Free Will and Determinism

[john_doran]

MichaelLewis:

What does it MEAN for me to cause a choice not caused by my character? To the extent to which it is not determined by something, it is unpredictable in principle, even by me.

what do you mean, “what do i mean”? a choice isn’ something caused by you in the way that the lights in the living room, say, are caused by you to go on. making a choice is something you do. it’s something you do.

MichaelLewis:

We appraise other people and ourselves with reference to our propensity to act in a particular way. You say character plays some role, perhaps you could give an account of the role it does play.

character is (part of) what makes you the person you are, with the desires and preferences and inclinations you in fact have. character, broadly speaking, (tends to) determine what you will find interesting - what it is you are inclined to want or pursue; if you have good character, you will be inclined to make good choices; if not, not.

keep in mind that not all human actions are necessarily the result of free choices - a great many (maybe even most) of them do proceed directly from the good or bad habits one has formed as a part of one’s “character” or personality. but the free choices you do make are made without determination by anything but the choosing itself.
MichaleLewis:
For now, I’ll guess at what you have in mind. Suppose I am contemplating committing a murder. My character and other, external, considerations constrain me to the extent that committing a murder seems just about as appealing as not committing one. It really seems as if I could go either way, and I’m struggling with the decision. (Would this be a “paradigmatic example of ownership”?) If we were to keep going back in time or otherwise replicate all the relevant circumstances surrounding my making this decision an infinite number of times, would I make the same choice in each instance? If I would, something is determining my choice.
if you do something in the actual world, and there is no possible world in which you do not do it, then your action is necessary, which is the exact opposite of free.

i think the very definition of free choice, at least the modally, is a choice you make in one possible world but do not make in another possible world which is identical to the first possible world at every time t up until the time you make the choice.

MichaelLewis:

…so nothing particular to me, prior to the act in question, caused me to commit the murder or not. Whatever you ascribe the ‘choice’ mechanism to, why should I accept responsibility for it? You will say that “I” am that mechanism, but why do you call that me? Considering that it operates independently of my personality, beliefs, and values, it seems pretty alien. What possible difference could there be between this “I” and a random number generator?

i’m not sure why you insist on describing free choices as the product of something like a “mechanism”; it is something you as a person do as a person. they are not “caused” by anything - they are made, or done, or just flat-out ***chosen. ***i have no idea how to make it any more clear than that.

i am also not sure what you mean when you ask why i call the thing that makes your free choices “you”. why do you call yourself “myself”? what are you referring to when you refer to yourself? and why do you call it “yourself”?

 

[vern_humphrey]

MichaelLewis:

What does it MEAN for me to cause a choice not caused by my character? To the extent to which it is not determined by something, it is unpredictable in principle, even by me. We appraise other people and ourselves with reference to our propensity to act in a particular way. You say character plays some role, perhaps you could give an account of the role it does play. For now, I’ll guess at what you have in mind. Suppose I am contemplating committing a murder. My character and other, external, considerations constrain me to the extent that committing a murder seems just about as appealing as not committing one. It really seems as if I could go either way, and I’m struggling with the decision. (Would this be a “paradigmatic example of ownership”?) If we were to keep going back in time or otherwise replicate all the relevant circumstances surrounding my making this decision an infinite number of times, would I make the same choice in each instance? If I would, something is determining my choice. There must be some reason why I keep choosing to murder or to abstain from murder. If it were possible that on one of these replays I would act differently, then eventually I would act differently, given an infinite set of trials. I presume you would say that eventually I would act differently. On at least some occasions, I would commit the murder, an on others I would not. Given this fact, how can I be blamed if in THIS particular instance, I committed the murder? I was at least initially the same person in all possible worlds; so nothing particular to me, prior to the act in question, caused me to commit the murder or not. Whatever you ascribe the ‘choice’ mechanism to, why should I accept responsibility for it? You will say that “I” am that mechanism, but why do you call that me? Considering that it operates independently of my personality, beliefs, and values, it seems pretty alien. What possible difference could there be between this “I” and a random number generator?

Thanks,

Michael

Congratulations – you’ve just stumbled into the concept of free will.http://forums.catholic-questions.org/images/icons/icon12.gif

If you commit murder, you ARE responsible, are you not? Would you deny that? Or do you think we should let every murderer go?

If you admit responsibility for your acts, you have accepted the concept of free will is real.

