Free agent is not contingent

[fhansen]

By free agent I mean that it could make free decision. What you call soul which decides does not have parts otherwise there would be a tension in the decision.

Don’t decisions necessarily involve tension?

 

[STT]

I’m curious as to what you mean by this statement. What is the difference between these two irreducible things, and how are they related?

Concept is an irreducible thing. Knowledge is structured in term of concepts. Each concept though relates to an independent thing in external reality such as an object, like word of electron and object of electron.

I’ll certainly try. Consciousness would be something which holds the ability to think, to reason (even if remotely), to process ideas, and all such things. It would perhaps be something best thought of as the thing which thinks; perhaps even the mind (unless I’m making something of a category error). Does that perhaps help?

The ability to think is different from something which thinks. So which one you are referring to?

 

[STT]

Don’t decisions necessarily involve tension?

True, but a free agent can resolve the tension. The tension in this case arises from existence of different options. In here, I am interested between tension in decision of two free agents for example. Two free agents are not free.

 

[STT]

Well knowledge is in relation to truth, yes?

Not always, think of some abstract area of mathematics.

Knowledge based outside of truth isn’t knowledge at all, can we agree?

Let’s call this type of knowledge of real instead of an abstract one.

If that be, could we also agree that knowledge is something like a recognition of truth?

Knowledge when it refers to truth is set of coherent concepts which explain the reality.

Were you to say yes, the only time knowledge could be irreducible is when truth is irreducible.

I would say that reality has objects so the truth which is the knowledge of reality cannot be irreducible.

Now, because all truth is connected, we could come to think that all truth, if reduced far enough, will reach a common point of contact. Now, truth very obviously cannot be solely reducible, otherwise we reach an infinite regress (like you said). Therefore, truth must eventually reach something which is irreducible (something to which the question “why is that so” becomes meaningless), which is the greatest point of common contact for all truth, and also becomes its origin. Thus, knowledge must be the same way, it seems to me; where it can be further and further reduced until you come to a point where you have something of highest knowledge, or a source of all knowledge, or an explanation to all knowledge.

Are you talking about absolute truth? If yes I think there should be arguments to support the absolute truth so I don’t agree with the bold part.

Granted, one may think that this idea falls under composition if one reads “the highest truth and knowledge” as an umbrella to all truth and knowledge rolled up in one (like if you were to take all the Lego bricks in the world and create one big structure out of them; its still composed). … In that case, singular highest truth is not composed, nor would highest knowledge be composed, in my estimate. Therefore, it seems to me that something uncomposed may still follow from creation.

I am afraid that I cannot agree since even absolute truth is the knowledge of reality. Absolute truth is the fundamental brick. It explains a fundamental feature in reality but it doesn’t mean that something uncomposed may still follow from creation.

 

[quaestio45]

quaestio45:

Well knowledge is in relation to truth, yes?

Not always, think of some abstract area of mathematics.

I tend to disagree; for even abstractions where we don’t know if something is true (or if we pretend something false is true) the supposing of its truth leads to truth claims (for example: a=b may or may not be true, but if it was then we may say 2a+5=2b+5; thus, we have a truth claim). As such, we may say something like “I know Darth Vader is Luke Skywalker’s father” and validly claim it as knowledge without being forced to say that knowledge is disconnected from what is true (though, the example I used would best suite this if it were rephrased “If we accept the initial concepts of Star Wars reality as true, then I know Darth Vader is Luke Skywalker’s father”. Though, this is something obviously implicit in any statement).

quaestio45:

If that be, could we also agree that knowledge is something like a recognition of truth?

Knowledge when it refers to truth is set of coherent concepts which explain the reality.

I would call that a body of knowledge rather than knowledge itself.

quaestio45:

Were you to say yes, the only time knowledge could be irreducible is when truth is irreducible.

I would say that reality has objects so the truth which is the knowledge of reality cannot be irreducible.

I tend to disagree STT. For I don’t think reality having objects necessarily means truth cannot be irreducible, for we can always ask the question “why are there any said objects in this particular arrangement” and thus come to higher, more explanatory truth; therefore truth of any particular can be finally reduced to truth of universality. Also, I’d like to make a distinction between a body of truth (which would be something like the whole of all truths, or a grouping of particular truths) which of course is reducible due to composition, and truth itself, which I might argue is not composite.

