Free will and foreknowledge revisited

[geometer]

You are talking about crystal formation, do these crystals make up humans?

They are not part of our biochemistry, they are aluminium alloy crystals which do not have traditional crystaline structure. Quasicrystal structure is glassy.

The crystals forming in our space-time though a six dimensional process, simply implies that six dimensional events are possible for any object in space-time. It implies that six dimensions apply to every physical thing that exists.

So, in answer to the question; Is man four dimensional? I would have to say no, man has six or more dimensions…

 

[Drawmack]

They are not part of our biochemistry, they are aluminium alloy crystals which do not have traditional crystaline structure. Quasicrystal structure is glassy.

The crystals forming in our space-time though a six dimensional process, simply implies that six dimensional events are possible for any object in space-time. It implies that six dimensions apply to every physical thing that exists.

So, in answer to the question; Is man four dimensional? I would have to say no, man has six or more dimensions…

Last time I checked 6 > 4 so if something is 6 dimensional it must be 4 dimensional. Also a mobius strip is a 2 dimensional object in 3 dimensional space so why is it impossible to have a 4 dimensional object in 6 dimensional space.

 

[geometer]

Last time I checked 6 > 4 so if something is 6 dimensional it must be 4 dimensional. Also a mobius strip is a 2 dimensional object in 3 dimensional space so why is it impossible to have a 4 dimensional object in 6 dimensional space.

Well, your original question was about whether or not we are constrained by time, I had thought.

 

[Drawmack]

Well, your original question was about whether or not we are constrained by time, I had thought.

Sure, that was one of my questions

1. Do you believe that time is a dimension?

1. Do you believe that man is a four dimensional being?

1. Do you believe that time, man’s fourth dimension, constrains him?

1. Can you accept that God, if you accept his existence, is a multidimensional (i.e. more than 4) being?

But, not the one you were addressing. You were addressing #2 and not #3. Therefore I refuted your answer on the grounds of #2 and not #3. Why would you answer one question and then when I refute your answer claim to be answering a different question? I’m sorry but if this is the discogent type of argument I can expect from you than I see no reason to continue a philosophical discussion with you.

These four questions are basic precepts of my argument. If you can agree not to refute these precepts then I can post my argument. However, I’m not going to spend a couple hours typing up my argument if the precepts it is based on are going to be ripped apart, that is why I just want yes or no answers. I’m setting up the groundwork for debate, not starting the debate.

 

[geometer]

Sure, that was one of my questions

But, not the one you were addressing. You were addressing #2 and not #3. Therefore I refuted your answer on the grounds of #2 and not #3. Why would you answer one question and then when I refute your answer claim to be answering a different question? I’m sorry but if this is the discogent type of argument I can expect from you than I see no reason to continue a philosophical discussion with you.

These four questions are basic precepts of my argument. If you can agree not to refute these precepts then I can post my argument. However, I’m not going to spend a couple hours typing up my argument if the precepts it is based on are going to be ripped apart, that is why I just want yes or no answers. I’m setting up the groundwork for debate, not starting the debate.

Well, I’m sorry that I can’t make it any easier. Have fun with it…

 

[itinerant1]

First, knowledge is defined as “true belief.” (I realize that there are many nuances in defining what knowledge is, and that it is most often defined as “justified true belief,” but for argument’s sake all that matters is that knowledge is true belief.)

To define knowledge as “true belief” or “justified true belief” requires additional distinctions. Belief involves things we do not see. For example, we believe Caesar crossed the Rubicon. We accept this historical fact on faith. Evidence can be ascertained to justify that faith. However faith, like opinion, properly considered, can be distinquished from knowledge. Knowledge in the full sense, (following Aristotle), is concerned with what is universal and necessary. We have opinion when we believe that a thing is so but might be otherwise; we have knowledge when we know that a thing is so and why it must be so and cannot be otherwise. We cannot have knowledge and belief or opinion about the same thing at the same time.

Argument: If at time T1, God knows that a person S will perform action X at a time T2, then, per the definition of knowledge, it is true at time T1 that S will do X at T2. And if it is true that S will do X at T2, then it is not the case that S can do not-X at T2. And if S cannot do not-X at T2, then he is performing an action without the ability to do otherwise; hence, he has no free will.

Now to my main purpose. The argument quoted above contains several flaws. First, the premiss "If at time T1, God knows…" contains false assumptions about the nature of God’s knowledge. God does not know things at a particular time (ex. T1) because He is outside of time. Furthermore, God knows His creation, and all things, through His essence. Therefore, the initial premiss must be rejected.

