C
Confessor01
Guest
I realize that many, many people have probably come across this argument and therefore deem it to be impotent because, well, it’s been around a while. That is generally how we humans deal with such arguments. We normally think that if some argument is common or hackneyed, and if it still hasn’t persuaded everybody of its veracity, then it can’t be correct. I am humbly asking that any readers please ignore the fact that the free will/omniscience argument has been visited many times in the past and look to this argument. It’s not anything special or distinct from older versions of the argument, but I am convinced that omniscience cannot be reconciled with free will. Consequently, I would like to see if anyone can prove the following argument to be unsound. It’s rather brief.
First, knowledge is defined as “true belief.” (I realize that there are many nuances in defining what knowledge is, and that it is most often defined as “justified true belief,” but for argument’s sake all that matters is that knowledge is true belief.)
Argument: If at time T1, God knows that a person S will perform action X at a time T2, then, per the definition of knowledge, it is true at time T1 that S will do X at T2. And if it is true that S will do X at T2, then it is not the case that S can do not-X at T2. And if S cannot do not-X at T2, then he is performing an action without the ability to do otherwise; hence, he has no free will.
Objections considered:
First, knowledge is defined as “true belief.” (I realize that there are many nuances in defining what knowledge is, and that it is most often defined as “justified true belief,” but for argument’s sake all that matters is that knowledge is true belief.)
Argument: If at time T1, God knows that a person S will perform action X at a time T2, then, per the definition of knowledge, it is true at time T1 that S will do X at T2. And if it is true that S will do X at T2, then it is not the case that S can do not-X at T2. And if S cannot do not-X at T2, then he is performing an action without the ability to do otherwise; hence, he has no free will.
Objections considered:
- God can know what we are doing without causing us to do them.
Yes, but causality is not the scope of this argument. This is whether or not we have the ability to do otherwise.
- Good friends or spouses can know how we’ll behave at some future time, but that doesn’t imply that we are forced to act that way.
On the contrary, no one except God knows infallibly how we will act. And if they did, then we would indeed be forced to act a certain way!
- It is improper to describe God as knowing a “future” action. He is outside of time.
Although God is timeless, it does not follow that He does not comprehend time. He created it! And this is the same God who acted within history and fulfilled prophecies. To say that He cannot understand the concept of “future actions” is therefore false.