Free will and foreknowledge revisited

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It’s beyond me to understand how divine knowledge works. But, I would like to examine your argument with you. You propose:

“If at time T1, God knows that a person S will perform action X at a time T2, then, per the definition of knowledge, it is true at time T1 that S will do X at T2. And if it is true that S will do X at T2, then it is not the case that S can do not-X at T2. And if S cannot do not-X at T2, then he is performing an action without the ability to do otherwise; hence, he has no free will.”

You state that causality is beyond this argument. I agree conditionally. If you mean that we will assume causality out of this entirely, and refrain from arguing that somehow God causes agents to act in a way that takes away their free will, then I agree. I then add this premiss to your argument:

Foreknowledge does not -cause- S to perform X in a way that takes away X’s free will. (added premiss to include your statement)

Let’s restate the question because I want to avoid blaspheming in any way. At T1, an agent Y knows that S will do X at T2. By this we mean that Y apprehends the fact that S will do X at T2. We know nothing else about Y except that the agent apprehends this with certainty. This means that “S will do X at T2” is true at T1. We know this because we know that Y knows this, and Y is certain. Let us hypothetically remove Y. The fact that “S will do X at T2” remains true. We have no reason to believe otherwise because all we knew about Y was that Y knew this statement to be true, and that Y’s foreknowledge did not cause the statement to be true (my added premiss).

Because the statement “S will do X at T2” remains true at T1, at T2 the agent S has no ability to do otherwise. Thus, it is not Y’s foreknowledge that takes away S’s free will.

My argument is concluded. Regardless of what you think about free will, I believe that in your example free will never had a chance; it was robbed from S before the agent Y had to be introduced. Thus, foreknowledge did not remove free will in the scenario you posited.
 
Miles Mariae,

As you pointed out, it’s not foreknowledge that properly takes away free will. It actually is bivalence, the fact that a proposition must be true or false. Therefore, a proposition about an agent’s future action is either true or false right now, and in that respect they cannot do otherwise.
 
Your “bivalence” argument removes free will only in an equivocal sense. No real determinist would take this seriously because you simply have not proven anything about whether actions are determined. The libertarian argues that the truth value of the propositions at T1 are determined by the agent’s actions, and the agent’s actions remain undetermined.
 
I do not believe that this situation is sufficient to brush aside PAP as a measure of freedom. To help my explanation, take for instance an argument often used against theological determinism. Someone will say something like, " ‘Ought’ implies ‘can.’ If I were in a deep pit and had no means of getting out, I couldn’t be rightfully commanded to leave the pit on fear of punishment," or, “If I were strapped to a chair with unbreakable chains and commanded to break free, I couldn’t be punished for not doing so. I couldn’t have done otherwise.” These scenarios show that an alternative possibility must exist in some sense for moral responsibility not to be destroyed.
Some scenario might show that, but the one you presented does not. It appears that the alternative to PAP – that the cause of the act was the will of the actor rather than outside causes – is just as efficacious of an explanation. The actor in your case wills to escape the pit. However, outside causes prevent him from escaping the chair ie. the chains. He is not morally responsible for failing to escape because outside forces caused him to stay, contrary to his will. PAP is not necessary in this situation.
And it is this general argument that I assume when I argue against free will. If a person wishes to argue that PAP is not essential to freedom, then they must make distinctions regarding a person’s ability-to-do-otherwise and explain how, e.g., a man chained down to a chair cannot rightly be punished for his inability to break free.
Because an outside cause prevailed – not the actor’s will. PAP is totally unnecessary here. And note, all I have to demonstrate is one instance that PAP is unnecessary to account for freedom and the argument in the OP fails.
Bivalence demands that all propositions regarding an agent’s choices at a given period of time be either true or false before the choices are carried out. And if all the agent’s choices are thus “set in stone” prior to their being chosen, then it follows that the agent could not have done otherwise. At this point, therefore, a distinction must be made to separate the scenario in which an agent’s future actions are already “set in stone” and a man chained to a chair. The latter is obviously not free, and therefore if the two examples cannot be conceptually distinguished, the former is not free either.
So far as I can see, this once again assumes that PAP is necessary for freedom without showing why it is necessary. To put it succinctly, from the source of causal control standpoint, it doesn’t matter how many people observe and thus have foreknowledge of S’s actions because they may very well be observing a free action of S – an action that S willed in spite of competing outside causes.