 

[jimmy]

Vern, you just enlightened me a little. If you believe in determinism, you basically deny the state the right to imprison a murderer because it is not of there will to do that crime. The only reason why they would be putting them in prison would be to cage someone to keep them under control. There is no punishment that is involved.

 

[vern_humphrey]

jimmy:

Vern, you just enlightened me a little. If you believe in determinism, you basically deny the state the right to imprison a murderer because it is not of there will to do that crime. The only reason why they would be putting them in prison would be to cage someone to keep them under control. There is no punishment that is involved.

Of course, if we believe determinism, we’d actually have to put God in the cage – the man who has already murdered isn’t going to do it again, unless God makes him do it. And He is just as likely to make someone else do it instad.

 

[jimmy]

vern humphrey:

Of course, if we believe determinism, we’d actually have to put God in the cage – the man who has already murdered isn’t going to do it again, unless God makes him do it. And He is just as likely to make someone else do it instad.

exactly.

 

[vern_humphrey]

jimmy:

exactly.

I have a brother-in-law who believes in determinism, and believes Michael Servatus SHOULD have been burned at the stake (as he was) for teaching Man has Free Will.

And he can’t see the irony for the life of him.http://forums.catholic-questions.org/images/icons/icon10.gif

 

[MichaelLewis]

John wrote:

*i’m not sure why you insist on describing free choices as the product of something like a “mechanism”; it is something you as a person do as a person. they are not “caused” by anything - they are made, or done, or just flat-out **chosen. *i have no idea how to make it any more clear than that.
***I want to maintain that they were chosen for a REASON, not arbitrarily. I see no middle ground here (Even though there are reasons why the choice even came up, you would say there is no free will exhibited there, only in the choice itself). Either there is a reason, or there is no reason. So after a choice is made for no reason, one can look back and truly say, ‘It could just have easily been the other way.’ When Jesus was tempted by the devil, he didn’t give in, but it could just have easily gone the other way; because it didn’t really come down to his desires or values; to who he was at the moment of choice. If it was determine by his character, then he wasn’t ‘free’ to act differently than he did in a libertarian sense.
i am also not sure what you mean when you ask why i call the thing that makes your free choices “you”. why do you call yourself “myself”? what are you referring to when you refer to yourself? and why do you call it “yourself”?*

I can’t imagine why I would feel responsible for something that didn’t proceed directly from my desires (desires for good, evil, or whatever). I don’t consider actions independent of MY desires to be MY actions. (Ultimately, I’m not responsible for having the desires that I have—for being the person that I am, except the extent that I change or fail to change myself by my actions. Though I am, by definition, responsible for THE ACTIONS that do proceed from who I am.)

It seems that under the libertarian conception of free will, actions are only free to the extent to which they do not proceed from a person’s character. This seems bizarre and counterintuitive to me. I appraise people for who they are, there actions are just ways of indicating that. To the extent that an action was not based upon who a person was, (and I don’t know that any conscious actions could fail to be wholly determined by who the actor is and perhaps their circumstances at the time of the action, but for the sake of argument I’ll imagine that something else was involved) I wouldn’t hold them responsible for that action.

Michael

 

[MichaelLewis]

Vern wrote:

I recommend reading the Catechism of the Catholic Church. This question is thoroughly discussed in paragraphs 1730 through 1748.

I read it, thanks. Unfortunately, it doesn’t go into detail about just what free will IS.

Congratulations – you’ve just stumbled into the concept of free will.
If you commit murder, you ARE responsible, are you not? Would you deny that? Or do you think we should let every murderer go?
If you admit responsibility for your acts, you have accepted the concept of free will is real.

I NEVER denied that we have free will, or that we are morally responsible for our actions; but I think determinism and free will are compatible. All I mean by ‘free will’ is that we can do what we want to do. That’s sufficient freedom for us to be morally responsible for our actions, and it is perfectly compatible with determinism. (Determinists who take this position are called “soft determinists”, as opposed to “hard determinists” who also believe in determinism, but agree with you libertarians that determinism entails that we are not morally responsible. Those of us who aren’t necessarily affirming the truth of determinism, only its compatibility with free will and moral responsibility, are called ‘compatiblists’. Most compatiblists, myself included, would also say that to the extent that our actions are not determined, we aren’t responsible for them. Determinism is GOOD for free will and moral responsibility.)

