Free will and foreknowledge revisited

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Your pretty busy with Mikeledes now, but I’ll reply to this old post briefly…
I do not believe this holds up. We can talk about actualized possibilities, but not about actualized truths. If X is true, then it’s true whether or not the event has occurred yet; there is no distinction to be made between non-actualized truths (as if a proposition is true but could be false) and actualized truths (as if a proposition is true but could not be false). Truthfulness precludes “possible falsity” whether the event of a proposition has occurred (whether the proposition has been “actualized,” as you say) or not.
You missed that X is an event and thereby constrained to time, namely T2. The statement is “X is true at T2” - this statement is true for all eternity, but X cannot be separated from T2 as events involve a verb with tense. Thus, “X is true” is meaningless. I’m sorry, but regardless of your beliefs on the subject, the logic holds up. But the beauty of logic is that you can test it! Go at it
Also, regarding points that you made besides this one, I agree that we have the ability to do otherwise in a sense: I believe we do not have an absolute ability to do otherwise, but a counterfactual one (i.e. if our desires were different at a point in time). But this is straying from the thread. For now, suffice it to say that free will requires an absolute ability to do otherwise, which I believe is impossible.
That’s fine - it isn’t supported by logic, scripture, and not even by atheist materialism which allows for chaos, but I will let it slide if you think it strays from the thread.
This can hold up only if the choice has already occurred or otherwise been “set in stone” such that the agent absolutely cannot do otherwise at all times approaching the time that the choice is made. It is unwarranted to say that a choice at T2 is based upon the abiding truth of a proposition that is true at T1 because of the agent’s choice at T2, for why would it be true before T2 if it were based on an event occurring at T2? That removes the “otherwiseness” of choices; they must be undetermined (i.e. not “set in stone”) at every moment prior to the actual choice.
See above regarding events and their necessary logical association with time.
I am not asking if a free agent can choose both X and not-X, but rather, given that it is true at T1 that he will choose X at T2, if he has the absolute ability to choose not-X at T2.
…and you didn’t just ask a contradiction? Read what you wrote.
Absolute ability cannot include a logical contradiction, that is why the omnipotent+inability question fails. At T2, S freely chooses X - for this reason, X is true at T2 and not-X is false. Otherwise stated, X is true at T2 iff S freely chooses X at T2. Write down the premises and then the argument - that may help (it’s what they had us do in school).
 
Again, you are assuming the point in dispute when you assert that God must be responsible for your actions (did you even consider the arguments I put forth for how morality implies determinism?). He is the Creator; you are the creature, and therefore applying arguments by creaturely analogies to prove your point won’t cross the gap. If a creature’s control of another creature’s brain removes the second creature’s moral responsibility, it does not imply that the same principle applies to the Creator, lest you beg the question.

Cows are not made in God’s image.
Can you explain what is meant by morality implies determinism.

Also I dont understand how if I am responsible for my lab creations actions, it doesnt imply that God is responsible for his. God is ALL knowing. That means, when he made my brain, he knew exactly what would happen the way he programmed it. That is no different then me making a brain and knowing it would turn into a killing machine and then me placing the brain in a body which goes around killing people.
 
Can you explain what is meant by morality implies determinism.
I also don’t see the connection.

I also don’t understand the reasoning behind the “intent leads to choice” argument. IMO, compatibilism uses an oversimplified cause and effect model. Prior to making a choice, one can experience more than one desire. I believe we’ve all experienced this. For example, when I go to a bookstore I often have two conflicting desires. One is the desire to buy a certain book and the other one is the desire to save money. So while a desire per se may be unchosen, there is often more than one “unchosen” desire to chose from and act upon.

Now going back to my example. Before making my choice, there is often an internal debate in which I try to figure out which desire I should act upon. This process can last several minutes and sometimes even an hour. And even if I’m waiting on line to pay for the book, the internal debate often still rages. Is this book worth the money I’m paying for it? Can I put this money to better use? Do I have space for this book? etc. So even as I pay for the book and hence made my choice, the other desire is still present. But I chose to act upon my desire to have the book. So the relationship between one’s desires and choices is not always so black and white.

