Free will and foreknowledge revisited

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It’s pretty safe to say that God could alter people’s desires either immediately or by means of secondary causes.

However, we must understand that God’s altering people’s characters is not a matter of temptation. Temptation is always external to oneself and is a matter of appealing to one’s sinful desires. The fact that God is ultimately in control of one’s desires (as He is in control of everything), being an internal action, cannot be considered as temptation.
There has been a change of plans due to the weather, so I’m back! 😃

It depends on what we mean by temptation. In the case of Jesus Christ, temptation was only external because He does not have concupiscence. But in the case of fallen humanity, the temptation is internal. That’s why James says:

James 1:13-14

13Let no one say when he is tempted, “I am being tempted by God”; for God cannot be tempted by evil, and He Himself does not tempt anyone.
14But each one is tempted when he is carried away and enticed by his own lust.


God cannot be tempted by evil precisely because He does not have concupiscence. . James, however, is using “temptation” here in an internal sense, as an internal drawing towards sin. So His point is that God cannot be internally drawn by sin - for he lacks concupiscence - and he does not internally draw anyone to evil. Temptation comes from within, not from God. That means that God does not play a direct role in temptation. If he directly causes a sinful desire to arise at any given moment, then it can be said that He is tempting that person because He is the direct cause of that “unchosen” desire.

To be continued…

God Bless,
Michael
 
I agree that our desires are often, if not always, dynamic and changing. But it still would follow that they would have some specific “value” or “strength” at any given instant.
But do you believe this “value” or “strength” exists before or after deliberation?
Deliberation would imply not that there is a “tie” among desires, but that there is some competition among them. If we were to give desires some numerical rating of strength, I’ll put it this way. If you have a desire to do X at 50 units, and a desire not to do it at 49.9 units, then you will deliberate. If you have a desire to do X at 50 units and a desire not to do it at 0 units, then you will not deliberate to any extent at all.
So I’m assuming that you’re saying that the person will choose X at 50 units? However, how does one quantify desires prior to deliberation? There are times when I strongly want to do something and simultaneously have a somewhat weaker desire not to do it. After deliberation, the “weaker” desire is the one I chose to act upon.
I agree with you that free will doesn’t imply the ability to do anything. Our options are certainly limited by our environment. But free will nonetheless implies that among our available options, we have some absolute, innate ability to choose between them – and that is what I am critiquing.
Then I ask you another question. You believe that God can create a world in which there is libertarian freedom but that this is not such a world. Do you believe that He can create a world in which there is no morality, since you argue that morality implies determinism? If He created a world with libertarian freedom, then does that mean there can’t be morality? If there is morality, then how is that reconciled with libertarian freedom - given the fact that you argue that libertarian freedom destroys morality?

You also argue that since our choices are influenced by desires, dispositions, etc then that means our choices are determined. God’s choices are also have motives or rooted in desires. Doesn’t that mean that God’s choices are determined as well? Does God enjoy freedom of choice?

Also, was it necessary for God to create this world?

God Bless,
Michael
 
Indeed the truth of the statement “Ben chooses X at T2” only comes into existence in the sense of actuation at T2… but that does not mean it is only true at T2, it means that it is only true contingent upon T2.
If T2 cannot occur prior to T2, then how can it be said that a proposition contingent upon a free-willed choice done at T2 is true prior to T2?
You may have replied to this further in this post (I prolly shouldn’t have jumped onto someelse’s subject), but i am still confused as to your objection. In the justice system, the arbiter is considered “arbitrary” when he ignores the laws of the system he has sworn to follow and instead rules according to his own conscience, will, or whim - “arbitrary” is when the reason for the choice exists within the will of the arbiter alone. Your definition of “arbitrary” as “without any motives, reasons, or influences at all” is incorrect - that would be “random” not “arbitrary”, and randomness implies that there is no reason at all, that the choice was determined by chaos and not by the will of any arbiter. Indeed, if that is the case then morality is not part of the discussion. But in free-will, there is an arbiter beyond chaos, namely the human being.
The reason that “random” is particularly inappropriate for this occasion is because then it sounds as if what I’m critiquing is an uncaused choice – but that is a straw man, as what free will actually is (and what I am actually critiquing) is an internally controlled agent-causation. I am trying to say that pure agent-causation, without the influence of unchosen factors (desires, etc.), destroys morality, not that uncaused choices do (even though they do).

I think the fact that we rarely talk about something that is purely caused by an agent might be reason why it’s so hard to pick a word that describes only this – “arbitrary” does not fit the bill well, and yet “random” also does not work as well because it implies a total lack of definite causality. Whatever be the case, please understand what I mean when I say “arbitrary.” I don’t really think it’s that big of a deal if I use a term you don’t prefer, so long as I define exactly what I mean by it.

I also think that the fact that we don’t have a suitable word to describe pure agent-causation also lends a piece of evidence towards my position, but I won’t present that argument for now. 🙂

This is neither a logical necessity nor a practical reality. We often have difficulty choosing between conflicting desires precisely because they are quantitatively equal. Choosing one of these quantitatively equal desires often represents avoiding another, strongly undesirable outcome.
Please see my post above (#159) to see what I told Michael regarding deliberation and desires. Otherwise, I’ll present a situation to you that I have done in the past, in order to explain how the event of at least two equally appealing options, i.e., equally desirable options, is perfectly understandable within the compatibilist framework I am advocating.