Next, it is stated “And if it is true that S will do X at T2, then it is not the case that S can do not-X at T2.” This premiss is logically flawed. First, it only asserts that whatever S has chosen he cannot do otherwise. But the only reason he cannot do not-X is because he did not make the choice to do not-X. The argument goes nowhere. In reality, S was free to choose either X or not-X. But your premiss tacitly involves the denial of free will on the part of X. Hence, you have assumed your conclusion in that premiss.

The conclusion "then he is performing an action without the ability to do otherwise; hence, he has no free will" was assumed, as previously pointed out, in the false premiss cited above. Therefore the argument remains both logically invalid and false. You have committed the classic fallacy of “begging the question.”
Strictly speaking, God’s knowledge of human acts in not foreknowledge, except from the human perspective. By way of analogy, this can be seen by picturing a calendar that includes all the days of your life from birth until death. We experience only the present moment that we are in; we remember the past, and we can only speculate about the future. On the other hand, God sees all the days on the calendar as one. He sees our entire life span, every choice at once. In this sense, from our limited perspective in time, we say that God has foreknowledge of our acts. He knows all of our acts of free will “before” we make them. Yet His comprehensive knowledge of our lives imposes no necessity on our acts of free will.

Again, regarding God’s knowledge of particulars, He knows all things through His essence.

 

[Confessor01]

atman,

To ensure that I understand your “picture,” please tell me if what I say is correct. God stands outside the line that represents time. On that line, there are divisions, such that it represents chronological history – some part of the line could be labeled T1, T2, etc. However, there is no “objective” time that it is “right now”; i.e. there is no cursor that moves across. God simply knows that a specific event is at T1, but it can’t be said that T1 is occurring “right now.” However, since T2 is ahead of T1 in relation to the objects and creatures that are within the timeline, God can tell people at T1 that T2 is the “future” to them, but not to God. In this case, God understands time and can act in it, yet there is no cursor that describes what part of history is “actually” taking place.

Is that accurate? If so, I’ll attempt to critique that view in my next post.

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geometer,

Predestination does not imply that we are “watching things happen.” Remember that predestination entails that humans themselves are integral parts of and causes in the universe. Predestination can be viewed as a passive, fatalistic process only if people presume that libertarian freedom exists in the midst of it somehow, which is impossible.

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tdgesq,

Can you cite any of the proponents of libertarianism who reject alternative possibilities? I always thought alternative possibilities were an essential component of libertarianism.

I realize this is from Wikipedia, but anyway: “Libertarianism holds onto a concept of free will that requires the individual to be able to take more than one possible course of action under a given set of circumstances.”

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Bob Crowley,

I don’t understand how “can” (rather than “will”) hurts my argument at all.

Furthermore, you said, “The fact God can observe both T1 and T2 does not mean we had no ‘will’ in the circumstances.” I realize that. As I said, my point is that if God infallibly knows we will do something before we do it, then we cannot do otherwise; and if we cannot do otherwise, then how can we have free will?

This statement of yours demonstrates a misunderstanding of theological determinism, by the way: “f the outcome were foreordained, then there would have been no point in spiritual parties trying to bend the decision their way, whether by the use of fear, intimidation, anxiety, peace, or whatever other weapons they may have in their armoury.” Predestinarians believe not that God ordains ends irrespective of means, but that He decrees all ends and all means leading to those ends. Thus, if you were ordained to make a specific choice, then He ordained every event in the history of the universe that would lead you to make that choice. To say that predestination makes everything pointless in the sense you imply is to presume that God can ordain ends irrespective of means, which is not predestination properly understood. (Actually, ends irrespective of means would be implied by omniscience and libertarian free will, but that’s another topic. )

Ben

 

[Confessor01]

Biggie,

I would ask that you hesitate in concluding that God’s goal in creation is not self-glorification, especially considered the mass of texts showing that He acts for self-glorification in pretty much everything else. Also, keep in mind that I’m a Calvinist, so simply telling me, “Neither could he have created to allow the fall of man in order to glorify himself,” without establishing why, will not help. I believe that everything ultimately occurs for the sole purpose of displaying God’s glory, including the damnation of reprobates (Romans 9:22).

“What need has God of glory, since he already possesses it?”

I didn’t say He was gaining glory. I said He’s displaying it. Seeing as God is the only Being in the universe to possess a multitude of infinite perfections, it is morally correct for Him to want to display these attributes. It certainly is not vain. (If you want a full treatment of the subject, please consult Jonathan Edwards’s “The End for Which God Created the World.”) Otherwise, suffice it to say that this is not a topic of central importance in this thread.