The same can be said about Christians that sin. How many Christians have conflicting desires and thoughts before finally chosing to sin? Even Paul himself said:

Romans 7:19

19 For the good that I will to do, I do not do; but the evil I will not to do, that I practice.

The Christian by the grace of God has the desire to do the will of God and yet also has the desire to sin. Often we act upon the desire to obey God, but often we do not. God has made a promise reagarding temptation:

1 Corinthians 10:13

13 No temptation has overtaken you except such as is common to man; but God is faithful, who will not allow you to be tempted beyond what you are able, but with the temptation will also make the way of escape, that you may be able to bear it.

God provides sufficient grace so that we will be able to endure temptation and overcome it. And yet Christians do sin. But that is a choice.

I don’t see how morality implies determinism. There is an objective standard by which all desires, intentions, and choices are judged, namely, the moral law of God. A desire or choice is good if it is in conformity with the law of God and its is not if it violates it. And we make choices in light of the law. 🤷 So I don’t see how libertarian free will undermines morality.

God Bless,
Michael
 
The main issue is that if there is no free will, then how did God ensure that they would sin without being the author of sin or the one who tempted them? I believe that Scripture is very clear regarding God and sin, they don’t mix. And I don’t believe He would directly cause anyone to sin. And I don’t see how God can infallibly ensure that someone commits a sin without directly causing that person to sin.

God Bless,
Michael
Well, we’ve gone around in circles on this one a lot. What is important is submission to what God says about Himself in His Word. If He says that He hardens the human heart and then punishes them for it, if He says that He is totally sovereign over evil, though not the author of sin, then those statements are true regardless of our comprehending it or not. I’ve seen that many non-Reformed people will assume that it’s perfectly acceptable to read Scripture in light of free will – that is, to impose free will on the text – until they can be explained philosophically how we can be free without their notion of free will.

This is just a wrong thing to do. It is contrary to the nature of faith. If God says something, then it’s true. If God says we don’t have free will, then we first accept it and then attempt to comprehend it. The reverse is idolatry. So, if you want to discuss the specific Scriptures rather than assuming that your present understanding of the subject (which is limited like mine) is the bar of your acceptance of truths of Scripture, then I’d be happy to.
So if God can create a world with libertarian freedom, then there is no intrinsic contradiction between divine foreknowledge and libertarian freedom. For if there was such a intrinsic and logical contradition, then such a world would be impossible. You may deny that in this world, divine foreknowledge and libertarian freedom cannot be reconciled, but you accept at least the hypothetical possibility of divine foreknowledge and libertarian freedom coexisting.

God Bless,
Michael
I couldn’t say there is an a priori, “it is inconceivable to imagine a possible world in which God is sovereign and libertarian free will exists,” contradiction. But I think this actual world does absolutely make the two contradictory.

However, I’m not how the a posteriori contradiction helps out at all.
I’m still waiting for a response to the above question. If God provides a way of escape from temptation to the Christian and Paul connects this to God’s fidelity, how can a Christian not have the free will to choose between His desire to serve God and the way of escape and sin? If he cannot chose otherwise in a real sense, then what “way of escape” did God provide? Or did God not keep His promise?

God Bless,
Michael
No person is ever “forced” to sin in the sense that there was no aspect of ability-to-do-otherwise, as I said before.

And also, how is this a distinctly Reformed issue? You believe that it was true from creation, if not from eternity past, that person S would sin at time T. It was “set in stone” for quite a long time. Person S could not have done otherwise.
IMO, compatibilism uses an oversimplified cause and effect model. Prior to making a choice, one can experience more than one desire. I believe we’ve all experienced this. For example, when I go to a bookstore I often have two conflicting desires. One is the desire to buy a certain book and the other one is the desire to save money. So while a desire per se may be unchosen, there is often more than one “unchosen” desire to chose from and act upon.
The fact that we have conflicting desires does not imply that we have some overarching, sovereign, “choice” that is free from all desires and not itself pushed one way or the other.

When we have two (or more) desires that compete very strongly, that’s when deliberation occurs. Deliberation does not imply libertarianism.
 
