M
Miles_Mariae
Guest
It’s beyond me to understand how divine knowledge works. But, I would like to examine your argument with you. You propose:
“If at time T1, God knows that a person S will perform action X at a time T2, then, per the definition of knowledge, it is true at time T1 that S will do X at T2. And if it is true that S will do X at T2, then it is not the case that S can do not-X at T2. And if S cannot do not-X at T2, then he is performing an action without the ability to do otherwise; hence, he has no free will.”
You state that causality is beyond this argument. I agree conditionally. If you mean that we will assume causality out of this entirely, and refrain from arguing that somehow God causes agents to act in a way that takes away their free will, then I agree. I then add this premiss to your argument:
Foreknowledge does not -cause- S to perform X in a way that takes away X’s free will. (added premiss to include your statement)
Let’s restate the question because I want to avoid blaspheming in any way. At T1, an agent Y knows that S will do X at T2. By this we mean that Y apprehends the fact that S will do X at T2. We know nothing else about Y except that the agent apprehends this with certainty. This means that “S will do X at T2” is true at T1. We know this because we know that Y knows this, and Y is certain. Let us hypothetically remove Y. The fact that “S will do X at T2” remains true. We have no reason to believe otherwise because all we knew about Y was that Y knew this statement to be true, and that Y’s foreknowledge did not cause the statement to be true (my added premiss).
Because the statement “S will do X at T2” remains true at T1, at T2 the agent S has no ability to do otherwise. Thus, it is not Y’s foreknowledge that takes away S’s free will.
My argument is concluded. Regardless of what you think about free will, I believe that in your example free will never had a chance; it was robbed from S before the agent Y had to be introduced. Thus, foreknowledge did not remove free will in the scenario you posited.
“If at time T1, God knows that a person S will perform action X at a time T2, then, per the definition of knowledge, it is true at time T1 that S will do X at T2. And if it is true that S will do X at T2, then it is not the case that S can do not-X at T2. And if S cannot do not-X at T2, then he is performing an action without the ability to do otherwise; hence, he has no free will.”
You state that causality is beyond this argument. I agree conditionally. If you mean that we will assume causality out of this entirely, and refrain from arguing that somehow God causes agents to act in a way that takes away their free will, then I agree. I then add this premiss to your argument:
Foreknowledge does not -cause- S to perform X in a way that takes away X’s free will. (added premiss to include your statement)
Let’s restate the question because I want to avoid blaspheming in any way. At T1, an agent Y knows that S will do X at T2. By this we mean that Y apprehends the fact that S will do X at T2. We know nothing else about Y except that the agent apprehends this with certainty. This means that “S will do X at T2” is true at T1. We know this because we know that Y knows this, and Y is certain. Let us hypothetically remove Y. The fact that “S will do X at T2” remains true. We have no reason to believe otherwise because all we knew about Y was that Y knew this statement to be true, and that Y’s foreknowledge did not cause the statement to be true (my added premiss).
Because the statement “S will do X at T2” remains true at T1, at T2 the agent S has no ability to do otherwise. Thus, it is not Y’s foreknowledge that takes away S’s free will.
My argument is concluded. Regardless of what you think about free will, I believe that in your example free will never had a chance; it was robbed from S before the agent Y had to be introduced. Thus, foreknowledge did not remove free will in the scenario you posited.