When I asked you to substantiate the claim that God “has chosen to forget” our free actions, you replied that “The fact that God possess a capacity does not necessitate that God use that capacity.” First, as a bit of an aside, I would just like to let it be known that arguments like this – and conclusions like the one you are attempting to establish – are distinctively open-theistic, which I’m pretty sure is contrary to RCC teaching (though, I could very well be wrong). Second, and more importantly, is the fact that your argument, in my estimation, misses the point. To say that God forgets something is not to say that He has a capacity He is deciding not to utilize; rather, it is to say that He is not omniscient. For instance, if I asked why God did not blow the planet Mars to bits, even though He’s omnipotent. You could (correctly) reply that He doesn’t have to – He’s capable of doing so, but He doesn’t need to exercise His power in that way. However, if you were to reply that He purposely made Himself weaker, then it would not be the case that He has a capacity He is not using. It would rather be the case that He has purposely lowered His capacity. This is far from an appeal to “logic itself.” This is a huge claim (that God purposely lowers His attributes) that demands substantiation from either Scripture or your Tradition.

I would also contend that such a claim flatly contradicts Scripture at points. Take, for instance, John 6:64: “For Jesus had known from the beginning which of them did not believe and who would betray him.” He had known from the beginning. It would be an outright contradiction of Scripture, as well as an odd saying, to say that He purposely forgot.

Otherwise, you are correct in that the mechanics are not to be fully comprehended by us, lest we desire to be as God. But nonetheless, we certainly must reject absolute logical contradictions. Therefore inasmuch as free will and omniscience are actually contradictory of each other, one must be rejected.

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Drawmack,

I’d answer “yes” to all four of those questions. However, my affirmation of time as a dimension should be taken with caution, for I am not familiar with any type of debate that time is a dimension or not (both if there is one and what its arguments for each side would be). Nonetheless, proceed with your argument, and I will do my best to understand it.

Also, regarding the third question, I might say that in the state between man’s death and Christ’s second coming (i.e. when the new heavens and new earth are established), man might be unconstrained by time. But I’m not sure of that, and I also am pretty sure it doesn’t bear any weight on your argument.

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itinerant1,

I really don’t care how you define knowledge in this thread, so long as it contains “truth” somewhere in the definition. Please don’t get too worked up about that.

You argued that my first premise “must be rejected” because I stated that God knows something “at time T1,” presumably because saying would imply that God is temporal. On the contrary, I am not implying that God is constrained by time. Rather, I am saying that from a human perspective, if a person is acting at time T1, then it is the case that God knows what that person does at T2. God can be outside of time and still know what events are future to us – and that is all I was saying.

You argued that my second premise was flawed: “But the only reason he cannot do not-X is because he did not make the choice to do not-X.” On the contrary, if it is the case that he cannot do not-X before he does the action, then he lacks free will when he was choosing X. I am not arguing that he has no free will because he couldn’t have done otherwise at the point of choosing X, but rather at all points before choosing X.

Your calendar illustrate seems similar if not identical to atmat explanation of time. Assuming that I have represented him properly (which he can confirm or deny in his next post), I will be responding to his illustration then. You can see my response to what is essentially your illustration at that time. (I don’t intend to sound arrogant in postponing it, but I don’t want to multiply my tasks unnecessarily. This board is rather busy.)

Ben

 

[Drawmack]

,

I’d answer “yes” to all four of those questions. However, my affirmation of time as a dimension should be taken with caution, for I am not familiar with any type of debate that time is a dimension or not (both if there is one and what its arguments for each side would be). Nonetheless, proceed with your argument, and I will do my best to understand it.

Also, regarding the third question, I might say that in the state between man’s death and Christ’s second coming (i.e. when the new heavens and new earth are established), man might be unconstrained by time. But I’m not sure of that, and I also am pretty sure it doesn’t bear any weight on your argument.

I don’t think that any of the limitation you mentioned will affect my argument. I’ll type it up and post it after the kid is in bed tonight.

 

[tdgesq]

tdgesq,

Can you cite any of the proponents of libertarianism who reject alternative possibilities? I always thought alternative possibilities were an essential component of libertarianism.

I realize this is from Wikipedia, but anyway: “Libertarianism holds onto a concept of free will that requires the individual to be able to take more than one possible course of action under a given set of circumstances.”

Sure. Here is the pertinent portion of an article from the Standford Encyclopedia of Philosophy entitled Foreknowledge and Free Will:

plato.stanford.edu/entries/free-will-foreknowledge/#2.5

Besides the demonstration in the above article, I think for most people there is something intuitively amiss with a definition of free will that only concerns alternate possibilities. There is some sense that there must be some identifiable outside cause affecting the actor to deprive him of freedom - whether that “outside” cause is genetics, parental and social influence, etc. Consider the following thought experiment.

