be tossed out.

I think we need a bit of elaboration to tell what is meant by knowledge, why knowledge is not useful for creation of free agent. Things either work according to a function or they are free. Free agent don’t function therefore there is no knowledge which can describe its behavior which is free.

 

[quaestio45]

Because, the creation otherwise contain one irreducible entity. An irreducible thing does not have structure/parts. It has however properties.

Forgive me, but I don’t see how that would necessitate that a specific creation must be composite.

The universe as we know is reducible.

Well, yes, but the universe is simply the collective of all beings, so if that were meant to be a point that something may not be created uncomposite, I think its rather weak.

If we accept that knowledge is structured and free agent is irreducible then it follows that there is no knowledge which can describe its behavior. It if free. You cannot program freedom. Therefore, you cannot create free agent. Different pieces of knowledge are functionally and coherently related.

Yes. But even if the act of creation was about one irreducible being, free agent, then there is no knowledge which can describe it. You cannot describe functionally something which doesn’t obey any functioning.

I think we need a bit of elaboration to tell what is meant by knowledge, why knowledge is not useful for creation of free agent. Things either work according to a function or they are free. Free agent don’t function therefore there is no knowledge which can describe its behavior which is free.

Okay… hold on one moment… is this perhaps what you are saying:
P1) Being is either scripted (behaviorally determined) or not (free)
P2) To be wholly designed is to be wholly determined
C1) Therefore a free being cannot be wholly designed
P3) Creation requires the created to be wholly designed
C2) Therefore a free being cannot be a created one