Free agent is not contingent

[STT]

The first thing I’ll have to ask is that you define the terms “structured” and “free agent”, that way we can be on the same page.

By structured I mean that the subject, such as knowledge or a car, has parts and these parts are coherently works together so the subject is functional.

By free agent I mean that agent can make free decision.

Im not entirely sure what you mean by this.

Something which has an essence but not property cannot interact with material.

 

[quaestio45]

Free-agent does not have any structure

So what then leads you to the belief that free-agents don’t hold structure?

Something which has an essence but not property cannot interact with material.

Well if the essence of a particular entity or thing is something which encompasses principles of interaction, I’m sure there would be no need for such properties/accidents, correct?

 

[STT]

So what then leads you to the belief that free-agents don’t hold structure?

For where if an agent has structure, and parts have capacity to freely decide, then there would be conflict in decision therefore the agent is not free. I have to mention that if only one part of an agent make free decision then I call that part as free agent.

Well if the essence of a particular entity or thing is something which encompasses principles of interaction, I’m sure there would be no need for such properties/accidents, correct?

No. Properties are always needed otherwise there would be no interaction for which something’s act depends on its nature and what it perceives (even God is eternally conscious of things which this, consciousness, is not a thing but a property). The thing always acts based on its nature if it is not free otherwise it can do against its nature.

 

[Gorgias]

That is a mere assertion which doesn’t apply to me.

What if I said that I think your assertions are made of green cheese?

The first thing I’ll have to ask is that you define the terms “structured” and “free agent”, that way we can be on the same page.

I asked the same thing upthread. @STT answered (IIRC) that “free agent” is an absolutely free spiritual entity (i.e., God Himself!), and that “structured” means “composite”.

To be totally fair Gorgias, the topic kinda went off rails a little after you said that an entity doesnt have to be composite

Umm… I don’t think that I said that, precisely. I think that I looked at his assertion and said that a spiritual entity doesn’t have to be composite. No?

Now you are better than Cantor. Could you please tell us what is wrong with his theorem?

Hardly. I think you’re misusing Cantor, but I’m willing to be shown wrong. As has been pointed out to you, it seems that you’re conflating the transfinite and the absolute. But, if you think you’re not, it’d be interesting to hear your defense.

 

[STT]

What if I said that I think your assertions are made of green cheese?

Then we make a cheese party!

I asked the same thing upthread. @STT answered (IIRC) that “free agent” is an absolutely free spiritual entity (i.e., God Himself!), and that “structured” means “composite”.

No. I said that free agent is a begin that can freely decide, like me and you.

Umm… I don’t think that I said that , precisely. I think that I looked at his assertion and said that a spiritual entity doesn’t have to be composite. No?

And I agree with you that what you call soul is free agent therefore it cannot have any parts.

Hardly. I think you’re misusing Cantor, but I’m willing to be shown wrong. As has been pointed out to you, it seems that you’re conflating the transfinite and the absolute. But, if you think you’re not, it’d be interesting to hear your defense.

There is no absolute since otherwise we are dealing with a paradox. Please read this: Burali-Forti paradox - Wikipedia

 

[quaestio45]

For where if an agent has structure, and parts have capacity to freely decide, then there would be conflict in decision therefore the agent is not free

Well, further then that, it would result in an infinite regress. For we could just extent the question of “where does the freedom of this thing come from” to the parts too - if they have capacity to freely decide. And therefore we would fall into an infinite series of structures, all having freedom of choice, but never having the explanation of the origin for such freedom of choice.

Therefore, it must be of two ways. Either the parts do not posess freedom of choice, yet from such things freedom of choice does stem, or a multitude of parts is not the explanation for such freedom, but rather something which pocesses freedom in itself. Now the former does not seem reasonable, for it does not seems as if what is purely of a given form can produce the opposite form even in the multitude. Thus, we must accept that freedom of choice must truly be something without smaller entities within itself for explanation of said freedom of choice (what I presume you call “a thing noncomposite”). Therefore, you must be correct in that freedom cannot come from what is “composed” (I’m generally careful to use a word like that, for composition is still held in such a thing even as simple as this. For only pure act can be supremely and totally simple).