Let’s assume that time travel is possible and person P jumps into a time machine and travels forward in time five minutes. He exits the time machine and observes person S pick a daisy. P jumps back in the time machine and returns to his original point in time. Let’s assume that the structure of your argument in the OP is valid. We can now make it read:

Argument: If at time T1, person P knows that a person S will perform action X at a time T2, then, per the definition of knowledge, it is true at time T1 that S will do X at T2. And if it is true that S will do X at T2, then it is not the case that S can do not-X at T2. And if S cannot do not-X at T2, then he is performing an action without the ability to do otherwise; hence, he has no free will.

But does it really make sense that just because person P observed (knew) that person S will pick the daisy mean that S doesn’t have free will with respect to that act, even assuming he couldn’t do otherwise? If the answer is “no,” then isn’t the answer also “no” in the argument you gave where God is the observer rather than P? If there was some way that God or person P, as the case may be, caused or otherwise determined S to pick the daisy, then I’d say you would have a good argument against libertarian free will. But that isn’t the argument presented in the OP.

 

[Confessor01]

tdgesq,

Thank you for posting the article. That was helpful.

I found this quote to be interesting: “The literature that clearly distinguishes the claim that free will requires alternate possibilities from the claim that free will requires the falsehood of determinism is contemporary. The former is a thesis about events in counterfactual circumstances, whereas the latter is a thesis about the locus of causal control in the actual circumstances.”

Compatibilists like me agree that we have a counterfactual but not an actual ability to do otherwise. Therefore, I think this might just be a matter of terminology. I might be calling people libertarians who would consider themselves compatibilists. In any case, using the terminology that I have employed, then by definition one must hold to PAP to be a libertarian.

I also found the Black/White/Mary Jones example to be rather odd. For the record, I don’t believe that that example shows that libertarian free will is true while disallowing PAP, but I don’t know if you want my explanation at the moment.

Otherwise, regarding your example with person P and time travel:

But does it really make sense that just because person P observed (knew) that person S will pick the daisy mean that S doesn’t have free will with respect to that act, even assuming he couldn’t do otherwise? If the answer is “no,” then isn’t the answer also “no” in the argument you gave where God is the observer rather than P? If there was some way that God or person P, as the case may be, caused or otherwise determined S to pick the daisy, then I’d say you would have a good argument against libertarian free will. But that isn’t the argument presented in the OP.

I think there are a couple problems with this attempted reductio ad absurdum:

1. Time travel cannot be allowed immediately as a hypothetical. All the actions involved with time travel could themselves be part of a specific timeline and thereby alter what the timeline would be otherwise. (Think “Back to the Future” if you’ve seen it.) In other words, by going forwards in time and seeing S pick the daisy, P might be engaging in a course of action that would lead to S’s not picking the daisy. And the fact that it could possibly affect the course of reality implies that P’s knowledge of S’s action is not infallible. Insofar as P’s knowledge is not infallible, it follows that S could possibly do otherwise, and so in that case he would have free will.
2. Assuming that P is purely a spectator and for whatever reason is guaranteed that no other event on the timeline will be altered, then we could legitimately say that P has infallible knowledge of S’s future action. And in that case, he’d be essentially in the place of God (who alone has infallible knowledge of future events). So in any case, this situation cannot appeal to some intuition that S would “seem to be acting freely” – because we have no idea what P’s situation would be like! In other words, if we want to ask, “Well, imagine you have infallible knowledge of someone else’s future action; wouldn’t they still seem be free?” My answer: I don’t know! I couldn’t give an answer as to how that would feel (because I can’t imagine what it would be like to have infallible knowledge of others’ future actions), but I can tell you that if P were to have infallible knowledge of S’s future actions, then it would still be the case that S cannot do otherwise, irrespective of what we might intuit of S’s acting freely. And thus my argument still holds up.

I think your argument about P, S, and daisies is essentially the same as the second objection that I anticipated in the OP. It is much more refined, but structurally the same in my opinion.

 

[tdgesq]

Thank you for posting the article. That was helpful.

No problem.

Compatibilists like me agree that we have a counterfactual but not an actual ability to do otherwise. Therefore, I think this might just be a matter of terminology. I might be calling people libertarians who would consider themselves compatibilists. In any case, using the terminology that I have employed, then by definition one must hold to PAP to be a libertarian.