Let’s say I go to McDonald’s and have a craving for something really cheap, perhaps off the dollar menu. At the moment I have an equal desire both for a burger and for chicken. Conveniently, I see that the McDouble and the McChicken are both only a dollar. How do I decide between the two, if my desire for burgers and for chicken is equal? Is that when pure agent causation kicks in?

I would say no. Rather, in this situation, the agent commits his choice to a third option, namely whatever might randomly decide the options for him. For instance, I might flip a coin, play eeney-meeney-miney-mo, select one “without thinking,” etc., and in doing so I will commit my choice to the outcome of that. My desire for burgers or chicken will not increase or decrease, but I will nonetheless have decided on one or the other by committing the choice to a random determinant. (Please note that these situations are very uncommon. Even when I go to McDonald’s and decide between a McDouble and McChicken, I find that I desire one more than the other, for whatever reason.)

If you want to say that this is silly because it seems evident that that is not what occurs, and rather what occurs is that the agent sovereignly selects one or the other by his free will, then I would obviously disagree. For why would the agent select one or the other unless he wanted to do so? And if he wanted to do so, then doesn’t that imply an overriding desire?
Knowledge of an event and causation of an event are separate.
I have already said that the argument is grounded primarily not in foreknowledge, but in bivalence. A proposition regarding an agent’s choice is true or false before the agent actually makes the decision, thereby implying that the agent had no alternative possibilities at that time of making the choice – and again, this is because a true proposition cannot become false, a standard dictate of logic.

And if the agent had no alternative possibilities, then this has a bearing on causation, namely that the locus of causal control must be entirely extrinsic to him. For, inasmuch as he possesses sovereign, determining causal control, he has that much ability to do otherwise. But it has already been shown that he has no ability to do otherwise, because he has no alternative possibilities but to choose as he does, by virtue of bivalence. Therefore it follows that the causal locus must be totally outside of him, rendering the free-willist thesis to be false.
 
It depends on what we mean by temptation. In the case of Jesus Christ, temptation was only external because He does not have concupiscence. But in the case of fallen humanity, the temptation is internal.
Here it would be prudent to make a threefold distinction, rather than external/internal. There is the sphere of external sins, and of internal sins, and of the innermost region. From the third sphere comes choices – both choices to sin externally and sin internally. When I spoke of temptations not being internal, I was referring to this third sphere. For instance, if you had a desire to covet, it would lead to the “next level,” an internal sin of coveting something else, and it could also lead to the “next level,” an external sin of actually stealing this object.

So, when I say that temptations are external, I mean that they are not innermost; they are pertaining to the outer two spheres, those of internal action and external action. In this sense, I believe it is quite clear that God is not tempting anyone, for He does not directly present options to the mind (e.g. “This car looks good; you should covet it”) that would entice anyone to sins internal or external.
 
But do you believe this “value” or “strength” exists before or after deliberation?
Before. Though there are certainly choices which affect one’s desires, I would still say that the desires affecting a particular choice (rather than the ones being chosen) must exist prior to the choice.
So I’m assuming that you’re saying that the person will choose X at 50 units? However, how does one quantify desires prior to deliberation? There are times when I strongly want to do something and simultaneously have a somewhat weaker desire not to do it. After deliberation, the “weaker” desire is the one I chose to act upon.
Well, I’d say that in truth you actually desired what you thought was the weaker one.

I think you may have mistaken notions, likely due to a flawed presentation of mine, so I want to make sure you understand two things: (1) I am not saying that deliberation consists of our own calculations of our desires and then acting based on whatever calculation we have. I am saying that the outcome of deliberation depends on the quantities, not the agent’s conscious calculations of those quantities. (2) Desires are not necessarily emotions. You can have an extremely strong desire to uphold duty while having strong emotions to the contrary.
Then I ask you another question. You believe that God can create a world in which there is libertarian freedom but that this is not such a world. Do you believe that He can create a world in which there is no morality, since you argue that morality implies determinism? If He created a world with libertarian freedom, then does that mean there can’t be morality? If there is morality, then how is that reconciled with libertarian freedom - given the fact that you argue that libertarian freedom destroys morality?
First, when I say “morality implies determinism,” I am saying that in this actual world, given the facts of the world we are in now, this is the case. In our world, morality and indeterminism (or at least, libertarianism) are incompatible.

Second, if He created a world that is like ours except that it has one difference, viz. having creatures with libertarian rather than compatibilist freedom, then I would say not only that morality is destroyed, but also that nothing would be chosen. In our world, we always choose things because we want to do them in some aspect or another, and therefore to remove the cause, wants/desires, would also remove the effect, choices.

Third, I can’t presently imagine what a world in which libertarian freedom and morality coexisted would look like, but I can say that I do not think I have enough evidence at hand to say that God is incapable of making such a world. I believe that libertarianism and morality are irreconcilable because of patently obvious facts in this world, but I don’t know what bearing this has on all possible worlds.
You also argue that since our choices are influenced by desires, dispositions, etc then that means our choices are determined. God’s choices are also have motives or rooted in desires. Doesn’t that mean that God’s choices are determined as well? Does God enjoy freedom of choice?

