Free Will and Determinism

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Michael, I understand what you are trying to say, I have actually been thinking about this lately. You have the understanding that our decisions proceed from who we are and we basically choose what we are pre-disposed to choose. It really is not an idea that rejects free will, but it assumes that we have one nature that is flesh and spirit. In reallity we have two seperate natures that are at war with eachother. On the one hand we have a sinfull flesh that says, I need I need I need. On the other hand we have a holy soul that says this is wrong and I should not do it. When we choose to do what is wrong we are letting the the flesh conquer us. When we choose to do what is right, we are conquering the flesh.
 
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jimmy:
Michael, think about it like this.

It is kind of like you have two natures, a spiritual nature which is the soul, and a physical nature which is the body. The physical nature is governed by desires for food and sex basically. It desires pleasure. The soul desires God. This is not just some souls, God created all souls with a good disposition. These two natures are completely seperate. Now, there is a battle between these two natures in the one body. You desire to do what is sinfull, but you also know that it is wrong and you desire to do what is right. Just because my body says I want to steal that candy bar, my soul does not have to follow that. The nature that overcomes the other in the battle is the winner.

God gives us grace so that we will know what is right and what is wrong when we are tested, and it also may give us strength.

For example, the little child that is about to make his first decision in life, he has two natures that are at odds. He has the choice to follow what is of the spirit or what is of the flesh. Either way, one has to win over the other.

If you want me to clarify anything please tell me.
But why does the child choose one way vs. another? I understand the idea of choosing either “the flesh” or God’s will. But there must be some reason why a child makes the choice one way vs. the other. If there is no reason, the choice is random, if there is a reason the child (who, remember, is innocent up to this point) is not responsible for it.
Thanks,
Michael
 
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MichaelLewis:
But why does the child choose one way vs. another? I understand the idea of choosing either “the flesh” or God’s will. But there must be some reason why a child makes the choice one way vs. the other. If there is no reason, the choice is random, if there is a reason the child (who, remember, is innocent up to this point) is not responsible for it.
Thanks,
Michael
It is a matter of strength. We can be strong and say I do not want to do this, or we can be weak and say I will give in now and be good later. But the thing is, the more we give in, the more we become submissive to the wants of the flesh. The flesh becomes stronger and the soul becomes weaker. Its kind of like a muscle, which follows the idea of LaMark who spoke of genetic changes through the generations and speculated the idea “use it or lose it”. If you use your muscles they get bigger and stronger, if you do not then they get small and weak. Likewise, the soul follows this tendency. With sin, the flesh becomes more attached to sin, and the soul loses its tendence toward good. With sacrifice and resistance to sin we make the soul stronger and the flesh loses its attachments to sin.

There is no outside force telling you this what you must do, and there is not internal force that says this is what you must do. It is simply a matter of fortitude and courage to suffer a little.

Do you understand what I am trying to say?
 
This is a very interesting discussion. I have struggled with this a little, with the same thoughts as you. I am learning though and understanding a new perspective.
 
Michael: You seem to be assuming certain characteristics of the soul in forming your question, and I believe these assumptions are limiting your understanding of the Catholic position.

Every human soul has its own absolute, unique will. All souls are created equal by God, at least when it comes to the exercise of will. On every human soul, God imparts the Natural Law, an innate understanding of what is Holy and what is evil. This imprint exists regardless of our upbringing and environment, and can’t be removed from the soul. This is a gift from God, a Grace, that ensures that the human soul doesn’t exist in a vacuum at any point in its existance. The human soul always, always, has the ability to resist evil, regardless of the outside pressures; it is solely up to the individual.

Now we come to your assumption. It seems that you are assuming that this will is not absolute and unique, when our faith tells us otherwise. Why does one soul freely choose evil, and another freely choose good? They choose because they can, plain and simple. In Genesis it says that God created Man in His own image, but what is this “image”? God exists without a creator, without an outside influence. God freely chose to create the universe by His own Divine Will, by Divine Fiat. Nothing influenced God in doing this, and nothing could have. God exists regardless of outside influence by definition. God’s name is “I am that is” for a reason; when God told this to Moses, He was exposing the core of His nature. In making us, God shaped that aspect of Himself into our being. When each soul is made, a little bit of “I Am” is right there in it. So yes, there IS a source, and an outside influence for each human soul, but that influence is the imprint of the independent Will, independent even from God. That is God’s image that we are made in.