Well, that being established, why must it follow that something devoid of parts in this manner cannot be created?

even God is eternally conscious of things which this, consciousness, is not a thing but a property

Well, actually, I don’t think many would agree with you on that, including myself. For God, if defined as pure actuality, does not hold properties or accidents, but instead, only the essence of act. The idea goes that God’s consciousness is simply God, along with his goodness and love; they are not parts of God, nor divisible in him. He simply is these things, and these things simply are him.

The thing always acts based on its nature if it is not free otherwise it can do against its nature.

I would rather say that a being not free is one completely restrained to act, whilst a free one is one that is at least partially unrestrained in ability to act.

 

[quaestio45]

Umm… I don’t think that I said that , precisely. I think that I looked at his assertion and said that a spiritual entity doesn’t have to be composite. No?

Thats what I interpreted from this particular quote:

It is not the case that God can only create composites. (However, there is something true that you can say here, and maybe this is where you’re getting confused: physical entities are composite. However, I don’t think you’re trying to ‘prove’ that physical entities cannot be created (since each of us is the counter-example that destroys that argument!) )

Nevertheless: it is not the case that God is able to create only composite entities. Therefore, your argument fails.

So yes, the caveat is that it isn’t applicable to physical entities

 

[STT]

Well, further then that, it would result in an infinite regress. For we could just extent the question of “where does the freedom of this thing come from” to the parts too - if they have capacity to freely decide. And therefore we would fall into an infinite series of structures, all having freedom of choice, but never having the explanation of the origin for such freedom of choice.

Therefore, it must be of two ways. Either the parts do not posess freedom of choice, yet from such things freedom of choice does stem, or a multitude of parts is not the explanation for such freedom, but rather something which pocesses freedom in itself. Now the former does not seem reasonable, for it does not seems as if what is purely of a given form can produce the opposite form even in the multitude. Thus, we must accept that freedom of choice must truly be something without smaller entities within itself for explanation of said freedom of choice (what I presume you call “a thing noncomposite”). Therefore, you must be correct in that freedom cannot come from what is “composed” (I’m generally careful to use a word like that, for composition is still held in such a thing even as simple as this. For only pure act can be supremely and totally simple).

Bravo. I agree with what you stated. Needless to say that I have an argument against emergence, in this case emergence of free will in a system made of parts which are not free.

Well, that being established, why must it follow that something devoid of parts in this manner cannot be created?

That is the final conclusion of my argument. Basically in A (first argument) we have two conclusion one of them, (3), being that created being are structured/composite and another one being (5) which is final conclusion that states the created being is not free. You agree with (4) so the premises that are left are (1) and (2). Do you agree with them?

Well, actually, I don’t think many would agree with you on that, including myself. For God, if defined as pure actuality, does not hold properties or accidents, but instead, only the essence of act. The idea goes that God’s consciousness is simply God, along with his goodness and love; they are not parts of God, nor divisible in him. He simply is these things, and these things simply are him.

That is total contradiction in my opinion, something is X and Y, X=Y while X=/=Y.

 

[quaestio45]

That is total contradiction in my opinion, something is X and Y, X=Y while X=/=Y.

Perhaps you misinterpret me? For what I’m trying to say is that God (a being of pure actus, if such is possible) holds no accidents/properties because that would mean he holds non-essence based traits, which simply cannot be. Thus, the things to which you are calling purely accidental/property are in God as God (they are held by essence, not by anything beyond such). Therefore, he is his consciousness, instead of he holds consciousness; therefore, consciousness is not a property in him.

You agree with (4) so the premises that are left are (1) and (2). Do you agree with them?

The first premise is that creation is dependent upon knowledge, yes? I don’t think I have any reason to disagree with you there. The second is that knowledge is structured (composed and coherent), yes? Again, I have no reason to disagree for the time being. In that case, yes, I agree with premise (1), (2), and (4).

 

[STT]

Perhaps you misinterpret me? For what I’m trying to say is that God (a being of pure actus, if such is possible) holds no accidents/properties because that would mean he holds non-essence based traits, which simply cannot be. Thus, the things to which you are calling purely accidental/property are in God as God (they are held by essence, not by anything beyond such). Therefore, he is his consciousness, instead of he holds consciousness; therefore, consciousness is not a property in him.