Also, was it necessary for God to create this world?
Both of these are difficult to answer. It seems like it would be permissible to rule out libertarianism (insofar as it depends on desires fueling choices), but God’s mechanism of decision-making could be so far different from ours that it’d be impossible to categorize it as compatibilist or libertarian or anything else. As a result, I simply can’t answer these questions, because His ways are not our ways. My apologies.

Alright, I’m done for the day. Later.
 
Here it would be prudent to make a threefold distinction, rather than external/internal. There is the sphere of external sins, and of internal sins, and of the innermost region. From the third sphere comes choices – both choices to sin externally and sin internally. When I spoke of temptations not being internal, I was referring to this third sphere. For instance, if you had a desire to covet, it would lead to the “next level,” an internal sin of coveting something else, and it could also lead to the “next level,” an external sin of actually stealing this object.

So, when I say that temptations are external, I mean that they are not innermost; they are pertaining to the outer two spheres, those of internal action and external action. In this sense, I believe it is quite clear that God is not tempting anyone, for He does not directly present options to the mind (e.g. “This car looks good; you should covet it”) that would entice anyone to sins internal or external.
You argue that from the third sphere (innermost region) comes choices, correct? Temptation precedes choice (whether internal or external sin) and hence I would argue that its in the innermost region, the “sphere” from which choices the two other spheres originate. The reason why God cannot be tempted in the sense that James uses it is precisely because temptation is in the innermost region and in God’s innemost region there is no concupiscence. In the case of fallen man, there is concupiscence and hence temptation - a drawing towards sin - originates in the innermost region and if acted upon leads to an internal sin (i.e. covet) or an external sin (i.e. stealing).

Now if God immediately alters one’s desires and/ or character and a person suddenly feels tempted to sin, then that is a direct work of God and hence God is tempting the person.

God Bless,
Michael
 
Before. Though there are certainly choices which affect one’s desires, I would still say that the desires affecting a particular choice (rather than the ones being chosen) must exist prior to the choice.
But if there is “value” before deliberation, then why are we deliberating? If I value my money more than my book, then there is no deliberation. I will not buy the book. If I place greater value on the book, then there is no deliberation. I will buy the book. But if I am deliberating and that deliberation lasts for a particularly long period of time, then that means that prior to deliberation I have not placed greater value to any desire. So it seems to me that the “value” or “strength” of a desire is the outcome of deliberation. And the fact that a person can be practically the same circumstances more than once and make different choices.

God Bless,
Michael
 
Well, I’d say that in truth you actually desired what you thought was the weaker one.

I think you may have mistaken notions, likely due to a flawed presentation of mine, so I want to make sure you understand two things: (1) I am not saying that deliberation consists of our own calculations of our desires and then acting based on whatever calculation we have. I am saying that the outcome of deliberation depends on the quantities, not the agent’s conscious calculations of those quantities. (2) Desires are not necessarily emotions. You can have an extremely strong desire to uphold duty while having strong emotions to the contrary.
So are you saying that it is God that places the differing quantities and then the human will moves towards the stronger quantity God has chosen? So we go back to James 1:13-14:

13Let no one say when he is tempted, “I am being tempted by God”; for God cannot be tempted by evil, and He Himself does not tempt anyone.
14But each one is tempted when he is carried away and enticed by his own lust.


A temptor uses means to tempt. If I chose to sin, and my choice is the strongest desire, and that desire has been been placed within me by God so that I am tempted and chose to sin, then that means God is doing the tempting and the “strongest desire” is the means He has chosen.

God Bless,
Michael
 
First, when I say “morality implies determinism,” I am saying that in this actual world, given the facts of the world we are in now, this is the case. In our world, morality and indeterminism (or at least, libertarianism) are incompatible.
So in another world libertarianism and morality are compatible? Libertarianism by definiton involves the ability to chose available options. If this ability does not exist, then it can’t be libertarianism. Free will also involves personal beings, that is, being that have an intellect and a will. And hence free will cannot exist without have beings that have an intellect and if there is an intellect, there are also “wants”, “motives”, etc. The Supreme Personal Being is God and He has an intellect and a will and hence has motives upon which He acts upon.

Now you have argued that libertarianism destroys morality because it means choices are “unaffected” by desires and hence are arbitrary. Since it is impossible for the intellect (which includes desires, wants, motives) etc. not to affect the will, then that means libertarianism always destroys morality regardless of what world libertarianism exists. And hence you are arguing that it is possible for God to create a world in which there is no morality, since libertarianism destroys morality?

Moreover, if God has libertarian free will, then doesn’t that mean that morality is destroyed? But if He his choices are determined, then how are His choices truly free?

God Bless,
Michael
 
Second, if He created a world that is like ours except that it has one difference, viz. having creatures with libertarian rather than compatibilist freedom, then I would say not only that morality is destroyed, but also that nothing would be chosen. In our world, we always choose things because we want to do them in some aspect or another, and therefore to remove the cause, wants/desires, would also remove the effect, choices.