You will have to explain what type of compatibilist you are before I can comment on the above. I can’t tell from the information provided. Libertarians would not deny the usefulness of considering counterfactual scenarios, and many would quite gladly hold to PAP. Although I don’t think you would find many today that would suggest that PAP is the only definitional component to free will. Libertarians are simply incompatibilists who hold that at least some people have free will such that determinism is false. I don’t know of anything definitionally that would require a libertarian to also accept PAP. Nor do I see how the self-proclaimed libertarians referred to in the article who reject PAP could be deemed “compatabilists.” I just don’t have enough information to tell though.

I also found the Black/White/Mary Jones example to be rather odd. For the record, I don’t believe that that example shows that libertarian free will is true while disallowing PAP, but I don’t know if you want my explanation at the moment.

That’s fine. I presented the article merely to show that to have a serious discussion about free will today you have to take into account causal control and its source.

I think there are a couple problems with this attempted reductio ad absurdum:

1. Time travel cannot be allowed immediately as a hypothetical. All the actions involved with time travel could themselves be part of a specific timeline and thereby alter what the timeline would be otherwise. (Think “Back to the Future” if you’ve seen it.) In other words, by going forwards in time and seeing S pick the daisy, P might be engaging in a course of action that would lead to S’s not picking the daisy. And the fact that it could possibly affect the course of reality implies that P’s knowledge of S’s action is not infallible. Insofar as P’s knowledge is not infallible, it follows that S could possibly do otherwise, and so in that case he would have free will.

There are several reasons why this objection doesn’t work. Let’s assume P hides himself from all spectators and takes every conceivable precaution not to tamper with the timeline, such precautions having been developed from myriad other travels. Is it possible that he could still interfere so that S doesn’t pick the daisy? Sure. Is it likely? No it is not. Is P justified in his belief that S will pick the daisy? Yes. Does S in fact pick the daisy? Let’s say that he does. Is P’s belief justified and true such that it constitutes knowledge? Yes. P knows that S will pick the daisy.

All your argument as presented requires is that P “knows that a person S will perform action X.” It does not by its terms require an “infallible” knowledge, whatever that means. Furthermore, even if you change your syllogism to require “infallible” knowledge, it is not evident how “regular” knowledge wouldn’t entail the same conclusion. Finally, regardless of the method by which P observes S, it is logically possible that P could have whatever degree of knowledge you are requiring by your argument. The method of acquiring that degree of knowledge doesn’t seem to matter.

1. So in any case, this situation cannot appeal to some intuition that S would “seem to be acting freely” – because we have no idea what P’s situation would be like! In other words, if we want to ask, “Well, imagine you have infallible knowledge of someone else’s future action; wouldn’t they still seem be free?” My answer: I don’t know! I couldn’t give an answer as to how that would feel (because I can’t imagine what it would be like to have infallible knowledge of others’ future actions), but I can tell you that if P were to have infallible knowledge of S’s future actions, then it would still be the case that S cannot do otherwise, irrespective of what we might intuit of S’s acting freely. And thus my argument still holds up.

Again, there are several problems with this objection. First, of course you can imagine what it would be like. Anybody who has watched Dr. Who or Back to the Future can imagine what it would be like. Second, the feelings and intuition of P would not be a basis for deciding that S’s action was free, but it would lead P to ask why it is that observing S pick the daisy entails that S lacked freedom. P would think: “well, what if I hadn’t observed S pick the daisy?” Then suddenly S would have freedom with respect to that action. P would finally ask the ultimate question: “what about me observing S caused him to pick the daisy”?

The answer is nothing. There is nothing about P observing S that caused either S to pick the daisy or otherwise prevented S from not picking the daisy. There is no causal connection. S’s action in picking the daisy is not determined if there is no cause. If S’s action is not determined, then it appears to be free.

This is why you can’t simply ignore the role of causation when discussing free will. What this reductio serves to illustrate is that your definition of “free will” as only PAP is deficient because it does not account for cause.

 

[Confessor01]

Just to let you know, I’ll reply to this tomorrow.

 

[Confessor01]

You will have to explain what type of compatibilist you are before I can comment on the above.

I’m sorry, but I’m not familiar in the distinctions to be made here. I’ll try to explain my views and perhaps you can provide a classification for me. I am a theological determinist, in that I believe God foreordains every single thing that occurs, including free human actions. I believe that actions are free when they are in accord with one’s will, although I believe that humans cannot choose what they will. That is, moral agents all have specific desires, and whatever desire is strongest at a particular moment, the agent will choose in accord with that desire. There is a sense in which desires may be chosen, but this can be only in a proximate sense – i.e., a choice based off of previously existing desires. (Therefore, desires cannot ultimately be chosen.) As a result, I believe that people act freely when they have a counterfactual ability to do otherwise (i.e. if their desires were different at the point of choosing).