You may still disagree, and that’s fine. But understand that you are going to run into people who disagree with PAP as the measure of freedom – who won’t care at all how many observers have foreknowledge of a future act because the act that is being observed could very well be an act of the will in spite of competing outside causes. That is their measure of freedom.

Thank you for your fascinating perspective on this though. I am really too busy to be posting, but this thread and the one entitled: “One final time: freedom of will does NOT logically lead to evil actions,” were just too interesting to pass up. 🙂
 
Your “bivalence” argument removes free will only in an equivocal sense. No real determinist would take this seriously because you simply have not proven anything about whether actions are determined. The libertarian argues that the truth value of the propositions at T1 are determined by the agent’s actions, and the agent’s actions remain undetermined.
Not to unfairly pick on Confessor, but this is an outstanding point. The determinist would be at least as interested, if not more interested, as the libertarian about the cause of the agent’s action.
 
What is truth?

The truth that I’m sitting here right now typing, is both determine and undetermined
First, the truth of the event is determined by the ultimate truth which is being in itself, or existence by nature, which is God. Without an ultimate eternal being, there is no truth. And thus any truth that is true of existence must exists eternally in that ultimate being, since existence transcends time. What i mean, is that all truth exists in the eternal now, and cannot be changed, since there can no event where existence is not eternally present, for all truth is in existence irrespective of time. The truth cannot lie.

On the other-hand, it can still be true that i freely chose something, regardless of foreknowledge to that fact. It could be argued that foreknowledge of a particular event can have causal effect if the fore-knower reveals it. However if an event is true because you chose it, revelation of that truth cannot be said to have a causal effect, because its still true that you chose it even though i am telling you before it happened. The truth cannot be changed. If i see you walking down the street, i am not causing you to do this just because i am seeing you do it, even though in seeing you i am gaining in knowledge. Thus having knowledge of future events is no different to seeing something in the present. It is true that i am going to the shop tomorrow; but thats only because i chose to go, and my freedom is not changed just because you saw it before it happened.
 
Your “bivalence” argument removes free will only in an equivocal sense. No real determinist would take this seriously because you simply have not proven anything about whether actions are determined. The libertarian argues that the truth value of the propositions at T1 are determined by the agent’s actions, and the agent’s actions remain undetermined.
Please see what I said to tdgesq in my recent post towards him above. The principle of alternative possibilities (PAP) must be taken into account.

And if you want to say that it doesn’t seem as if the inability to do otherwise matters at all – merely because, as you say, the cause of the agent’s actions is purely the agent himself – then you must show how this can be differentiated from other scenarios in which there is no ability to do otherwise, such as being chained to a chair.
 
Some scenario might show that, but the one you presented does not. It appears that the alternative to PAP – that the cause of the act was the will of the actor rather than outside causes – is just as efficacious of an explanation. The actor in your case wills to escape the pit. However, outside causes prevent him from escaping the chair ie. the chains. He is not morally responsible for failing to escape because outside forces caused him to stay, contrary to his will. PAP is not necessary in this situation.
So you think the main distinction is whether the person desired to escape the pit?
 
So you think the main distinction is whether the person desired to escape the pit?
No. The distinction is: what is the causal source of the actor’s desire to escape or not to escape? If the causal source is exclusively outside forces (including genetics) then the actor is not free, regardless of the decision made. If the causal source is the actor’s will apart from or in opposition to outside forces, then the actor is free. The “desire,” as you put it, is self-determined.

That is why it doesn’t matter how many people have foreknowledge of a future event, because they may very well be viewing a free self-determined action. On the other hand, they may be viewing an action that is completely determined by outside causes. The fact that there is an observer of a future action does not tell us anything about the cause of the action.

Maybe I should put it this way: Do you deny that the cause of an actor’s desires and actions has relevance to whether he freely made a decision?
 