Third, I can’t presently imagine what a world in which libertarian freedom and morality coexisted would look like, but I can say that I do not think I have enough evidence at hand to say that God is incapable of making such a world. I believe that libertarianism and morality are irreconcilable because of patently obvious facts in this world, but I don’t know what bearing this has on all possible worlds.
The problem is that you cannot logically have choices without having any wants or desires, regardless of what world God creates. Any being that has an intellect has wants or motives, including God. If not, they wouldn’ t be a personal being capable fof making choices. Secondly, I don’t see how libertarian freedom in this world is intrinsically incompatible with morality but its possible that it is not intrinsically incompatible with morality in another world. When it comes to choice, you have to have two basic logical components:
  1. An intellect
  2. A will
Again, the most perfect and supreme example of this is God Himself. If you do not have an intellect and a will, then you cannot make a choice and hence there is no libertarian freedom. So in any world God creates in which libertarian freedom exists, creatures with an intellect and a will must also exist. And if they have an intellect, they also have wants and desires, like God. Therefore, if they have wants and desires and have libertarian freedom, then according to your argument, they have destroyed morality. So it is possible for God to create a world without morality.

I would also like to know what the “patently obvious facts” are?

God Bless,
Michael
 
Both of these are difficult to answer. It seems like it would be permissible to rule out libertarianism (insofar as it depends on desires fueling choices), but God’s mechanism of decision-making could be so far different from ours that it’d be impossible to categorize it as compatibilist or libertarian or anything else. As a result, I simply can’t answer these questions, because His ways are not our ways. My apologies.

Alright, I’m done for the day. Later.
I don’t think we can have precise knowledge of God’s mechanism of “decision-making,” but we also know from Scripture and creation itself that God has both an intellect and a will and that he also makes choices (i.e. the principle of election that is emphasized by Calvinism). So if we say as a general principle that if desires and motives are present, then choices are determined and this “truth” must also apply to God as well. Since God has “motives” (justice, love, etc.) then that means His choices are also determined. But if we argue that God is an exception to the rule, then that means that having desires or motives does not necessitate determinism. We can say birds fly, for example. But we cannot say being a bird necessitates flying for there are flightless birds. So we cam say hypothetically that making choices rooted in motives and determinism are compatible, but we cannot say that choices rooted in motives necessitates determinism. Because then one would have to conclusively argue that God’s choices are determined and that He does not have libertarian freedom. But if there is just one example of motives and choices coexisting with libertarian freedom, then that means that one thing (motives/choices) does not necessitate the other (determinism). And if having motives does not necessitate determinism, then this philosophical argument against libertarian freedom is negated.

Moreover, God does not need anyone or anything. If He needed someone or something, then that would make God truly dependant on creation to keep anyone of His attributes intact. God is a self-subsisting being. And hence creation is a pure act of divine choice and not a necessity. This also means that this is an act of libertarian freedom.

His ways are not ways. He also says His thoughts are not our thoughts and hence He has motives and choice. And if motives and choice can coexist in God without necessitating determinism, then that means that God can also create creatures in which motives and choice coexist without determinism. And if libertarian freedom can possibly exist in God without destroying morality, that also means that God can create a world in which creatures possess libertarian freedom without destroying morality. In other words, there is no philosphical contradiction between having motives and libertarian freedom or libertarian freedom and morality. For in any world, choice will always involve the intellect and the will.