 

[quaestio45]

quaestio45:

Now, because all truth is connected, we could come to think that all truth, if reduced far enough, will reach a common point of contact. Now, truth very obviously cannot be solely reducible, otherwise we reach an infinite regress (like you said). Therefore, truth must eventually reach something which is irreducible ( something to which the question “why is that so” becomes meaningless ), which is the greatest point of common contact for all truth, and also becomes its origin. Thus, knowledge must be the same way, it seems to me; where it can be further and further reduced until you come to a point where you have something of highest knowledge, or a source of all knowledge, or an explanation to all knowledge.

Are you talking about absolute truth? If yes I think there should be arguments to support the absolute truth so I don’t agree with the bold part.

What do you mean by “absolute truth”? That truth is irreducible? If so, then my argument is simple:
P1) All particular truth is reducible to higher truth
P2) Particular truths are connected via shared higher truth
P3) All particular truths are connected
C1) Therefore, all particular truth is reducible to a shared highest truth

Furthermore, if particular truths are not reducible to a shared highest truth, then:

1. Not all particular truth is connected
   &
2. Particular truths are reducible ad infinitum

Both of which seem quite absurd.

 

[quaestio45]

quaestio45:

Granted, one may think that this idea falls under composition if one reads “the highest truth and knowledge” as an umbrella to all truth and knowledge rolled up in one (like if you were to take all the Lego bricks in the world and create one big structure out of them; its still composed). … In that case, singular highest truth is not composed, nor would highest knowledge be composed, in my estimate. Therefore, it seems to me that something composed may still follow from creation.

I am afraid that I cannot agree since even absolute truth is the knowledge of reality.

I would disagree; I still hold that knowledge is not truth but the recognition of truth.

Absolute truth is the fundamental brick. It explains a fundamental feature in reality but it doesn’t mean that something uncomposed may still follow from creation.

I don’t think it explains a fundamental feature in reality, but instead that it explains all of reality the same way a mathematical axiom explains and justifies what is built atop of it. Regardless, you are right; even with this, it doesn’t necessarily mean that something uncomposed may be created. What it does do, however, is put more weight on your argument. For not only do the premises, in my estimate, not necessarily lead to the conclusion (as I showed above), but there is a chance that one of the premises may be false. If that be the case, we may need to start thinking of repairing what argument we have so far. That being, if I understand correctly:
P1) [Creation] is dependent upon [knowledge]
P2) [Knowledge] holds the attributes [cohesion and composition (structure)]
C1) [Creation] holds the attributes [cohesion and composition (structure)]

 

[STT]

I tend to disagree; for even abstractions where we don’t know if something is true (or if we pretend something false is true) the supposing of its truth leads to truth claims (for example: a=b may or may not be true, but if it was then we may say 2a+5=2b+5; thus, we have a truth claim). As such, we may say something like “I know Darth Vader is Luke Skywalker’s father” and validly claim it as knowledge without being forced to say that knowledge is disconnected from what is true (though, the example I used would best suite this if it were rephrased “ If we accept the initial concepts of Star Wars reality as true , then I know Darth Vader is Luke Skywalker’s father”. Though, this is something obviously implicit in any statement).

Think of a class {a,b} with an operator + with these properties, a+a=b and a+b=a and b+a=b and b+b=a. Can you give me an example of such a set in reality?

I would call that a body of knowledge rather than knowledge itself.

Ok, I can buy that definition.

I tend to disagree STT. For I don’t think reality having objects necessarily means truth cannot be irreducible, for we can always ask the question “why are there any said objects in this particular arrangement” and thus come to higher, more explanatory truth; therefore truth of any particular can be finally reduced to truth of universality. Also, I’d like to make a distinction between a body of truth (which would be something like the whole of all truths, or a grouping of particular truths) which of course is reducible due to composition, and truth itself, which I might argue is not composite.

Could you please provide your argument for the truth being non-composite? Could you please tell me what the truth is?

 

[STT]

What do you mean by “absolute truth”?

By absolute truth I mean the truth which explain a fundamental feature of reality. Like we are minds interacting through material.

That truth is irreducible?

What do you mean with irreducible?

If so, then my argument is simple:
P1) All particular truth is reducible to higher truth
P2) Particular truths are connected via shared higher truth
P3) All particular truths are connected
C1) Therefore, all particular truth is reducible to a shared highest truth

I am afraid that I cannot understand your argument. Isn’t (P1) equal to (C1)? Also what do you mean with the particular truth?

Furthermore, if particular truths are not reducible to a shared highest truth, then:

1. Not all particular truth is connected
   &
2. Particular truths are reducible ad infinitum

Both of which seem quite absurd.

I have to wait for your definition of particular truth.

 

[STT]

I would disagree; I still hold that knowledge is not truth but the recognition of truth.

Can we agree that the knowledge is set of coherent statements? Knowledge of course is not the truth.