So, we choose because we can. We choose by fiat, an arbitrary decision, and we can make such decisions by virtue of the fact that God made us with that ability expressly imprinted on our souls. There doesn’t have to be a greater “why” for the decision that a soul makes, just as there doesn’t have to be a “why” for God creating the Universe, or existing for that matter. Now there are of course influences, callings, and impulses, but ultimately every moral decision is made by fiat, otherwise it is not a moral decision at all; every soul can choose the good regardless of outside influences, though we can certainly lie to ourselves with the aid of evil influences.

Is it distressing that some souls freely choose evil? Absolutely, and that’s what makes evil so abhorrent! Is it frightening that some souls freely choose Hell (and the Church teaches that Hell is absolutely a free choice)? Certainly, and that is why all good-thinking people are called upon to call others to good. The choice is ultimately theirs, but we need not suffer the loss of our brethren to evil laying down. God has also made us capable of calling to one another, for both evil and good ends. Some philosophers seek to soothe the angst that evil causes in others by putting an ultimate outside “cause” for such choices, but Catholics can enjoy no such illusions. A soul is damned not by determinism, nor by random chance, but by absolute exercise of the will. Yes, it’s scary. Evil is scary.
 
Michael,

I think that you make very good point and I agree with the direction that you are going. Some form of determinalism is inescapable seeing as how if God offered some sort of previenient (helping) grace to “balance the scales” of our choices, then the choice would be either arbitrary at best and indesicive at worst. And, as you have said, these type of choices are not really free in the libertarian sense.

In your readings, I am sure that you have studied Augustine, Aquanis, Luther, Calvin, and Jonathan Edwards on this subject. They all espoused some sort of compatiblism in thier thinking. The issue may not be one of “free will” (a very elusive concept), but one of liberty. I believe that “We are free to choose according to our greatest desire of the moment” (Ronald Nash), and that desire is produced by many outside factors, but we do not have liberty to choose against our nature. Therefore, we are not ever the “first cause” in our actions. But at the same time, we are held responsible for those actions and those actions are free (i.e. not forced).

This is where the concept of compatiblism comes in. Christian compatiblism, like that of Jonathan Edwards, does not seek to hold libertarian free will (of which there is no such thing) and determinalism in tension, but it seeks to hold human responsibility and divine determinalism in tension. While we may not understand how this works out, in the end, God will be just in His judgments. We must trust in that.

Michael
 
I don’t understand the aversion to the idea that such decisions can be and are arbitrary. Either we are the arbiters of our actions, or we aren’t. Of course I don’t mean arbitrary in the impulsive sense, here, but rather in the sense of fiat, a decision coming from a self-propelled will, that of an acting judge.
 
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michaelp:
Michael,

I think that you make very good point and I agree with the direction that you are going. Some form of determinalism is inescapable seeing as how if God offered some sort of previenient (helping) grace to “balance the scales” of our choices, then the choice would be either arbitrary at best and indesicive at worst. And, as you have said, these type of choices are not really free in the libertarian sense.

In your readings, I am sure that you have studied Augustine, Aquanis, Luther, Calvin, and Jonathan Edwards on this subject. They all espoused some sort of compatiblism in thier thinking. The issue may not be one of “free will” (a very elusive concept), but one of liberty. I believe that “We are free to choose according to our greatest desire of the moment” (Ronald Nash), and that desire is produced by many outside factors, but we do not have liberty to choose against our nature. Therefore, we are not ever the “first cause” in our actions. But at the same time, we are held responsible for those actions and those actions are free (i.e. not forced).

This is where the concept of compatiblism comes in. Christian compatiblism, like that of Jonathan Edwards, does not seek to hold libertarian free will (of which there is no such thing) and determinalism in tension, but it seeks to hold human responsibility and divine determinalism in tension. While we may not understand how this works out, in the end, God will be just in His judgments. We must trust in that.

Michael
The idea of determinism leads to the idea that God is evil, he puts us in situations where we can not follow him by choice, and then he judges us on that. He is essentially making us either choose him or reject him by giving us this nature. With this idea you can never claim that God loves us because is choosing to send some of us straight to hell by making some murderers and theives.

I choose to reject this idea, and I can’t see how you guys can’t see the rationality of it being a free choice we make.
 
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Ghosty:
Michael: You seem to be assuming certain characteristics of the soul in forming your question, and I believe these assumptions are limiting your understanding of the Catholic position.

Every human soul has its own absolute, unique will. All souls are created equal by God, at least when it comes to the exercise of will. On every human soul, God imparts the Natural Law, an innate understanding of what is Holy and what is evil. This imprint exists regardless of our upbringing and environment, and can’t be removed from the soul. This is a gift from God, a Grace, that ensures that the human soul doesn’t exist in a vacuum at any point in its existance. The human soul always, always, has the ability to resist evil, regardless of the outside pressures; it is solely up to the individual.