You missed that X is an event and thereby constrained to time, namely T2. The statement is “X is true at T2” - this statement is true for all eternity, but X cannot be separated from T2 as events involve a verb with tense. Thus, “X is true” is meaningless. I’m sorry, but regardless of your beliefs on the subject, the logic holds up. But the beauty of logic is that you can test it! Go at it
T2 was contained within X: by the proposition X, I meant “an event E will occur at a time T.” (I thought this was implied when I was talking, and that I didn’t need to make such distinctions. My mistake.) Therefore the proposition X, regarding an event that is peculiar to a specific time, has been true for a long time.
…and you didn’t just ask a contradiction? Read what you wrote.
Absolute ability cannot include a logical contradiction, that is why the omnipotent+inability question fails. At T2, S freely chooses X - for this reason, X is true at T2 and not-X is false. Otherwise stated, X is true at T2 iff S freely chooses X at T2. Write down the premises and then the argument - that may help (it’s what they had us do in school).
What I said is not a contradiction. I asked if X has the ability to choose a second option if it is true that he will not pick that option – not if X will pick the second option if it is true that he won’t (that would be a contradiction).
 
Can you explain what is meant by morality implies determinism.
All our moral actions have certain unchosen motives, desires, dispositions, etc. that influence us. Now, either these can influence us entirely, such that they totally “coerce” us to choose a specific way, or they do not. If they do, then determinism ensues. If they do not, then our choice is ultimately determined by some factor that is wholly unaffected by any motives at all and is thus arbitrary. But arbitrary actions are not in the scope of moral discourse – moral actions are always performed for specific reasons, intentions, etc. Therefore, if unchosen motives, desires, etc. do not wholly influence a person to action, then morality is impossible.

By modus tollens (and gratuitously given the premise that morality does exist on earth, as it’s impossible to believe otherwise), it follows that morality implies determinism.
Also I dont understand how if I am responsible for my lab creations actions, it doesnt imply that God is responsible for his. God is ALL knowing. That means, when he made my brain, he knew exactly what would happen the way he programmed it. That is no different then me making a brain and knowing it would turn into a killing machine and then me placing the brain in a body which goes around killing people.
Because you can’t assume that creaturely principles apply to God by virtue of analogical arguments without assuming what you want to prove, viz. that God is similar to us in the way you think He is.
 
Well, we’ve gone around in circles on this one a lot. What is important is submission to what God says about Himself in His Word. If He says that He hardens the human heart and then punishes them for it, if He says that He is totally sovereign over evil, though not the author of sin, then those statements are true regardless of our comprehending it or not.
This is hocus-pocus. If God tells me that my name is both Daniel and not Daniel, even God cannot make this true. The hypothetical is invalid, because God could not be God and say such a thing truthfully.

If God says that He hardens the human heart and then punishes them for it, we must interpret that so as to conform to simple logic – indeed, the only other option that we have is to reject the authority of the Scripture passage (I am not saying we should do that). He hardens the heart after the human will has freely chosen sin. In Scripture, God hardens hearts that have already turned from Him.

God cannot say that 2 and 2 is 5. He has revealed Himself within the laws of logic – otherwise, why would we have the laws of logic, as it were, inscribed in our minds?
 
This is hocus-pocus. If God tells me that my name is both Daniel and not Daniel, even God cannot make this true. The hypothetical is invalid, because God could not be God and say such a thing truthfully.

If God says that He hardens the human heart and then punishes them for it, we must interpret that so as to conform to simple logic – indeed, the only other option that we have is to reject the authority of the Scripture passage (I am not saying we should do that). He hardens the heart after the human will has freely chosen sin. In Scripture, God hardens hearts that have already turned from Him.

God cannot say that 2 and 2 is 5. He has revealed Himself within the laws of logic – otherwise, why would we have the laws of logic, as it were, inscribed in our minds?
I’m not saying that God is capable of contradiction, but rather assuming that He is not: my point is that if God says something, then by definition it’s not a contradiction.

Otherwise, if you assume an imposition of free will on the text that speaks rather clearly of God’s direct and immediate control over the human heart, then I would plead with you to see the text for what it perspicuously is saying regarding God’s sovereignty.
 
Alright, I think I’m gonna call it a day.

Later dudes, S you in your A’s, don’t wear a C, and J all over your B’s.
 
I’m not saying that God is capable of contradiction, but rather assuming that He is not: my point is that if God says something, then by definition it’s not a contradiction.
Why not assume that it’s not God that’s speaking, or assume that you misunderstood Him?

If I told my brother to hit my sister with a stick, and then blamed him for it, then I would be unjust, even if I were God. The conclusion is not that whatever God says is true (which is self-evident); the conclusion is that God did not do the thing in question. Alternately, the conclusion is that God is not good.

