Indeed the truth of the statement “Ben chooses X at T2” only comes into existence in the sense of actuation at T2… but that does not mean it is only true at T2, it means that it is only true contingent upon T2.
If T2 cannot occur prior to T2, then how can it be said that a proposition contingent upon a free-willed choice done at T2 is true prior to T2?
You may have replied to this further in this post (I prolly shouldn’t have jumped onto someelse’s subject), but i am still confused as to your objection. In the justice system, the arbiter is considered “arbitrary” when he ignores the laws of the system he has sworn to follow and instead rules according to his own conscience, will, or whim - “arbitrary” is when the reason for the choice exists within the will of the arbiter alone. Your definition of “arbitrary” as “without any motives, reasons, or influences at all” is incorrect - that would be “random” not “arbitrary”, and randomness implies that there is no reason at all, that the choice was determined by chaos and not by the will of any arbiter. Indeed, if that is the case then morality is not part of the discussion. But in free-will, there is an arbiter beyond chaos, namely the human being.
The reason that “random” is particularly inappropriate for this occasion is because then it sounds as if what I’m critiquing is an
uncaused choice – but that is a straw man, as what free will actually is (and what I am actually critiquing) is an internally controlled agent-causation. I am trying to say that pure agent-causation, without the influence of unchosen factors (desires, etc.), destroys morality, not that uncaused choices do (even though they do).
I think the fact that we rarely talk about something that is purely caused by an agent might be reason why it’s so hard to pick a word that describes only this – “arbitrary” does not fit the bill well, and yet “random” also does not work as well because it implies a total lack of definite causality. Whatever be the case, please understand what I mean when I say “arbitrary.” I don’t really think it’s that big of a deal if I use a term you don’t prefer, so long as I define exactly what I mean by it.
I also think that the fact that we don’t have a suitable word to describe pure agent-causation also lends a piece of evidence towards my position, but I won’t present that argument for now.
This is neither a logical necessity nor a practical reality. We often have difficulty choosing between conflicting desires precisely because they are quantitatively equal. Choosing one of these quantitatively equal desires often represents avoiding another, strongly undesirable outcome.
Please see my post above (#159) to see what I told Michael regarding deliberation and desires. Otherwise, I’ll present a situation to you that I have done in the past, in order to explain how the event of at least two equally appealing options, i.e., equally
desirable options, is perfectly understandable within the compatibilist framework I am advocating.
Let’s say I go to McDonald’s and have a craving for something really cheap, perhaps off the dollar menu. At the moment I have an equal desire both for a burger and for chicken. Conveniently, I see that the McDouble and the McChicken are both only a dollar. How do I decide between the two, if my desire for burgers and for chicken is equal? Is that when pure agent causation kicks in?
I would say no. Rather, in this situation,
the agent commits his choice to a third option, namely whatever might
randomly decide the options for him. For instance, I might flip a coin, play eeney-meeney-miney-mo, select one “without thinking,” etc., and in doing so I will commit my choice to the outcome of that. My desire for burgers or chicken will not increase or decrease, but I will nonetheless have decided on one or the other by committing the choice to a random determinant. (Please note that these situations are very uncommon. Even when I go to McDonald’s and decide between a McDouble and McChicken, I find that I
desire one more than the other, for whatever reason.)
If you want to say that this is silly because it seems evident that that is not what occurs, and rather what occurs is that the agent sovereignly selects one or the other by his free will, then I would obviously disagree. For why would the agent select one or the other unless he
wanted to do so? And if he wanted to do so, then doesn’t that imply an
overriding desire?
Knowledge of an event and causation of an event are separate.
I have already said that the argument is grounded primarily not in
foreknowledge, but in
bivalence. A proposition regarding an agent’s choice is true or false before the agent actually makes the decision, thereby implying that the agent had no alternative possibilities at that time of making the choice – and again, this is because a true proposition cannot become false, a standard dictate of logic.
And if the agent had no alternative possibilities, then this has a bearing on
causation, namely that the locus of causal control must be
entirely extrinsic to him. For, inasmuch as he possesses sovereign, determining causal control, he has that much
ability to do otherwise. But it has already been shown that he has
no ability to do otherwise, because he has no alternative possibilities but to choose as he does, by virtue of bivalence. Therefore it follows that the causal locus must be totally outside of him, rendering the free-willist thesis to be false.