Now we come to your assumption. It seems that you are assuming that this will is not absolute and unique, when our faith tells us otherwise. Why does one soul freely choose evil, and another freely choose good? They choose because they can, plain and simple. In Genesis it says that God created Man in His own image, but what is this “image”? God exists without a creator, without an outside influence. God freely chose to create the universe by His own Divine Will, by Divine Fiat. Nothing influenced God in doing this, and nothing could have. God exists regardless of outside influence by definition. God’s name is “I am that is” for a reason; when God told this to Moses, He was exposing the core of His nature. In making us, God shaped that aspect of Himself into our being. When each soul is made, a little bit of “I Am” is right there in it. So yes, there IS a source, and an outside influence for each human soul, but that influence is the imprint of the independent Will, independent even from God. That is God’s image that we are made in.

So, we choose because we can. We choose by fiat, an arbitrary decision, and we can make such decisions by virtue of the fact that God made us with that ability expressly imprinted on our souls. There doesn’t have to be a greater “why” for the decision that a soul makes, just as there doesn’t have to be a “why” for God creating the Universe, or existing for that matter. Now there are of course influences, callings, and impulses, but ultimately every moral decision is made by fiat, otherwise it is not a moral decision at all; every soul can choose the good regardless of outside influences, though we can certainly lie to ourselves with the aid of evil influences.

Is it distressing that some souls freely choose evil? Absolutely, and that’s what makes evil so abhorrent! Is it frightening that some souls freely choose Hell (and the Church teaches that Hell is absolutely a free choice)? Certainly, and that is why all good-thinking people are called upon to call others to good. The choice is ultimately theirs, but we need not suffer the loss of our brethren to evil laying down. God has also made us capable of calling to one another, for both evil and good ends. Some philosophers seek to soothe the angst that evil causes in others by putting an ultimate outside “cause” for such choices, but Catholics can enjoy no such illusions. A soul is damned not by determinism, nor by random chance, but by absolute exercise of the will. Yes, it’s scary. Evil is scary.
Good post.
 
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MichaelLewis:
Ok, but how can HE be held responsible for which side “wins”? He is not responsible for his “fallen tendency toward evil” and he is not responsible for “the influence of God’s grace”.
These two do not affect his choice really, they are the two choices. You either choose grace or you choose the fallen flesh. Grace simply gives you knowledge of what is right and if you accept it then it will give you strength. It strengthens your conscience. Grace is not forced upon you, it is your choice to accept.

It is a simple choice between choosing to fall into sin, or to stand strong.
 
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MichaelLewis:
I’m concerned with the I. Granted that we can have “higher” or “lower” influences on us, what determines our choices?
we do.
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MichaelLewis:
Again, focus on the first decision a person is morally responsible for. We have genetics, the implanted soul, and life experiences—this includes any impact God might have on a person—together these constitute a person’s character. Now suppose a child is faced with the first choice he is to be held morally responsible for, and he chooses to violate a moral prohibition. Why does he so choose? Does this choice proceed from his character or not? If it does not, how can he be held morally responsible for it? If it does, his ‘free will’ cannot consist in any real possibility that he could have done other than what he did (given that he was who he was when he made the decision). Do you see the dilemma?
sure. but it’s a dilemma of your own making. you are simply stipulating that a choice not caused by character cannot be said to have been committed “by” that person.

but why believe that? i would say that free choices totally without any causally sufficient antecedent conditions of any kind are almost the paradigmatic example of ownership - the things that are most truly ours are those things we do but need not have done.
MichaleLewis:
Because this is the first
choice for which he is morally culpable, he can in no sense be blamed for being the person he is just before he makes this choice, but the only way to consider him morally responsible for his first action is to say that his choice does proceed from who he is. So moral responsibility cannot arise from indeterminism, rather they must be determined in a specific way: by the (unchosen) characteristics of the actor.
the choice doesn’t “proceed” from who he is in the sense that it isn’t a causal consequence of his personality. but then, free choices never “proceed” from one’s character in that way.

but that doesn’t mean that character doesn’t play a role - after all, it’s that person making the choice, not some other person. it’s just not a determinative role.
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MichaelLewis:
If I have made the dilemma clear, please try to tell me what is really going on in this specific case from a Catholic perspective. Why does the child make one choice rather than another if the choice does not proceed from his character?
the child just chooses one way or the other. that’s what it means to choose freely.

of course, the child can have reasons for choosing one way or another - free choices need not occur only between alternatives to each of which the agent is indifferent (like buridan’s a$$). on the contrary, choices can be free only when the alternatives in question are mutually exclusive (i.e. you can’t have all of them), and each offers some good not offered by the others. that is, only when there’s something about each alternative in which one is rationally interested.
 