I don’t think it explains a fundamental feature in reality, but instead that it explains all of reality the same way a mathematical axiom explains and justifies what is built atop of it. Regardless, you are right; even with this, it doesn’t necessarily mean that something uncomposed may be created. What it does do, however, is put more weight on your argument. For not only do the premises, in my estimate, not necessarily lead to the conclusion (as I showed above), but there is a chance that one of the premises may be false. If that be the case, we may need to start thinking of repairing what argument we have so far. That being, if I understand correctly:
P1) [Creation] is dependent upon [knowledge]
P2) [Knowledge] holds the attributes [cohesion and composition (structure)]
C1) [Creation] holds the attributes [cohesion and composition (structure)]

I am afraid that all premises and the conclusion sound to me. Could God create without knowledge? No. That is basically first premise. Knowledge, what we discuss right now, is structured, it is made of coherent statements, and each statement is made of words. The conclusion is obvious to me since God uses His knowledge in order to create.

 

[quaestio45]

Think of a class {a,b} with an operator + with these properties, a+a=b and a+b=a and b+a=b and b+b=a. Can you give me an example of such a set in reality?

I must admit STT, I am in great confusion as to what is being communicated here (not due to misuse of language on your part, but rather my seeming ignorance in it ). If its something along the lines of “can statements which are clearly contradictory be mapped to or found in reality”, then I’d say no; of course not. But even then, from such things we can explore the “seemingly true” if we simply suppose a premise is true; even if we don’t know or just isn’t true at all, we can build a system of truth atop of from said supposition (if the premise is not true, everything built atop of it is likely not true either, as is the fate of anything built atop a faulty foundation; but it does not take away from the truth claims being just that).

Could you please tell me what the truth is?

Particular truth would be the equivalent of a particular aspect of reality (“the adequation of things and intellect”), whilst highest truth would be in correspondence to highest reality. That be so, truth is in correspondence to reality (in physical, metaphysical, and theoretical sense, I’d presume).

 

[quaestio45]

Could you please provide your argument for the truth being non-composite?

Well, we can think of three variations of truth. Particular truth, collective truth, and highest truth. Particular truth must be composite because its derived and built from what multitude of higher truths are atop it. Collective truth must be composite because it is, obviously, a collective of particular or all truths. That leaves highest truth, to which I would say cannot be composite, because the only way truth may be composite is if its composition comes from those truths higher then itself. But highest truth is highest, which means nothing can come higher then it; therefore, highest truth cannot be composite.

By absolute truth I mean the truth which explain a fundamental feature of reality. Like we are minds interacting through material.

So not that there is truth at all? Gotcha.

What do you mean with irreducible?

That it is composite and therefore can be picked apart by what makes it up.

I am afraid that I cannot understand your argument. Isn’t (P1) equal to (C1)?

Allow me to modify my argument for better understanding.

P1) All particular truths are reducible to their higher truths
P2) Connected particular truths must share a particular higher truth
P3) All particular truths are connected
C1) Therefore, all particular truths are reducible to a shared highest truth

 

[quaestio45]

Can we agree that the knowledge is set of coherent statements? Knowledge of course is not the truth.

Because I hold knowledge to be a recognition of truth, and because collective truth is all connected and coherent, I can agree collective knowledge is a set of recognized coherent truths.

I am afraid that all premises and the conclusion sound to me. Could God create without knowledge? No. That is basically first premise. Knowledge, what we discuss right now, is structured, it is made of coherent statements, and each statement is made of words.

I do find myself in agreement with both premises; creation is dependent upon knowledge, which holds a particular set of attributes if we are talking about collective knowledge. However, two things: one, if God exists as highest truth and thus highest knowledge, and if without the world (or “before” the world) there was only highest truth and highest knowledge (which are both seemingly uncomposed) then there is no need to fall into the exact pitfalls of the second premise; in fact, I’d say it may only hold true of us individuals who find ourselves in a land where there is more then highest truth and highest knowledge by which we must utilize to create anything. But it doesn’t seem to apply to anything beyond us that can utilize highest truth and knowledge (like the God we are discussing). On that regard, we may say that the argument does not extend successfully to what is God.

Furthermore, I do not hold that the argument be valid (though I do hold them to be sound to an extent), for the reasons I stated above

 

[Richca]

Like car. Does your soul have parts like a car which only function when they are properly working together or it is an irreducible entity?

Gorgias:

That doesn’t follow.

It follows if different parts make decision. Just look at societies.

And, that doesn’t follow, either.

It follows if the decision cannot be made because of conflict.