Then I have ask you what do mean with consciousness in the sentence “God is His consciousness”.

The first premise is that creation is dependent upon knowledge, yes? I don’t think I have any reason to disagree with you there. The second is that knowledge is structured (composed and coherent), yes? Again, I have no reason to disagree for the time being. In that case, yes, I agree with premise (1), (2), and (4).

(3) follows from (1) and (2). (5) follows from (3) and (4).

 

[quaestio45]

(3) follows from (1) and (2).

Well to this, STT, I must disagree. For, were to extract a general formulation from your argument, it would be something like the following:
P1) [A] is dependent upon
P2) holds the attributes [C]
C1) [A] holds the attributes [C]

But this formulation simply does not follow, for something can be dependent on another without holding the necessary attributes of what it is dependent upon. Allow me to give you a couple examples:
P1) [Monkeys] are dependent upon [water]
P2) [Water] holds the attribute [wetness]
C1) [Monkeys] hold the attribute [wetness]

P1) [Swords] are dependent upon [craft]
P2) [Craft] holds the attribute of [making]
C1) [Swords] hold the attribute of [making]

P1) [A house dog] is dependent upon [its master]
P2) [A master] holds the attribute of [leadership]
C1) [A house dog] holds the attribute of [leadership]

Now, a way by which to modify such argument is by changing the conclusion so that it has the middle phrase of premise one rather then premise two.
P1) [A] is dependent upon
P2) holds the attributes [C]
C1) [A] is dependent upon [C]

Thus, with this modification, all uses of the formula make much more sense.
P1) [Monkeys] are dependent upon [water]
P2) [Water] holds the attribute [wetness]
C1) [Monkeys] are dependent upon [wetness]

P1) [Swords] are dependent upon [craft]
P2) [Craft] holds the attribute of [making]
C1) [Swords] are dependent upon [making]

P1) [A house dog] is dependent upon [its master]
P2) [A master] holds the attribute of [leadership]
C1) [A house dog] is dependent upon [leadership]

Were we to apply this formulation to your argument, it would become:

P1) [Creation] is dependent upon [knowledge]
P2) [knowledge] holds the attributes [composition and cohesion]
C1) [Creation] is dependent upon [composition and cohesion]

Thus, we do not fall into the conclusion that creation must be either composed or cohesive, just that it is dependent on those two principles.

 

[quaestio45]

Then I have ask you what do mean with consciousness in the sentence “God is His consciousness”.

Consciousness would be that thing which has thoughts and processes form without internalizing form.

 

[Gorgias]

No. I said that free agent is a begin that can freely decide, like me and you.

Except didn’t you assert that physical beings aren’t in the picture, in your construct?

 

[STT]

Well to this, STT, I must disagree. For, were to extract a general formulation from your argument, it would be something like the following:
P1) [A] is dependent upon
P2) holds the attributes [C]
C1) [A] holds the attributes [C]

But this formulation simply does not follow, for something can be dependent on another without holding the necessary attributes of what it is dependent upon. Allow me to give you a couple examples:
P1) [Monkeys] are dependent upon [water]
P2) [Water] holds the attribute [wetness]
C1) [Monkeys] hold the attribute [wetness]

P1) [Swords] are dependent upon [craft]
P2) [Craft] holds the attribute of [making]
C1) [Swords] hold the attribute of [making]

P1) [A house dog] is dependent upon [its master]
P2) [A master] holds the attribute of [leadership]
C1) [A house dog] holds the attribute of [leadership]

Now, a way by which to modify such argument is by changing the conclusion so that it has the middle phrase of premise one rather then premise two.
P1) [A] is dependent upon
P2) holds the attributes [C]
C1) [A] is dependent upon [C]

Thus, with this modification, all uses of the formula make much more sense.
P1) [Monkeys] are dependent upon [water]
P2) [Water] holds the attribute [wetness]
C1) [Monkeys] is dependent upon [wetness]

P1) [Swords] are dependent upon [craft]
P2) [Craft] holds the attribute of [making]
C1) [Swords] are dependent upon [making]

P1) [A house dog] is dependent upon [its master]
P2) [A master] holds the attribute of [leadership]
C1) [A house dog] is dependent upon [leadership]

Were we to apply this formulation to your argument, it would become:

P1) [Creation] is dependent upon [knowledge]
P2) [knowledge] holds the attributes [composition and cohesion]
C1) [Creation] is dependent upon [composition and cohesion]

Thus, we do not fall into the conclusion that creation must be either composed or cohesive, just that it is dependent on those two principles.