I have a brother-in-law who believes in determinism, and believes Michael Servatus SHOULD have been burned at the stake (as he was) for teaching Man has Free Will.
*And he can’t see the irony for the life of him. *

If your brother-in-law is a soft determinist, there is nothing ironic about it. Even if he is a hard determinist, he still might want to see people punished for the purpose of deterring others, protecting society, etc. Even hard determinists can have standards of right and wrong. They just won’t think people are blame or praise worthy for meeting or failing to meet these standards. It could still be the case that someone “should” be burned at the stake, perhaps to set an example for others. (Not that I agree with your brother-in-law’s position on this Michael Servatus fellow, of course.)

Michael

 

[vern_humphrey]

MichaelLewis:

Vern wrote:

I recommend reading the Catechism of the Catholic Church. This question is thoroughly discussed in paragraphs 1730 through 1748.

I read it, thanks. Unfortunately, it doesn’t go into detail about just what free will IS.

It is the ability to form your own decisions and act on them.

MichaelLewis:
I NEVER denied that we have free will, or that we are morally responsible for our actions; but I think determinism and free will are compatible. All I mean by ‘free will’ is that we can do what we want to do. That’s sufficient freedom for us to be morally responsible for our actions, and it is perfectly compatible with determinism. (Determinists who take this position are called “soft determinists”, as opposed to “hard determinists” who also believe in determinism, but agree with you libertarians that determinism entails that we are not morally responsible. Those of us who aren’t necessarily affirming the truth of determinism, only its compatibility with free will and moral responsibility, are called ‘compatiblists’. Most compatiblists, myself included, would also say that to the extent that our actions are not determined, we aren’t responsible for them. Determinism is GOOD for free will and moral responsibility.)

We can’t fly – so we’re not responsible for not flying.

But if you have no definition of Free Will, how can you have one for Determinism?

**

MichaelLewis:
If your brother-in-law is a soft determinist, there is nothing ironic about it. Even if he is a hard determinist, he still might want to see people punished for the purpose of deterring others, protecting society, etc. Even hard determinists can have standards of right and wrong. They just won’t think people are blame or praise worthy for meeting or failing to meet these standards.

And therefore it is both immoral and illogical to punish them for doing what they cannot help doing.

MichaelLewis:
It could still be the case that someone “should” be burned at the stake, perhaps to set an example for others. (Not that I agree with your brother-in-law’s position on this Michael Servatus fellow, of course.)

What does “setting an example” mean in a context of no free will?

Will it change the behavior of people who have no ability to control their behavior?

 

[MichaelLewis]

Contarini:

Alas, I’m not familiar enough with Hume and Locke to answer the question adequately as posed. I’m posting on this thread only to point out that St. Thomas Aquinas definitely does see a kind of determinism (with regard to God’s agency) as being fully compatible with free will. See his discussion of predestination in Question 23 of ST I. A friend of mine who teaches philosophy at the University of St. Thomas in Houston put it this way: Thomas is a compatibilist with regard to God (i.e., God can determine a human action without violating free will) but a libertarian with regard to second causes. Of course, the Molinist tradition is far more robustly libertarian than the Thomist. So certainly Catholics can be libertarians across the board. But it seems clear that with regard to divine agency, they can also be compatibilists. Not, however, with regard to second causes (unless I’m gravely mistaken).

Edwin

Thank you Edwin. I’m just concerned now with how certain they are about incompatiblism concerning secondary causes. I’m wondering if they would “bet the Church on it” so to speak.

 

[MichaelLewis]

Vern Wrote:

It is the ability to form your own decisions and act on them.

**

Then I believe in free will; who would deny that we form our own decisions? I’m just saying that there are reasons we form them one way vs. another. (These reasons are at least partially rooted in who we are. To that extent, we are morally responsible for them.)

*We can’t fly – so we’re not responsible for not flying.

---

We can choose one way vs. another—so we are responsible for so choosing. We aren’t responsible for things outside of our control, such as what ultimately made us the choice makers that we are. But WE ARE the choice-makers that we are. We can be judged as good choice-makers or bad choice makers. It doesn’t matter how we came to be who we are. A pound of gold is a pound of gold, regardless of where it came from.

But if you have no definition of Free Will, how can you have one for Determinism?

Determinism isn’t a moral concept, though it might have moral implications. The truth of determinism would simply mean that every state of the universe, throughout time, is entailed by the previous state. Given the way things were (taking everything relevant into consideration) the way things are necessarily follows. Some physicists think that this might be false, that at a quantum level there are truly random events. If that is the case, hopefully it doesn’t have an impact upon our behavior. The less quantum fluctuations effect what I do, the better! (All things being equal, of course.)