But I’m gonna stick with the free will defense.😉
 
All our moral actions have certain unchosen motives, desires, dispositions, etc. that influence us. Now, either these can influence us entirely, such that they totally “coerce” us to choose a specific way, or they do not. If they do, then determinism ensues. If they do not, then our choice is ultimately determined by some factor that is wholly unaffected by any motives at all and is thus arbitrary. But arbitrary actions are not in the scope of moral discourse – moral actions are always performed for specific reasons, intentions, etc. Therefore, if unchosen motives, desires, etc. do not wholly influence a person to action, then morality is impossible.

By modus tollens (and gratuitously given the premise that morality does exist on earth, as it’s impossible to believe otherwise), it follows that morality implies determinism.

Because you can’t assume that creaturely principles apply to God by virtue of analogical arguments without assuming what you want to prove, viz. that God is similar to us in the way you think He is.
Im just writing taking every thing you say into a real life example so I can help comprehend it.

killing is a moral decision so Ill go with that. So my moral action is to not kill but lets say I have a desire to kill one person but I don’t choose it. Here is where I get confused. How could my unchosen desire (desire to kill someone) make me choose a certain way. What certain way are you speaking of? If my desire to kill someone does make me choose a certain way, then that event was caused by previous events (determinism.) I can agree with that. The event was the certain way, and the previous event was my desire to kill.

I dont understand these parts

If my unchosen desire to kill does not cause me to go a specific way then my choice is determined by something unaffected by motives at all and thus arbitrary.

Therefore, if my unchosen desire to kill does not wholly influence me to action, then morality is impossible.

So im going to break this down simply. I think about killing people, I choose not to, but have an unchosen desire to still kill someone. Can you explain the rest of this in that context? Im still confused
 
Well, we’ve gone around in circles on this one a lot. What is important is submission to what God says about Himself in His Word. If He says that He hardens the human heart and then punishes them for it, if He says that He is totally sovereign over evil, though not the author of sin, then those statements are true regardless of our comprehending it or not. I’ve seen that many non-Reformed people will assume that it’s perfectly acceptable to read Scripture in light of free will – that is, to impose free will on the text – until they can be explained philosophically how we can be free without their notion of free will.

This is just a wrong thing to do. It is contrary to the nature of faith. If God says something, then it’s true. If God says we don’t have free will, then we first accept it and then attempt to comprehend it. The reverse is idolatry. So, if you want to discuss the specific Scriptures rather than assuming that your present understanding of the subject (which is limited like mine) is the bar of your acceptance of truths of Scripture, then I’d be happy to.
I think we all believe here that God is sovereign and that this sovereignty does not exclude evil, though He is not the author of sin. As a Catholic, I believe that God is also absolutely sovereign in how He distributes His graces. He has a right to grant and withhold grace. The following is from the Catholic Haydock Commentary:

**Ver. 15-16. I will have mercy, &c. Then it is not of him that willeth, &c. By these words he again teaches that God’s call and predestination of those whom he has decreed to save, is not upon account of any works or merits in men, but only to be attributed to the mercy and goodness of God. See St. Thomas Aquinas on this chap. lect. iii. See St. Augustine, Encher. chap. xcviii. Epis. 194. in the new Ed. Ep. 105. ad Sixtum de lib. Arbit. chap. xxv. &c. (Witham)

Ver. 17. For the Scripture saith to Pharao, &c. St. Paul had shewn that there was no injustice in God by his giving special graces to the elect; now he shews that God cannot be accounted unjust for leaving the reprobate in their sins, or for punishing them as they deserve; for this purpose he brings the example of Pharao, who remained hardened against all the admonitions and chastisements of him and his kingdom. — Have I raised thee up, placed thee king over Egypt; I have done so many miracles before thee, I have spared thee when thou deservedst to be punished with death, and at last shall punish thee with thy army in the Red Sea, that my name may be known over all the earth. (Witham)

Ver. 18. And whom he will, he hardeneth.[3] That is, permits to be hardened by their own malice, as it is divers times said in Exodus, that Pharao hardened his heart. God, says St. Augustine, is said to harden men’s hearts, not by causing their malice, but by not giving them the free gift of his grace, by which they become hardened by their own perverse will. (Witham) — Not by being the cause, or author of his sin, but by withholding his grace, and so leaving him in his sin, in punishment of his past demerits. (Challoner)**

haydock1859.tripod.com/id153.html

While we affirm that God is absolutely sovereign in how He distributes His grace and that it is an expression of His mercy and goodness - not an entitlement or a payment - we also affirm that man remains truly free under the influence of grace. You may argue that non-Reformed people impose free will on the text, but I believe that the Reformed impose their philosophical/ theological assumptions on the text. But there are alternative and reasonable explanations to the texts that Calvinists often turn to to defend their doctrine.