Well, I am saying that the act of creation depends on something which is structured, namely knowledge. To me it is clear that the act of creation which depends on knowledge cannot lead to something which doesn’t have structure since knowledge is a relation between concepts, each concept is an irreducible (by irreducible I mean that it doesn’t have any structure) thing that is related to one irreducible objective thing, therefore the act of creation deals with irreducible objective things rather than a single objective thing.

 

[quaestio45]

the act of creation deals with irreducible objective things rather than a single objective thing.

As in, it can only produce what is an irreducible objective thing?

each concept is an irreducible (by irreducible I mean that it doesn’t have any structure) thing that is related to one irreducible objective thing

What is said irreducible objective thing?

 

[STT]

As in, it can only produce what is an irreducible objective thing?

Let me tell you a piece of knowledge, X is build of Y and Z, for which Y and Z are irreducible since otherwise Y or Z are build of another irreducible things and this obviously leads to regress which is not acceptable so there are irreducible things that X are build of them. I have to stress that knowledge is about the relation between things, {X, Y, Z} for example, rather that what really {X, Y, Z} are.

What is said irreducible objective thing?

Something which does not have structure.

 

[STT]

Consciousness would be that thing which has thoughts and processes form without internalizing form.

Would you mind to elaborate?

 

[STT]

Except didn’t you assert that physical beings aren’t in the picture, in your construct?

I am talking about free agent so if by physical beings you mean electrons and such, they seems to not be free, so they are out of discussion.

 

[quaestio45]

Let me tell you a piece of knowledge, X is build of Y and Z, for which Y and Z are irreducible since otherwise Y or Z are build of another irreducible things and this obviously leads to regress which is not acceptable so there are irreducible things that X are build of them.

Well knowledge is in relation to truth, yes? Knowledge based outside of truth isn’t knowledge at all, can we agree? If that be, could we also agree that knowledge is something like a recognition of truth? Were you to say yes, the only time knowledge could be irreducible is when truth is irreducible. Now, because all truth is connected, we could come to think that all truth, if reduced far enough, will reach a common point of contact. Now, truth very obviously cannot be solely reducible, otherwise we reach an infinite regress (like you said). Therefore, truth must eventually reach something which is irreducible (something to which the question “why is that so” becomes meaningless), which is the greatest point of common contact for all truth, and also becomes its origin. Thus, knowledge must be the same way, it seems to me; where it can be further and further reduced until you come to a point where you have something of highest knowledge, or a source of all knowledge, or an explanation to all knowledge.

Granted, one may think that this idea falls under composition if one reads “the highest truth and knowledge” as an umbrella to all truth and knowledge rolled up in one (like if you were to take all the Lego bricks in the world and create one big structure out of them; its still composed). However, I say that such thing is not the case were we to view it in a similar light to a philosophical law; though it brings rise to everything proceeding it, it is not in itself all those things, but their explanation (the same way the law of noncontridiction does not encompass all possible noncontridictory claims, but instead allows such to take place). In that case, singular highest truth is not composed, nor would highest knowledge be composed, in my estimate. Therefore, it seems to me that something uncomposed may still follow from creation.

 

[quaestio45]

Something which does not have structure.

Allow me to clarify in my question. You said that…

each concept is an irreducible thing that is related to one irreducible objective thing

I’m curious as to what you mean by this statement. What is the difference between these two irreducible things, and how are they related?

Would you mind to elaborate?

I’ll certainly try. Consciousness would be something which holds the ability to think, to reason (even if remotely), to process ideas, and all such things. It would perhaps be something best thought of as the thing which thinks; perhaps even the mind (unless I’m making something of a category error). Does that perhaps help?