The soul has parts. Not material quantitative bodily parts like the parts of our bodies, but formal parts which are called the soul’s powers which are accidents of the soul. The human soul has the rational/spiritual powers of intellect and will, sensory powers, and vegetative powers. The powers of the soul are not its essence but are accidents of the soul.

Free choice is an interplay of the intellect and will. The knowledge of choices are in the intellect. The intellect considers the choices, makes a judgement, and presents this judgement to the will under the aspect of good. The will follows with willing the choice. Choice is substantially an act of the will but the will doesn’t will anything without the object of the will being presented to it by the intellect. The ‘job’ of the will is to will the good which can be apparent good or true good but it is the ‘job’ of the intellect to know what to will or what good.

 

[o_mlly]

Therefore, any created thing is structured

Non sequitur: An effect (created contingent being) cannot have a property not present in one or more of its causes (creator necessary being) but may have fewer.

 

[STT]

Particular truth would be the equivalent of a particular aspect of reality (“the adequation of things and intellect”), whilst highest truth would be in correspondence to highest reality. That be so, truth is in correspondence to reality (in physical, metaphysical, and theoretical sense, I’d presume).

I am afraid that I cannot understand your division of particular truth and higher truth. Truth is truth, no higher or lower, it is simply a set propositions.

 

[STT]

Well, we can think of three variations of truth. Particular truth, collective truth, and highest truth. Particular truth must be composite because its derived and built from what multitude of higher truths are atop it. Collective truth must be composite because it is, obviously, a collective of particular or all truths. That leaves highest truth, to which I would say cannot be composite, because the only way truth may be composite is if its composition comes from those truths higher then itself. But highest truth is highest, which means nothing can come higher then it; therefore, highest truth cannot be composite.

I don’t agree with your three divisions unless you provide an example for each.

That it is composite and therefore can be picked apart by what makes it up.

I understand what irreducible is. I don’t understand how that could be applied to a sort of truth. Isn’t any sort of truth can be explained by a proposition?

Allow me to modify my argument for better understanding.

P1) All particular truths are reducible to their higher truths
P2) Connected particular truths must share a particular higher truth
P3) All particular truths are connected
C1) Therefore, all particular truths are reducible to a shared highest truth

I do not agree with the existence of higher truth. Of course the truth is made of propositions and they are connected in a coherent manner.

 

[STT]

The soul has parts. Not material quantitative bodily parts like the parts of our bodies, but formal parts which are called the soul’s powers which are accidents of the soul. The human soul has the rational/spiritual powers of intellect and will, sensory powers, and vegetative powers. The powers of the soul are not its essence but are accidents of the soul.

Free choice is an interplay of the intellect and will. The knowledge of choices are in the intellect. The intellect considers the choices, makes a judgement, and presents this judgement to the will under the aspect of good. The will follows with willing the choice. Choice is substantially an act of the will but the will doesn’t will anything without the object of the will being presented to it by the intellect. The ‘job’ of the will is to will the good which can be apparent good or true good but it is the ‘job’ of the intellect to know what to will or what good.

Which part of you decide?

 

[STT]

Non sequitur: An effect (created contingent being) cannot have a property not present in one or more of its causes (creator necessary being) but may have fewer.

I agree with the bold part. But it follows from it that creation is structured.

 

[quaestio45]

I am afraid that I cannot understand your division of particular truth and higher truth. Truth is truth, no higher or lower, it is simply a set propositions.

I agree that all truth is of the same “substance” (I know truth is not a substance, but I lack any term which could perhaps be similar enough for me to use), however I don’t think its an absurdity to say that there is something thats true of a particular aspect of reality (for example, there is an apple on my desk; such a truth is only a description of a particular part of reality, and not something like reality as a whole, or future and past). Now when I use the term “higher truth” what I mean to say is that, relative to some other particular truth, it brings about explanation to it or allows for it (for example, the particular truth would be there is an apple on my desk; the higher truth in relation the particular truth would be something like “I put the apple there” or “the apple is material” or “the apple is a fruit”; all such things bring greater explanation and therefore more clarity of reality; thus, it is a “higher” truth).

I don’t understand how that could be applied to a sort of truth. Isn’t any sort of truth can be explained by a proposition?

In terms of description, yes; but there are truths which explain truths, which, without, would change a truth subsequent to it. Such, they are a composite of all “truths” prior to it. Note, I am not discussing a truth claim, but rather the truth in a claim.

I do not agree with the existence of higher truth. Of course the truth is made of propositions and they are connected in a coherent manner.

You do not believe that some truths are more broadly explanatory of reality and subsequent truths?