You all keep referencing “free will.” Can you define what “free will” is for me?
 
john doran:
we do.

sure. but it’s a dilemma of your own making. you are simply stipulating that a choice not caused by character cannot be said to have been committed “by” that person.

but why believe that? i would say that free choices totally without any causally sufficient antecedent conditions of any kind are almost the paradigmatic example of ownership - the things that are most truly ours are those things we do but need not have done.

the choice doesn’t “proceed” from who he is in the sense that it isn’t a causal consequence of his personality. but then, free choices never “proceed” from one’s character in that way.

but that doesn’t mean that character doesn’t play a role - after all, it’s that person making the choice, not some other person. it’s just not a determinative role.

the child just chooses one way or the other. that’s what it means to choose freely.

of course, the child can have reasons for choosing one way or another - free choices need not occur only between alternatives to each of which the agent is indifferent (like buridan’s a$$). on the contrary, choices can be free only when the alternatives in question are mutually exclusive (i.e. you can’t have all of them), and each offers some good not offered by the others. that is, only when there’s something about each alternative in which one is rationally interested.

What does it MEAN for me to cause a choice not caused by my character? To the extent to which it is not determined by something, it is unpredictable in principle, even by me. We appraise other people and ourselves with reference to our propensity to act in a particular way. You say character plays some role, perhaps you could give an account of the role it does play. For now, I’ll guess at what you have in mind. Suppose I am contemplating committing a murder. My character and other, external, considerations constrain me to the extent that committing a murder seems just about as appealing as not committing one. It really seems as if I could go either way, and I’m struggling with the decision. (Would this be a “paradigmatic example of ownership”?) If we were to keep going back in time or otherwise replicate all the relevant circumstances surrounding my making this decision an infinite number of times, would I make the same choice in each instance? If I would, something is determining my choice. There must be some reason why I keep choosing to murder or to abstain from murder. If it were possible that on one of these replays I would act differently, then eventually I would act differently, given an infinite set of trials. I presume you would say that eventually I would act differently. On at least some occasions, I would commit the murder, an on others I would not. Given this fact, how can I be blamed if in THIS particular instance, I committed the murder? I was at least initially the same person in all possible worlds; so nothing particular to me, prior to the act in question, caused me to commit the murder or not. Whatever you ascribe the ‘choice’ mechanism to, why should I accept responsibility for it? You will say that “I” am that mechanism, but why do you call that me? Considering that it operates independently of my personality, beliefs, and values, it seems pretty alien. What possible difference could there be between this “I” and a random number generator?

Thanks,

Michael
 
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michaelp:
You all keep referencing “free will.” Can you define what “free will” is for me?
Free will is the free choice to make a choice. It is inherent to the soul. Your flesh might say I want to do this, but that does not suppress your free will. The free will of your soul and the lack of good in your flesh are seperate.

There is no character that determines that I have to make a specific decision. You can always go against any nature you have or any characteristic.
 
What does it MEAN for me to cause a choice not caused by my character?
Again you seem preoccupied with the notion of “cause”, even using it in place of “make”.😛
Given this fact, how can I be blamed if in THIS particular instance, I committed the murder? I was at least initially the same person in all possible worlds; so nothing particular to me, prior to the act in question, caused me to commit the murder or not. Whatever you ascribe the ‘choice’ mechanism to, why should I accept responsibility for it? You will say that “I” am that mechanism, but why do you call that me?
Your eternal soul, final arbiter and will, makes the decision, and must be held accountable. Your soul, your will, IS particular to you. Your mixing of time-travel with this question seems poorly placed given the Catholic concept of eternity, and such postulating becomes irrelevant. You are judged by what you do, not by what you might have done. In Catholic belief, moments happen once in temporality, and all moments are present at once in eternity. When you make your fiat, you have made an indelible mark on eternity. This is part of the “I am” image again. By God’s Grace and Will we have become participants, not mere spectators, in Eternity. Our scope of power is VERY limited compared to His, but the nature of that power, to imprint on eternity, is not.

You can postulate until the end of time (;)) about what you might have done, but the fact is that all that exists is what you did do. At any given instant you can will good or evil, but once willed the act is. What is doing the willing? Your free will and soul (henceforth “Mini-IAM” :p). The questions “would” and “wouldn’t” are largely irrelevant in this context, only “did” or “didn’t” matter, because they are all that exists.
 
Well, thank you Ghosty, and all other contributors to this thread. I must say I can make nothing of the ‘agent libertarianism’ you espouse, but I do understand that at least the Catholic position is not consistent with free will compatiblism.