God Bless,
Michael
 
If T2 cannot occur prior to T2, then how can it be said that a proposition contingent upon a free-willed choice done at T2 is true prior to T2?
Wow, do you really not understand how truth is eternal? I think I’m repeating myself at this point. The logical statement whose truth is contingent upon some time T2 is true at all times before and after T2 also because its truth is not contingent upon those times, but only upon T2. When humanity discovered that the circumference of a circle could be calculated by multiplying the diameter by the constant pi, the truth of the discovery (c=d x pi) was already true, had been true since the existence of circular objects (or the form, if you want to be Platonic). The truth of the equation was not contingent upon the moment of our discovering it to be true. Again, if “the world comes to end on 12/21/2012” is true, then the event was always going to happen because the statement is true. Similarly, if “Ben chooses X at T2” is indeed true, then it was true before Ben ever actually chose X at T2, it simply was not actuated until then.
Truth does not depend on the time of its utterance. The truth of a logical statement regarding an event does depend on time, but only in the sense that a moment in time is part of the logical statement itself. That is why the statements “Ben chooses X at T2” and “Ben chooses X at not-T2” can only both be true if Ben can choose X more than once, in which case the latter statement is incomplete for it is temporally non-specific.
Am I getting through? If the statement has only 4 parts, then its truth is contingent upon only those 4 specific parts. If one of those parts is a moment T2, then as long as T2 did/does/will happen then that portion of the statement remains logically sound; but since we have accepted “Ben chooses X at T2” is true, then logic demands each and every part of the statement remain sound. That means that, even if there is no Ben yet, nor any X, and T2 has not yet come to pass, we know that all must come together to satisfy the known truth of the statement…
The reason that “random” is particularly inappropriate for this occasion is because then it sounds as if what I’m critiquing is an uncaused choice – but that is a straw man, as what free will actually is (and what I am actually critiquing) is an internally controlled agent-causation. I am trying to say that pure agent-causation, without the influence of unchosen factors (desires, etc.), destroys morality, not that uncaused choices do (even though they do).
I think the fact that we rarely talk about something that is purely caused by an agent might be reason why it’s so hard to pick a word that describes only this – “arbitrary” does not fit the bill well, and yet “random” also does not work as well because it implies a total lack of definite causality. Whatever be the case, please understand what I mean when I say “arbitrary.” I don’t really think it’s that big of a deal if I use a term you don’t prefer, so long as I define exactly what I mean by it.
I also think that the fact that we don’t have a suitable word to describe pure agent-causation also lends a piece of evidence towards my position, but I won’t present that argument for now. 🙂
Actually, i think we (humans) constantly talk about agent-caused events, and all human experience points to their reality, which is the reason you are having so much trouble expressing your argument! I know precisely what you mean, and the problem is that you have run into a mutual exclusion of three possibilities, 2 of which eliminate moral discourse.
A) All choices are determined solely by factors external to the agent’s own will, decisions are merely the instantaneous victory of a powerful externally-caused desire over a weaker one (2>1) and the strength of these externally-caused desires was determined by previous external causes, ab aeterno;
B) All choices are determined solely by chaos, i.e. desires have no intrinsic weight (and as such needn’t even be called “desires”) but irresistibly influence (or not) the choice of the agent according to random chance, like the flipping of a coin or rolling of dice;
or C) All choices are ultimately solely determined by the independent will of the agent (arbiter) who is capable of choosing between desires or subjectively determining their weight (though he needn’t always) and allowing whichever he chooses to sway his decision.
Options A & B logically negate morality, but C fits perfectly into the definition of “arbitrary” and exemplifies human experience as evinced in our systems of justice and the majority of people’s belief systems. C is the only one that allows for the existence of morality, freewill, and a deity describable is such terms. The existence of free will is an empirical fact based upon the assertion that there can exist 2 desires of subjectively equal weight between which the arbiter chooses, and the denial that the choice was random (as proponents of B contend).
 
First of all, I must admit that there is far too much going on in this thread for me to follow. I’ve got three small children to chase around the house, and have little time to read every post, so I apologize if I go over something we’ve already talked into the ground.

My observation is that both sides have very difficult things we are trying to prove. Confessor01 must prove that:
It is meaningful to talk of a just God, and yet to claim that this just God predestines men to a destiny (possibly hell) that cannot possibly be escaped.
This proof defies common sense, since it seems to say that my actions are my responsibility despite the fact that I am not responsible for them – I could not not choose them.

From my perspective, your response to this has been marvelously agile, but never quite persuasive. You tell me that such a God is just, but how can I confirm that? If you quite pinned me into a corner and convinced me that your interpretation of Scripture was correct, I would reject Scripture. Why? Because I do not believe that God would give us an intuition of justice, and then egregiously violate it. We do not know our sense of justice to be infallible, true, and we are not qualified to judge God. But why would God practice such a deception on us?

Meanwhile, I am forced to defend the idea that:
Some actions are freely chosen by an agent, and neither determined by his constellation of desires nor anything else previously existing in his person, and yet they carry moral weight.
I have looked back on some old papers of mine, and I want to tweak what I said earlier. I said before that “I may choose which motivations I will be compelled by”. This is an oversimplification. Rather, in following the ideas of C.A. Campbell, free will is manifest in decisions of whether to exert *moral effort *or not. This is the freedom to resist one’s own established character – whether a habitually evil person (that is, most of us, most of the time) will lend their moral will to complement the grace of God, or not.
I understand that, according to the Catholic notion, God made humans as “mini-creators” and in doing so gave them the free will that He already has. I get that. But it doesn’t follow that asserting this – saying that you have free will “through the power of God,” etc. – is conducive to explaining how my argument is not cogent.
I consider your argument perfectly cogent. If I choose to believe it, however, it will force me to believe that God is unjust and cruel. Whether I am wrong or right in that judgment, I will be compelled by the very intuition He gave me to reject Him. Or, if I am predestined for grace anyway, I will spend much of my life comforting and consoling people that God is sending eternally to hell, without their having a free will to deserve it.
This is the exact problem I am trying to reveal that is necessarily inherent in the free-willist paradigm, viz. how one goes about choosing which things he will be influenced by, when those influences are always unchosen. This is contrary to experience and destroys morality; please see my explanations of that above.
I have looked at those explanations. I realize that my point is not perfectly argued, and I do desire to be as correct and complete as I can possibly be. I assert that it is possible to exert moral effort in a way that is entirely agent-initiated (morally relevant) and yet not caused by the previous state of events. Although I doubt that my solution destroys morality, I am quite convinced that the Calvinist solution does destroy morality.

That said, I can’t tell you how enjoyable it is to conduct a debate like this. I am convinced that God sometimes sustains us in error (but which one of us 🤷) just so that we can have a hell (heaven?) of a time figuring things out together. But – in His own good time – may the Lord grant each of us wisdom to know the whole truth (which is probably something neither of us imagined).
 