I also think this view can be demonstrated when different passages about God’s control over the human heart are observed.

Also, for the record, I understand that PAP is not the only difference between compatibilists/determinists and libertarians, but from my knowledge it is the primary difference, such that all other differences stem from that difference.

1. In your rebuttal to my first objection, you spoke of how P could act in such a way as to avoid interfering with S, i.e., how P could be a pure spectator and not alter S’s decision-making processes at all. I agree with this fact. But I thought it still needed to be mentioned, because, with that observation made, I believe your objection becomes the exact same as the second objection that I anticipated in the OP. This is why, immediately after discussing how time travel could alter S’s decisions, I said the following: “Assuming that P is purely a spectator and for whatever reason is guaranteed that no other event on the timeline will be altered, then we could legitimately say that P has infallible knowledge of S’s future action.”
2. As seen in the italicized quote immediately above, I said that P’s action would be infallible. You seem to express confusion on what I mean by this (rightfully so, as I never defined it) and in retrospect I realize that I should not have used the concept of infallibility to convey my point. Knowledge of a proposition implies the truthfulness of that proposition even when infallibility is not one of the requirements of knowledge. (Interestingly, I broke my own rule here, since I mentioned in the OP not to worry about and over-define knowledge!) Consequently, I will now abandon the whole notion of “infallible knowledge.” It is not important to the argument, and it represents a mistake on my part anyway.
3. As a result, no matter how one wishes to define knowledge (except if you go crazy and define it as “a brown puppy” or something), knowledge of a proposition P will imply the truthfulness of P. And as long as that occurs, the falsity of P is impossible. (I’m not saying that P is a necessary truth, but certainly if P is true, then it is necessary that the exact same proposition cannot also be false.) Therefore, if P is “Bob will choose to eat a cheeseburger for dinner at 6:00,” then Bob cannot do other than that.
4. Contra my second objection, you said the following:

First, of course you can imagine what it would be like. Anybody who has watched Dr. Who or Back to the Future can imagine what it would be like.

Yes, you are right. I spoke an untruth earlier. I would say I did this because I was still attempting to use the concept of “infallible knowledge,” which was a mistake of mine. It is certainly conceivable to imagine what it would feel like if I were to know that another person were going to do a future action.

Second, the feelings and intuition of P would not be a basis for deciding that S’s action was free, but it would lead P to ask why it is that observing S pick the daisy entails that S lacked freedom. P would think: “well, what if I hadn’t observed S pick the daisy?”

I believe you are missing the point when you say that “observing S pick the daisy entails that S lacked freedom.” It is not merely the knowledge of a future action that implies the lack of freedom; it is the truthfulness (or falsity) of a proposition involving a future action that implies the lack of freedom. It’s not that P happened to observe S’s future action before S performed the action – no, rather, it’s that the proposition regarding what S would do in the future was already true prior to S’s future action. This is simply easier to demonstrate by speaking of foreknowledge. In fact, your observation shows that the entire omniscience/free will conundrum very easily boils down to one regarding the bivalence of propositions (the property of a proposition that it must be either true or false and nothing else [for any onlooking readers who wish to know]).

So, it is in this sense that I would contend that bivalence necessitates determinism.

 

[tdgesq]

I’m sorry, but I’m not familiar in the distinctions to be made here. I’ll try to explain my views and perhaps you can provide a classification for me.

Interesting. I know quite a few Calvinists who don’t mind being called hard determinists. The proximate cause/ultimate cause distinction is one I am familiar with as I’ve heard it often from Reformed Presbyterians. Whether or not a proximately caused act really constitutes a choice that makes free will meaningful (the actor morally responsible) is doubtful to me. That’s off topic though. I understand what you mean now.

Also, for the record, I understand that PAP is not the only difference between compatibilists/determinists and libertarians, but from my knowledge it is the primary difference, such that all other differences stem from that difference.

That isn’t true in modern discussion about free will. PAP and the locus of cause are often set against one another as the primary aspect of freedom. The issue historically was recognized by St. Augustine, although whether he ever adopted a position in favor of one or another is questionable. He wrote about this subject so prolifically and changed his position so many times that it’s hard to know.

1. This is why, immediately after discussing how time travel could alter S’s decisions, I said the following: “Assuming that P is purely a spectator and for whatever reason is guaranteed that no other event on the timeline will be altered, then we could legitimately say that P has infallible knowledge of S’s future action.”