God Bless,
Michael
 
I couldn’t say there is an a priori, “it is inconceivable to imagine a possible world in which God is sovereign and libertarian free will exists,” contradiction. But I think this actual world does absolutely make the two contradictory.

However, I’m not how the a posteriori contradiction helps out at all.

No person is ever “forced” to sin in the sense that there was no aspect of ability-to-do-otherwise, as I said before.

And also, how is this a distinctly Reformed issue? You believe that it was true from creation, if not from eternity past, that person S would sin at time T. It was “set in stone” for quite a long time. Person S could not have done otherwise.
As you yourself have stated, you can’t say a priori that divine foreknowledge and libertarian freedom are irreconcilable. So the mere fact that God forsees ad act and hence that act will occur as God foresaw it does not mean that libertarian freedom cannot exist.

God Bless,
Michael
 
I know you called it a day, but perhaps you’ll still read this…
T2 was contained within X: by the proposition X, I meant “an event E will occur at a time T.” (I thought this was implied when I was talking, and that I didn’t need to make such distinctions. My mistake.) Therefore the proposition X, regarding an event that is peculiar to a specific time, has been true for a long time.
What I said is not a contradiction. I asked if X has the ability to choose a second option if it is true that he will not pick that option – not if X will pick the second option if it is true that he won’t (that would be a contradiction).
I agree, X at T2 has been true for long time, eternally in fact, which is the point I made which you seem to have missed - X’s truth is contingent on T2. If T2 never occurs, then X is not true. Secondly, yes, the free chooser has the absolute ability to choose between mutually exclusive options until that choice is made, whereupon one choice is actualized as true and the other as false. An infallible observer has no impact on the freedom of that choice, for the observer’s knowledge is contingent on the very act of the choice being made. Again, X at T2 is true if and only if S chooses X at T2. S can (i.e. is free to) choose either X or not-X until T2 - at that moment, i.e. precisely T2, X at T2 becomes true for all eternity. Call it a trans-temporal ripple effect, if you like, but it is simple logic.
 
All our moral actions have certain unchosen motives, desires, dispositions, etc. that influence us. Now, either these can influence us entirely, such that they totally “coerce” us to choose a specific way, or they do not. If they do, then determinism ensues. If they do not, then our choice is ultimately determined by some factor that is wholly unaffected by any motives at all and is thus arbitrary. But arbitrary actions are not in the scope of moral discourse – moral actions are always performed for specific reasons, intentions, etc. Therefore, if unchosen motives, desires, etc. do not wholly influence a person to action, then morality is impossible…
I disagree. Certainly, motives, desires, dispositions do influence our choices. But they do not totally coerce us to choose a specific way or not. Let’s go back to the Christian. According to Calvinism, the Christian is regenerated (new heart, new spirit, etc.) and that means that their motives are now oriented towards God (faith, love, hope, etc.) However, despite this change and infusion of graces, Christians still chose to sin. So why is it that the regenerated heart and soul does not wholly influence the person to the point that they no longer sin because they do not want to sin and hence chose not to sin?

Again, we may have so-called “unchosen” motives, desires, etc, but again I believe you are oversimplifying it. We are not dominated by a single desire and solely act upon that desire. We often simultaneously have conflicting desires, motives, intentions, etc. And this is true for the regenerate and the unregenerate. For example, an unregenerate person is invited by by a friend to join a group that’s planning a major theft. This person may have been raised in a crime infested neighborhood, influenced by thuggish friends, and may even have committed crimes before. However, though he may even have an inclination towards crime, that does not mean that he will chose to commit this particular crime. Why? Because his desire to commit this crime may come in conflict with his basic desire for self-preservation. He now has to determine which of these two desires he must follow. But whatever choice he makes, it is influenced by a desire. If he choses to commit the crime, then he is influenced by his desire to steal. If he choses not commit the crime, then he is influenced by his basic instinct of self-preservation (i.e. he’s afraid he’ll get caught and go to jail.) My point is that of the two desires he has, he choses to act upon one.

