Free Will and Determinism

[MichaelLewis]

John wrote:

what does it mean for a desire to be “your” desire? why do you call the thing that has the desire “you”?
what does it mean for your body to be “yours”? your thoughts? your ideas? and so on.
**
I don’t know if I could that any more than I could explain what red looks like to a blind person. How would you answer it?

perhaps you can explain why the role character does play in the libertarian account of making of free choices is bizarre and counterintuitive.

As I under it, the only role it plays for you is setting up the choice. Apparently it plays no role in making it.

also, explain how a choice that is caused by anything can still be “free”.

So long as I am the immediate cause, it comes from me—from what I want. Sure, there are reasons why I want the candy bar, there are reason why I am the way I am in all respects. What matters is that somehow I am here and I want a candy bar more than I want to be faithful to my diet. I’m still responsible for breaking my diet because I didn’t want it enough to stick to it. It’s no good complaining that I didn’t create myself, I am what I am: a diet breaker, and should be judged accordingly. Now if this bothers me enough that I want to change, I’ll take steps to change. But once again, it all turns on what I come to want. I don’t know what else I can say about it, except that I can’t imagine what else free will could be.

 

[MichaelLewis]

vern humphrey:

I think you just made my point.

In your first case, determinism can only exist in a metaphysical sense.

Determinism is a metaphysical doctrine. In what other sense did you think it could ‘exist’? How did I “make your point”??

Michael

 

[vern_humphrey]

MichaelLewis:

Determinism is a metaphysical doctrine. In what other sense did you think it could ‘exist’? How did I “make your point”??

Michael

You made my point again – free will is, as I said, real. It is not metaphysical. It is therefore in a different realm than determinism.

To put them together as you did is to try to taste a color, or smell music.

 

[MichaelLewis]

vern humphrey:

You made my point again – free will is, as I said, real. It is not metaphysical. It is therefore in a different realm than determinism.

To put them together as you did is to try to taste a color, or smell music.

A true metaphysical doctrine does reflect reality. If determinism is true, metaphysicly, and we have free will, then free will and determinism are compatible. Did YOU mean nothing more than “*no power forces us to do what we don’t want to do, or keeps us from doing what we do want to do”? * We have no quarrel if that is the extent of your claim.

 

[john_doran]

MichaelLewis:

I don’t know if I could that any more than I could explain what red looks like to a blind person. How would you answer it?

well, right - that’s sort of my point: you keep asking me how my libertarian free choices could be “mine”. and this answer of yours seems suitable enough for me to turn around and give you.

MichaelLewis:

As I under it, the only role it plays for you is setting up the choice. Apparently it plays no role in making it.

right. and what’s wrong with that? what’s so radically counterintuitive about being inclined one way or another without being caused to choose in that way?

MichaelLewis:

So long as I am the immediate cause, it comes from me—from what I want.

but that’s arbitrary to say that being the “immediate” cause is what matters. what difference does it make where you are in the causal chain if what ultimately determines that the action is done are the initial conditions and the governing causal laws? i mean, if you believe in a laplacean universe, then your eating the candy bar was determined at the initial moment of creation, since every subsequent state of the universe is determined necessarily by the initial conditions at t=1.

so, again: if some kinds of causal determinism mitigate freedom, why doesn’t every kind of cause do so?

after all, your “wants” and “desires” are just brain-states that are governed just as inexorably by causal laws as are the movement of the planets through space, or the propagation of electromagnetic radiation.

by the way, what do you think it means for god to make a free choice?

 

[vern_humphrey]

MichaelLewis:

A true metaphysical doctrine does reflect reality.

Two interesting words in that sentence, “true” and “reflect.”

MichaelLewis:
If determinism is true, metaphysicly, and we have free will, then free will and determinism are compatible. Did YOU mean nothing more than “*no power forces us to do what we don’t want to do, or keeps us from doing what we do want to do”? *We have no quarrel if that is the extent of your claim.

Nor do we – until we attempt to graft something else on it. As I said, free will is real, determinism is metaphysical.