No. The distinction is: what is the causal source of the actor’s desire to escape or not to escape? If the causal source is exclusively outside forces (including genetics) then the actor is not free, regardless of the decision made. If the causal source is the actor’s will apart from or in opposition to outside forces, then the actor is free. The “desire,” as you put it, is self-determined.

That is why it doesn’t matter how many people have foreknowledge of a future event, because they may very well be viewing a free self-determined action. On the other hand, they may be viewing an action that is completely determined by outside causes. The fact that there is an observer of a future action does not tell us anything about the cause of the action.
The problem here is that you can’t so starkly make a distinction between the locus of causal control and PAP.

Let me put it this way: if it has been true for millennia that we would be discussing this issue right now, then the causes of our actions were already set in stone at that time in the past. They are not spontaneously arising from our free choice and wills; all the causal factors of our present actions had to be set in place before we were even born. If the causal factors were not set in place in the past, then it would simply not be true at that point in the past that we would be doing what we are now, for there would be no necessary connection from that point in time to right now.

In other words, the lack of external causal constraints which is necessary for “free will” precludes that our actions could be “set in stone” prior to their being done. They are set in stone by virtue of bivalence, etc.
Maybe I should put it this way: Do you deny that the cause of an actor’s desires and actions has relevance to whether he freely made a decision?
It certainly has relevance. The question now is whether or not an impossibility to do otherwise (because of bivalence) implies external constraints on causes.
 
The problem here is that you can’t so starkly make a distinction between the locus of causal control and PAP.
Surely I can. Modern philosophers in this area do it all the time. The purpose isn’t for me to completely divorce the two, but to clarify that there are real differences between the two. It is also meant to show that you only define freedom according to PAP in your Argument found in the OP and not the locus of causal control. That is why your argument fails.
Let me put it this way: if it has been true for millennia that we would be discussing this issue right now, then the causes of our actions were already set in stone at that time in the past.
I have already agreed with that (provisionally). We couldn’t have acted otherwise. That is a falsification of PAP. However, your statement above says nothing about whether any of these actions were taken apart from or in contravention of outside forces.
They are not spontaneously arising from our free choice and wills; all the causal factors of our present actions had to be set in place before we were even born.
Spontaneity is not the measure of free will – it is whether the action was caused by outside forces or not. The second statement does not make sense. Causal factors don’t occur until, well, they occur. I agree with you that the effects of causal factors may be foreseen before they occur, or may even be seen at the time they occur. That tells me nothing about the source of the cause, which is the entire question.
In other words, the lack of external causal constraints which is necessary for “free will” precludes that our actions could be “set in stone” prior to their being done.
This is just a bare conclusion. What you would have to demonstrate is that foreknowledge of actions necessitates that those actions were caused exclusively by outside forces. Yet the Argument in the OP doesn’t profess to do that. If you can restate that argument such that it does, then you would have something.
It certainly has relevance. The question now is whether or not an impossibility to do otherwise (because of bivalence) implies external constraints on causes.
If the locus of causal control has relevance to free will, then it must be dealt with in the Argument you presented. You have only dealt with PAP in the OP. For that reason alone the argument fails. Also, if you were to make such a demonstration, it would have to show that the impossibility to do otherwise necessitates, not just implies, external constraint on all human action. No such showing has been made. In fact, in the OP you stated:
Objections considered:
  1. God can know what we are doing without causing us to do them.
Yes, but causality is not the scope of this argument. This is whether or not we have the ability to do otherwise.
You refused to consider causality. My suggestion is that you reconstruct the argument to take into account causality and then show how it necessitates that all human actions are determined by outside forces. Otherwise, I think we aren’t going to get anywhere.
 
Please see what I said to tdgesq in my recent post towards him above. The principle of alternative possibilities (PAP) must be taken into account.

And if you want to say that it doesn’t seem as if the inability to do otherwise matters at all – merely because, as you say, the cause of the agent’s actions is purely the agent himself – then you must show how this can be differentiated from other scenarios in which there is no ability to do otherwise, such as being chained to a chair.
An agent can(1) perform either X or Y at T2 if his performing X or Y depends on his own volition.

An agent can(2) perform either X or Y at T2 if he can both choose to do X at T2 and still do Y at T2.