So I believe that you are creating a false dichotomy between free will and choices influenced by desires, motives, etc. *All *choices are influenced by a desire or a motive. But one must remember that we often have more than one desire before making our choice. To believe that man has free will does not mean he is unaffected by motives or desires. Free will means that the person has the ability to chose otherwise, the ability to chose available options, and this choice is affected by motives and desires. But since at any given point man can have more than one desire, you cannot say that desire coerces us to choose a specific way. For if that were the case, then how do you explain the words of Paul himself:

Romans 7:19

**19For the good that I want, I do not do, but I practice the very evil that I do not want. **

If Paul wants to do good and yet does evil, then why doesn’t his desire to do good coerce him to chose a specific way, that is, to do good. Why doesn’t his desire to do good, the effect of regeneration, determine the choices he makes. Why doesn’t his actions reflect his desire?

God Bless,
Michael
 
Hmm… by “call it a day”, did our young Protestant-hopeful mean “abandon his cause”?
Tis a shame, I was hoping his little visit would spur him to a more rigorous investigation of the premises on which he bases his beliefs, especially those claiming to be rooted in logic, human experience, and “perspicuous” Biblical interpretation.
But then again, maybe the visit has challenged him…
 
Why not assume that it’s not God that’s speaking, or assume that you misunderstood Him?

If I told my brother to hit my sister with a stick, and then blamed him for it, then I would be unjust, even if I were God. The conclusion is not that whatever God says is true (which is self-evident); the conclusion is that God did not do the thing in question. Alternately, the conclusion is that God is not good.

But I’m gonna stick with the free will defense.😉
It all comes down to whether or not God says the thing in question, in which case we have to go to the Bible and find out rather than assume what the Bible can or cannot say.
killing is a moral decision so Ill go with that. So my moral action is to not kill but lets say I have a desire to kill one person but I don’t choose it. Here is where I get confused. How could my unchosen desire (desire to kill someone) make me choose a certain way. What certain way are you speaking of? If my desire to kill someone does make me choose a certain way, then that event was caused by previous events (determinism.) I can agree with that. The event was the certain way, and the previous event was my desire to kill.
It’s possible to have conflicting desires; in such cases, the stronger desire (eventually) wins out.
If my unchosen desire to kill does not cause me to go a specific way then my choice is determined by something unaffected by motives at all and thus arbitrary.

Therefore, if my unchosen desire to kill does not wholly influence me to action, then morality is impossible.
Yes, that is how I would say it.
So im going to break this down simply. I think about killing people, I choose not to, but have an unchosen desire to still kill someone. Can you explain the rest of this in that context? Im still confused
As long as the desire to kill someone is not strong enough to overcome desires that would keep you from killing someone, then you will continue to refrain from killing people.
I think we all believe here that God is sovereign and that this sovereignty does not exclude evil, though He is not the author of sin. As a Catholic, I believe that God is also absolutely sovereign in how He distributes His graces. He has a right to grant and withhold grace
In my opinion, a lot of groups claiming to follow the Bible understand that God is allowed to dispense grace as He so pleases, that He is not obliged in any way to save anybody, that grace is sufficient, that some form of predestination, etc. do not consistently adhere to these beliefs. It’s fairly effortless to say, “Well of course, God has mercy on whom He has mercy; it’s His privilege, not His obligation,” etc., but it takes more to understand the logical implications of this.

Also, ambiguity plays a huge role. If a Calvinist were to write that entire commentary (i.e., the section you quoted), I would think he was perfectly orthodox. It all comes down to what people mean. I believe that the mechanism by which God hardened Pharaoh was a withdrawal of grace and in that sense a “permission” of evil, which is different from the Catholic viewpoint. But nonetheless both Catholic and Calvinist conceptions of God’s permission of evil can be said with the same words.

This leads to the importance of asking very direct, very revealing questions – e.g. not, Do you believe in predestination?, but, Do you believe the reprobates have any choice in being reprobate or elect?, or, Do you believe God wants only His elect to be saved?