I wonder though, does the Catholic religion hang on this? Has the Catholic Church declared infallibly that this view of freewill is true? Would a Catholic philosopher who found it incoherent and was convinced that he was right have to choose: EITHER the Catholic position on free will is correct OR the Catholic Church is false? (If anyone could direct me to a list of doctrines of that sort, I would be very appreciative.)

Thank you all for your time. I’m happy to keep going at this, but for my part I don’t know what else I can say; I suspect you are talking about something ineffable; but I have no idea just what it could be. Perhaps michaelp will have more to contribute in response.

Michael
 
MichaelLewis: My pleasure in contributing. For what it’s worth, I understand your possible frustration. It’s a BIG issue to tackle, and one that really can’t be resolved by reason. No matter how much we think about it, some mystery will always be present.

As for Catholic doctrine, I honestly don’t know of anything being specifically laid out, and there is definately some wiggle room in orthodox belief. That being said, I think that certain doctrines, like that of Original Sin, sort of preclude any kind of determinism. I know that there was a huge debate about the nature of “predestination”, and that produced some results that might pertain to your question. I believe that, based on the Church’s rejection of Calvinistic predestination, a stance such as the one you are proposing is completely out of the question, but I’m not certain on this. Again, do some research on the question of Predestination, and I’ll see what I can scrounge up.

The “norm” of Catholic thought does fall into the “free will” category, with outside influences but nothing approaching determinism. The debate within the Church has generally centered around the how’s and why’s of the outside influences, rather than whether or not they constitute an absolute “cause”. I believe Aquinas and Augustine dealt a lot with this.

Good luck in your search!
 
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MichaelLewis:
Well, thank you Ghosty, and all other contributors to this thread. I must say I can make nothing of the ‘agent libertarianism’ you espouse, but I do understand that at least the Catholic position is not consistent with free will compatiblism.

I wonder though, does the Catholic religion hang on this? Has the Catholic Church declared infallibly that this view of freewill is true? Would a Catholic philosopher who found it incoherent and was convinced that he was right have to choose: EITHER the Catholic position on free will is correct OR the Catholic Church is false? (If anyone could direct me to a list of doctrines of that sort, I would be very appreciative.)

Thank you all for your time. I’m happy to keep going at this, but for my part I don’t know what else I can say; I suspect you are talking about something ineffable; but I have no idea just what it could be. Perhaps michaelp will have more to contribute in response.

Michael
Michael, I would like to contribute more, but I represent a Calvinistic perspective that represents compatiblism and defines free will as the ability to act according to the dictates of your nature. I have not found any Catholics that agree with this although I believe Pascal believed in some form of determinalism.

Michael
 
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MichaelLewis:
Is a Catholic required to reject the compatibility of free will and determinism, as advocated by such philosophers as David Hume or John Locke? Must a Catholic accept agent libertarianism—the view that we make undetermined choices, which we are fully responsible for? Would failure to do so constitute heresy?
Alas, I’m not familiar enough with Hume and Locke to answer the question adequately as posed. I’m posting on this thread only to point out that St. Thomas Aquinas definitely does see a kind of determinism (with regard to God’s agency) as being fully compatible with free will. See his discussion of predestination in Question 23 of ST I. A friend of mine who teaches philosophy at the University of St. Thomas in Houston put it this way: Thomas is a compatibilist with regard to God (i.e., God can determine a human action without violating free will) but a libertarian with regard to second causes. Of course, the Molinist tradition is far more robustly libertarian than the Thomist. So certainly Catholics can be libertarians across the board. But it seems clear that with regard to divine agency, they can also be compatibilists. Not, however, with regard to second causes (unless I’m gravely mistaken).

Edwin
 
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Contarini:
Alas, I’m not familiar enough with Hume and Locke to answer the question adequately as posed. I’m posting on this thread only to point out that St. Thomas Aquinas definitely does see a kind of determinism (with regard to God’s agency) as being fully compatible with free will. See his discussion of predestination in Question 23 of ST I. A friend of mine who teaches philosophy at the University of St. Thomas in Houston put it this way: Thomas is a compatibilist with regard to God (i.e., God can determine a human action without violating free will) but a libertarian with regard to second causes. Of course, the Molinist tradition is far more robustly libertarian than the Thomist. So certainly Catholics can be libertarians across the board. But it seems clear that with regard to divine agency, they can also be compatibilists. Not, however, with regard to second causes (unless I’m gravely mistaken).

Edwin
I recommend reading the Catechism of the Catholic Church. This question is thoroughly discussed in paragraphs 1730 through 1748.

You can find the Catechism on line here scborromeo.org/ccc.htm
 
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