Your bivalence argument says that the agent could indeed choose an action (say, X) at T2. This choice will cause the agent to be unable to do Y at T2 (you use bivalence at T1 to arrive at this conclusion). Thus it is not true that the agent can(2) perform either X or Y at T2, and you conclude that he does not have free will.

The fact that we must deny that the agent can(2) perform either X or Y at T2 does indeed seem to be a fact of the universe.

Nonetheless, the agent can(1) perform either X or Y at T2 and the fact that his decision comes from his own volition is sufficient to assign moral blame or praise.

In answer to your question regarding being strapped to a chair:

If the agent is strapped to a chair at T1, and being strapped to a chair will physically restrain him from performing Y, and physically forces him to perform X, THEN it is not true that the agent can(2) perform either X or Y at T2. But it is also false that the agent can(1) perform X or Y at T2. And thus the difference is shown. We conclude that blame and praise should be assigned based on what the agent can(1) do but not what he can(2) do. That is, agents sin if they willfully choose an evil action (actual sin) and not if they are coerced into an evil action that they do not will (formal sin). W^5.
 
My vocabulary was wrong. Ignore the formal vs actual distinction, I think I just made it up. One is a sin (willed) and one is not a sin (coerced). It would be material if it were willed and unknown but that’s outside of this discussion. The rest of my points stand. “It is not true that an agent can(2) choose between X and Y at T2” is a pointless tautology.
 
Confessor01,

I don’t have the time or talent to engage you on this complex topic. But, given that you seem to be an avid reader (judging from the intellectual posts you’ve put on Catholic Answers recently), I would encourage you to read a book that some consider to be the definitive work on God’s sovereignty vs man’s free will, from a Catholic perspective. If you haven’t read it already, you might want to check it out some day. It is Predestination by the Dominican priest, Fr. Reginald Garrigou-Lagrange. You might be surprised to see how close a Catholic of the Thomist school of thought (as opposed to the Molinist school) is to Calvinism on predestination. That’s all I’ve got.
 
tdgesq,

Apparently I have not phrased my rebuttal very well. Let me do it here briefly:

If an agent cannot do otherwise than what he does (i.e. if there are no alternative possibilities), then how can it be said that he possesses the locus of causal control? An inability directly implies that the locus of causal control is exterior.

This is why I said you cannot so quickly make a distinction between causality and PAP. Certainly they can be distinguished (so I misspoke in that sense), but they nonetheless cannot be disjoined. To say that one is unable to do otherwise (PAP) is to imply that one does not possess the causal locus (causality).
 
An agent can(1) perform either X or Y at T2 if his performing X or Y depends on his own volition.

An agent can(2) perform either X or Y at T2 if he can both choose to do X at T2 and still do Y at T2.

Your bivalence argument says that the agent could indeed choose an action (say, X) at T2. This choice will cause the agent to be unable to do Y at T2 (you use bivalence at T1 to arrive at this conclusion). Thus it is not true that the agent can(2) perform either X or Y at T2, and you conclude that he does not have free will.

The fact that we must deny that the agent can(2) perform either X or Y at T2 does indeed seem to be a fact of the universe.

Nonetheless, the agent can(1) perform either X or Y at T2 and the fact that his decision comes from his own volition is sufficient to assign moral blame or praise.

In answer to your question regarding being strapped to a chair:

If the agent is strapped to a chair at T1, and being strapped to a chair will physically restrain him from performing Y, and physically forces him to perform X, THEN it is not true that the agent can(2) perform either X or Y at T2. But it is also false that the agent can(1) perform X or Y at T2. And thus the difference is shown. We conclude that blame and praise should be assigned based on what the agent can(1) do but not what he can(2) do. That is, agents sin if they willfully choose an evil action (actual sin) and not if they are coerced into an evil action that they do not will (formal sin). W^5.
(a) I am not arguing that an agent cannot do both X and Y at T2, and therefore that he does not have free will. That is not my argument. However, this correction doesn’t really seem to matter, as you still end up with an understanding that in my argument, bivalence necessitates determinism.

(b) You have basically taken tdgesq’s route in relegating moral responsibility purely to the locus of causal control.

