C
Chiral
Guest
Your pretty busy with Mikeledes now, but I’ll reply to this old post briefly…
Absolute ability cannot include a logical contradiction, that is why the omnipotent+inability question fails. At T2, S freely chooses X - for this reason, X is true at T2 and not-X is false. Otherwise stated, X is true at T2 iff S freely chooses X at T2. Write down the premises and then the argument - that may help (it’s what they had us do in school).
You missed that X is an event and thereby constrained to time, namely T2. The statement is “X is true at T2” - this statement is true for all eternity, but X cannot be separated from T2 as events involve a verb with tense. Thus, “X is true” is meaningless. I’m sorry, but regardless of your beliefs on the subject, the logic holds up. But the beauty of logic is that you can test it! Go at itI do not believe this holds up. We can talk about actualized possibilities, but not about actualized truths. If X is true, then it’s true whether or not the event has occurred yet; there is no distinction to be made between non-actualized truths (as if a proposition is true but could be false) and actualized truths (as if a proposition is true but could not be false). Truthfulness precludes “possible falsity” whether the event of a proposition has occurred (whether the proposition has been “actualized,” as you say) or not.
That’s fine - it isn’t supported by logic, scripture, and not even by atheist materialism which allows for chaos, but I will let it slide if you think it strays from the thread.Also, regarding points that you made besides this one, I agree that we have the ability to do otherwise in a sense: I believe we do not have an absolute ability to do otherwise, but a counterfactual one (i.e. if our desires were different at a point in time). But this is straying from the thread. For now, suffice it to say that free will requires an absolute ability to do otherwise, which I believe is impossible.
See above regarding events and their necessary logical association with time.This can hold up only if the choice has already occurred or otherwise been “set in stone” such that the agent absolutely cannot do otherwise at all times approaching the time that the choice is made. It is unwarranted to say that a choice at T2 is based upon the abiding truth of a proposition that is true at T1 because of the agent’s choice at T2, for why would it be true before T2 if it were based on an event occurring at T2? That removes the “otherwiseness” of choices; they must be undetermined (i.e. not “set in stone”) at every moment prior to the actual choice.
…and you didn’t just ask a contradiction? Read what you wrote.I am not asking if a free agent can choose both X and not-X, but rather, given that it is true at T1 that he will choose X at T2, if he has the absolute ability to choose not-X at T2.
Absolute ability cannot include a logical contradiction, that is why the omnipotent+inability question fails. At T2, S freely chooses X - for this reason, X is true at T2 and not-X is false. Otherwise stated, X is true at T2 iff S freely chooses X at T2. Write down the premises and then the argument - that may help (it’s what they had us do in school).