Temptation precedes choice (whether internal or external sin) and hence I would argue that its in the innermost region, the “sphere” from which choices the two other spheres originate.
That temptation precedes choice could just as much imply that it is affecting one externally, in which case it would not originate from the innermost sphere. For instance, I can be tempted by walking along a nude beach; my being there, and therefore my cause of temptation, is purely outside of me, or at least my being there is not a matter of my desires being directly affected by some other individual. They might be appealed to, but not increased or decreased.
The reason why God cannot be tempted in the sense that James uses it is precisely because temptation is in the innermost region and in God’s innemost region there is no concupiscence. In the case of fallen man, there is concupiscence and hence temptation - a drawing towards sin - originates in the innermost region and if acted upon leads to an internal sin (i.e. covet) or an external sin (i.e. stealing).
It’s because temptation appeals to (not originates from) the innermost region.
But if there is “value” before deliberation, then why are we deliberating? If I value my money more than my book, then there is no deliberation. I will not buy the book. If I place greater value on the book, then there is no deliberation.
Because the values conflict and compete with each other. If you value your money substantially more than you value your book, then there is no deliberation. If you value them both almost equally, then your decision becomes much more intense, and it becomes a deliberation.
And the fact that a person can be practically the same circumstances more than once and make different choices.
Practically similar circumstances are not identical circumstances – and even identical environments would not be identical circumstances, unless the person’s innermost sphere, his decision-making structure involving all his desires, motives, etc., were identical as well.
So are you saying that it is God that places the differing quantities and then the human will moves towards the stronger quantity God has chosen? So we go back to James 1:13-14
The fact that God is somehow involved in people’s temptations (even by His having direct control over the human heart) should not be surprising, seeing as He is the Creator and sovereign King of the universe, and the universe itself contains many instances of temptations. It seems that you want to divorce God from any possible involvement of any sort in temptation, which I do not see in James 1:13-14 or any passage in the Bible. If you believe that the passage teaches that God cannot have control over the strength of humans’ desires, even towards evil, then please show why.
So in another world libertarianism and morality are compatible?
Perhaps. I don’t know. To be honest, I’m kind of surprised that you’ve stuck with this point for so long.
Libertarianism by definiton involves the ability to chose available options. If this ability does not exist, then it can’t be libertarianism.
I’m fairly certain that, if you would peruse the definitions of metaphysical libertarianism according to the current philosophy world, you will find that that is not the definition of it, or rather that the definition is more exclusive than what you have said. But even if you want to define it as such, please realize that I am not critiquing what you have defined to be libertarianism.
Since it is impossible for the intellect (which includes desires, wants, motives) etc. not to affect the will, then that means libertarianism always destroys morality regardless of what world libertarianism exists. And hence you are arguing that it is possible for God to create a world in which there is no morality, since libertarianism destroys morality?
Well, first, it’s certainly possible for God to create a world without morality – by that, I mean a world in which there are no created moral beings, as God Himself remains the standard of morality. Take, for example, if God desired to make a world only of plants.

Second, it is conceivable that God could structure the nature of the intellect and will differently, so in that case there might be a compatibility of libertarianism and morality. But nonetheless in this world, it is structured in such a way to preclude their compatibility.

Third, even if there is no possible alternative structure of the intellect and will, then that means there is no possible world in which libertarianism and morality can coexist, in which case my entire argument is totally unaffected.
Moreover, if God has libertarian free will, then doesn’t that mean that morality is destroyed? But if He his choices are determined, then how are His choices truly free?
I don’t know how God’s intellect and will are structured. Furthermore, if it were the case that they couldn’t be structured in such a way as to allow for God to have libertarian free will, then they could still be structured in some other way, different from the various options we have presented thus far (libertarianism, compatibilism, etc.).

(continued below)
 
(continued from above)
If you do not have an intellect and a will, then you cannot make a choice and hence there is no libertarian freedom.
Statements like these beg the question. I have shown why libertarianism is impossible and why morality and determinism are compatible, and yet you assert that they are not. These asserted objections can certainly not be logical objections at all. Seriously, saying things like, “God has motives and choices; therefore we can too,” when in fact you mean, “God has motives and choices; therefore we can have libertarian freedom,” is assuming what you want to prove. I have already explained at length why choice does not equal libertarianism. Please stop assuming it does.
Since God has “motives” (justice, love, etc.) then that means His choices are also determined. But if we argue that God is an exception to the rule, then that means that having desires or motives does not necessitate determinism.
No, what this means is that God’s motives do not necessitate determinism for God. It would be an equivocation, if not a blasphemy, to assume that the decision-making structure for the Creator is identical to the creature.

Moreover, when I say that morality necessitates determinism, I am saying that in this actual world, given the undeniable facts of this world, morality necessitates determinism. I apologize if this implied statement was unclear.

Wow, do you really not understand how truth is eternal? I think I’m repeating myself at this point.
Drop the arrogance. I don’t appreciate it.
The logical statement whose truth is contingent upon some time T2 is true at all times before and after T2 also because its truth is not contingent upon those times, but only upon T2.
You’re not answering my question. I understand that you’re saying the truth of the proposition is contingent upon the time it is made. But how can it be true prior to the time upon which it is contingent if the time upon which it is contingent has not yet occurred? Simply asserting that truth is eternal, even in the form of a mocking question, does not resolve this issue. You’re saying that a proposition’s truth is contingent upon a specific time period that has not yet occurred. If this is the case, then if that time period has not yet occurred, then it follows that the truth of that proposition, being contingent upon the not-yet-occurred time period, is not yet established, in which case it would be a mistake to say that the proposition is true prior to its occurrence.