 

[MichaelLewis]

John Wrote:

well, right - that’s sort of my point: you keep asking me how my libertarian free choices could be “mine”. and this answer of yours seems suitable enough for me to turn around and give you.

**

I understand that somethings are ineffable; maybe that’s the problem here. What troubles me is that you aren’t just affirming there is something you can’t describe, you are denying something that seems obvious and can be described: causality. I can’t imagine anything apart from causality and randomness; randomness doesn’t seem to give us freedom, as it is outside of anything’s control. Causality seems to do nicely, on the other hand. My action are caused, by ME! I can’t see any third way, and I certainly don’t want to be judged based on a random event.

right. and what’s wrong with that? what’s so radically counterintuitive about being inclined one way or another without being caused to choose in that way?

There is nothing counterintuitive about being inclined one way or another; but if someone is to be fully moraly responsible for a choice, the choice itself needs to caused by who that person is. To blame a person for an action is to make an assesment of the person based on that action. If the action does not correlate to the person, the assesment is unjust.

*but that’s arbitrary to say that being the “immediate” cause is what matters. what difference does it make where you are in the causal chain if what ultimately determines that the action is done are the initial conditions and the governing causal laws? i mean, if you believe in a laplacean universe, then your eating the candy bar was determined at the initial moment of creation, since every subsequent state of the universe is determined necessarily by the initial conditions at t=1.

---

so, again: if some kinds of causal determinism mitigate freedom, why doesn’t every kind of cause do so?

The difference is that the reason I am fated to eat the candy bar is because I’m fated to be me. If it were determined that somehow my body would act against my will, that would harm my freedom.

after all, your “wants” and “desires” are just brain-states that are governed just as inexorably by causal laws as are the movement of the planets through space, or the propagation of electromagnetic radiation.

Even if we do have non-physical minds, our actions would still be either determined (by physical and ‘spiritual’ laws acting on our non-physical minds) or random. I suppose then you could say our wants and desires are “just soul-states”; but they are important because they constitute who we are.

by the way, what do you think it means for god to make a free choice?

If God exists, he has a nature. Freedom for him simply means that he does what he wants, presumably in accordance with that nature.

Michael

 

[MichaelLewis]

vern humphrey:
Two interesting words in that sentence, “true” and “reflect.”

Nor do we – until we attempt to graft something else on it. As I said, free will is real, determinism is metaphysical.

What do YOU mean by metaphysical?

 

[vern_humphrey]

MichaelLewis:

What do YOU mean by metaphysical?

That which is listed below “Physical.” (That’s how the term was coined.)

The metaphysical is Plato’s Universe of the Mind.

 

[john_doran]

MichaelLewis:

I understand that somethings are ineffable; maybe that’s the problem here. What troubles me is that you aren’t just affirming there is something you can’t describe, you are denying something that seems obvious and can be described: causality.

but i ***can ***describe free choice, and have done so a number of times already: a choice is free if there are no antecedent sufficient causal conditions for the choice, nor any true propositions that entail the proposition that the choice is made; in short, if there is a possible world identical in all respects to the one in which the choice is made up to the time of the choice, but the choice is not made.

a choice is free only if nothing determines the choice but the choosing itself.

and i’m denying that freedom and determinism are compatible because it seems self-evident to me that they are mutually exclusive; whatever is caused is so far forth not free.

MichaelLewis:

I can’t imagine anything apart from causality and randomness; randomness doesn’t seem to give us freedom, as it is outside of anything’s control.

but there’s nothing random about free choices as i describe them, nothing at all. your inability to understand libertarian freedom is not proof of its arbitrariness.

MichaelLewis:

Causality seems to do nicely, on the other hand. My action are caused, by ME! I can’t see any third way, and I certainly don’t want to be judged based on a random event.

but you’re only free if your actions are chosen by you. and, again, i have given you a third way you have yet to demonstrate is anything but difficult for you to grasp.

MichaelLewis:

There is nothing counterintuitive about being inclined one way or another; but if someone is to be fully moraly responsible for a choice, the choice itself needs to caused by who that person is.

no. one can only be responsible for something if he did it but need not have; if your actions are caused (nomologically) in any way, then it is impossible for you to have done differently. ergo, you cannot be responsible for those actions, whether or not you call those causes “wants” or “desires” or “character”.