Not to belabor this, but generally if you recognize that a scenario is logically possible you don’t insert facts or conditions that make it otherwise. I think I see what happened though. You were thinking while typing and then got to the end and realized that the scenario was in fact possible. I do that all the time. As long as we both agree it is logically possible that P can substitute as the knowing observer then we are both on the same page.

Knowledge of a proposition implies the truthfulness of that proposition even when infallibility is not one of the requirements of knowledge. (Interestingly, I broke my own rule here, since I mentioned in the OP not to worry about and over-define knowledge!) Consequently, I will now abandon the whole notion of “infallible knowledge.” It is not important to the argument, and it represents a mistake on my part anyway.

No worries. I think we are in accord now.

1. As a result, no matter how one wishes to define knowledge (except if you go crazy and define it as “a brown puppy” or something), knowledge of a proposition P will imply the truthfulness of P. And as long as that occurs, the falsity of P is impossible. (I’m not saying that P is a necessary truth, but certainly if P is true, then it is necessary that the exact same proposition cannot also be false.) Therefore, if P is “Bob will choose to eat a cheeseburger for dinner at 6:00,” then Bob cannot do other than that.

I don’t deny this, although some strange things can potentially happen when we involve events that “haven’t happened yet.” We don’t need to get into that for purposes of this discussion though. I accept your analysis above.

Yes, you are right. I spoke an untruth earlier. I would say I did this because I was still attempting to use the concept of “infallible knowledge,” which was a mistake of mine. It is certainly conceivable to imagine what it would feel like if I were to know that another person were going to do a future action.

Don’t worry about it. I realize now that it came from the infallible/regular knowledge dichotomy.

I believe you are missing the point when you say that “observing S pick the daisy entails that S lacked freedom.” It is not merely the knowledge of a future action that implies the lack of freedom; it is the truthfulness (or falsity) of a proposition involving a future action that implies the lack of freedom.

I’m fairly certain I’m tracking. When I say that P observes S pick the daisy, I make no bones about the fact that P knows S picks the daisy. And I completely understand the notion that if P knows S picks the daisy, that it is true S picks the daisy – since it wouldn’t be knowledge otherwise. Where we disagree is whether or not P knowing S picks the daisy entails that S lacks free will.

It’s not that P happened to observe S’s future action before S performed the action – no, rather, it’s that the proposition regarding what S would do in the future was already true prior to S’s future action. This is simply easier to demonstrate by speaking of foreknowledge.

Correct. What this would show (provisionally; excluding issues of time) is that S could not have acted other than to pick the daisy. I agree. It shows that the PAP is impossible in this case. But my contention all along is that freedom is not measured by PAP but by the source of causal control. See my first post.

 

[tdgesq]

. . . continued

So, it is in this sense that I would contend that bivalence necessitates determinism.

You mean bivalence necessitates determinism if PAP is the measure of freedom. But the entire question is whether PAP is properly the measure of freedom. I argue that it isn’t, and the scenario I gave you above is an explanation of why. Here is a more complete explanation, again from the perspective of P:

P thinks: “I saw S pick the daisy, so I know that S will pick the daisy. I know that S can’t do anything other than pick the daisy.”

Things are looking pretty bad for S’s freedom at this point, until P thinks more deeply about what constitutes freedom.

P goes on to think: “But this seems weird to me. Does S really lack freedom because I know he picked the daisy? Surely my foreknowledge of S picking the daisy didn’t cause him to pick the daisy. What did cause him to pick the daisy? I suppose it could have been a lot of things. Maybe he was genetically predisposed under the particular circumstances to pick the daisy. Then again, maybe he was genetically predisposed not to pick the daisy yet he exercised his will to do it anyway. What am I really concerned with when it comes to somebody’s freedom, regardless of whether I have foreknowledge of an event or not? Am I concerned with whether S could do something other than what he did (what I know he would do), or am I concerned with the cause – the origin – of S’s act?”

You don’t necessarily have to choose one of these choices over the other, but you do have to recognize that PAP is not the whole story when it comes to freedom. If S acts in contravention of – or at least apart from – outside determining factors, then he acted freely, regardless of whether somebody had foreknowledge of his actions or not.

 

[Confessor01]

This might be the first instance in which my taking more time to respond to others’ posts has paid off!

Essentially the debate has been reduced to this statement of yours:

You mean bivalence necessitates determinism if PAP is the measure of freedom. But the entire question is whether PAP is properly the measure of freedom.

I apologize for not recognizing your main point earlier.

Anyway, I will analyze your arguments for why PAP is not properly the measure of freedom (at least, the arguments you have provided thus far), tomorrow. Sorry to postpone it.