Presumably, you attempt to solve this by appealing to the “actuated” truth of a proposition, but there are a few problems with that: (1) “Actuated” is not a descriptor that applies to truth but to possibilities, as in modal logic, and (2) there is no difference regarding the truth of a proposition before or after its occurrence (its “actuation”); a proposition is just as true prior to its occurrence as after, as you have stated earlier. Now, if the truth of a proposition – not the actuation of its truth – is contingent upon the time during which it occurs, then appealing to something besides the truth is simply a red herring.
Actually, i think we (humans) constantly talk about agent-caused events, and all human experience points to their reality, which is the reason you are having so much trouble expressing your argument!
Obviously it is true that humans often talk about choices (and therefore agent-caused acts), but what I said is that we rarely talk about pure agent-caused acts, i.e. acts made apart from any types of desires or motivations. And I would argue that this is because such acts never occur, because they are impossible and contrary to the nature of human freedom.
Options A & B logically negate morality, but C fits perfectly into the definition of “arbitrary” and exemplifies human experience as evinced in our systems of justice and the majority of people’s belief systems.
First, stating that option A negates morality after I explained at length why all objections to its compatibility with morality are petitio principiis is itself a petitio principii.

Second, you can’t seriously be trying to simply assert that option C "fits perfectly into the definition of ‘arbitrary’ "! Please, deal with my arguments.

I consider your argument perfectly cogent. If I choose to believe it, however, it will force me to believe that God is unjust and cruel.
Might you consider that your intuition is false? You have yourselves said that “most of us” are evil a lot – with which I wholeheartedly agree. With this in mind, why would you believe that what you “feel” is correct over what might be said in Scripture, or demanded by God-given reason?

Alright, this is it for me, and due to how my location works out, for the weekend. I’ll see y’all next on Monday.
 
Might you consider that your intuition is false? You have yourselves said that “most of us” are evil a lot – with which I wholeheartedly agree. With this in mind, why would you believe that what you “feel” is correct over what might be said in Scripture, or demanded by God-given reason?
It makes no difference whether my intuition is false. I said that “If I choose to believe it, however, it will **force **me to believe that God is unjust and cruel.” I may use my reason to understand why I should assent to a proposition, but I cannot control my fundamental beliefs.

Fundamental belief: I choose my own actions.
Fundamental belief #2: People ought not punish others for something they could not help being/doing.

I would be surprised if you didn’t, in 99.9999% of all possible cases, agree with those two fundamental beliefs. But somehow, in case #10000000, you say that God need not conform to belief #2. I understand why, but I’m afraid you’re being sold a bill of goods.

Now, you might say “God is not a person.” He is not a human being, but He is a person. He is personal. Just as a Father would not instill in His son a false idea of morality, God would not instill in us a false sense of right and wrong. Paul does not say that what he thinks is right isn’t right; he says that he does not **do **what he thinks is right. It is possible to have a corrupted conscience, but it is possible to retain the idea of true morality we are born with and yet still sin.

It is not about what I feel. It is about the reality of God’s revelation in my rational nature. Your worldview involves a redefinition of “love”: it comes to mean one thing for men, and another thing for God. I cannot agree to that.
 
This has been an intellectually stimulating thread. I just picked up on it on page 9 after Ben pointed me here. I want to introduce a couple of other concepts to this discussion.
The main thrust of the past 3 pages has been Ben’s assertion that all human decisions are driven by motivations that are implanted by God. This renders man into no more than a morality computer. Whatever is (name removed by moderator)ut is consequently output.

I don’t see it that way. Man was given a series of unique gifts. He was given Free will, the ability to choose. He was given reason, the mechanism by which he choses. And he was given conscience, God’s direct (name removed by moderator)ut to us of right and wrong.

I would assert that people have widely divergent capability to reason and that no two people think the same way. This is part of our uniqueness and part of what makes us human. No each of us uses our ability to reason to make decisions based on a series of (name removed by moderator)uts. We have our experience, our intuition and we also have what our conscience tells us. At times, we go against what our conscience tells us and we subsequently feel bad. I’m sure every human being has experienced that at least once in their lives (with the exception of Jesus and Mary).

To deny that we are independent beings, capable of making our own decisions is to belie our humanity. You can offer no proof that man is not capable of independent thought. And it goes against the whole of scripture, which exhorts us to do follow the commandments, to love our neighbors and God. and warns that the wages of sin is death. You know that virtually all the epistles have sections defining how to live the Christian life. Why would this be necessary if we had no real choice? And why would we be told that we would be judged based on the commandments (Matthew 19: 15-19) and whether we carried out the works of mercy for the least of our brothers (Matthew 25: 31-46) if that was pre-ordained and out of our control?