MichaelLewis:
To blame a person for an action is to make an assesment of the person based on that action. If the action does not correlate to the person, the assesment is unjust.
this seems false. blaming a person for an action is to make an assessment of the action, not the person. assessing someone’s character is a horse of a different color.

MichaelLewis:

The difference is that the reason I am fated to eat the candy bar is because I’m fated to be me. If it were determined that somehow my body would act against my will, that would harm my freedom.

semantics. if you’re fated to do what you do, then the names of the causes in the chain are utterly irrelevant - they’re all causes.

i mean, come on - if you can’t help being you, and thus can’t help doing what you do; if you are who you are necessarily, and thus do what you do necessarily, what room is there for morally meaningful freedom?

you can of course call it whatever you want, just like i can call a gun a pencil. but that’s to engage in lexicology, not ontology.

MichaelLewis:

Even if we do have non-physical minds, our actions would still be either determined (by physical and ‘spiritual’ laws acting on our non-physical minds) or random.

ok. why should anyone believe this?

MichaelLewis:

If God exists, he has a nature. Freedom for him simply means that he does what he wants, presumably in accordance with that nature.

if what you mean to say here is that god is caused to act in the way he does, then you are saying something definitively non-catholic. which may not matter to you.

it’s also a position that’s philosophically indefensible. but that’s a story for another day.

 

[MichaelLewis]

John wrote:

*but i **can *describe free choice, and have done so a number of times already: a choice is free if there are no antecedent sufficient causal conditions for the choice, nor any true propositions that entail the proposition that the choice is made; in short, if there is a possible world identical in all respects to the one in which the choice is made up to the time of the choice, but the choice is not made.
a choice is free only if nothing determines the choice but the choosing itself.

…but there’s nothing random about free choices as i describe them, nothing at all. your inability to understand libertarian freedom is not proof of its arbitrariness.

Imagine a world without libertarian free will. In this world, like the libertarian one, our character sets up our choices, but does not determine them (at least in some cases); instead, the result of the operation of random decision generators (RDG) in our brains determines what we will do (it is truly random, the outcome is determined by quantum fluctuations, and no one knows that it exists).

Imagine that in this world, I am deciding whether I will eat a candy bar and violate my diet, or not. My character has set up the decision making process in such a way that I am just as inclined to eat the candy bar as I am to not eat it. I deliberate, wavering back and forth between eating it and not eating it, until my RDG activates and determines that I will eat it. I experience this as having come to a decision myself. Consider that before I made this decision neither I nor anyone else could have predicted what I ultimately would do. After I made the decision, I might explain it in terms my really liking candy bars, just as I could have explained sticking to my diet because I really want to be thin. But of course neither ‘explanation’ really explains why I favored the one desire over the other. Leaving all other factors the same, in half of all possible worlds my RDG would have determined that I would eat the candy bar; in the other half I will abstain. Neither I nor anyone else can give a genuine, sufficient reason why I ate the candy bar. Nevertheless, the choice SEEMS to have come from me, after all I did have a (non-sufficient) reason to eat it. It doesn’t seemlike I was forced; I was undecided for a while, but I finally made up my mind. Why shouldn’t I claim this decision as my own?

I don’t see the difference, from any conceivable perspective, between my choosing to eat a candy bar in the described world, and my choosing to eat one in a world where I have libertarian free will. Can you explain how the outcome, my experience, or anyone else’s experience of my choosing would be different with libertarian free will as opposed to a RDG?

You see, I suspect (could be wrong) that no one understands libertarian free will, that it is a placeholder for “I don’t like determinism and I don’t like randomness, so there must be something else.” combined with the feeling that we really might have done something different than we did.
(Cont…)

 

[MichaelLewis]

(cont…)
John wrote:
blaming a person for an action is to make an assessment of the action, not the person. assessing someone’s character is a horse of a different color.