 

[Gottle_of_Geer]

I realize that many, many people have probably come across this argument and therefore deem it to be impotent because, well, it’s been around a while. That is generally how we humans deal with such arguments. We normally think that if some argument is common or hackneyed, and if it still hasn’t persuaded everybody of its veracity, then it can’t be correct. I am humbly asking that any readers please ignore the fact that the free will/omniscience argument has been visited many times in the past and look to this argument. It’s not anything special or distinct from older versions of the argument, but I am convinced that omniscience cannot be reconciled with free will. Consequently, I would like to see if anyone can prove the following argument to be unsound. It’s rather brief.

First, knowledge is defined as “true belief.” (I realize that there are many nuances in defining what knowledge is, and that it is most often defined as “justified true belief,” but for argument’s sake all that matters is that knowledge is true belief.)
Argument: If at time T1, God knows that a person S will perform action X at a time T2, then, per the definition of knowledge, it is true at time T1 that S will do X at T2. And if it is true that S will do X at T2, then it is not the case that S can do not-X at T2. And if S cannot do not-X at T2, then he is performing an action without the ability to do otherwise; hence, he has no free will.
Objections considered:

1. God can know what we are doing without causing us to do them.

Yes, but causality is not the scope of this argument. This is whether or not we have the ability to do otherwise.

If​

• “omniscience cannot be reconciled with free will”

• how can God predestine the elect, as the Bible says He does ? God knows all things, past, present, future, possible, hypothetical, the lot. To say that anything in the whole of creation can possibly be hidden from Him is

• contrary to the Bible, which asserts the opposite
• to deny that God’s knowledge is simple. But as He is simple Being, so is His knowledge.

There is no future with God - only with us. We are in space & time in as fishes are in water - God is not. A fisherman in a river may be “tensed” from the POV of a passing trout; but in respect to himself, he is not. The trout’s motion is real to him, & the fisherman can see the trout; make the river straight enough in its length, & the fisherman will see the past & present & future & potential course of the trout in the river. His knowledge does not limit the trout’s freedom.

Since God is the only Source of all the being of all His creatures in all their modes of being & their acts, His knowledge is causal - but how does that stop it being a cause of their freedom to will ? It is not in the same order of being - for God is not a creature. There is no “room” for any “collision” - any more than size and shape collide. God & creatures are incommensurable. God’s sovereign freedom & infinite knowledge - and do you mean the action of knowing, or the possession of knowledge ? - are the foundation of our own liberty & knowledge; especially of man unfallen, in his first state before God.

 

[Confessor01]

Gottle of Geer,

When I say that omniscience cannot be reconciled with free will, my main purpose is to reject free will, not to reject omniscience.

Also, as mentioned above, the primary issue here is actually bivalence, not simply foreknowledge.

 

[Confessor01]

tdgesq,

P thinks: “I saw S pick the daisy, so I know that S will pick the daisy. I know that S can’t do anything other than pick the daisy.”

Things are looking pretty bad for S’s freedom at this point, until P thinks more deeply about what constitutes freedom.

I do not believe that this situation is sufficient to brush aside PAP as a measure of freedom. To help my explanation, take for instance an argument often used against theological determinism. Someone will say something like, " ‘Ought’ implies ‘can.’ If I were in a deep pit and had no means of getting out, I couldn’t be rightfully commanded to leave the pit on fear of punishment," or, “If I were strapped to a chair with unbreakable chains and commanded to break free, I couldn’t be punished for not doing so. I couldn’t have done otherwise.” These scenarios show that an alternative possibility must exist in some sense for moral responsibility not to be destroyed.

From what I have seen, libertarians (or at least, what I might erroneously define as “libertarians”) usually do not make distinctions regarding man’s inability and claim therefore that if a person cannot do otherwise (without qualifying in what respects he cannot do otherwise), they claim therefore that he is not a free agent.

And it is this general argument that I assume when I argue against free will. If a person wishes to argue that PAP is not essential to freedom, then they must make distinctions regarding a person’s ability-to-do-otherwise and explain how, e.g., a man chained down to a chair cannot rightly be punished for his inability to break free.

Bivalence demands that all propositions regarding an agent’s choices at a given period of time be either true or false before the choices are carried out. And if all the agent’s choices are thus “set in stone” prior to their being chosen, then it follows that the agent could not have done otherwise. At this point, therefore, a distinction must be made to separate the scenario in which an agent’s future actions are already “set in stone” and a man chained to a chair. The latter is obviously not free, and therefore if the two examples cannot be conceptually distinguished, the former is not free either.