Now determinism can apply to any isolated system, not just the universe. If God or spirits exist outside the universe, and interact with it, then of course the state of the universe at time t1 does not necessarily entail what it will be at time t2. But if that were the case, the total system would be the universe and the realm(s) where God and spirits dwell. Determinism could still apply to that system.

I do have a definition of free will: A person has free will if they can choose consciously, in a deliberative fashion, between alternatives. That’s what I mean by it anyway.

And therefore it is both immoral and illogical to punish them for doing what they cannot help doing.

Well, the morality of it would depend upon the moral standards we are comparing it against. One might argue that it is justifiable on utilitarian grounds; society will be better off on balance and so on. Certainly a hard determinist is being inconsistent if he argues that against moral responsibility and for retribution. But he need not be illogical if he justifies it for the sake of restitution, reformation, the defense of others, or the deterrence of others.

What does “setting an example” mean in a context of no free will?
Will it change the behavior of people who have no ability to control their behavior?

You seem to mistake determinism with fatalism, the belief that whatever happens was bound to happen, regardless what we want, as if some foreign entity possessed us, forcing us to do what we don’t want to do. This is straw-man determinism, which is refuted everyday. Our actions are determined by what we want to do, which is determined by who we are, which is determined by a number of things, but ultimately not by us.
Michael

 

[vern_humphrey]

MichaelLewis:

And therefore it is both immoral and illogical to punish them for doing what they cannot help doing.

Well, the morality of it would depend upon the moral standards we are comparing it against.

Are you arguing for moral relativism? Do you say there are circumstances that would make burining an innocent man at the stake moral?

I personally take the position that there are some things that are wrong, regardless of how many people disagree.

MichaelLewis:
One might argue that it is justifiable on utilitarian grounds; society will be better off on balance and so on. Certainly a hard determinist is being inconsistent if he argues that against moral responsibility and for retribution. But he need not be illogical if he justifies it for the sake of restitution, reformation, the defense of others, or the deterrence of others.

It would be a bogus argument. Servetus was not attacking anyone physically, nor if Servetus is wrong can killing him reform anything.

MichaelLewis:
You seem to mistake determinism with fatalism, the belief that whatever happens was bound to happen, regardless what we want, as if some foreign entity possessed us, forcing us to do what we don’t want to do. This is straw-man determinism, which is refuted everyday. Our actions are determined by what we want to do, which is determined by who we are, which is determined by a number of things, but ultimately not by us.
Michael

You seem to be fading into reification. If we are to argue the nature of reality, we must first of alll agree it is real, not an artificial construct.

 

[MichaelLewis]

vern humphrey:
Are you arguing for moral relativism? Do you say there are circumstances that would make burining an innocent man at the stake moral?

I personally take the position that there are some things that are wrong, regardless of how many people disagree.

It would be a bogus argument. Servetus was not attacking anyone physically, nor if Servetus is wrong can killing him reform anything.

You seem to be fading into reification. If we are to argue the nature of reality, we must first of alll agree it is real, not an artificial construct.

I am NOT defending the burning of Servetus. I thought I was clear on that in a prior post. I’m just defending the general idea of punishment from the point of view of someone who doesn’t believe in moral responsibility. I do believe in it. My concern is with its nature, not its existence. I’m not defending moral relativism either. The question here isn’t what is right or wrong, but given that an act is right or wrong, are we responsible for committing or not committing it, and what makes us responsible?

Michael

 

[vern_humphrey]

MichaelLewis:

I am NOT defending the burning of Servetus. I thought I was clear on that in a prior post. I’m just defending the general idea of punishment from the point of view of someone who doesn’t believe in moral responsibility.

You’ll pardon me if I say that seems to be a distinction without a difference.

MichaelLewis:

I do believe in it. My concern is with its nature, not its existence. I’m not defending moral relativism either. The question here isn’t what is right or wrong, but given that an act is right or wrong, are we responsible for committing or not committing it, and what makes us responsible?

Michael

If we have free will, we are responsible. And it is free will that makes us responsible.

The case of Servetus puts it in strong relief – if we do NOT have free will, all our actions to control human behavior, from education to punishment are futile and therefore immoral.

 

[MichaelLewis]

vern humphrey:

If we have free will, we are responsible. And it is free will that makes us responsible.