I’ll agree that we can assess actions, but actions can’t feel guilty or be punished or rewarded. Surely you aren’t suggesting that to the extent a person’s action is free it doesn’t reflect a person’s character? On your account, why can’t I say of someone who judges me (including God), “Hey, those were my ACTIONS, don’t assess ME based upon THEM.”

semantics. if you’re fated to do what you do, then the names of the causes in the chain are utterly irrelevant - they’re all causes.
i mean, come on - if you can’t help being you, and thus can’t help doing what you do; if you are who you are necessarily, and thus do what you do necessarily, what room is there for morally meaningful freedom?
you can of course call it whatever you want, just like i can call a gun a pencil. but that’s to engage in lexicology, not ontology.

I see moral responsibility as an appraisal of character, as I have indicated. A good person is a person with good values, convictions and habits (the true test, of course, is to see these characteristics exhibited in difficult circumstances). It doesn’t matter how they came to be good people or bad people (Except, in the case of bad people, we may want to know why they are bad so we can help them to change.) they are what they are and should be appraised accordingly—always with a recognition of the possibility of improvement of course, and sorrow for the injustices perpetrated against them, which might have spoiled their character, but does not mitigate any evil that is present. You may disagree, but is that so unreasonable?

if what you mean to say here is that god is caused to act in the way he does, then you are saying something definitively non-catholic. which may not matter to you.

**

While I’m not Catholic, or even a theist, I’m interested in seeing if the Catholic God is reconcilable with determinism. I certainly don’t believe that my position demeans God; everything that exists has a nature, I’m only suggesting that if God exists he has one as well. I presume (when I am very optimistic) that whatever God values is part of his unchanging nature, that he has always acted in accordance with his values, not as things foreign to him, but as part of who he is.

Michael

 

[MichaelLewis]

vern humphrey:

That which is listed below “Physical.” (That’s how the term was coined.)

The metaphysical is Plato’s Universe of the Mind.

Metaphysics \Met`a*phys"ics, n. [Gr. ? ? ? after those things which relate to external nature, after physics, fr. ? beyond, after + ? relating to external nature, natural, physical, fr. ? nature: cf. F. m['e]taphysique. See Physics. The term was first used by the followers of Aristotle as a name for that part of his writings which came after, or followed, the part which treated of physics.]

1. The science of real as distinguished from phenomenal being; ontology; also, the science of being, with reference to its abstract and universal conditions, as distinguished from the science of determined or concrete being; the science of the conceptions and relations which are necessarily implied as true of every kind of being; philosophy in general; first principles, or the science of first principles. [1913 Webster]

(Emphasis Mine)
This is from Dictionary.Net

 

[vern_humphrey]

MichaelLewis:

Metaphysics \Met`a*phys"ics, n. [Gr. ? ? ? after those things which relate to external nature, after physics, fr. ? beyond, after + ? relating to external nature, natural, physical, fr. ? nature: cf. F. m['e]taphysique. See Physics. The term was first used by the followers of Aristotle as a name for that part of his writings which came after, or followed, the part which treated of physics.]

1. The science of real as distinguished from phenomenal being; ontology; also, the science of being, with reference to its abstract and universal conditions, as distinguished from the science of determined or concrete being; the science of the conceptions and relations which are necessarily implied as true of every kind of being; philosophy in general; first principles, or the science of first principles. [1913 Webster]

(Emphasis Mine)
This is from Dictionary.Net

Precisely how does this differ from my definition?

 

[jccurtis]

Michael, I have been struggling with this issue for some time. In your determinism, can you explain to me what differentiates us from complex robots? Or how God is different than a complex, very powerful robot (I understand you are not a theist, but can you explain this under the hypothetical assumption that God exists)?

I am sure that I am misunderstanding you, but I do not see the distinction you have made between fatalism and determinism. Can you describe this distinction in a different way for me?

 

[BibleReader]

Catholics are required to believe in “affirmative predestination,” which is able to be frustrated by our free decision to reject friendship with God and the grace which makes that freedom of the will and that friendship possible.

Grace does not compel the cooperation of the will. Instead, grace ineffably raises the freedom of the will from enslavement to sin, to perfect equanimity, so that we can be held responsible for our rejection of friendship with God and so damned to Hell.