Also, what could be important is simply inquiring into how predestination occurs in a Catholic theology, given free will, etc. Anyway, I’m done ranting.
You may argue that non-Reformed people impose free will on the text, but I believe that the Reformed impose their philosophical/ theological assumptions on the text.
Would you agree that the text is where this dispute is to be solved?
As you yourself have stated, you can’t say a priori that divine foreknowledge and libertarian freedom are irreconcilable. So the mere fact that God forsees ad act and hence that act will occur as God foresaw it does not mean that libertarian freedom cannot exist.
I think you misunderstood my point. By my saying that there is no a priori contradiction between them, what I mean is that it’s not completely inconceivable to think of a world in which God creates men with libertarian freedom. That world would be substantially different from our present one. Given this world, the two are in fact impossible. Given experience of this world, the contradiction is insurmountable; hence it is a posteriori.
I disagree. Certainly, motives, desires, dispositions do influence our choices. But they do not totally coerce us to choose a specific way or not. Let’s go back to the Christian. According to Calvinism, the Christian is regenerated (new heart, new spirit, etc.) and that means that their motives are now oriented towards God (faith, love, hope, etc.) However, despite this change and infusion of graces, Christians still chose to sin. So why is it that the regenerated heart and soul does not wholly influence the person to the point that they no longer sin because they do not want to sin and hence chose not to sin?
Because there are still sinful desires in one’s heart, even after regeneration. Regeneration does not remove all sin in one’s life; that is the final result of sanctification (which is never achieved this side of heaven).

(continued below)
 
(continued from above)
Again, we may have so-called “unchosen” motives, desires, etc, but again I believe you are oversimplifying it. We are not dominated by a single desire and solely act upon that desire. We often simultaneously have conflicting desires, motives, intentions, etc.
I realize we often have conflicting desires, and that we very rarely have only one desire. But my point is that we always have a strongest desire at a particular moment (which could be among 1000 conflicting desires for all I know), viz. for whatever we think to reflect “the good” most at a particular moment. And our choices always act in accord with this strongest desire.

Let me present the argument this way: it is clear that our actions are influenced in some degree by unchosen dispositions, motives, etc. Now, either these dispositions influence us completely or only partially. if the former is true, then determinism follows. If the latter is true, then some factor, “free choice,” must be the ultimate arbiter in a decision, and this “free choice” must itself be wholly unaffected by dispositions and motives (otherwise it would be coerced). But if it is wholly unaffected by dispositions and motives, then it follows that the ultimate arbiter of a decision is entirely arbitrary. And decisions which are entirely arbitrary do not fall under the auspices of moral discourse. Therefore, it follows that if dispositions affect our choices only partially, then morality is destroyed.
Romans 7:19

19For the good that I want, I do not do, but I practice the very evil that I do not want.

If Paul wants to do good and yet does evil, then why doesn’t his desire to do good coerce him to chose a specific way, that is, to do good. Why doesn’t his desire to do good, the effect of regeneration, determine the choices he makes. Why doesn’t his actions reflect his desire?
I have noticed that according to the Bible’s language, upon regeneration the “perspective” of the regenerate changes from the “old man” to the “new man.” Sinful desires are therefore seen as desires that we do not want to do in one sense, since we know they’re wrong and don’t want to displease God; yet want to do in another sense, since we derive immediate pleasure from them (or some similar reason). Likewise, godly desires can be desires that we want in one sense and do not want in the other sense. Paul is referring not to his desires in the sense that they determine his actions, but in the other sense.

The example I like to use when explaining this is a little boy whose mother has told him to eat his vegetables. He certainly does not want to eat his vegetables, and he will talk at length about how he despises vegetables, how much he hates them, how he has no desire at all to eat them, but still does. However, there is an unspoken desire at play here, viz. the desire to avoid his mother’s discipline. Due to the strength of that desire, he will still eat the vegetables, even though he doesn’t want to.

This reflects the point I made above, that we can have conflicting desires and yet always have one strongest desire.
I agree, X at T2 has been true for long time, eternally in fact, which is the point I made which you seem to have missed - X’s truth is contingent on T2. If T2 never occurs, then X is not true.
With all due respect, I didn’t miss it. Here was the argument I put forth, whether it is sound or not:
This can hold up only if the choice has already occurred or otherwise been “set in stone” such that the agent absolutely cannot do otherwise at all times approaching the time that the choice is made. It is unwarranted to say that a choice at T2 is based upon the abiding truth of a proposition that is true at T1 because of the agent’s choice at T2, for why would it be true before T2 if it were based on an event occurring at T2? That removes the “otherwiseness” of choices; they must be undetermined (i.e. not “set in stone”) at every moment prior to the actual choice.//indent]

It was a brief argument, and I made it in post #68, so it’s understandable that it might have gotten lost amidst the deluge of posts since then.
Secondly, yes, the free chooser has the absolute ability to choose between mutually exclusive options until that choice is made, whereupon one choice is actualized as true and the other as false. An infallible observer has no impact on the freedom of that choice, for the observer’s knowledge is contingent on the very act of the choice being made.
The reason knowledge is invoked in the omniscience/free will topic is actually just for the point of asserting the bivalence of propositions, and how this bivalence is already set in place prior to the person’s actions. So for now, we can skip over the observer section of the argument and go immediately to the fact that all propositions must be either true or false.