The case of Servetus puts it in strong relief – if we do NOT have free will, all our actions to control human behavior, from education to punishment are futile and therefore immoral.

Since you are describing fatalism and not ordinary determinism, which certainly does not imply that education and punishment are futile, shall I conclude that you agree that determinism and free will are compatable?

 

[vern_humphrey]

MichaelLewis:

Since you are describing fatalism and not ordinary determinism, which certainly does not imply that education and punishment are futile, shall I conclude that you agree that determinism and free will are compatable?

As long as I get to define the terms (since you admit you can’t) then what does it matter?http://forums.catholic-questions.org/images/icons/icon10.gif

My position is that we have free will and are responsible for our actions. No power makes us do what we do, and our freedom is not an illusion.

 

[john_doran]

MichaelLewis:

I want to maintain that they were chosen for a REASON, not arbitrarily.

well, as i have said, choices are made for reasons in the sense that when i decide to stay home and read a book instead of go to the movies with friends, my reasons might be that i wanted to avoid going outside, or that the point i’m at in my book is particularly exciting.

choices just aren’t made for “reasons” in the sense that the “reason” the glass broke was because i knocked it off the table.

MichaelLewis:

I can’t imagine why I would feel responsible for something that didn’t proceed directly from my desires (desires for good, evil, or whatever). I don’t consider actions independent of MY desires to be MY actions.

what does it mean for a desire to be “your” desire? why do you call the thing that has the desire “you”?

what does it mean for your body to be “yours”? your thoughts? your ideas? and so on.

the concept of “self” and “possession” is not univocal.

It seems that under the libertarian conception of free will, actions are only free to the extent

to which they do not proceed from a person’s character.
sure. if, by “proceed from” you mean “are caused by”; a free choice is fee only if it is not the result of antecedent and causally sufficient conditions.

This seems bizarre and counterintuitive to me. I appraise people for who they are, there actions are just ways of indicating that. To the extent that an action was not based upon who a person was, (and I don’t know that any conscious actions could fail to be wholly determined by who the actor is and perhaps their circumstances at the time of the action, but for the sake of argument I’ll imagine that something else was involved) I wouldn’t hold them responsible for that action.
well, perhaps you can explain why the role character does play in the libertarian account of making of free choices is bizarre and counterintuitive.

also, explain how a choice that is caused by anything can still be “free”.

 

[MichaelLewis]

vern humphrey:

As long as I get to define the terms (since you admit you can’t) then what does it matter?http://forums.catholic-questions.org/images/icons/icon10.gif

My position is that we have free will and are responsible for our actions. No power makes us do what we do, and our freedom is not an illusion.

I defined both free will and determinism. What else would you like me to define, and where do you think I admitted that I can’t?

My only possible objection to your position is your statement that “No power makes us do what we do” If you mean that no power forces us to do what we don’t want to do, or keeps us from doing what we do want to do, I agree absolutely. If you mean that there is no sufficient set of reasons why we do what we do, I must either disagree or deny that we are morally responsible to the extent that an action is underdetermined in this way. Which do you mean?

 

[john_doran]

MichaelLewis:

Determinism isn’t a moral concept, though it might have moral implications. The truth of determinism would simply mean that every state of the universe, throughout time, is entailed by the previous state. Given the way things were (taking everything relevant into consideration) the way things are necessarily follows.

the soul is not governed by physical covering laws.

You seem to mistake determinism with fatalism

, the belief that whatever happens was bound to happen, regardless what we want, as if some foreign entity possessed us, forcing us to do what we don’t want to do. This is straw-man determinism, which is refuted everyday. Our actions are determined by what we want to do, which is determined by who we are, which is determined by a number of things, but ultimately not by us.
if A is determined by B is determined by C is determined by D …is determined by Z, then A is determined by Z.

if our choices are ultimately determined by conditions beyond our control, then (1) how are they in any sense “free”, and (2) how are we to be held responsible for them?

 

[vern_humphrey]

MichaelLewis:

I defined both free will and determinism. What else would you like me to define, and where do you think I admitted that I can’t?

My only possible objection to your position is your statement that “No power makes us do what we do” If you mean that no power forces us to do what we don’t want to do, or keeps us from doing what we do want to do, I agree absolutely. If you mean that there is no sufficient set of reasons why we do what we do, I must either disagree or deny that we are morally responsible to the extent that an action is underdetermined in this way. Which do you mean?

I think you just made my point.

In your first case, determinism can only exist in a metaphysical sense.