 

[Ghosty]

I don’t see the difference, from any conceivable perspective, between my choosing to eat a candy bar in the described world, and my choosing to eat one in a world where I have libertarian free will. Can you explain how the outcome, my experience, or anyone else’s experience of my choosing would be different with libertarian free will as opposed to a RDG?

The outside experience may indeed not seem any different between the two, but that’s hardly the point. The substance of the decision is distinctly different; in one case the will is imposing its desires on reality, and in the other we are merely imposing the illusion of desires upon the will.

This isn’t a matter that can be tested within the boundaries you’ve established. Like the philosophical question “How can you be certain you aren’t just dreaming an espescially vivid dream right now,” you’re left with no definite answer. Since we can’t distinguish between the two realities from where we stand, we’re forced to abandon the inquiry as meaningful, instead focusing on the matter of what we do with our necessary assumption. In the above example, I assume this is not a dream, so I avoid jumping off cliffs to try and fly. With the issue of free will, I assume that my will is indeed free, and that I’m responsible for my actions.

Now the real question, from a non-theistic position, is which assumption leads to a healthier world? Even this is based on personal preference, but most people answer that assuming free will is more satisfying, because it lends justification for society protecting itself from dangerous individuals, for example. It’s also usually more personally satisfying, because most people seem to enjoy thinking that their actions are free, for whatever reason. From the theistic perspective of a Catholic, we simply can’t accept determinism. The cases for determinism and for free will can appear equal to basic reason, but we must reject determinism based on our understanding of the things God has revealed to us. The cases are not, in fact, equal for us because we have more information to work with (revelation from God), and this information precludes determinism.

So based on the information you are using, you can’t determine a difference between the two, which is fine. You’ll have to figure out what the implications are for such a problem for yourself, or with others of your persuasion. We Catholics are simply drawing from a larger data-set. We can answer your question meaningfully, but unless you can accept the data we’re using, the answer will be useless for you. You started this inquiry about the Catholic belief in particular, and I think we’ve established the answer for that. Any attempts to reduce the question down to your data-set is like asking for us to justify the belief of Jesus as the Messiah without using Catholic revelation.

 

[john_doran]

MichaelLewis:

Imagine a world without libertarian free will. In this world, like the libertarian one, our character sets up our choices, but does not determine them (at least in some cases); instead, the result of the operation of random decision generators (RDG) in our brains determines what we will do (it is truly random, the outcome is determined by quantum fluctuations, and no one knows that it exists).

Imagine that in this world, I am deciding whether I will eat a candy bar and violate my diet, or not. My character has set up the decision making process in such a way that I am just as inclined to eat the candy bar as I am to not eat it. I deliberate, wavering back and forth between eating it and not eating it, until my RDG activates and determines that I will eat it. I experience this as having come to a decision myself. Consider that before I made this decision neither I nor anyone else could have predicted what I ultimately would do. After I made the decision, I might explain it in terms my really liking candy bars, just as I could have explained sticking to my diet because I really want to be thin. But of course neither ‘explanation’ really explains why I favored the one desire over the other. Leaving all other factors the same, in half of all possible worlds my RDG would have determined that I would eat the candy bar; in the other half I will abstain. Neither I nor anyone else can give a genuine, sufficient reason why I ate the candy bar. Nevertheless, the choice SEEMS to have come from me, after all I did have a (non-sufficient) reason to eat it. It doesn’t seemlike I was forced; I was undecided for a while, but I finally made up my mind. Why shouldn’t I claim this decision as my own?

you shouldn’t claim it as your own because it’s not your own.

listen, a world in which you are in fact a brain in a vat in a laboratory on an alien world, being experimented on by betelgeusian cognitive scientists who are stimulating your brain to give you all of the experiences and thoughts and feelings and sensations you have now is also phenomenologically indistinguishable from this world. so why shouldn’t you say that such a world is just as real as this world, where you actually are having the experiences you seem to be having?

same reason: because it’s not the real world.