That being said, let’s take this proposition P: “Ben will choose X at time T2.” At time T1, this proposition is either true or false; for argument’s sake, we’ll say that it’s true. This means that at time T1, it is already “set in stone” that I will choose X at time T2. This implies that I have no ability to change this prior to choosing X at T2, which in turn implies that the source of causal control in my choosing X is entirely extrinsic to me.​
 
Im still having trouble figuring out what you mean by this. Can you give a real life example. I also dont understand what it has to do with my brain argument.

“Let me present the argument this way: it is clear that our actions are influenced in some degree by unchosen dispositions, motives, etc. Now, either these dispositions influence us completely or only partially. if the former is true, then determinism follows. If the latter is true, then some factor, “free choice,” must be the ultimate arbiter in a decision, and this “free choice” must itself be wholly unaffected by dispositions and motives (otherwise it would be coerced). But if it is wholly unaffected by dispositions and motives, then it follows that the ultimate arbiter of a decision is entirely arbitrary. And decisions which are entirely arbitrary do not fall under the auspices of moral discourse. Therefore, it follows that if dispositions affect our choices only partially, then morality is destroyed.”
 
With all due respect, I didn’t miss it. Here was the argument I put forth, whether it is sound or not: This can hold up only if the choice has already occurred or otherwise been “set in stone” such that the agent absolutely cannot do otherwise at all times approaching the time that the choice is made. It is unwarranted to say that a choice at T2 is based upon the abiding truth of a proposition that is true at T1 because of the agent’s choice at T2, for why would it be true before T2 if it were based on an event occurring at T2? That removes the “otherwiseness” of choices; they must be undetermined (i.e. not “set in stone”) at every moment prior to the actual choice.
It was a brief argument, and I made it in post #68, so it’s understandable that it might have gotten lost amidst the deluge of posts since then.
No, it didn’t get lost. The issue is that the proposition is true at T1 if and only if it is also true at T2 because T2 is the actual moment of the event, i.e. the moment of actualization, even if it is in the future. Truth is eternally abiding, thus what is true later was true earlier, e.g. X x 1 = X. A logical statement, when determined to be true, is true regardless of the moment. However, in the case of events in time, like the picking of a daisy, the fall of a feather, etc., any logical statement regarding the event is necessarily coupled to the precise moment of the event. If [X = S picks daisy A at T2] is true, it is true even at T1, but the statement [X = S picks daisy A at T1] is also necessarily false (unless S can pick the daisy twice). The abiding truth of X is contingent upon T2. If one were simply to say X is true where [X = S picks daisy A], leaving off the moment of incident, the statement lacks completeness, for the event must occur at some time T; and until T2, the truth of X remains un-actualized.
“Set in stone” is a bad analogy for events because it ignores time. A marble rolling down a ramp will pass elevation E at time Z, but if time Z never comes to pass or the ramp or marble are somehow changed, the event may not actually take place or may occur at a different time, making the statement false.
The reason knowledge is invoked in the omniscience/free will topic is actually just for the point of asserting the bivalence of propositions, and how this bivalence is already set in place prior to the person’s actions. So for now, we can skip over the observer section of the argument and go immediately to the fact that all propositions must be either true or false.
That being said, let’s take this proposition P: “Ben will choose X at time T2.” At time T1, this proposition is either true or false; for argument’s sake, we’ll say that it’s true. This means that at time T1, it is already “set in stone” that I will choose X at time T2. This implies that I have no ability to change this prior to choosing X at T2, which in turn implies that the source of causal control in my choosing X is entirely extrinsic to me.
Causal control is only extrinsic to you if you are not free at T2, but you are. It is already “set in stone” only means that someone knows that you do make that choice (in the present tense) at a future time. Your proposition is future tense, “will choose”, and is not true at any moment after T2 because of the tense. The correct logical proposition is “Ben chooses X at T2” - see how this is contingent on the moment T2? Nothing about the proposition removes causal control from the actor.
 
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