I will repeat my counterargument against (b) right here: if someone is unable to do otherwise than they actually do, then this directly implies that the locus of causal control is outside him. For if it were within him, then it would not be the case that he would have a personal inability to do other than he does.
 
Confessor01,

I don’t have the time or talent to engage you on this complex topic. But, given that you seem to be an avid reader (judging from the intellectual posts you’ve put on Catholic Answers recently), I would encourage you to read a book that some consider to be the definitive work on God’s sovereignty vs man’s free will, from a Catholic perspective. If you haven’t read it already, you might want to check it out some day. It is Predestination by the Dominican priest, Fr. Reginald Garrigou-Lagrange. You might be surprised to see how close a Catholic of the Thomist school of thought (as opposed to the Molinist school) is to Calvinism on predestination. That’s all I’ve got.
Thank you for the recommendation! I’ll check that out.
 
(a) I am not arguing that an agent cannot do both X and Y at T2, and therefore that he does not have free will. That is not my argument. However, this correction doesn’t really seem to matter, as you still end up with an understanding that in my argument, bivalence necessitates determinism.

(b) You have basically taken tdgesq’s route in relegating moral responsibility purely to the locus of causal control.

I will repeat my counterargument against (b) right here: if someone is unable to do otherwise than they actually do, then this directly implies that the locus of causal control is outside him. For if it were within him, then it would not be the case that he would have a personal inability to do other than he does.
You continue to equivocate between definitions of ability. Further discussion is a waste of time.
 
(a) I am not arguing that an agent cannot do both X and Y at T2, and therefore that he does not have free will. That is not my argument. However, this correction doesn’t really seem to matter, as you still end up with an understanding that in my argument, bivalence necessitates determinism.
You are arguing that the agent cannot both choose X and choose Y, and cannot both choose X and perform Y. Bivalence only necessitates this result. This is not determinism.
(b) You have basically taken tdgesq’s route in relegating moral responsibility purely to the locus of causal control.
I will repeat my counterargument against (b) right here: if someone is unable to do otherwise than they actually do, then this directly implies that the locus of causal control is outside him. For if it were within him, then it would not be the case that he would have a personal inability to do other than he does.
Someone is unable to do otherwise than they choose to do. That is the only result of bivalence, and that is not a loss of causal control. True, I must reject with you that the agent can(2) choose between actions, such that he cannot choose one and yet perform the other, or choose one and yet choose the other.

But he can in fact choose one. And it is his choice of X that makes the proposition “He will do X” true at T1. And indeed that proposition’s truth materially implies that he will choose X. But it does not cause him to choose X, because his choice of X is what caused the proposition to be true. But two things cannot be mutually causal. Thus the proposition does not cause him to choose X. Thus he does not relinquish causal control. W^5.
 
Apparently I have not phrased my rebuttal very well. Let me do it here briefly:
You phrased it well. I understand exactly what you are saying.
If an agent cannot do otherwise than what he does (i.e. if there are no alternative possibilities), then how can it be said that he possesses the locus of causal control? An inability directly implies that the locus of causal control is exterior.

This is why I said you cannot so quickly make a distinction between causality and PAP. Certainly they can be distinguished (so I misspoke in that sense), but they nonetheless cannot be disjoined. To say that one is unable to do otherwise (PAP) is to imply that one does not possess the causal locus (causality).
If everything you state here is true, it still doesn’t save the argument in the OP. You would be required to demonstrate that falsification of PAP necessitates that the actions of the person were not determined by outside forces. You have not done this. In fact, you didn’t even attempt to do this in claiming that causality was irrelevant to the issue.

I am going out of town for a week and likely will not be able to respond to any further posts on this thread. Please keep the following in mind:

The argument you presented is not yours. I mean, you picked it up someplace else. My response for the most part was the same thing. I learned about alternatives to PAP somewhere else and applied them here. That is the way with most things in life. If the argument in the OP doesn’t completely work – so what? You really haven’t lost anything. That kind of thing happens to me all the time. There are a lot of other determinist/predestination arguments out there. Find one that takes the issue of locus of causal control head on. I look forward to it!
 
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