MichaelLewis:

I don’t see the difference, from any conceivable perspective, between my choosing to eat a candy bar in the described world, and my choosing to eat one in a world where I have libertarian free will. Can you explain how the outcome, my experience, or anyone else’s experience of my choosing would be different with libertarian free will as opposed to a RDG?

1. well, from the perspective of moral culpability there’s all the difference in the world: in the RDG world you have none, while in the libertarian world, you do.
2. explain to me why the ability to differentiate between these worlds experientially is important. can you explain the difference in experience between a world with a god and a world with none? a world with necessary truths and a world with none? a world that was created 5 minutes ago to look like it’s 15 billion years old and a world that’s actually 15 billion years old? a world where there are other minds and a world where you are the only mind? a world where you are being systematically deceived by a malicious cartesian demon into believing the world is as it appears when it’s not, and a world that is as it seems?

MichaelLewis:

You see, I suspect (could be wrong) that no one

understands libertarian free will, that it is a placeholder for “I don’t like determinism and I don’t like randomness, so there must be something else.” combined with the feeling that we really might have done something different than we did.
maybe not. but no one understands quantum mechanics, either, for one thing. or the human brain. or what it’s like to be dead. what’s your point?

libertarian free choice is a “placeholder” for “i feel free and i am convinced that we are morally responsible for our actions and the only way we can be liable in that way is if our choices are completely uncaused…”

 

[john_doran]

MichaelLewis:

I’ll agree that we can assess actions, but actions can’t feel guilty or be punished or rewarded. Surely you aren’t suggesting that to the extent a person’s action is free it doesn’t reflect a person’s character? On your account, why can’t I say of someone who judges me (including God), “Hey, those were my ACTIONS, don’t assess ME based upon THEM.”

i meant only to observe that persons and what they do are different: a good person can commit a bad act, and a bad person can commit a good act, which would be straightforwardly impossible if evaluations of character and actions were necessarily identical.

of course, becoming a good person requires the consistent performance of good acts, and vice versa for becoming a bad person. which is further demonstration of the difference between the two.

MichaelLewis:

While I’m not Catholic, or even a theist, I’m interested in seeing if the Catholic God is reconcilable with determinism. I certainly don’t believe that my position demeans God; everything that exists has a nature, I’m only suggesting that if God exists he has one as well. I presume (when I am very optimistic) that whatever God values is part of his unchanging nature, that he has always acted in accordance with his values, not as things foreign to him, but as part of who he is.

whether or not it’s demeaning to god, god cannot be caused to act by anything : as the uncaused cause, god is necessarily free in the libertarian sense.

 

[MichaelLewis]

jccurtis:

Michael, I have been struggling with this issue for some time. In your determinism, can you explain to me what differentiates us from complex robots? Or how God is different than a complex, very powerful robot (I understand you are not a theist, but can you explain this under the hypothetical assumption that God exists)?

I am sure that I am misunderstanding you, but I do not see the distinction you have made between fatalism and determinism. Can you describe this distinction in a different way for me?

JC,

As I see it, we are different from robots because we have desires and can appreciate values. If robots were able to do these things as well (I don’t know if that is possible or not), I think we would have to grant them the same dignity and respect we give each other. I think it is our inner life that gives us value; I imagine it is the same with God. Frankly, because I can’t see the difference between a libertarian free choice and a random event, I don’t see what libertarian free will could do for God or us. I suppose the difference is that I take persons’ and (and God’s) value as a basic truth (I assume that they have an inner life just as I do, and I know that that gives me value.). As far as moral responsibility goes, so long as someone is acting purposefully, I can judge them based upon their actions, because those actions reflect their character (as my actions reflect mine). That’s all I’m talking about when I assign moral responsibility.

If fatalism is true, then regardless of what I might want, if I’m fated to commit a murder, I’ll commit a murder. If just determinism is true, on the other hand, if I don’t want to commit a murder, I wont commit a murder. My desires DO determine my actions. Although, my desires are themselves determined. I think the confusion here may come from supposing that external forces are destine to frustrate one’s wishes, when in fact it is just that our wishes themselves are ultimately caused by external forces, only because we are caused to be who we are by external forces. This is to say nothing more than that we are not self-creating. Is that a good explanation?

Michael