As I said on the other thread, I understand the desire to give all credit to God, but in fact, this line of thought doesn’t give God enough credit. Why couldn’t an omniscient and omnipotent God develop a plan that would allow man to have free will without losing control? Why would men have to be pre-programmed robots for God to keep control? And doesn’t it make sense that a Just God would judge us based on our own actions? And finally, wouldn’t a loving God give us lives that had meaning? Don’t you all realize that we are tested throughout our lives. Our lives have meaning because we can choose between good and evil and be rewarded with Heaven or condemned to Hell. After all, a life without choices, challenges and responsibility isn’t much of a life. Who would want that? and why would a loving God create a universe like that?
 
Drop the arrogance… I understand that you’re saying the truth of the proposition is contingent upon the time it is made. But how can it be true prior to the time upon which it is contingent if the time upon which it is contingent has not yet occurred? …You’re saying that a proposition’s truth is contingent upon a specific time period that has not yet occurred …if that time period has not yet occurred, then it follows that the truth of that proposition, being contingent upon the not-yet-occurred time period, is not yet established, in which case it would be a mistake to say that the proposition is true prior to its occurrence.
I am sorry, i don’t mean to sound arrogant, but I am banging my head against a wall. Among the characteristics of Truth (and I mean real, honest, not just an opinion or belief, “truth”) are immutability and timelessness - Truth is eternal. Now, in a world free of both omniscience and absolute determinism, Truth regarding future events cannot be established, perhaps even is not established - there is no truth regarding time-contingent events beyond this very moment because anything might happen to negate our predictions and prophecies. However, we do not live in a world so free if you accept the existence of an omniscient being or absolute determinism. An omniscient being is aware of all events, even those that have not yet occurred, and so to Him the truth of such is (metaphorically speaking) already established, regardless of whether or not He tells anyone or whether or not people believe He even exists (assuming that He actually does exist - I’ll ignore determinism for the time being).
Now, the omniscient being knows what, from our perspective, has yet to happen. That knowledge necessarily implies an immutable Truth with regard to all events at all points in time (and their corresponding false antitheses). This means that any complete logical statement regarding an event, eg. “Ben chooses X at T2”, is already established as True or False with respect to the omniscient being’s knowledge of T2 and all corresponding events, regardless of whether or not T2 has been actuated from the perspective of those in time. Thus, what is true about T2 is actually true prior to being actuated at T2. The truth of the proposition is not “up in the air” even though the event hasn’t occurred yet.
However, if you do not accept absolute determinism or the existence of an omniscient being, then indeed the truth of an event is not established until actuated at the time upon which it is necessarily contingent.
Is that any better?
…appealing to the “actuated” truth of a proposition, but there are a few problems with that: (1) “Actuated” is not a descriptor that applies to truth but to possibilities, as in modal logic, and (2) there is no difference regarding the truth of a proposition before or after its occurrence (its “actuation”); a proposition is just as true prior to its occurrence as after, as you have stated earlier. Now, if the truth of a proposition – not the actuation of its truth – is contingent upon the time during which it occurs, then appealing to something besides the truth is simply a red herring.
Hmm… that sounded like you do understand. (2) is indeed what I have been saying, it’s simply the term “actuated” you have issues with? Perhaps I’ve been misusing it… By “actuated” I mean “actualized in time-space reality”: If “Ben chooses X at T2” is true, it has always been true but is not actuated until all necessary components of the statement are actualized in time-space reality since one of them is T2. Does that make sense? My apologies if I have been misusing “actuated” - I did not mean to suggest that a true statement had the potential of being false until the moment upon which the statement was contingent, only that that moment (T2) and the truth of the statement were necessarily conjoined by logic.
 
…we rarely talk about pure agent-caused acts, i.e. acts made apart from any types of desires or motivations. And I would argue that this is because such acts never occur, because they are impossible and contrary to the nature of human freedom.
I think mikeledes has already set about helping you with this one, so I won’t repeat him :p.
First, stating that option A negates morality after I explained at length why all objections to its compatibility with morality are petitio principiis is itself a petitio principii.
Second, you can’t seriously be trying to simply assert that option C "fits perfectly into the definition of ‘arbitrary’ "! Please, deal with my arguments.
First, I was just giving my perception of the matter, and I think others on this thread are doing a better job than I of explaining the logic behind it and the logical exclusion of all other positions (maybe they are not). But I’ll look back at your arguments in the thread (it may take a while). I will state that appealing to God as the source of all morality, justice, and goodness is a petitio principii as well, which may mean that we are all SOL. My main concern is whether or not all reality and human experience is an illusion - call it a Cartesian dilemma - which is the reason I assert C. Secondly, the definition I found of “arbitrary”, which fits perfectly into C, is from Merriam-Webster:
1: depending on individual discretion and not fixed by law
2a: not restrained or limited in the exercise of power: ruling by absolute authority; b: marked by or resulting from the unrestrained and often tyrannical exercise of power
3a: based on or determined by individual preference or convenience rather than by necessity or the intrinsic nature of something; b: existing or coming about seemingly at random or by chance or as a capricious and unreasonable act of will

Perhaps I’ll just leave to others the discussion of why free will is necessary for and not destructive of morality, but I do think that the definition of “arbitrary” fits my C and vice versa, that part really can’t be argued against until you present an alternate definition of “arbitrary” and explain where you got it.
 
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